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4.    Management accounting  tools in 
banks: are banks without budgets 
more profitable? 
 
Trond Bjørnenak 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The book  Relevance Lost: The Rise and Fall of Management  Accounting, 
which was published  more  than  20 years ago,  introduced a debate  and 
sparked  academic interest in new forms of management accounting,  new 
management control  ideas and potential  solutions  (Johnson  and Kaplan, 
1987). The main argument was that information provided by typical 
management accounting  and control  systems came too late, and was too 
aggregated  and  distorted  by financial  reporting  to be relevant  for deci- 
sion making. Furthermore, the book suggested that these systems did not 
support  communication or the implementation of strategies. In response, 
a number of new management accounting tools were introduced, including 
activity-based  costing (ABC) systems and balanced  scorecards.  Table 4.1 
contrasts  the traditional systems (before Relevance Lost) with the modern 
solutions (after Relevance Lost). 
After the publication of Relevance Lost,  textbooks  were changed,  and 
 
Table 4.1 Changes in management accounting and control systems 
 
Dimension  “Traditional systems”  “Modern systems” 
 
Costing  Simplified full costing  Advanced ABC systems 
Cost objects  Departments and 
products 
Multi-dimensional: customer, 
markets and distribution channels 
Data  sources  Internal  Internal  and external 
Time perspectives  Ex post  Ex ante (rolling forecasts, target 
costing) 
Performance 
measures 
Financials  Combinations of financials and 
non-financials, e.g., balanced 
scorecards 
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 Managing in dynamic business environments 
 
the new concepts  and  tools  were given significant  attention. More  than 
50 percent  of the concepts  listed in the 1982 edition  of Horngren’s  Cost 
Accounting: A Managerial Emphasis (Horngren and  Foster,  1982) were 
not included in the 2005 edition (Horngren, Foster  and Datar, 2005) and 
vice versa.  A dominant share  of these changes  related  to  concepts  and 
tools discussed in the Relevance Lost debate, such as activity-based costing 
and balanced scorecards (Ax and Bjørnenak, 2007). 
In the past  decade,  a new debate  has emerged.  This time, the move- 
ment,  which is known  as “Beyond  Budgeting,”  is driven  by a group  of 
practitioners and consultants. Beyond Budgeting is a practice-defined 
concept that has taken many different forms. However, all instances of 
Beyond Budgeting have a common platform in that they serve as a critique 
of budgets.  One of the pioneers in this movement  was the Swedish bank 
Svenska Handelsbanken, which abandoned budgets as early as the 1970s. 
These  two  critical  movements   in  management  accounting   practice 
and research motivated  this study. This study is informed  by the success 
of Handelsbanken. Although other Scandinavian banks have followed 
Handelsbanken’s example, the use of budgets  in the Norwegian  banking 
sector has not previously been investigated.  In this regard, we identify the 
number  of banks  that  do not  rely on budgets  and  the characteristics  of 
these banks, and we investigate how budgets are used and found useful in 
other  banks.  We also address  the use of other  tools in the industry  with 
the purpose of understanding which tools are used and the extent to which 
they  are  found  useful.  Finally,  we explore  the  association  between  the 
tools used and various measures of performance effects. 
The chapter  is organized  as follows. First,  the Handelsbanken case is 
presented. Second, the research method and variables are discussed. The 
findings from the survey study are then presented, while finally limitations 
and ideas for future research are discussed. 
 
 
SVENSKA  HANDELSBANKEN – A SUCCESSFUL 
BANK WITHOUT BUDGETS 
 
In 1970, Jan Wallander  took over as CEO of Sweden’s Svenska 
Handelsbanken (hereafter  Handelsbanken). One of his first moves was 
to  abandon budgeting  (Wallander,   1994, 1999). The  decision  did  not 
receive much attention until the 1990s when Wallander published the book 
Budgeten: Ett onödigt ont [Budgets – an unnecessary evil] (1994). The book 
was written in Swedish, but a shorter  version was published  in English in 
the Scandinavian Journal of Management in 1999 (Wallander,  1999). This 
case has since been cited in a number  of books  and  articles as a classic 
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case of Beyond Budgeting, and Wallander  is often described as a Beyond 
Budgeting pioneer (Hope and Fraser,  2003a, 2003b; Lindsay  and Libby, 
2007; Bogsnes, 2009). 
Wallander’s inspiration for abandoning budgets arose from his years as 
a professional  economist.  Prior to coming to Handelsbanken, he worked 
at  a  research  institute  specialized  in providing  long-term  forecasts  for 
different  variables  (e.g.,  demand  for  electronics).  These  forecasts  were 
based on historical  trends,  and  breaks  in the curves could not  normally 
be foreseen. He saw this as one of the main problem with budgets, as they 
prevented management from identifying the important issues that made a 
difference. 
The  alternative  outlined  by Wallander  was to  keep the  management 
control system simple: 
 
It is evident that  the kind  of information I am talking  about  are the figures 
that  to a large extent you already have or should have in your profit  and loss 
account  and balance sheet and your ordinary information systems. What  you 
have to do is to organize  and  construct  them in such a way that  they fit the 
demand. (Wallander,  1999: 413) 
 
Handelsbanken’s solution  was to focus on relative financial performance 
(benchmarking branches  on costs, profit and losses) and a profit-sharing 
bonus  plan (see Lindsay  and  Libby,  2007, for more details).  The simple 
system was not kept secret in any way. The bank did not implement  bal- 
anced scorecards, rolling forecasts or advanced activity-based costing 
systems.  Nevertheless,   Handelsbanken  has  continually   outperformed 
other  Scandinavian banks.  The  bank  has  reported  an  ROE  above  the 
industry  average for almost  every year since 1972, while its total  annual 
shareholder return  has been more than  20 percent over the same period. 
The  most  obvious  profit  driver  has  been cost-efficiency, with  the  cost/ 
income ratio  at approximately 45 percent  (the industry  average is above 
60 percent). 
The existence of a high-performing bank without budgets in which 
“modern” advanced  management accounting  tools  are  not  used  moti- 
vated this study of Norwegian  banks for several reasons. First,  although 
Handelsbanken is Swedish, it is one of the largest banks in Norway,  and 
its success and its control  system are well known in the industry.  Second, 
some Norwegian  banks have followed Handelsbanken in abandoning 
budgets  (see bbrt.org). Third,  the high number  of different banks  within 
the  Norwegian   banking  industry,   all  generally  operating in  the  same 
market,  may give us interesting  insights into the use of different tools in 
management control systems. 
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THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 
The study started with an investigation of the control system in 
Handelsbanken, which is described in detail in different books and articles 
(Wallander  1994, 1999; Lindsay and Libby, 2007). In addition, one of 
Handelsbanken’s larger branch  offices was visited and its managers  were 
interviewed. Two Norwegian banks were also visited in order to collect 
background information. 
The survey was then sent to 118 of the largest Norwegian  banks.  The 
largest Norwegian  bank (DnB) was excluded because it works under dif- 
ferent (more international) conditions, while the other banks mainly focus 
on the domestic market.  Foreign  banks active in the Norwegian  market, 
such as Handelsbanken, were not included. 
The  Norwegian   economy   has  experienced  stable  growth   in  recent 
decades, mainly driven by the booming oil industry. Although Norwegian 
banks were affected by the financial meltdown in 2008, all of the banks in 
the dataset  showed a surplus  in 2010 and 2011, and losses on bad loans 
were rather  low in the  period  of investigation  (2009–11). None  of the 
banks included in the initial sample had problems fulfilling the capital 
requirement  set by the financial supervisory authority (Basel II). Thus, all 
of the targeted  banks were profitable  and solid and faced relatively stable 
market conditions  during the period of investigation. 
Data  were collected on three issues: 
 
1. The use and perceived usefulness of different  management accounting 
tools, including budgets, benchmarking, activity-based costing, balanced 
scorecards,  rolling  forecasts  and  customer  profitability  accounting. 
These were identified  as the most important tools in the two banks 
analyzed  in the  pre-study.  Respondents were asked  to  indicate  the 
extent to which they used different tools using a five-point Likert scale 
(1 5 “not at all,” 5 5 “to a very large extent”) and the extent to which 
they found the tool useful (1 5 “useful only to a very limited extent,” 
5 5 “very useful”). 
2. The  degree to which respondents agreed with 18 different  statements 
dealing with budgeting critiques. This was measured  on a five-point 
Likert  scale (1 5 “totally  disagree,”  5 5 “totally  agree”). The state- 
ments were consistently  negatively loaded,  and were mainly adopted 
from Libby and Lindsay (2010) and Ekholm and Wallin (2000). 
3. Measures of performance. Three measures of success or bank perform- 
ance were used. First,  the perceived usefulness of different  manage- 
ment  accounting  tools  was included  in the questionnaire (as shown 
in 1). The other  two – the cost/income  ratio  (an important perform- 
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ance measure in Handelsbanken and used by the industry) and return 
on  equity  (used  in  the  industry)  – were  measured  using  account- 
ing data collected by the Norwegian Saving Banks Association 
(Sparebankforeningen). The data were publicly available on the asso- 
ciation’s webpage. Reliability was tested using accounting data for ten 
of the banks. The test did not identify any reliability problems. 
 
The  survey  was  undertaken in  the  spring  of  2010  and  specifically 
asked  respondents to focus on the tools  used in 2009 (Johansen,  2010). 
Performance measures were based on accounting  figures for 2009. 
In total, 81 banks returned  the questionnaire. Ten of the 37 non- 
responding banks indicated that they did not have time to complete the 
questionnaire. This gives a response rate of 69 percent, which is relatively 
high  when  compared  to  similar  studies  (e.g., Naranjo-Gil et al.,  2009; 
Libby  and  Lindsay,  2010). Each  bank’s  CFO  was asked  to  answer  the 
survey, because decisions to adopt  any of the investigated tools are often 
made by the top management team and because the CFO is a key person 
in the introduction or implementation of changes, for example the aban- 
donment  of budgets.  The focus on CFOs  is in line with other  studies of 
management practices (Young et al., 2001; Naranjo-Gil et al., 2009). We 
tested for possible non-response bias with regard to size, profitability and 
cost-efficiency, but found no significant differences. 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
This section presents the results of the survey. First, there is a description 
of the adoption rates for different tools and how different tools were used 
in combination. Second, the CFOs’ responses to different  statements  on 
potential  problems  with budgets  are presented.  Third,  the link between 
the use of different  management accounting  tools and  two performance 
measures is explored. 
 
The Use and Perceived Usefulness of Management Accounting Tools 
 
Table 4.2 shows the use and perceived usefulness of different management 
accounting  tools. 
The adoption rate  for activity-based  costing (ABC) is very low. Only 
one of the banks had fully implemented  ABC, while five others had done 
so to some degree and six had implemented it to a low degree. These adop- 
ters do not find ABC highly useful. The other tools are more common and, 
on average, seen as useful. Notably, 72 of the 81 banks used budgets. We 
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Table 4.2 Use and perceived usefulness of management accounting tools 
 
Level of use ABC BSC Benchmarking Rolling 
forecast 
Customer 
profitability 
analyses 
Did not use (1) 85% 47% 21% 17% 16% 
Low (2) 7% 11% 11% 14% 22% 
Some (3) 6% 14% 24% 35% 35% 
High (4) 0% 15% 36% 21% 26% 
Fully implemented  (5) 1% 14% 9% 14% 1% 
Usefulness 2.56 3.68 3.87 3.56 3.57 
 
Notes: 
ABC 5 activity-based  costing; BSC 5 balanced scorecard. 
N 5 81 for level of use, but only users are included in the calculation  of usefulness. 
Usefulness is an average on a Likert scale of 1–5. 
 
 
Table 4.3 Use and usefulness of budgets for different purposes 
 
Purpose Planning  Coordination   Resource 
allocation 
Motivation  Evaluation  Reward 
 
Use  3.88 3.28 3.33 3.43 3.94 2.86 
Usefulness 3.90 3.31 3.51 3.38 3.82 3.17 
 
 
Notes: 
N 5 72. 
Likert scale of 1–5. 
 
 
asked these banks  about  the use and  usefulness of budgets  for different 
purposes.  The results are show in Table 4.3. 
Budgets are commonly  used for planning  and evaluation, and they are 
seen as highly useful for these purposes.  Budgets  are less often  used in 
reward  systems, but they are also viewed as useful for this purpose.  The 
high proportion of users (89 percent of the total) and the level of perceived 
usefulness for the main purposes show that budgets hold a strong position 
in the management control systems of Norwegian  banks. 
Tools may be used in different combinations. An analysis of the correla- 
tions between the use of different tools is given in Table 4.4. 
Only a few of the tools are significantly correlated.  The use of ABC is 
correlated with the use of BSC. The uses of both tools are also significantly 
correlated  with size, that  is, larger banks are using ABC and BSC. Other 
tools are not strongly correlated with size. Thus size may be the underlying 
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Table 4.4 Correlations (Pearson) between the use of different tools 
 
 
 
ABC 
ABC  BSC Benchmarking    Budgets    Rolling forecast 
BSC ***0.333 
Benchmarking  *0.199   ***0.311 
Budgets  0.085 0.076 0.052 
RF  0.16 0.111 ***0.336 0.032 
Customer  0.038 0.053 **0.219 0.175 0.149 
profitability 
analyses 
 
 
Note:    Significance levels * p , 0.1, ** p , 0.05, *** p , 0.01. 
 
 
Table 4.5 Correlation (Pearson) between the use and usefulness of 
different tools 
 
Use Perceived usefulness 
 
ABC  BSC  Bench- 
marking 
 
Budgets    Rolling 
forecast 
 
Customer 
profitability 
analyses 
 
ABC  ***0.498 0.046 0.103 0.101 −0.089  0.029 
BSC 0.153  ***0.836 0.163 −0.019  0.048 0.158 
Benchmarking  0.055 **0.239   ***0.720 0.072 *0.206 **0.277 
Budgets  −0.017  −0.012  −0.044   ***0.682 0.053 0.15 
Rolling forecast  0.045 0.042 **0.255 0.143  ***0.767 **0.253 
Customer 
profitability 
analyses 
0.063 0.026   ***0.286 **0.248 0.072 ***0.747 
 
Note:    Significance levels * p , 0.1, ** p , 0.05, *** p , 0.01. 
 
 
factor for the correlation between ABC and BSC. Benchmarking  is corre- 
lated with many of the other tools, which may be explained by the nature 
of the benchmarking, that  is, benchmarking is typically integrated  with 
performance measures, customer analyses or forecasting. 
In order  to investigate  the link between the use and  usefulness of dif- 
ferent tools, we correlated  use with perceived usefulness. The results are 
shown in Table 4.5. 
Notably, use and usefulness are highly correlated  for all tools. In other 
words,  CFOs  seem to  perceive the  tools  used  in their  organizations as 
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useful. We also tested  for interaction effects, that  is, the use of budgets 
combined  with the use of other tools and the level of usefulness of other 
tools,  but  did  not  find  any  significant  results.  Most  significant  in this 
respect is the finding that  the use of a budget  is not  correlated  with the 
perceived usefulness of other tools. This may indicate that budgets are not 
highly integrated  with other tools. 
This study of the adoption of different tools shows that, with the excep- 
tion of ABC, the tools investigated are used by Norwegian banks and that 
the banks that use them find them useful. The use of these tools is highly 
correlated with perceived usefulness, a finding that may question the valid- 
ity of studies based on the perceived usefulness of different tools. Budgets 
are the most widely used and are believed to be very useful. This implies 
that the view held by Jan Wallander  and Handelsbanken is not generally 
accepted in the industry. 
 
The Relevance of Critiques of Budgets 
 
The previous  section showed that  budgets  play an important role in the 
control  systems of Scandinavian banks,  despite the problems  covered in 
the Beyond Budgeting  literature. In this section,  we investigate  whether 
the bank CFOs agree with some of the claims made in that  literature. In 
total, 18 different statements  were tested. We used an approach similar to 
that found in Neely et al. (2003)1 in that we looked at problems related to: 
1) the budgeting  process, 2) organizational and  individual  behavior  and 
3) strategic  focus and  value creation.  These areas are discussed in more 
detail below. 
 
Problems or weaknesses in the budgeting process 
The budgeting  process as a whole is often an endeavor  requiring  consid- 
erable amounts of time and  resources  (e.g., Neely et al., 2003) from the 
different  layers of an organization. Thus budgets  need to be developed, 
redrawn   when  needed  and  approved. After  approval,   they  are  often 
revised and different types of analyses are performed, including prognoses 
and  variance  analyses.  Top  management (e.g., the  board  of  directors) 
often requires  monthly  or quarterly  reports,  and  updates  regarding  cor- 
rective efforts when budgets are not met. The sheer number of participants 
in the budgeting  process tends to prolong  the process. Along these lines, 
in their study of US and Canadian companies,  Libby and Lindsay (2010) 
found that the budgeting process took slightly more than ten and six weeks 
(median), respectively. Similarly, Hope and Fraser  (2003a) claim that the 
budgeting  process absorbs  up to 30 percent  of management’s  time. The 
scope of the budgeting  process is also supported by Neely et al. (2003), 
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who claim that  as much  as 20 percent  of management time is spent  on 
(planning and) budgeting practices. 
Other aspects of the budgetary process have also been questioned. Most 
critical, perhaps, is the process’s reliance on underlying assumptions  about 
the  future.  Although such  assumptions  are  inevitable  given the  nature 
of budgeting,  the frequency,  reliability  and  extent  of these assumptions 
can hamper  the benefits derived from the budgeting  process. According 
to Wallander  (1994, 1999), a budget  is often no more than  an extrapola- 
tion of the past and present, as the organization finds it too difficult and 
time-consuming to analyze these assumptions  in detail. Thus,  according 
to Wallander  (1999), companies tend to make their predictions by looking 
at the past or by assuming the “same weather tomorrow as today.” 
According  to Hope  and  Fraser  (2003b), Bogsnes (2009) and  others,  this 
lessens the company’s ability to adapt  to the ever-changing business envi- 
ronment. Furthermore, although  Wallander  (1999) admits  that  forecasts 
are inevitable, he suggests that their value will ultimately rely on their 
accuracy. Such assumptions  range from general forecasts made by exter- 
nal experts (e.g., governmental bodies) on factors such as prices and wages 
to the interpretation of those forecasts in the organization and in specific 
parts of the organization (e.g., departments). Thus there is uncertainty 
related not only to the general forecasts but also to how those forecasts are 
incorporated into the different layers of the organization. 
Similarly, budgets and the assumptions  made in the budgeting  process 
have  been criticized  for  quickly  becoming  outdated (Hope  and  Fraser, 
2003b).  Libby  and  Lindsay  (2010)  investigated  this  issue  in  detail  in 
their  US survey and  found  that  65 percent  of respondents “somewhat” 
agreed  that  outdatedness was a problem,  whereas  40 percent  “agreed” 
or “strongly  agreed.”  These figures suggest that  this particular issue can 
indeed be problematic for many organizations. 
Another   critique   relates  to  the  calendar   rhythm   of  the  budgeting 
process.  Wallander  (1999) refers  to  the  budget  as a  yearly  ritual.  The 
Beyond Budgeting  literature  calls for a more dynamic  (flexible) process 
(Bogsnes, 2009) in which resources are allocated  based on ongoing  judg- 
ments, targets are adjusted  according  to changes in the environment and 
prognoses  are  updated  more  frequently  than  every 12 months.  In  this 
respect, Hope and Fraser (2003b) emphasize that decisions should be made 
on a continuous basis and not according to the calendar. Furthermore, the 
fact that  budgeting  is often  viewed as a yearly ritual  (Wallander,  1999) 
may be one reason why budgets are poor in signaling changes relevant to 
the management of organizations. Hope  and Fraser  (1999) suggest that, 
as budgets are unable to cope with the changing competitive environment, 
they lack the responsiveness  and agility needed to meet customer  needs. 
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Table 4.6 Average response to statements related to the budget process 
 
 
 
Time and assumptions 
Too much time is spent on budget-related activities (e.g., 
developing, revising, reporting, variance analysis, etc.). 
Budgets are heavily based on uncertain  assumptions  about  the 
future. 
The assumptions  on which budgets are built are quickly out of 
date/outdated. 
On flexibility and dynamics 
Budgets prevent responsiveness because they are poor in 
signaling changes in the surrounding environment. 
Budgets prevent responsiveness to changes because they are 
difficult to alter after they are approved 
Budgets prevent responsiveness to changes because it is 
difficult to get funds allocated outside the budget. 
Budgets hamper responsiveness because they mainly/heavily 
focus on achieving budget targets rather  than maximizing 
value creation 
Mean (St. dev.) 
 
 
2.74 (1.14) 
 
2.91 (1.03) 
 
2.90 (1.02) 
 
 
2.89 (0.96) 
 
2.57 (1.01) 
 
2.16 (0.93) 
 
2.83 (1.15) 
 
Notes: 
N 5 81. 
Likert scale of 1–5. 
 
 
Moreover,  Hope  and  Fraser  (1999: 18) describe the general  features  of 
the budgeting process as “such a slow, rigid and often highly ‘political’ 
process,” which “is a major handicap  in today’s fast changing competitive 
environment.” 
Based  on  the  above  critiques,  we asked  respondents to  indicate  the 
extent to which they agreed with seven different statements. The results, 
which  are  shown  in  Table  4.6,  indicate  that  these  critiques  find  little 
support  in practice.  All statements  have an average of less than  3 on the 
five-point Likert scale, and the medians were 2 or 3 for all statements. If 
we exclude the nine banks that did not use budgets, the averages were even 
lower. All banks provided responses. 
 
The influence on organizational and individual behavior 
According to Neely et al. (2003), budgets and, to some extent, the budget- 
ing process can make room for, and even encourage, dysfunctional behav- 
ior that results in actions and decision making that do not add value to the 
company  as a whole. More  specifically, Neely et al. (2003: 22) state that 
traditional budgeting  methods  “are  counterproductive in that  they  are 
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usually affected by gaming, corporate politics and horsetrading tactics.” 
Hope and Fraser (2003b) suggest that the budget serves as a “fixed- 
performance contract.” Hope  and  Fraser  (2003a: 113) take  this part  of 
the critique even further, claiming that “budgets can result in ‘earnings 
management’  or even outright  fraud.” 
Thus budgets often lack incentives that would encourage employees and 
departments to act in the best interest of the company. Instead, employees 
or departments promote  their own interests. Typical examples include 
instances  when departments, divisions or similar units protect  their own 
interests at the expense of the company,  that is, by choosing projects and 
investments that benefit the department rather  than the company,  by 
negotiating  budgetary  targets that  can easily be reached,  by overestimat- 
ing the resources  needed  to ensure  that  adequate  resources  are at their 
disposal or by using resources when such use is not necessary in order to 
ensure that the next period does not bring a cut in resources. Other exam- 
ples involve deferring revenues or expenses in order to achieve budgetary 
targets.  Many  of these issues are also valid on an individual  level. These 
problems  are often  referred  to as budgetary  gaming  (Hope  and  Fraser, 
2003b). In general, they are related to what Hope and Fraser (2003b) term 
the “budget  contract,” which contains  a number  of fallacies (see Hope 
and  Fraser,  2003b: 6–8). Interestingly,  Libby  and  Lindsay  (2010) find a 
significant negative correlation between budgetary  value and gaming, that 
is, more gaming reduces the value of the budget. 
Given the problems inherent in budgeting with regard to detecting or 
signaling business changes, some researchers claim that budgets reinforce 
vertical control,  leading to a situation  in which relevant  information on 
how to deal with emerging issues is lacking (Neely et al., 2003; Bogsnes, 
2009). Thus advocates of Beyond Budgeting suggest that making room for 
decentralized decision making makes it easier for an organization to adapt 
to changes,  which in turn  favors  organizations, as they encounter  these 
issues at an early stage. In other words, they can be proactive when dealing 
with changes, rather  than reviewing them in hindsight when it may be too 
late to respond properly. 
In relation  to dysfunctional behavior,  the existence of departmental 
budgets  and  targets  may  have  a  negative  impact  on  cooperation and 
the sharing  of knowledge  in the organization (Hope  and  Fraser,  2003b; 
Bogsnes, 2009). Information, experiences and ideas may not be commu- 
nicated throughout the organization, as departments are focused on their 
own best interests and on protecting  their advantages at the expense of the 
rest of the organization. A focus on achieving budgetary  targets may even 
provoke  elements of hostility among  different  parts  of the organization. 
This also relates to budgets lacking the incentives necessary to ensure that 
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Table 4.7 Statements  on behavioral effects of budgets 
 
 
 
Budgets hamper cooperation and knowledge sharing 
between departments owing to the heavy focus on achieving 
own budgetary  targets. 
Budgets may lead to the negotiation of targets lower than 
those actually achievable to make it easier to reach budgets. 
Budgets may lead to an overestimation of resources to ensure 
an adequate  supply of resources. 
Budgets may cause assigned funds to be spent before the end 
of one period in order to prevent reduced funding in the 
next period. 
Budgets may lead to deferring revenues and/or  costs to ensure 
that the period’s budgetary  targets are met. 
Budgets may lead to expediting costs when budgets will not 
be met. 
Mean (St. dev.) 
 
2.62 (1.03) 
 
 
3.07 (1.10) 
 
2.93 (1.05) 
 
2.23 (1.14) 
 
 
2.63 (1.05) 
 
2.40 (1.02) 
 
Notes: 
N 5 81. 
Likert scale of 1–5. 
 
the entire  organization is moving  in the same direction  and  to support 
consideration of what is best for the company as a whole. Thus the impor- 
tance of learning and knowledge sharing, and the need to attend to human 
capital and other resources are pivotal to ensure the necessary innovations 
and ideas are being applied and adapted in everyday activities. 
Six statements  based on these critiques were included in the survey. The 
results are show in Table 4.7. Consistent  with Libby and Lindsey (2010), 
we find indications  of budgetary  gaming among the banks’ responses. 
However, there is a low level of agreement with all of the other statements. 
 
Strategic coherence and value creation 
Strategic coherence, and the link between strategy and performance meas- 
ures have increased in importance and relevance in recent years. As dis- 
cussed earlier, some researchers  claim that  budgeting  has too many roles 
and purposes, and that it centers on short-term target setting and resource 
allocation.  These factors  inhibit  the budget  from being clearly linked to 
the overall  strategy  of the organization. Overall,  an  assertion  has been 
made that  budgets cannot  be aligned with strategy,  as these elements are 
prepared  in isolation  (Hope  and Fraser,  2003b). This is partially  related 
to the frequent emergence of goal conflicts, and the lack of superior goals 
or objectives that  would help to resolve such conflicts. In the presence of 
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Table 4.8 Integration of budgets in the strategic process and value 
creation 
 
Mean (St. dev.) 
 
Budgets are poorly linked to the organization’s  strategy.  2.42 (1.09) 
Budgets add little value because they focus too heavily on 
financial performance measures at the expense of other 
strategically important indicators/measures. 
Budgets add little value because they focus on cost reduction 
rather  than value creation. 
Budgets create little value because they focus on achieving 
budgets rather  than creating value. 
Budgets create little value because they focus on routines 
rather  than creative thinking and value creation. 
2.58 (0.93) 
 
 
2.51 (0.94) 
 
2.57 (1.11) 
 
2.67 (1.04) 
 
Notes: 
N 5 81. 
Likert scale of 1–5. 
 
dysfunctional behavior  and an over-reliance on financial performance 
measures, goal conflicts may escalate. As financial performance measures 
are  often  short-term by nature,  employees’ attention in the  absence  of 
a strategic  focus will tend  to be on historical  conditions  rather  than  on 
strategic, long-term thinking subject to some concrete goals and objectives 
(Hope and Fraser,  2003b; Neely et al., 2003; Bogsnes, 2009). 
Researchers  also claim that, in today’s ever-changing business environ- 
ment,  organizational cooperation and  the  importance of the  ability  to 
foster creativity and innovativeness  contrast  the bureaucratic nature  and 
formalized  routines  inherent  in budgeting  (“command and  control”;  see 
Bogsnes, 2009). Furthermore, budgets focus on costs and on variance 
analyses  rather  than  on the exploration of strategic  opportunities. This 
may result in exploitation rather  than  exploration and a failure to recog- 
nize potential  new sources of income. In total, a focus on costs may lower 
the firm’s overall value creation.  In relation  to value creation,  Hope  and 
Fraser  (1999) argue that  future  cash flows are likely to flow from intan- 
gible assets, which they claim that budgets are not designed to manage or 
control. 
The empirical  results for five statements  related  to these critiques  are 
shown in Table 4.8. The results are not very supportive  of the critiques. 
In summary,  the findings show that  the use and usefulness of budgets 
are supported by the generally low agreement  with claims found  in the 
Beyond Budgeting critique. Only one of the 18 statements  has an average 
of more than  3. However,  the proportion of “strongly  agree” (5) varies 
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from 5 to 20 percent for the different statements, which shows that  some 
CFOs have adopted  a critical view. 
 
The Link between Management Accounting Tools and Performance 
 
The success of management accounting  innovations can be measured  in 
numerous  ways. According to Cinquini and Mitchell (2005), the most 
common measure of the success of ABC is the adopter’s perceived view of 
the tool. Ittner  and Larcker  (2009) question the reliability of this measure 
and  call for  more  studies  that  link management accounting  systems to 
actual financial performance. 
In our  study,  we linked the survey data  to two different  performance 
measures: 
 
●●    Return on equity (RoE). ROE is the most commonly used measure 
of financial performance in banks.  One important weakness is that 
this measure is not risk adjusted and it does not adjust for the lever- 
age of the bank. 
●●  Cost/income ratio. This ratio is used by the bank association  for 
benchmarking.  It  is  also  one  of  the  most  important  measures 
reported  in Handelsbanken. 
 
In order  to  investigate  the  associations  between  the uses of different 
tools we use OLS regression  analyses using the performance measure  as 
the dependent  variable and different tools in use as independent  variables. 
Use is measured  on Likert scale of 1–5. Size (measured as total capital) is 
also included in the analyses. The results for RoE are shown in Table 4.9. 
We see that budgets are significantly negatively associated with per- 
formance,  while benchmarking, size and customer  profitability are posi- 
tively  associated  with  RoE.  The  coefficient  for  BSC  is  negative,  but 
not  significant.  In order  to validate  the results we asked the banks  with 
budgets  whether  there had  been any changes in the focus on budgets  in 
the  last  years.  None  of the  banks  claimed  to  have  increased  the  focus 
on  budgets  (some have  reduced  it, but  the  majority  did  not  make  any 
changes). Thus the potential  explanation of banks increasing focus on 
budgets when financial performance is low was not supported. 
Note  that  this does not prove that  there is a negative cause-and-effect 
relationship between budgets and performance. However, it indicates that 
budgets  are not  necessary for high performance. It is also interesting  to 
note that Handelsbanken is strongly using benchmarking and relative per- 
formance as a key factor in its control system. ABC, rolling forecasts, BSC 
and budgets are used only to a low degree or not at all in Handelsbanken. 
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Table 4.9 Association between ROE and different tools in use 
 
Variable R2  (adj.) 
26.90% 
P-value 
,0.001 
 Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 6.247 0.003 
Budgets −1.1033 0.021 
ABC −0.1544 0.822 
BSC −0.3703 0.258 
Benchmarking 1.2247 0.002 
Rolling forecasts 0.1095 0.766 
Customer  profitability analyses 0.8354 0.054 
Size (1000 million NOK) 0.04726 0.046 
 
Notes: 
N 5 81. 
  
OLS regression.   
 
Table 4.10 Association between tools and cost/income ratios 
 
Variable R2  (adj.) 
12.10% 
P-value 
0.02 
 Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 56.84 0.001 
Budgets 1.613 0.165 
ABC −0.397 0.813 
BSC 1.421 0.078 
Benchmarking −2.065 0.033 
Rolling forecasts 0.550 0.542 
Customer  profitability analyses −1.223 0.246 
Size (NOK 1000 million) −0.11125  0.055 
 
 
Notes: 
N 5 81. 
OLS regression. 
 
The key to Handelsbanken’s success has been its low cost/income  ratios 
(around 40 percent; see, for example, Lindsay and Libby, 2007). The results 
of the  OLS  regression  for  cost/income  ratios  are  shown  in Table  4.10. 
The model explains less of the total variation  than the RoE analysis. 
Benchmarking and size are associated with lower costs. One interpretation 
might be that benchmarking and size are positively associated with higher 
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Table 4.11 Association between performance and tools 
 
Tools  RoE  Cost/income  Usefulness 
 
 Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value (adopters) 
Benchmarking 1.17 0.004 −2.07 0.033 3.87 
Budget −1.10 0.021 1.61 0.165 3.17–3.90 
BSC −0.37 0.258 1.42 0.078 3.68 
Customer 0.84 0.054 −1.22 0.246 3.57 
Profitability 
analyses 
     
ABC 0.15 0.822 −0.40 0.813 2.56 
Rolling forecasts 0.11 0.766 0.55 0.542 3.56 
 
profitability through lower costs. The coefficient for budgets  is positive 
(higher  costs) but  not  significant.  Note  that  the  use of balanced  score- 
cards is also associated with higher costs (significant at the 0.1 level). 
In summary,  we have three indicators  of success, which are shown in 
Table  4.11. Benchmarking  is widely adopted, and  is perceived  as very 
useful by the adopters. It is positively associated with higher profitability 
and  lower costs. Budgets are the most  used tool  among  banks,  and  are 
seen as very useful for different purposes. However, budgets are negatively 
associated with RoE. Balanced scorecards are also used by a high number 
of banks and are seen as very useful. The more they are used, the greater 
the perception that they are useful. However, the tool is negatively associ- 
ated with cost-efficiency. Customer  profitability analyses are seen as very 
useful, and they are positively associated with higher RoE. For rolling 
forecasts  and  ABC, we find no significant  associations  between use and 
financial performance. Furthermore, for ABC, the adoption rate and the 
perceived usefulness are low. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This study of the adoption of different management control  tools by 
Norwegian  banks  shows the Handelsbanken model has not been widely 
copied. Only nine of the 81 responding banks did not use budgets. A simple 
test of differences between banks without budgets and banks with budgets 
showed  that  the former  had  higher  RoEs  and  lower cost/income  ratios 
than banks with budgets in all years from 2006 to 2010. Furthermore, the 
difference was significant in 2006, 2007 and 2008. Therefore,  Norwegian 
banks  without  budgets  appear  to  be more  profitable  than  banks  with 
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budgets.  However,  this  conclusion  is based  on  only  one  differentiating 
factor (budgets or no budgets). 
The study presented in this chapter includes the size of the bank and the 
use of other tools. It also includes the extent to which budgets are used and 
the use of budgets for different purposes. When we include the level of use, 
we find a significant negative relationship between the use of budgets and 
financial performance. However,  this does not serve as proof of a cause- 
and-effect relationship. The study does not control for the point at which 
a specific tool was adopted  or the time at which budgets  were removed. 
It is therefore  difficult to trace the effects of such changes. However,  the 
results show that there is not a conflict between a lack of budgets and cost- 
efficiency and profitability. 
Beyond  Budgeting   is  a  practice-defined  concept   that   takes  many 
forms.  Some companies  that  remove  budgets  replace  them  with  other 
tools, such as rolling forecasts and versions of the balanced scorecard. 
Others,   such  as  Handelsbanken,  do  not   implement   the  new,  more 
advanced  tools introduced after the publication of Relevance Lost.  The 
results of this study do not support the utility of the advanced  solutions, 
as  we do  not  find  positive  associations for  balanced   scorecards  and 
rolling forecasts. 
The  nine banks  without  budgets  differed  to  a statistically  significant 
extent with regard  to the use of two tools – benchmarking and customer 
profitability analyses – which they used to a greater degree. These tools are 
also significantly associated with higher profitability. Thus it is difficult to 
separate  the effects of removing budgets  from the effects of introducing 
benchmarking or customer profitability analyses. 
It may seem paradoxical that  budgets still are among  the most impor- 
tant  tools in banks’ control  systems – the more they use budgets, the less 
profitable  they are. This paradox  should be addressed  in future research. 
The results  of such research  may give us an indication  of how systems 
work. In order to better understand the cause-and-effect  relationships, we 
need a deeper understanding of how the different tools are used and how 
the functions are filled when budgets are removed. This requires more field 
studies of banks with and without budgets. 
 
 
NOTE 
 
1.   Neely et al. (2003) conducted  a thorough literature  review and  undertook interviews 
with representatives  of cutting-edge  or  leading  companies  to  identify  the  most  com- 
monly  cited problems  or  weaknesses  inherent  in budgeting.  Neely et al. (2003) used 
three main categories: 1) competitive strategy, 2) business process and 3) organizational 
capability. 
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 QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH IN 
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 
(QMAR) - WHY RELEVANT 
AND HOW TO IMPROVE?   
Oppdal Workshop, October 9th, 2013. 
 
Trond Bjørnenak, Norwegian School of Economics 
29.10.2013 
Trond Bjørnenak, Norwegian School of Economics 
Plan 
• Present some of my work as excellent examples of 
quantitative research 
• Some of the problems 
- Driven by data not a research problem (or management accounting) 
• But with a potential 
- To investigate some problems 
• And could be improved 
- By interaction with other researchers  
25
But what is quantitative research in MA 
(QMAR)? 
• Research that uses data that may be represented 
numerically and are of a quantity and quality to 
support empirical analysis using parametric or non-
parametric statistical methods. (Anderson and 
Widener, 2007) 
Problems: There are many examples like 
these… (BSC research) 
Davis & Albright (MAR, 2004) 
26
Or this….. (EAR, 2009) 
The data for the analysis were collected in 2000, from a survey 
sent to European companies that had recently developed a 
Balanced Scorecard. Because no ‘ready to-use’ database on BSC 
adopters existed, we identified the organisations of our sample 
through the lists of attendances to four BSC conferences for 
practitioners. 
This gave us a response rate of 14.5% for the surveyed 
organisations and 9.5% in terms of the number of questionnaires 
sent. This is close to prior response rates for similar surveys 
(Foster and Swenson, 1997). 
What is the purpose QMAR?  
• To test and build theories 
- Most of the published articles is of the testing type 
• Example: Does complexity drive costs? 
- Informed by the ABC debate in early 1990s 
- Identification of complexity drivers in different industries 
- Foster and Gupta (1990); Banker and Johnston (1993); MacArthur and 
Stranahan (1998) 
 
• And informed other interesting studies 
27
Another favorite: Diffusion studies 
• How and why do companies adopt innovations? 
 
- Exploratory and explanatory research on the diffusion of e.g. BSC 
 
- Tor-Eirik Olsen; BSC in Hospitals and higher education 
 
- Informed by theory (Abrahamson, 1999) and other diffusion theories 
 
- Followed up by interviews  
 
Why are these good examples of QMAR? 
• It is informed by theories and practice 
- Porter (1985) 
- Diffusion theory 
• It acknowledge the importance of context (industries) 
• It is of importance to practices and management 
accounting 
28
Back to the 1990s 
• What are companies doing/ NOT DOING? 
 
• If we want to give a picture of practice we need to be 
more focused 
- Industry, background, position 
• And we can develop constructs and aggregate  
Survey studies as a source of information 
• Respondents (all Norwegian) 
- 109 Executive MBAs (RR: 59%) 
- 81 Banks (CFO; RR: 69%) 
- 50 Higher education institutions / Universities (CFO; RR: 74%) 
- 37 Health entities / hospitals (CFO; RR: 71%) 
• Questionnaire (2010-2011): 
- Use and perceived usefulness of budgets and other MA tools 
- 18 statement on budget problems (adopted from Ekholm and Wallin, Libby 
and Lindsey ++). 
• Pre-tested, tested for response bias  
- respondents larger for Universities 
• Factor analysis: 18 statement into 4 factors 
- FLEXIBILITY; TIME&ASSUMPTIONS; GAMING; VALUE CREATION;  
• Follow up interviews 
- Five banks, >10 Universities and Hospital 
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Adoption rates, use and usefulness  
Norwegian Executive MBAs (2010) 
Response: 109 (RR: 59%) 
Homogeneity: Information field – but different industries 
and jobs  
4 
3,3 3,2 
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MBA Use
MBA Useful
91% 71% 87% 
28% 53% 
59% 
35% 
43% 
34% 
96% 
67% 
31% 
Adoption  
rates 
Budgets for different purpose in Universities, 
Hospitals and Banks 
  Universities (N=37; 
100%) 
Hospitals 
(N=20; 100%) 
Banks (N=72; 89%) 
  Use (usefulness) Use (usefulness) Use (usefulness) 
Planning 3.92 (4.28) 4.10 (4.20) 3.87 (3.90) 
Coordination 3.19 (3.36) 3.25 (3.45) 3.28 (3.31) 
Resource allocation 3.84 (4.37) 4.10 (4.10) 3.33 (3.51) 
Motivation  2.81 (3.00) 3.15 (2.85) 3.43 (3.38) 
Reward  2.11 (2.53) 2.05 (2.58) 2.86 (3.17) 
Performance evaluation, 
control and follow-up 
3.61 (3.57) 4.07 (3.85) 3.94 (3.82) 
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Factor analyses: Problems with budgets are 
different (CFOs) 
Factor Mean (St.dev.) 
Univers Hospitals BANKS Combined 
GAMING 2.57 (0.87) 3.03 (0.78) 2.65 (0.86) 2.68 (0.86) 
TIME & 
ASSUMPTIONS 
2.43 (0.79) 2.80 (0.90) 2.85 (0.97) 2.73 (0.93) 
VALUE CREATION 2.53 (0.99) 2.73 (1.02) 2.58 (0.92) 2.59 (0.95) 
FLEXIBILITY 2.78 (1.09) 3.03 (1.06) 2.36 (0.88) 2.57 (0.99) 
Interesting? 
AND CFO characteristics are important: 
Gaming and Tenure (Universities) 
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What have we learned? 
• That the average picture is not very interesting 
- But budgets are still the most used and most useful tool 
- ABC and ABM is not 
- Information field has an effect 
• Differences are more interesting 
- Differences in adoptions 
• Industry and CFO characteristics 
- Differences in perceived problems 
• Information field 
• CFO characteristics 
• Industry (not only public sector / private sector)  
 
What does it mean to be useful /successful?  
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What is meant by MAI success? 
• Success equals participants’ view of it 
 
•   Conditions indicative of MAI success 
 
•   Success equals the continuing existence of the MAI 
 
•   Success equals the meeting of objectives 
 
•   Success equals improvement on existing information 
 
•   Success as evidenced by the organizational use of the MAI 
 
•   Success equals change in decision-making 
 
•   Success equals financial benefit 
 
 
Success equals participants’ view of it? 
• Personal opinions of individuals based on their impressions formed through contacts with MAIs 
 
• Results are taken as being indicative of the success levels in the operations of the MAI 
 
Example (Kennedy & Affleck-Graves (2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
Example (Foster & Swenson, 1997) 
How successful do your supervisors/team leaders regard your ABCM efforts? 
How successful do your department managers regard your ABCM efforts? 
How successful do your line personnel regard your ABCM efforts? 
 
1=Complete failure   2=Unproven   3=Moderately successful   4=Very successful   5=Extremely successful 
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But then we are measuring what they are 
doing? (Norwegian banks) 
N=81 Percieved Usefulness         
USE ABC BSC Benchmarking Budgets 
Rolling 
forecasts 
Customer 
profitability 
ABC ***0,498 0,046 0,103 0,101 -0,089 0,029 
BSC 0,153 ***0,836 0,163 -0,019 0,048 0,158 
Benchmarking 0,055 **0,239 ***0,720 0,072 *0,206 **0,277 
Budgets -0,017 -0,012 -0,044 ***0,682 0,053 0,150 
Rolling forecasts 0,045 0,042 **0,255 0,143 ***0,767 **0,253 
Customer 
profitability 0,063 0,026 ***0,286 **0,248 0,072 ***0,747 
Using different measures (Ittner, Larcker and 
Randall, 2003)    
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How to improve this type of research 
• The purpose: Not to find a statistical significant 
coefficient, but to give a level of understanding to 
correlations 
• Combining measures most contribute to our 
understanding, not be driven by available data 
• We need a deep understanding of the companies we 
are studying 
- Why I should study banks, hospitals and universities 
- Why we should be careful to give (some) PhD students a dataset 
An example: Understanding the effects of 
tools in Norwegian Banks 
• A case study of Handelsbanken 
• 10 year of working with a Norwegian bank (4 years as 
the chairman)  
• Quantitative study (correlations) 
• Following up with presentations of finding and open 
discussions  
• Improved understanding of WHY 
• Improved discussions in the banks 
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Associations between use and performance 
(Return on Equity) - OLS regression  
Number of observations Adj R2 P-Value   
81 26,90 % 0,000 *** 
Variable Coefficients  P-Value   
Intercept 6,247 0,003   
Budgets -1,1033 0,021 ** 
ABC -0,1544 0,822   
BSC -0,3703 0,258   
Benchmarking 1,2247 0,002 *** 
Rolling forecasts  0,1095 0,766   
Customer profitability 0,8354 0,054 * 
Size   0,04726 0,046 ** 
Summing up different measures in Banks  
  ROE Cost/Income 
Usefulnes 
(adopters) 
  Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value   
Benchmarking 1,17 0,004 -2,07 0,033 3,87 
Budget (Yes/no) -2,25 0,134 2,11 0,559 3,1-3,9 
Budget (1-5) -1,10 0,021 1,61 0,165 3,1-3,9 
BSC -0,37 0,258 1,42 0,078 3,68 
CP  0,84 0,054 -1,22 0,246 3,57 
ABC -0,15 0,822 -0,40 0,813 2,56 
RF 0,11 0,766 0,55 0,542 3,56 
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Example 2: Customer profitability 
• Øyvind Helgesen, experienced CFO 
- We do not understand our costumers profitability 
1. Knew the industry (fish exporters) and the problems they where 
facing 
2. Calculated the customer profitability 
3. Questionnaire to the top mangers 
4. Correlated with actual calculations  
Perceived profitability  
Table 1. Absolute customer accounting figures: (1) associations between managers’ perceptions
and estimated figures taken from customer accounts
Respondent No. of cases Coefficient
 1 22 0,209
 2 22 0,225
 3 22 0,615**
 4 22 0,175
 5 22 0,136
 6 22 0,222
 7 22 0,058
 8 22 0,096
 9 21 0,285
10 30 0,028
11 30 0,285
12 30 0,357*
13 31 0,135
14 31 0,351*
15 31 0,165
3 of 15 significantly  
better than random 
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They agree within companies 
Table 5. Relative customer profitability: associations concerning the perceptions of the managers
of one of the fish exporting companies
Kendall’s tau statistic Manager A Manager B Manager C Manager D Manager E
Coefficient of association:
Manager A
Manager B 0,502**
Manager C 0,502** 0,436*
Manager D 0,735** 0,645** 0,568**
Manager E 0,248 0,386 0,620** 0,497**
Significant correlation between managers within the same  
company in 9 out of 11 cases (profitability and credit ratings) 
What did we learn? 
• That management accounting may make a difference in 
performance 
• That the difference is not context free 
• We should be careful with perceived success measures  
• We should not try to find different measures of success that 
are highly correlated or use «what we have», but measures 
that can extend our understanding of the effects 
• We should use data from industries that we think we 
understand 
• We should present the results to practitioners in order to 
learn WHY 
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 Horizontal co-ordination in hospitals -  
 On the interaction between formal and informal controls 
 
Kari Nyland and Charlotte Marie Morland 
Trondheim Business School 
 
Abstract 
In complex organizations managers need a wide perspective on management control, and the interplay 
between formal and informal processes has for a long time been recognized as important for managers to 
understand. In this paper we want to contribute to the understanding of how different controls interact in 
complex, professional organizations. The issue is studied through a case study of  the coordination of 
services from the anesthesia department (AN) and orthopedic surgery (OS) in a large university hospital in 
Norway,  two departments that are hierarchically separated but mutually dependent. We put forward the 
following research question: How can different controls contribute to the coordination of medical services 
across two clinical departments treating the same patients? The formal, vertical control mechanisms seem 
to create challenges for horizontal coordination. However, interaction with informal mechanisms enables 
loose control and operational flexibility.  This is characterized by the legitimization of social controls and the 
significant amount of trust between actors at different levels in the hierarchy. The study shows close links 
between mechanisms, suggesting that different sources of influence should be studied in context. We also 
discuss the relationship between the different sources' influence and the nature of the activity to be 
controlled. This indicates that the understanding of how different mechanisms interact depends on the 
nature of the activity and should not be regarded as generic. 
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Introduction 
 
Norwegian hospitals have during the last ten years gone through several “New Public Management” 
inspired reforms to increase efficiency and to make managers accountable for the use of resources . 
The underlying aim for these reforms has been to formalize vertical coordination and control, which 
have made hospital units more specialized and hierarchically organized. Management control 
systems have been designed to increase transparency and accountability between managers at 
different levels, however a resent study shows that horizontal mechanisms are not well implemented 
in Norwegian hospitals (Pettersen and Solstad, 2013). 
The vertical focus has influenced the ability for different units to collaborate and coordinate activity 
on a horizontal level by creating the need for separate management control systems (Kraus & 
Lindholm 2010). One such formal mechanism is activity based financing, which is implemented in 
departments with a suitable, measureable activity. The financing system is creating strong incentives 
to increase activity in some medical functions at the hospital, while other functions are still funded 
by fixed grants, facing quite different incentives. This obviously creates significant control 
challenges since the creation of value occurs in the composition of medical services from various 
functions in the hospital. Thus, the need for coordination is significant, while the formal framework 
is challenging.  
In complex organizations managers need a wider perspective on management control. An alternative 
is to rely on the professionals and their expertice and experience to get the job done in a best possible 
way. The interplay between formal and informal prosesses which operate within organizations, has 
for a long time been recognized as important for managers to understand (Hopwood, 1976). 
Nevertheless, this is still an unexplored area. Several studies in management accounting and control 
point to a gap in the literature to describe how formal and informal coordination mechanism interact 
in both vertical and horizontal control systems (Malmi & Brown, 2008, Sandelin 2008, Albernethy 
and Stoelwinder 1995, van der Meer-Koistra and Vosselman 2000, van der Meer-Koistra and 
Scapens 2008 to mention a few). 
In this paper we want to contribute to the understanding of how different controls interact in complex, 
professional organizations. We have chosen to study this issue through a case study in a hospital 
consisting of several parallel hierarchies where the creation of value depends on how well various 
specialties are able to cooperate in the treatment of patients. We study the coordination of activities 
between two departments that are highly interdependent since their services must be performed at the 
same place, at the same time, an on the same patient; the cooperation between the anesthesia 
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department (AN) and orthopedic surgery (OS). The formal basis for coordination is, however, 
demanding. The departments belong to different clinics (hierarchies) located in separate buildings 
within the hospital area, and they are funded in different ways. AN is a medical service department 
financed through a fixed budget, while OS is facing a flexible, activity based budget. Thus, the 
departments are facing different incentives  regarding  the determination of level of activity. We put 
forward the following research question: How can different controls contribute to the coordination of 
medical services across two clinical departments treating the same patients? To be able to study the 
influence of the professions as well as formal controls, we focus our study at the operational level in 
the departments. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, a theoretical framework is given, focusing at different forms 
of control, formal and informal control mechanisms and the interaction between these. Then the 
context is described, and different sources of influence and the use of control mechanisms in 
coordinating medical services at two departments (AN and OS) are discussed. The discussion will be 
summarized by outlining some empirical findings. Last, some concluding reflections are offered to 
contribute to our understanding on how activities are coordinated at an operational level in a hospital. 
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Theoretical perspective 
 
The control system can be seen as an instrument to draw boundaries to surround people in the 
organization, to encourage, enable and sometimes force managers and employees to perform in the 
interest of the organization.  The literature points to a variety of forms of control and control 
mechanisms that can be used for this purpose.  
Management control systems have traditionally been designed to increase transparency and 
accountability between managers at different levels within the organization. In our case, the two local 
hierarchies in the hospital are controlled by one common top management. Nevertheless, the 
hierarchies represent autonomous entities facing quite conflicting incentives. The success of the 
hospital depends on how well different functions are able to coordinate their activities. Such a setting 
makes the literature on inter-organizational control relevant. We will look into what this literature 
suggests about the design of a control system to also draw boundaries around the collaboration 
between two (more or less) independent organizations.   
 
Different forms of control and control mechanisms 
The traditional perspective is to define management control based on the assumption that someone 
(different levels of managers) is seeking to control the behavior of others (employees).  Ouchi (1979) 
identifies three different forms of control; outcome control, behavior control and clan control.  Which 
form is most efficient depends on knowledge of the transformation process and the ability to measure 
output.  Ouchi (1979) also describes three different groups of coordination mechanisms: market-, 
hierarchy- and clan mechanisms. These are rare in pure form, but traditionally work in combination 
with each other.  
The market as a coordination mechanism is mainly described in terms of coordinating transactions 
between autonomous units acting in a market. In such settings, price will be the principal carrier of 
information and coordinate the scope of transactions. Within a public hospital, the conditions will be 
different as no markets exists for services. An approach to ta market mechanism may be the use of 
transfer pricing. When a market does not exist, the literature recommends cost-based transfer prices to 
help regulate the scope of delivery between different units by contributing to goal congruence and 
help sharing the value created between the units to provide a basis for evaluation (Horngren et al. 
2012, Merchand & Van der Stede 2007).  
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The hierarchy is based on rules and standards that participants in an organization must relate to. 
Drawing on Malmi and Brown (2008) this may be mechanisms such as planning, cybernetic controls, 
reward and compensation mechanisms and different administrative controls. These control elements 
may then be based on the desired outcome (outcome control) or on desired behavior (behavioral 
control).  
Control mechanisms of the market or bureaucratic variety may fit well in stable manufacturing 
industries were output is measurable, and the causal relationships between effort and performance are 
well known. In hospitals, it is a familiar dilemma that output and especially the quality of the output is 
difficult to measure. In such organizations dominated by professionals performing complex tasks,  
hierarchical controls may be poorly suited. An alternative may be to trust the professionals  to make 
decissions based on their expertice and experience. 
“Organizations in public sector, in service industries, and in fast-growing technologies may 
not fit these specifications and perhaps should have cultural or clan forms of control instead” 
(Ouchi, 1979, p 845) 
Cultural controls is another concept that covers mechanisms like clans, values and symbols (Malmi 
and Brown, 2008), also termed as informal,  social control mechanisms (Ouchi 1979,  Cäker 2008). 
While hierarchical mechanisms are associated with formal rules and norms, social control 
mechanisms are often associated with trust; managers trust individuals to take responsibility to carry 
out tasks assigned to them (Ouchi 1979). In terms of management information this implies that 
managers have confidence that individuals will seek the information they need. What kind of 
information this is, will depend on the situation and may vary over time and between different 
decisions. The need for information thus requires flexibility and adaptability, and individuals may 
collect information also outside the formal control system (Jonsson and Grønlund 1988). 
Hopwood (1974) assumes a slightly different perspective on control when he discusses three different 
influences on behavior; managers, groups within or even outside the organization, and individual 
values and characteristics. These sources of influence is described as administrative control 
(managers), social control (groups) and self-control (individual). The control process may be 
described as an ongoing competition for influence from these three sources.  
Thus, coordination and control may be described from two different perspectives, based on 
characteristics of the mechanism used or on who is influencing behaviour. The term “clan control” 
may according to Ouchi (1979) imply that a manager (for various reasons) trust individuals to take 
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responsibility to carry out the tasks assigned to them eg. based on their professional norms or other 
norms developed within the group.  Drawing on Hopwood (1974) this may be based on “social 
control”  indicating that one or different groups influence the behavior of the staff.  In the following, 
we  identify how managers, different groups and individual values and skills influence the  
coordination of activity between functions in a hospital. By doing this, we also identify different 
control mechanisms in use.  
 
The interaction between different forms of control 
From a management control perspective, it is important to understand the interaction between 
different  sources of influence and how managers may control the impact of the other forms of 
control. It is usually assumed that social-and self-controls may support the bureaucratic forms of 
controls, and that training and socialization processes may help balancing individual and 
organizational goals and values (Ouchi 1979). Thus the various forms of control may be seen as 
complementary. Managers may seek to influence the development of norms and values within 
professional groups or restrict employees' decision space through the use of hierarchical controls. 
However, sometimes group- or individual values may be quite different from those persued by the 
organization, and an important question is what happens when people are influenced by different 
forms of control simultaneously.  
 Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1995) study the conflict that occurs when strong professional groups 
(doctors and nurses) who are trained to perform complex tasks and whose behviour is primarily 
controlled  through social and self-control mechanisms, are faced with bureaucratic mechanisms that 
restrict their autonomy. They find that professionals who feel that they are limited by output controls 
(eg strict budgetary control), are experiencing higher level of role conflict and achieve lower job 
satisfaction and performance. They conclude that 
“Not only will these controls (output control) not operate effectively, they are likely to  have adverse 
individual and organizational effects” (Albernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995, p 13) 
They did not find the corresponding relationship between professions and behavior control. This is 
explained by the fact that behavioral control is performed by persons within the same professional 
expertice, and thus considered an acceptable means of control.  
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Horizontal coordination  
Traditionally  management control systems in hospitals have been criticized for being too vertically 
oriented (Otley 1994, Cäker 2008, Cäker and Siverbo 2011). Hierarchal management processes such 
as the strategy process, budget process, performance measurement, reporting and evaluation have 
been directed along the lines of responsibility in functionally oriented organizations, focusing on the 
internal efficiency within separate functions. Systems to support coordination between functions have 
been less developed (Pettersen and Solstad, 2013).  
The concept of horizontal control means that there are several interests to be taken into account, and 
the challenge is to achieve a balance of interests and power. There is an extensive literature that 
studies the horizontal control between organizations, such as the relationship between manufacturers 
and their suppliers (see Cäker (2008) for an overview). According to van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Scapes (2008) findings from this literature may also be relevant for understanding the relationship 
between departments within an organization. 
While it was previously assumed that coordination between organizations primarily was based on 
formal mechanisms like transactional contracts, Cäker (2008) finds that informal mechanisms and 
trust may also be important in these settings. Trust may create the necessary flexibility in a 
relationship that is essentially characterized by strict bureaucratic control. Informal mechanisms may 
be especially important at the operational level, due to high complexity.Trust may originate from prior 
experiences and shared norms and values. Earlier studies show that professionals within health 
organizations have a common loyalty towards the patient and not necessarily to their employing 
organization (Albernethy, 1996).  On a more general basis, Håkanson and Lind (2004) suggest  that 
frequent interaction between groups  may drive the development of shared norms and values and thus 
facilitate cooperation across organizational boundaries. They suggest that both informal and formal 
interaction such as the development of joint plans and systems, may contribute to the adaptation of 
common goals and accountabilities.  Regular contact contributes to the development of a common 
culture, and through the establishment of venues for joint problem solving, units may develop 
common knowledge and make decisions that contribute to common goal achievement -  even if they 
do not belong to the same organization. 
Horizontal relations at operational level are generally characterized by high mutual dependence, often 
high complexity and continuous changes. In such a context, it is impossible to design a formal control 
system that addresses all possible challenges. When senior managers do not possess the necessary 
operational knowledge, their subordinates will be expected to control their own lateral relationships. 
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In such situations it is important that managers facilitate and support control by creating a decision 
space that enable decisions at operational level (van der Meer-Kooistra and Scapes 2008).  
At the operational level, many individuals may be involved. To understand the coordination 
mechanisms within this perspective, it is necessary to study these actors and the relationships between 
them through rich case descriptions.  
 
Her trenger vi en tabell evt figure som virser hvordan vi vil gå videre med disse 
dimensjonene/kategoriene av controls I casestudien. Evt. En presisering av forskningsspørsmålet på 
bakgrunn av våre teoretiske perspektiv;  
Research question: 
How may different controls contribute to coordinate services …? 
a) Describe the different controls in action… 
b) How do different controls interact? 
c) How do managers, groups and individual values influence…? 
 
 
 
Method 
 
The first introduction to the challenges for coordination between the AN and the OS was based on an 
inquiry by a leader at a clinic level at the AN.  This inquiry motivated the first step of data collection 
which was conducted by a master student at Trondheim Business School (Hovland 2012) in close 
cooperation with one of the co-author of this paper. After a thorough review of the data conducted by 
Hovland (2012), we saw the empirical story in the data was connected to the use of formal and 
informal coordination mechanism. The literature gave us new insight in the problematic the 
departments was facing, and helped us aim the study. Based on the limitations of prior knowledge to 
the subject investigated in this paper, we conducted a research design that makes it possible to utilize 
knowledge as it is obtained, so that important factors are not overlooked. A research method that 
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enables this is a case study using interviews (Yin, 1994). Case study as a research method to study 
management control systems has been inquired in empirical accounting research, primarily because 
of the importance of capturing the organizational context (see eg Kaplan 1986). Going into the 
organization's natural surroundings provides richer access to data compared to other scientific 
methods: 
"More and more we feel the need to be on site, and to be there long enough to be Able to 
understand what is going on. (...) For while systematic data create the foundation for our 
theories, it is the anecdotal data that enable us to do the (theory) building "(Mintzberg, 1979, 
p 587) 
Our study was conducted in two steps. The first step was completed in spring 2012 where the focus 
was on coordination at a hospital/clinic level. Interviews were conducted with the CEO and different 
clinic manager. This gave insight into the formal organizing of the hospital. Documents were also 
used to draw the formal chart of the organization of the hospital. Interviews were also made at an 
operational level, mostly about the effect and challenges the differences in the financial system was 
creating. Both of the authors have years with experience in doing hospital research and had good 
insight into the formal organization of the hospital. A total of 11 interviews were conducted in this 
phase (see table 3). Based on the findings from this part, we went ahead and studied coordination at 
the operational level. It was conducted five in depth interviews with formal decision makers at an 
operational level (see Table 3). Since the formal decision makers at an operational level is relatively 
few (operational level consisting of managers and section managers at two departments), the number 
of respondents in this part of the study is relatively few.  
Table 3 describes an overview of the interviews conducted in this study. The interview of the 
clinic manager 3 is from a previous data collection, which were included in this study as the 
interview contained information about management contract.   
Date Function Pages Time 
First step data collection:   
21.03.2012 CFO 4  
21.03.2012 Constituted leader for doctors in AN 5  
21.03.2012 Clinic manager orthopedic clinic and leader of the OS  7,5  
22.03.2012 CEO 3  
26.03.2012 Controller orthopedic clinic  5  
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26.03.2012 Department manager doctors at AN  5,5  
30.03.2012 Medical leader of the orthopedic clinic  5,5  
11.04.2012 Controller anesthesia clinic  6,5  
11.04.2012 Clinic manager anesthesia clinic 13  
17.04.2012 Department manager nurses OS  6,5  
17.04.2012 Department manager Emergency surgery rooms  6  
  
Interview about management contract:  
18.04.12 Clinic manager 3 18** 01:39:00 
  
Second step data collection:  
12.12.2012 Department manager Emergency surgery rooms  14** 01:09:37 
18.12.2012 Department manager nurses AN  15** 00:57:37 
20.12.2012 Section manager nurses AN on OS 16**  01:24:11 
02.01.2013 Department manager nurses OS  12** 00:55:33 
02.01.2013 Section leader nurses OS 11,5** 00:43:35 
 
 
In total  154 06:49:33* 
Table 3   Data collection                                            
  *The time for the interviews conducted in step 1 is not included                                                                                                    
   ** The interviews from step 1 are transcribed in another format  
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Case description 
The formal structure of the hospital has evolved during the last ten years due to reform ideas 
describing hospitals as effective, autonomous and transparent entities. The hospital structure was 
previously centered on clinics and divisions all localized together in one building. In 2003, the 
director changed the formal organization of the hospital. A new clinic structure was established, 
organizing medical specialties into separate clinics to strengthen the lines of accountability (see 
figure 1). A total of 19 hospital clinics and divisions were organized as autonomous entities with 
finance, human resources and professional responsibility to ensure vertical coordination and control. 
Professionals within the same medical field were gathering together in clinics under a clinic manager 
as showed in table 2.  
           
     
 
The board
 
 
CEO
 
( CEO, leaders of the 19 clinics and divisions and staff directors )
Staff directors
Administration
Medical 
Coordinated health care
Finance
Organization
Communications
Head of nurses/
Head of doctors
Section leaders
Head of department
Emergency surgery / Ortopdic 
surgery
17 other clinics 
and divisions
Clinic 
of Anaesthesia
Clinic manager
Clinic
of Orthopaedy               
Clinic manager
Executive board
Operational 
level
Clinic level
Hospital level
 
Table 2   Formal organization to ensure hierarchical control 
The focus in our case study is the coordination of activity between the department of anesthesia and 
department of orthopedic. Two departments those are separated hierarchically, but mutually 
dependent: 
 
Department of anesthesia (AN) 
Clinic of anesthesia and emergency medicine were organized in one clinic in 2005 to strengthen the 
research community in anesthesia and facilitate efficient utilization of capacity within this 
service. The clinic provides services to other clinics that include anesthesia during surgery, ventilator 
assistance, pain management and intensive care nursing. All units at the hospital that performs 
operations rely on anesthesia services. This means that the anesthesia clinic provides service to many 
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clinics and departments located in different centers. The department of orthopedic surgery is one of 
the main users of the anesthesia services. 
Clinic of anesthesia and emergency medicine consists of several departments. The focus in our 
analysis is centered to the anesthesia department (AN). The department is organized into two units 
(doctors and nurses). Each unit has a manager, and the manager has a section manager that operates 
as a coordinator. The department managers report directly to the clinic manager who is also 
responsible for several other departments e.g. intensive and ambulance. The section managers do not 
hold any financial responsibilities.  
 
Department of orthopedic surgery (OS) 
OS operates acute injuries and performs most types of surgery in the field of orthopedics. The 
department belongs to the clinic for orthopedics, rheumatology and skin diseases and is located in the 
Motion Centre, which is the building next to the emergency center where the clinic of anesthesia is 
located. The clinic of orthopedic, rheumatology and skin diseases is divided into 7 departments, 
including the department of orthopedic surgery 
OS operates eight operating theaters. Orthopedic surgeons and nurses and anesthesia doctors and 
nurses work closely together at these operation theaters. If one of the professions is missing, the 
theater is closed, and the patient cannot be operated. The quality of the surgery depends on close 
cooperation between both orthopedic and anesthesia professionals. In the operating theater planned 
(elective) surgeries is the main activity. These are patients that are signed up for a surgery, often 
planned several months in advance. The operating theaters are basically open between 0730 and 
1530. The capacity of the room is planned to be fully booked every day, but it happens quite often 
that there are delays. It must then be decided whether a surgery should be delayed to another day, or 
whether to use overtime to see the patient through surgery that day.  
 
Different financial incentive systems  
To increase the autonomy of the clinics, the activity-based funding model is implemented within the 
hospital. However, this model applies only to those clinics that have their own patients and where the 
activity can be measured using the DRG system. This is the case for the orthopedic clinic. For 
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service clinics, that support the treatment of patients belonging to other clinics, measuring the level 
of activity is more difficult. Thus, service clinics, like the anesthesia clinic, are financed through a 
fixed budget.  
The use of formal and informal mechanism to coordinate activities across departments 
According to many broad definitions of control mechanism, coordination and control can be 
highlighted from several different perspectives (culture, budgets, steering goals etc.) meaning there 
are several different mechanisms that influence control in a complex organization as a hospital. Due 
to our research question, we have chosen to shed light on what we see as central mechanisms in 
coordinating activity between the two departments.  We will give a short presentation of these, and 
how they are used together in coordinating the daily activity.  
 
Vertical coordination and control  
To strengthen vertical information between the management and the clinics, the CEO and the clinic 
manager make every year a written contract that includes a budget for the clinic. The clinic manager 
reports to the CEO on achievements of the contract once a year. Despite the good intentions within 
the contract to ensure communication and control between CEO and clinic managers, the contract 
does not seem to fulfill its intentions: 
"What happens is that I get the contract from the department of Human Resources, based on 
last year contract. We then have to convert the DRG points to match this year predictions. We 
also include new things. The contract is more like an intention. Let's say that I fail to fulfill 
any of these requirements. It has to go very far for this to have any consequences for my job. 
"(clinic manager 3) 
The contract may be seen more as a common formality than a practical insurance for operational 
activity. One reason can be that the budget itself has a poor legitimacy when it comes to facilitate an 
accurate operational activity.  
"When you open the budget and see that you do not have enough to cover the cost of the 
staff, and the finance department says ‘go anyway’. On the first of January, five minutes past 
midnight. Then we know that the budget is going to be exceeded. It is not difficult to 
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understand that this is going to be negative even without us doing anything. This means we 
have been under-budgeted. "(Department manager nurses AN)  
The budget and the financial systems are perceived as unfair by different managers at several levels 
in the hospital. The OS wants to increase their activity, but depends on AN services to be able to 
provide more surgeries. The differences in the finance system between the two clinics and the 
challenges it creates, keeps coming up in interviews with clinic managers at the two clinics. When 
AN says that they cannot increase their activity without exceeding the budget, it creates distrust 
among actors in OS due to a lack of activity measurability and transparency from the AN: 
"We keep hearing anesthesia say: ‘We cannot increase the activity’. It gets frustrating, and I 
think: OK, if you can’t, why don’t you prove it? "(Controller, orthopedic clinic) 
The distrust to the anesthesia clinic seems to be supported by the hospital management: 
"This is a word against words battle. The anesthesia clinic is alone against all those around 
them. I'm pretty confident that they have not done enough internally yet. But I cannot bring 
up something that I can show for, and say, look here! One would think that they would take 
the initiative to show proof of what they have done. Where is the proof? "(CFO) 
"It's probably a perception in some clinics, and also with me, that they (anesthesia) are a bit 
slow ... There is a perception that anesthesia has not taken its share of cost reductions. At the 
same time, we do not have a good enough system to coordinate activity (CEO). 
This is referring to the lack of transparency on how AN spends their resources. This shows that the 
transparency and accountability is harder when it is a service clinic then for a medical clinic. This 
indicates that clinics have poor insight in other clinics activity and resource allocation, as this clinic 
manager has stated:  
"You know very little about what happens at the other centers and clinics. When you know 
little, it's easy to think: I’m being cheated" (Clinic manager, orthopedic clinic) 
The formal vertical control mechanisms seem to create challenges for horizontal coordination of 
activity between two units at the hospital.  
Lack of transparency and differences in finance systems have given rise to distrust to the formal 
systems, and given the clinic managers incentives to enter into their own internal trade arrangements: 
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"When it comes to the level above when we are assigned resources, it is nada communication. 
We discussed whether we should make agreements between us, leader agreements, like the 
agreements they do in business, similar to agreements for buying and selling services. If the 
planning does not become more interdisciplinary, we need to go more and more in that 
direction. That will involve more of internal billing or internal trade.  But then we have to be 
allowed to run the store, on the store's terms. We cannot run a hybrid like it is today."(Clinic 
manager, anesthesia clinic) 
It seems like this line of thinking is known by the CEO. However, he does not support these ideas: 
"This is probably about a negotiating process. In an internal commercial reality, the 
anesthesia clinic would be commissioned to get their own revenue by selling their services. 
That is an approach to the problem. I'm not a fan of it "(CEO). 
Lack of transparency and differences in funding and incentive systems are obvious challenges for 
cooperation between the two clinics.  
 
Horizontal Coordination and the role of social control 
 
At an operational level, the issues regarding the differences in the financial system for the two clinics 
do not seem to affect the outcome of the cooperation and coordination between the two departments. 
The solution seems to lie in the social control mechanisms that help to reduce the uncertainty 
associated with the financing systems.  
 
One important formal horizontal coordination mechanism is the planning of activity that involves 
several clinics and departments. Both the AN and the orthopedic departments use an activity plan 
where the activity of the orthopedic department is well described and planed that facilitate 
cooperation between clinics involved in orthopedic surgeries. Although the clinic managers seem to 
have the impression that there is a lack of communication and transparency between the clinics in 
terms of the orthopedic surgery plan: 
"We prepare activity plans that we send over to the anesthesia, but if they capture the details 
are not good to say" (clinic manager orthopedic clinic) 
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Even though the clinic managers believe the hierarchically separated clinics have a hard time to 
communicate and share information, when we asked at an operation level (department managers, 
section leaders ets, see table 2), every department managers are certain that they have good insight in 
the plan. The manager at the anesthesia department even proclaims that they contribute in the 
planning of this plan: 
"I think that it cannot be that lack of communication. Nurses for each section are talking to 
each other. Whether they manage to run the operation rooms depends mostly of the 
nurses"(Department manager nurses AN) 
The use of the orthopedic surgery plan to coordinate activities between the departments show the 
significant role planning have in coordinating medical services. It seems like AN is well informed 
about the resources needed by OS due to the “orthopedic surgery plan ” that contains all the planned 
activity for the orthopedic department.  
 
Another initiative from an operative level to cope with the differences caused by the separate 
hierarchy and the differences in the financial system is a meeting where the most important users of 
anesthesia services are invited:  
 
"We have changed our strategy this year by inviting the other clinics for a 
meeting. Previously we got a phone call or an e-mail saying "we want you to operate one 
extra operating room" or "we will have open all summer in the operation rooms."  It is very 
convenient for us to see that this is not possible, but maybe not for our partner standing there 
with pressure from patients who want to be operated” (Department manager nurses AN). 
This meeting creates an opportunity to share information about the different budgets and to have 
insight in how the different departments are operating. Meetings between departments create 
opportunities to make agreements about internal trades. When we asked about internal trades 
between the departments, the department manager nurses AN answered:  
"It is perhaps somewhat accepted that one cannot increase activity without involving 
anesthesia in the decision. Here we just pass  the ball back, and tell them that if a clinic 
manager wants to have an extra surgery theatre in the middle of the year, we will manage to 
organize it, if he will pay what it costs: one and a half nursing position for each surgery 
theatre" (Department manager nurses AN). 
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It seems that both AN and OS seem to acknowledge the need for planning to get resources at hand 
when needed. AN is well informed about the resources needed by OS due to the orthopedic surgery 
plan and the information that are shared at this meetings between the departments. On the surgery 
theaters, good planning ensure a relatively permanent staff at the theaters. People often know the 
persons they are working with. Some of the leaders at the departments have also been around for a 
long while and some have also moved around at different clinics:  
"I've been head of nurses on department for anesthesia in five years. And before that I was 
head nurse for the surgical ward. For many years there also" 
"Section leader for anesthesia doctors and I have known each other a long time, for 24-25 
years maybe. We actually went to the same Officer Candidate School for several years" 
(Section manager nurses AN on OS). 
This indicates that many of the leaders at an operational level know each other which make it easier 
to communicate across levels and departments. The OS and the AN both have a person that acts as a 
section manager that operates as a coordinator associated with the planning of activity on the 8 
operating theaters. These are nurses who have a shared responsibility for the operation of the 
theaters. To fulfill this responsibility, they have a joint office in direct relation to the operating 
rooms. Co-localization helps to strengthen the daily communication, and decisions can be made 
rapidly to ensure coordination of the theaters:  
"The Operations rooms are located just inside the two doors. The section leader for the nurses 
from the anesthesia department and the orthopedic department sit in a shared office that is 
available for employees to drop in" (Department manager nurses OS) 
The shared office helps the coordinators to get insight in the operative challenges for coordination 
between the departments: 
"We do not have any planned meetings. We take things as they come up and talk 
continuously" (Section manager nurses AN on OS) 
This co-localization and the rapid decision-making are made possible by the trust from the 
department managers to carry out operational decisions. When we asked the department manager of 
nurses on OS about the autonomy given to the coordinator to make operative decisions, she replied 
that she trust that the coordinator will do her job well. She also explained that she has the necessary 
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information to control the coordinators daily decisions, but she does not do it. This is how the 
coordinator experiences the trust from her formal manager:  
“My manager got to just trust that I am doing what I should. She sees the result”         
(Section manager nurses OS) 
Trust is an important mechanism to make the informal coordination go smooth on a daily basis. Due 
to trust, the managers at an operational level do not seem to need different control mechanisms to 
govern that the job is done in a satisfactory way. Trust may therefor create the necessary flexibility in 
a relationship that is hierarchically organized due to the need for strict bureaucratic control. As long 
as the coordinators do their job, the managers do not see the need to control what they are doing. The 
close relationship between the leader and the coordinator can to some degree explain the amount of 
trust between the actors. They talk daily which each other, and know each other well, and co-
localization helps the daily communication. The good climate of cooperation across professions and 
departments seems strongly connected to a shared responsibility for the patients: 
"It is the patient that is most important for everyone here. It is important that patients are 
satisfied. Everybody knows that when a patient comes to get his or her surgery at the hospital, 
the patient has taken time off from work and organized babysitting. We have to have very 
good reasons to skip the surgery just because the budget does not fit to this "                
(Section manager nurses AN on OS) 
According to the coordinators at the two departments, the loyalty to the patients makes it easy to get 
employees to work overtime. Although anesthesia must exceed their budget, the use of overtime and 
the hiring of additional personnel are accepted when it is necessary for the care of the patient: 
"It's a very collective spirit in that respect. And most people think of the patient, and like I 
said, we have operated a lot of patients. We operate more patients now than before. And we 
have, how many patients have we gotten through? We have operated nearly 300 patients on 
overtime this year" (Section manager nurses AN on OS) 
Even though operating patient at overtime is a huge financial challenge for the budget founded AN, 
the accountability for the patients may appear to override the accountability to the budgets. The 
department managers at each department is the only one at an operational level that have financial 
accountability. They have to report on finance to the clinic manager. The department managers seem 
to spare the section managers for the financial accountability by holding the information about 
financial issues to them self. This enables a decoupling from financial issues at an operational level.  
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Earlier, we described how each year there is a verbal negotiation of the terms in the budget, and the 
CEO describes it as a “word against word – battle”. If the budget is not legitimized at a hospital and 
clinic level, it is no reason that they should at an operational level. The AN makes their operative 
decisions based on the need for medical services either this means that they will fulfill the frames set 
in the budgets or not.  
 
Combination of formal and informal coordination mechanisms 
Even though it seems like the differences in funding systems at the hospital and clinic level create 
problems for interaction and coordination, some social and informal mechanisms at an operational 
level has managed to dampen the challenges caused by the differences in the finance systems. 
informal coordination mechanisms as trust, strong professional identity, tight network and  common 
goals about the patients welfare seem to help to compensate for the weaknesses in the financial 
system and the judgment of budgets as unfair. This indicates a strong role for the professions at the 
operational level to coordinate activity between the clinics, and the importance of trust between 
professionals at different departments. The amount of trust from department managers to 
coordinators makes rapid operational decisions possible. The lack of financial responsibility at an 
operational level makes a decoupling possible from focusing on budgets to focus on the 
accountability for the patients.  
Our study shows that on an operational level, many different control mechanisms both formal and 
informal works together to cope for the weaknesses created in the financial system. Table 3  
summarizes the most important mechanisms categorized into formal hierarchical mechanisms and 
informal social mechanisms 
Formal, hierarchical  mechanisms Informal, social mechanisms 
Orthopedic surgery plan  
Activity data from operating theaters  
Joint meeting with the "customers" 
Internal Trading 
Employees with extensive experience  
Tight networks  
Common culture "us in the surgery 
theaters» Common goals 
Organization of employees in regular teams    
Collocation 
Accountability to the patient          
Medical professions 
Trust 
 
Table 3   Horizontal control mechanisms at an operational level 
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Discussion of the findings 
 
Our research question is to describe how different control mechanisms contribute to horizontal 
coordination at the operational level between anesthesia and orthopedic surgery. We have described 
a broad package of control mechanisms that help drawing boundaries around the cooperation 
between the two departments at the operational level (see table 2). Despite the fact that the 
departments are facing quite different incentives through different funding system and evaluation 
regimes, these mechanisms contribute to well-coordinated services in the surgery theaters. This was 
a surprising finding, due to earlier studies indicating that horizontal control systems are not well 
implemented in Norwegian hospitals (Pettersen and Solstad 2013).   
The theoretical discussion added some additional dimensions to the research question. How is the 
relationship between the various control mechanisms, and how is the relationship between the 
influence of managers (administrative controls), various groups within the organization (social 
controls) and individual characteristics (self-control). In this discussion we will highlight three 
findings that contribute to shed light on these issues.  
Social controls appears to be particularly important 
We see that informal mechanisms such as culture, shared values and close networks between 
decision-makers are very important for coordination at the operational level. This is consistent with 
Cäker (2008), which emphasizes the importance of trust between the parties in coordination at this 
level.  
Concern for the patients is an important mechanism that contributes to this common cultural 
development in the operating theaters. Staff from both departments talk of "us in the surgery theater," 
and according to the coordinators employees make no distinction on who works for AN or OS.  
These social mechanisms work in relation with and are supported by several administrative 
mechanisms. Permanent staff of nurses and doctors from AN working at OS is probably an important 
precondition for the development of such a shared culture. Collocation means that coordinators have 
no need for formal meetings to coordinate activities. And hiring of experienced staff with tight 
networks within the hospital makes collaboration easier. Thus, we see how norms and values develop 
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between groups that cross organizational boundaries due to frequent interaction (Håkansson and Lind 
2004). 
 
One important background for our study was the dilemma created by the different incentives facing 
the two departments through different funding systems, and the obvious demand for coordinated 
services. In the description of the context, we described how the funding systems and difficulties 
concerning lack of transparency between the departments, was causing a low level of trust between 
the clinical managers.  
At operational level we find that the desire to do a good job for the patients in the surgery theaters is 
regarded as more important than the specific clinic objectives. The accountability to the patients may 
seem to outweigh accountability to the budget. This is in line with earlier findings (Albernethy 
1996). However, accountability to the budget makes professionals at operational level negotiate on 
the financing of extra resources. Initiatives to internal trading at operational level imply a significant 
accountability for the budget situation. 
 
Social and formal controls seem to be closely related 
Formal and Social controls do not operate independently; formal controls allows for social controls 
to develop and vice versa. Collocation of the coordinators of AN and OS and organization of 
personnel from AN in regular team helps ensure frequent interaction between staff from the two 
departments - which contributes to the development of a common culture (Håkanson and Lind 2004). 
On the other hand, dense networks, loyalty to the patient and a common culture in the operating 
theaters facilitate agreements on internal trading and  planning across organizational boundaries. 
These are examples of how formal and informal mechanisms seem complementary. 
However, we also see cases where the various mechanisms work against each other. Separate 
budgets and the lack of a regular transfere pricing system prevents a permanent increase of the 
capacity of AN although this is something the professionals in both departments want. Ant the 
managers implementation of budgetary control ( loose control) hampers the formal objective of 
budget balance.  
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Fig xx Interaction between formal and informal controls 
 
Vertical decoupling enables pragmatism and horizontal coupling 
We find that the control focus at operational level is largely horizontally oriented. This would hardly 
have been possible if not managers  at the this level, particularly coordinators of operating theaters, 
have been given sufficient decision space to  make the decisions necessary to coordinate services. 
There is less focus on budgets, but a common culture of always doing what is best for the patient. 
It seems that pragmatism is highly valued: 
".. We have professionals who work to the benefit of the patient, we let the rest be. You know 
how to do things; no one can overrule you "(Department Manager OS) 
Pragmatic solutions require loose control regarding the overall control system. This loose control  
occurs in our case at the department level. The department manager of AN withdraws the strict 
supervision of budget deficits or statistics of activity, on the contrary, she trusts the coordinators to 
have the necessary expertise to make the best decisions. The authority to hiring additional staff or to 
order overtime, is delegated to the coordinators.  However, they have no responsibility to the budget. 
In this way, the operational level is protected from the formal control system. We can say that AN is 
vertically loosely controlled to allow for a horizontal collaboration with OS at operational level.  
Formal Informal 
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Earlier studies have described hospitals as loosely coupled organizations, and emphasized that such 
loose couplings are necessary to get the job done (Nyland and Pettersen 2004…..). We find that the 
department manager of AN serves more as a facilitator than as a strict controller, leaving to the 
coordinators to control operations according to the needs that arise in the operating theater. 
According to van der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens (2008) this is a typical feature of lateral 
relationships within an organization, the management system must have an adequate balance 
between strict control and flexibility to ensure good coordination. 
 
 
 
Some concluding remarks 
Will be added… 
Få med at det er vanskelig å kategorisere mekanismene. Hva er formalle og uformelle? Henger 
så tett sammen… Hva er innflytelse fra leder/grupper/individ? F eks ser vi at avdelingsledere 
er både ledere, clanmedlem ( profesjon) og har individuelle karakteristikker og erfaring som 
har innflytelse over atferden på operasjonelt nivå.  
 
Betydning av type aktivitet? Påvirker koblingen mellom mekanismene. 
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Abstract 
We test whether hedge funds using high frequency trading (HFT) strategies outperform 
other hedge funds and indices. We study a total of 540 funds, 380 after filtration, from 
Eurekahedge and the Hedge Fund Research Database stating that they are using HFT as part 
of or their main strategy. We study monthly data from 2000 to 2012 and compare their 
performance with market (MSCI World Index, S&P 500) and other hedge funds (Eurekahedge 
Hedge Fund Index Global and Hennesee Hedge Fund Index Global) as benchmarks. The 
findings suggest that HFT-funds does not provide an excess return compared to other hedge 
funds. HFT-funds have become an important part of financial markets, and although they do 
not provide excess return, they may nonetheless be needed in the market, as a supplier of 
liquidity and efficiency. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Actualization 
In the financial press there has been an increasing focus on use of high frequency trading and 
so called trading robots/computers. One of the biggest, and most recent, incidents that 
attracted the attention of the financial press was the flash crash in the U.S. May 6
th
 2010 when 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped about 1000 points (9%) in a matter of minutes, just 
to recover most of the drop a few minutes later. This was due to several incidents occurring at 
the same time triggering withdrawal orders from several “computer trading robots” and 
creating a spiraling effect. The effect was increased by the fact that many market-making HFT 
robot withdrew from the market, drasticly reducing liquidity in the market. In 2007 Goldman 
Sachs’ hedge fund, Global Equity Opportunities, got a $3 billion add-on investment after it 
had lost about $1.4 billion (28%) of its total assets in a matter of weeks. This was because 
their algorithm-based HFT-computer could not handle the unrest in the market (Bloomberg, 
2007 and E24.no, 2007). After even more troubles the same hedge fund was shut down in 
January 2010 (Bloomberg, 2010). In 2012 and 2013 new rules have been applied by several 
of the big stock exchanges. June 1
st
 2012 Nasdaq induced an extra fee to try and reduce the 
number of trading robots manipulating the markets (E24.no, 2012).  
The existing research on this topic has been focused on the impact this trading style has on the 
market, and not so much on the opportunities for investors. Therefore, we wish to test if 
hedge funds using HFT are really superior to other hedge funds. The hype on HFT has been 
big, but there has not been solid empirical evidence showing that HFT really is a superior 
investment opportunity. Hence, we wish to present empirical data on the return of hedge 
funds using HFT as their investing strategy, and to present results either in favor or against 
HFT. The problem statement that materializes is: Do these hedge funds give a superior return 
compared to other hedge funds? 
2 Hedge Funds and Computerized Trading 
2.1 Hedge Funds 
Hedge funds are typically organized as limited partnerships, with the investors as limited 
partners and the managers as general partners. Managers of hedge funds often invest a 
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significant portion of their personal wealth to ensure the alignment of economic interests 
among the partners. The major problem with defining a hedge fund is that they are normally 
not required to register with financial regulatory boards in their representative countries. 
According to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Comission’s (SEC) Investor Bulletin on hedge 
funds one can say the following: "Like mutual funds, hedge funds pool investors' money and 
invest those funds in financial instruments in an effort to make a positive return. However, 
unlike mutual funds, hedge funds are not registered with the SEC. This means that hedge 
funds are subject to very few regulatory controls....Because of this lack of regulatory 
oversight, hedge funds historically have been available to accredited investors and large 
institutions, and have limited their investors through high investment minimums (e.g., $1 
million). Many hedge funds seek to profit in all kinds of markets by pursuing leveraging and 
other speculative investment practices that may increase the risk of investment loss." (SEC, 
2012) 
Another statement, also taken from the SEC, a testimony from Donaldson, the Chairman of 
the SEC, provide some insight: "The term 'hedge fund' is undefined, including in the federal 
securities laws. Indeed, there is no commonly accepted universal meaning. As hedge funds 
have gained stature and prominence, though, 'hedge fund' has developed into a catch-all 
classification for many unregistered privately managed pools of capital. These pools of 
capital may or may not utilize the sophisticated hedging and arbitrage strategies that 
traditional hedge funds employ, and many appear to engage in relatively simple equity 
strategies. Basically, many 'hedge funds' are not actually hedged, and the term has become a 
misnomer in many cases." (Donaldson, 2003) 
Due the private nature of hedge funds, they have fewer restrictions than regular mutual funds. 
There are no restrictions on the use of leverage, short-selling and derivatives, and this allows 
them to follow significantly different investment strategies. Hedge funds are not an asset class 
by itself, but more an alternative investment vehicle just like real estate and private equity. 
Nevertheless, hedge funds are subject to antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 
(Hennessee Group, 2012) 
 
Market efficiency 
Some comment with reference to Fama (1970)… 
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2.2 Algorithmic Trading 
Algorithmic trading is defined as “electronic trading whose parameters are determined by 
strict adherence to a predetermined set of rules aimed at delivering specific execution 
outcomes.” (Chlistalla, Speyer, Kaiser, & Mayer, 2011, p. 3)  
Trading algorithms have continuously evolved to what is known as third-generation 
algorithms, which include intelligent logic that learns from market activity and adjusts the 
trading strategy of the order based on what the algorithm perceives is happening in the 
market. (Chlistalla et al., 2011) 
There is a wide variety of trading algorithms, but if we remove the customizations of 
algorithms, we see that there is a small number of core strategies used. Johnson (2010) 
defines these three main categories for algorithms: Impact-driven,  cost-driven and 
opportunistic. 
An impact-driven algorithm tries to minimize the overall market impact. These algorithms try 
to reduce the effect trading has on the asset price. Impact-driven algorithms evolved from 
simple order-slicing strategies. By splitting large orders into smaller orders, they try to reduce 
the impact on asset prices and the overall market impact. (Cesari, Marzo, & Zagaglia, 2012) 
Cost-driven algorithms try to reduce the overall transaction costs. A transaction has more 
costs than just commission and spread, we also have to take into account the implicit costs 
such as market impact and timing risk to find the overall cost. The market impact can be 
minimized by splitting the trade into smaller orders and spreading them over time, but this 
exposes us for a greater timing risk. Therefore a cost-driven algorithm tries to minimize the 
transaction costs by finding a balance between market impact and the overall exposure to 
timing risk. (Johnson, 2010) (Perold, 1988) 
Opportunistic algorithms have evolved from a range of trading strategies. They all take 
advantage of favorable market conditions, using real-time information to actively search for 
optimal times to execute the trade, whether this is based on price, liquidity or other factors. 
(Yang & Jiu, 2006) 
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There are several types, like Price inline algorithms (PI) (Johnsen, 2010), liquidity-driven 
algorithms and pairs trading  (Elliott, Hoek, & Malcolm, 2005, p. 271)  (Whistler, 2004). 
(Kaufman, 2011)..  
The trading algorithms mentioned above are strategies that can be applied to any asset class. 
Still there are some algorithms based on the unique properties of certain classes. As 
algorithmic trading continues to expand outside the equities market, more of these asset-class 
specialized strategies will be developed.  One type of asset-class specific trading algorithm is 
the Multi-leg algorithm. Trading strategies for bonds, futures and options often involves 
multiple legs. Each leg represents an order of a specific asset, which might be as simple as a 
two-way spread trade. They may have three or four legs as well, or in some cases even more 
complex. Another developing area is volatility-driven algorithms. Derivatives are contracts 
based on underlying assets, price movements in the underlying factor are then important. The 
price of a derivative contract is not only affected by the price of the underlying asset, but also 
by the interest rate and its volatility estimates. Algorithms that can take all this into account 
have therefore been developed. (Johnson, 2010) 
2.3 High Frequency Trading 
According to Gomber et al. (2011) the term High Frequency Trading has emerged in the last 
five to six years. High-Frequency Trading (HFT) has become a collective term for many 
different strategies regarding purchase and sale of financial assets. It should be noted that 
HFT is not a strategy itself, but rather a collective term for different high-speed strategies. 
What these strategies have in common is that they are carried out frequently and fast; HFT 
strategies may carry out several thousand transactions per second. To make this possible 
traders use computers programmed with trading-algorithms. These algorithms gather and 
analyze market data at an incredible pace, before acting in the market. It is crucial that the 
computers acts fast, since the opportunity to trade may only exist in a fraction of a second. 
These trades are often repeated and may lead to a total of several million trades per day. The 
gains from each trade are often only pennies, but do enough of these trades in a day, and you 
gain a pretty nice profit, according to the theory.  
The majority of HFT-based strategies can be separated into market making strategies, 
statistical arbitrage strategies and liquidity detection strategies. Market making strategies 
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mimic the traditional role of market markers; placing quotes on both the buy and sell sides 
attempting to profit by earning the bid-ask spread (Chlistalla et al. (2011) and Guo 
(2012)).This strategy will typically provide liquidity to the market, but the risk of electronic 
market makers is that they have no formal market making obligation, so they can withdraw 
from the market when they want. This is what happened during the previous mentioned flash 
crash, where several of the major HFTs withdrew from the market reducing the liquidity 
drastically. Chaboud, Alain, Hjalmarsson, Vega & Chiquoine (2009) also found that high 
frequency trades are more correlated than human trades.  
Statistical arbitrage strategies seek to correlate prices between securities and to profit from 
imbalance in those correlations. The range of this strategy is wide and can be arbitraged 
between cross-border or domestic marketplaces, arbitrage between derivatives and its 
underlying assets or arbitrage between various forms of tradeable indexes. These strategies 
increases market efficiency and reduce volatility, but HFT increases asymmetric information. 
The increase of asymmetric information is a result of the difference in response-time between 
HFT and other slower traditional traders (Brogaard, Hendershott, & Riodan, 2012). 
HFT strategies can involve more nefarious methods also referred to as “the darker arts” of 
HFT. When using a market maker strategy the trader can manipulate the market by quote 
stuffing. “Quote stuffing is a practice in which a large number of orders to buy or sell 
securities are placed and then canceled almost immediately.” (Egginton, Van Ness, & Van 
Ness, 2012, p. 3). This impairs the visibility of the market for slow traders giving high-
frequency traders the possibility of executing profitable trades at a slow trader’s expense. One 
way of doing this is known as the smoking strategy. The basic idea of a smoking strategy is 
for the high frequency trader to place alluring ask-quotes to attract market bids from slower 
players in the market, then right before the market bids reaches the market, the high-
frequency trader cancels the lure quotes. Resulting in the slow buyer’s bid hitting a larger ask-
price. Almost the opposite of the smoking strategy is the spoofing strategy. The idea is that 
the high-frequency trader places a large limit sell order above the best ask price, while at the 
same time placing a limit buy inside the quotes. The limit order appears as selling pressure 
alluring naïve investors to sell, lowering the price down to the high-frequency traders’ 
previously placed bid (Guo, 2012). 
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Today the HFT market-share range from 40-70% for the U.S. market and 19-40% for the 
European market (Gomber et al. (2011)). 
3 Risk and Performance Measures 
Risk is commonly looked upon as the total volatility in the possible return of an investment. 
One usual way to measure risk with regard to volatility is by using the standard deviation of 
the rate of return. For the greater part of this section on portfolio ratios we will build on 
Markowitz’ mean-variance paradigm, saying that the mean and standard deviation of the 
distribution of one-period return are sufficient statistics for evaluating the prospects of an 
investment portfolio. (Markowitz, 1952) 
3.1 Sharpe Ratio 
The importance of the trade-off between reward (the risk premium) and risk (as measured by 
standard deviation) suggests that we measure the attraction of an investment by the ratio of its 
risk premium to the standard deviation of its excess returns. This reward-to-volatility measure 
is widely used to evaluate the performance of investment managers: 
(3.1)              
     
  
 
 
, where Rp is the expected portfolio return, Rf is the risk free rate, and σp is the standard 
deviation of the portfolio. Rp - Rf is also known as the differential return. In this version, the 
ratio indicates the expected differential return per unit of risk associated with said differential 
return.  
3.2 Treynor’s Measure 
Like Sharpe’s ratio, Treynor’s measure gives the excess return per unit of risk, but instead of 
total risk it uses systematic risk. The advantage of using both Sharpe and Treynor together 
when rating funds is that you get a measure of both the total risk and the systematic risk of the 
investment. Treynor’s Measure is defined as: 
(3.2)   
( ̅   ̅ )
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, where  ̅  is the average return of the portfolio,  ̅  the average risk free rate and    the beta 
(the impact of the systematic risk) of the portfolio. It is important to remember that like the 
Sharpe ratio, Treynor’s measure does not quantify added value of a portfolio, it is purely a 
ranking criterion (Friend & Blume, 1970). 
3.3 Jensens Alpha 
An alternative method of ranking portfolio management is Jensen's alpha, which in contrast to 
the Sharpe Ratio and Treynor’s Measure, is based on market indices. Jensen’s Alpha 
quantifies the added return as the excess return above the security market line in the capital 
asset pricing model. In Jensen’s Alpha the rankings are based on systematic risk alone. The 
portfolios alpha, or Jensen’s alpha, can be expressed as: 
(3.3)                 ̅    ̅    ( ̅   ̅ )   
, where  ̅  is the average return of the portfolio,  ̅  the average risk free rate,    the portfolios 
beta and  ̅  the average market return. (Jensen, 1969) 
3.4 Tracking Error 
Tracking error is used to measure how closely a given portfolio follows the benchmark it is 
trying to replicate. As with the Sharpe Ratio, tracking error is both measured with the use of 
ex post data and ex ante data. Ex ante data is used by portfolio managers to control risk, while 
ex post data is useful for performance ratings. Tracking error is defined as: 
(3.4)    √
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, where T is the number of observations,     is the portfolios abnormal return over a given 
benchmark for period t and  ̅ the portfolios average (arithmetic) abnormal return over the 
given benchmark for the period t (Morningstar (2012) and Goodwin (1998)). This way of 
calculating tracking error is called the standard deviation of the active returns.  
3.5 Information Ratio 
Information Ratio (sometimes referred to as Appraisal Ratio) is a risk adjusted ratio that tells 
us how much abnormal return a fund manager/fund has contributed to, given the amount of 
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active risk taken (the Tracking Error). The information ratio based on historical data is simply 
the ratio of the return and standard deviation: 
(3.5)    
  ̅̅ ̅̅
 ̂  
 
 
, where   ̅̅ ̅̅  is the arithmetic average of excess returns over the historical period from t=1 
through T (  ̅̅ ̅̅  
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   , and             where     is the excess return of the 
portfolio over the benchmark) and  ̂   is the equivalent tracking error (see equation 7.9).  
3.6 Sortino Ratio 
In the ratios mentioned above, standard deviation is the most used measure of risk, however, 
in modern portfolio theory this measure is questioned on theoretical, practical, and empirical 
grounds (Estrada, 2006). The standard deviation treats an x% fluctuation above and below the 
mean in the same way, something a rational investor would not agree to; a fluctuation below 
the mean is less desirable than a fluctuation above the mean. Furthermore, beta is also used as 
a measure of risk (systematic risk), most importantly in the CAPM. According to Estrada 
(2006) beta has weaknesses similar to those of standard deviation. An asset that goes up 
substantially more than the market when the market goes up, but does not go down more than 
the market when the market falls, can have a high beta, although it is clearly a good 
investment.  
(3.6)               
         
    
 
 
, where      is the asset or portfolios expected return,      the minimal acceptable rate of 
return (which can be a benchmark return), and      the portfolios downside deviation with 
respect to the MAR.      can be defined as the semideviation with respect to     : 
(3.7) 
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, where   indexes time, and   denotes the number of observations (Sortino & Price (1994), 
Estrada (2006), and Plantinga, Van der Meer & Sortino (2001)). The Sortino ratio represent 
the latest addition to the modern portfolio theory, often called the post-modern portfolio 
theory. 
4 Methodology 
4.1 Data 
The data we have used is mainly gathered from the Hedge Fund Research Database (see 
www.hedgefundresearch.com). “The licensed/redistributed HFR Database, currently 
comprised of over 7000 funds and fund of funds, is available to all accredited investors. 
Information on our hedge fund universe of established and emerging managers is collected 
directly from the fund managers and/or their respective offshore administrators, while other 
pertinent information is culled from offering memoranda, onsite visits, and due diligence 
interviews.  
 
HFR Database is the foundation for the HFRI Indices, the industry's most widely utilized 
benchmark of hedge fund performance information. The HFRI Fund Weighted Composite 
alone is comprised of over 2200 funds from our database universe.” (Hedge Fund Research, 
Inc., 2013) 
Furthermore we also collected information from Eurekahedge (see www.eurekahedge.com). 
This was just a small sample of 38 funds. 
 “Eurekahedge is the world's largest alternative investment funds research house, specializing 
in hedge fund databases. Maintaining a hedge fund list of 27583 funds, across all strategies 
and asset classes, Eurekahedge delivers market-leading hedge fund analysis along with the 
most accurate hedge fund information on the market, tailored to investors' needs.” 
(Eurekahedge Pte Ltd., 2013) 
In addition to data on individual hedge funds, we have also collected data on hedge fund-
indices and other indices, such as Eurekahedge Hedge Fund Index Global, Hennesee Hedge 
Fund Index Global, S&P 500 Composite and MSCI World Index (our market index). This is 
done by the use of Thompson Reuters’ Datastream. 
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4.1.1 Database 
The selection of a database or sample of hedge funds may be subject to a performance bias. 
Almost all databases differ from one another (Fung & Hsieh, 2004). This is also shown by the 
performance-difference between the indices of the three databases we have gathered 
(Eurekahedge, Hennessee and HFR). Due to the fact that it is both very difficult and often 
expensive to get access to performance data in the hedge fund industry, we have been subject 
to the matter of cost. This does not mean that we have chosen the cheapest database for 
collection of data, but rather a weighted evaluation of cost, access possibilities and quality. 
The database we have gained access to, the HFR Database, has often been used in research. It 
is a highly reputed, and accepted, database for hedge fund research. 
4.1.2 Hedge Funds 
As mentioned, hedge funds are not an asset class, but rather an alternative investment vehicle. 
Referring to our research questions, we are looking for hedge funds using HFT and 
algorithmic trading. There exist, however, not a general accepted classification of the different 
strategies used by hedge funds. We are therefore subject to the classification set by the hedge 
funds themselves, and furthermore the classification set by the database we are using (in this 
case the HFR database and Eurekahedge). To do this we need to extract the funds stating that 
HFT is part of, or their main strategy. The data obtained from Eurekahedge consists only of 
hedge funds stating that they are using HFT as their main strategy (we call this classification 
“Black Box”). In the HFR-database we chose three strategy-categories to form our dataset: 
Equity market neutral, Quantitative Directional and Active Trading (see Appendix 1 – HFR 
Fund Strategies for complete description of each strategy-category). We then ended with a 
total of 502 funds (from a total of about 7000 in the database), belonging to these categories. 
Thus we came up with a total dataset consisting of about 540 different funds (HFR-database 
and Eurekahedge). For the funds we chose the management fees had an average of: 
Management fee 1.56 % 
Incentive fee 18.40 % 
Table 4-1: Average annual fees HFT-funds. 
Due to the fact that we are comparing HFT-funds with other hedge funds our return data will 
not be adjusted with regards to management and incentive fees (the average of the total 
database is very similar, respectively 1.5% and 15.20%). 
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4.2 Data Biases 
Hedge Funds are not required to publicly disclose their activities. hedge funds who join a 
database do this for selfish reasons. Joining a database is a way of marketing a hedge fund, 
especially since advertising for hedge funds is strictly regulated in most of the world. 
Therefore, before using data from hedge fund databases, we must consider the well-
documented biases in the data (See Ackerman, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999), Liang 
(2000), Fung and Hsieh (2000), Fung and Hsieh (2002), Fung and Hsieh (2004) and 
Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov (2010)).  
4.2.1 Selection Bias 
As mentioned above, hedge funds are not required to report their activities to the public. The 
hedge fund managers decide for themselves what information to publicly disclose, and 
therefore need incentives to join a database. Exposure to potential investors might be the 
incentive they need to reveal their activities. As a result, hedge funds deciding to join a 
database are likely to have different characteristics and performance than hedge funds not 
joining, and therefore the database will not be a representative sample of the total population 
of hedge funds. For example the most successful and least successful hedge funds are not 
likely to join such databases, since the most successful hedge funds will have no problem 
acquiring capital and the least successful hedge funds have no reason to advertise their 
disappointing results. Well performing unknown hedge funds are most likely to join 
databases. This is a difficult bias to circumvent but should rather be considered when 
interpreting data made from hedge funds. 
4.2.2 Survivorship Bias 
Some hedge fund databases only provide information on operating funds and funds that have 
ceased operation are purged from the database. This results in a survivorship bias since the 
surviving funds normally perform better than dead funds. Normally, hedge funds that have 
ceased operation did not perform as well as the hedge funds still operating. This resulting 
survivorship bias may cause the analysis to overstate historic performance and reduce the 
historic risk.  
The HFR database we used does not remove funds that have ceased their operation; therefore 
we do not have to take this into account.  
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4.2.3 Backfill Bias/ Incubation Bias 
Backfill bias arises when a hedge fund’s prior history is included when joining a database. 
Many new funds starts with an incubation period, if they perform well they join a database 
seeking new investors. If their performance is “bad” they cease operation. Therefore, when 
databases backfill funds’ performance this will result in and upward biased average return. 
The HFR database allows hedge funds to backfill their performance history, but they provide 
the date that hedge funds joined the database. To circumvent this bias we have used these 
dates and removed all performance data prior to the date the fund joined the database.  
4.2.4 Sampling Differences  
Sampling difference exists among various hedge fund databases. Hedge funds normally 
reports to one or two databases, but not all. As a result there will be some difference in the 
performance of the different samples (as mentioned by Fung and Hsieh, 2004). This bias is 
impossible for us to circumvent, taken into account that we only have access to the academic 
version of the HFR-database where all fund identifying information is removed. This too will 
have to be taken into account when we analyze our findings. 
4.2.5 Illiquid Assets 
The return data of hedge funds is often highly serially correlated. According to Getmansky, 
Lo and Makarov (2004) exposure to illiquid assets and smoothed returns is the reason for this. 
Getmansky et. al. (2004) also found that the level of autocorrelation between the different 
hedge fund- style categories varied significantly. The reason for this is that trading in illiquid 
assets is a requirement for smoothed returns to be possible. Therefore, hedge fund-styles 
trading with a lot of illiquid assets will be more exposed to autocorrelation. “Of course, for 
securities more easily traded and with deeper markets, mark-to-market prices are more 
readily available, extrapolated marks are not necessary, and serial correlation is therefore 
less of an issue. But for securities that are thinly traded, or not traded at all for extended 
periods of time, marking them to market is often an expensive and time-consuming procedure 
that cannot easily be performed frequently. Therefore, we argue in this paper that serial 
correlation serves as a proxy for a fund’s liquidity exposure.” (Getmansky, Lo, & Makarov, 
2004, p. 545) 
The hedge funds we study does frequent trading in highly liquid assets, as a result we should 
not find evidence of strong autocorrelation in our dataset. “Finally, a more prosaic channel 
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by which serial correlation can arise in the reported returns of hedge funds is through 
‘‘performance smoothing’’, which is the unsavory practice of reporting only part of the gains 
in months when a fund has positive returns so as to partially offset potential future losses and 
thereby reduce volatility and improve risk-adjusted performance measures such as the Sharpe 
ratio. For funds containing liquid securities easily marked to market, performance smoothing 
is more difficult and, as a result, less of a concern. Indeed, it is only for portfolios of illiquid 
securities that managers and brokers have any discretion in marking their positions.” 
(Getmansky, Lo, & Makarov, 2004, p. 545) 
5 Analysis 
As mentioned above we have in our analysis compared our HFT-database funds with a 
selection of benchmarks, both hedge fund benchmarks (Hennesee, Eurekahedge) and market 
benchmarks (S&P 500, MSCI World). 
5.1  Limitations 
 The limitations we have set are the following: 
- We set the timeframe to monthly returns within January 2000 – December 2012. This 
we did because the main section of the funds did not have observations before this 
date (HFT is a relatively new trading-strategy (Gomber et al., 2011), so to find hedge 
funds saying they used HFT before this would only mean that they have changed their 
strategy and kept the return information for the old strategies). We used the same 
timeframe for our benchmarks. 
- We set the minimum number of observations to 12, to be able to compute reliable 
ratios and variance measures (with few observations variance, and especially 
semivariance, is often very low and several of our ratios did not comply with a 
variance or semivariance of zero).  Meaning we deleted all the funds that did not 
comply with this assumption.  
- Our world market in this paper is set to the MSCI World Index, which also the active 
returns of the funds are measured against. 
- Our “risk-free rate” is set to the monthly average of the 3mnth T-bill rate within our 
timeframe. 
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5.2 Descriptive statistics 
We have used the simple CAPM model to extract residuals to be able to test our sample for 
different types of bias. To show how we tested our sample, we will use an illustrative example 
to show how the calculations and tests for one fund are done and then we will present a 
summary of the rest of the funds. The sample fund we use is fund 259 (given our anonymized 
database, funds have only numbers for distinguishing reasons) from the academic version of 
the HFR database. 
First we have a summary of the statistics of fund 259 (Table 7-1). The sample mean is very 
small, only 0.40%, and the sample standard deviation is much larger indicating some extreme 
values. Absence of skewness and kurtosis is strongly rejected, leading to a strong rejection of 
normality.  
 
Table 5-1: Statistics on fund 259 
The following Table 7-2 shows the output from the linear regression. The significance level 
of regression F is smaller than 0.05 and the coefficient estimates are also statistically 
significant, but   is not very high.  
 
Strategy  # 
Percentage of 
normal distibution 
Equity Market Neutral 91 43.128 % 
Quantitative Directional 47 49.474 % 
Actrive Trading 19 40.426 % 
Black Box 14 41.180 % 
Total 157 40.464 % 
Table 5-2: Normal distribution funds. 
The following Table 7-3 shows the output from the linear regression. The significance level 
of regression F is smaller than 0.05 and the coefficient estimates are also statistically 
significant, but   is not very high. 
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 Table 5-3: Linear regression fund 259 
5.2.1 Heteroscedasticity 
The output from White’s test (table 7-4) shows that homoscedasticity cannot be rejected in the 
case of fund 259, since the P-value > 0.05. Therefore we can conclude that heteroscedasticity 
is not a serious problem for this particular fund.  
 
Table 5-4: White's-test fund 259 
 
Strategy  # 
Percentage of 
Heteroscedasticity 
Equity Market Neutral 47 22.275 % 
Quantitative Directional 29 30.526 % 
Actrive Trading 14 29.787 % 
Black Box 2 5.882 % 
Total 90 23.196 % 
Table 5-5: Heteroscedasticity in residuals. 
Table 7-4 shows the White’s test we have done in Rats individually for all HFT-funds. Table 
7-5 shows the amount of funds that have heteroscedasticity in the residuals. As mentioned in 
chapter 6, if we detect heteroscedasticity our estimator will not be BLUE. Therefore, we now 
have to take into account that for about 30% of our funds, we cannot be sure that our 
estimator has the lowest possible variance. 
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5.2.2 Normality 
Using the same residuals we tested the residuals concerning normally distributed. Financial 
data does often violate this assumption, but as long as the other four assumptions are met and 
the sample size are sufficiently large violation of the normality assumption is virtually 
inconsequential. An example of the Jarque-Bera test and its belonging statistics are presented 
in Table 7-6.  
 
Table 5-6: Normality statistics of residuals fund 259 
The Jarque-Bera test is strongly rejecting normality (sign. level < 0.05) for fund 259.  For a 
summarized table of the results from the Jarque-Bera tests see Appendix 3.   
A: Strategy  # 
Percentage of 
normal 
distribution 
Equity Market Neutral 81 38.39 % 
Quantitative Directional 37 38.95 % 
Active Trading 15 31.92 % 
Black Box 14 41.18 % 
Total 147 38.68 % 
Table 5-7: Normal distribution in residuals. 
We found that about 39% of our HFT hedge funds have normally distributed residuals. This is 
a bit surprising as theory suggests that financial data are not normally distributed. 
5.2.3 Autocorrelation 
As mentioned hedge fund returns frequently exhibit strong degree of autocorrelation. 
Getmansky et. al. (2004) found that this was a result of expose to illiquid assets and 
performance smoothing by hedge fund managers. They also found that the level of 
autocorrelation varied significantly between different hedge fund styles. Their explanation for 
this was that the different hedge funds styles traded in different asset classes, and it was easier 
for hedge funds trading in illiquid assets to smooth their performance. As a result, the more 
illiquid assets the hedge funds traded in, the more autocorrelated were the returns. Since we 
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have selected hedge funds stating that they use HFT we should not find strong degree of 
autocorrelation.  
We used the residuals extracted from the CAPM, individually testing each of our 380 hedge 
funds for autocorrelation. Following is a sample of the output from the Ljung-Box test we ran 
to test our hedge funds for autocorrelation. We used twelve lags and as we can see for this 
particular hedge fund we reject the null hypothesis (Sig. level < 0.05) that all 12 
autocorrelation coefficients are equal to zero, and conclude that there is autocorrelation in the 
residuals.  
 
Table 5-8: Result Ljung-Box test fund 259 
Out of the 380 hedge funds tested for autocorrelation we could not reject the possibility of 
autocorrelation in the residuals for 167 of the hedge funds (table 7-9). This is equal to about 
44% of the hedge funds. For a summarized table of the results from the Ljung-Box tests see 
Appendix 3. 
A: Strategy  # 
Percentage of 
autocorrelation 
Equity Market Neutral 105 49.76 % 
Quantitative Directional 45 47.39 % 
Active Trading 17 36.17 % 
Black Box 0 0.00 % 
Total 167 43.95 % 
Table 5-9: Autocorrelation within different strategy styles 
5.2.4 Implications of autocorrelation in our thesis 
Now that we have found autocorrelation in some of our hedge fund data we need to consider 
the implication this have on our study and how to deal with it. As mentioned we cannot 
expect autocorrelation in our data to be a result of illiquid assets and performance smoothing. 
Getmansky et. al. (2004)  discussed other sources of autocorrelation, the most common ones 
are: market inefficiencies, time-varying expected returns, time-varying leverage and incentive 
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fees with high water marks. Although, due to the fact that reporting standards for hedge funds 
are nonexistent and the HFR database only provide limited information on trading style we 
cannot fully rule out the possibility of performance smoothing as a source of autocorrelation.   
Fung and Hsieh (2001), Brooks and Kat (2001), and Agarwal and Naik (2004) demonstrate 
that autocorrelation invalidates standard mean-variance analysis for hedge funds. Getmansky 
et al. (2004) based on a moving average representation of reported returns show how this 
process affects the Sharpe ratio and beta in a standard single index market model. As the 
smoothing lowers the variance of the returns and the covariance (with the market index), but 
leaves the mean unaffected, the standard risk measures tend to underestimate the actual risk. 
Cesare, Stork and de Vires (2011) built on this and developed more performance ratios 
adjusting for autocorrelation. They also found that traditional performance measures 
overvaluated the performance of hedge funds because they undervaluate the risk level of the 
hedge funds. Another study by Gallais-Hamonno & Nguyen-Thi-Thanh (2007) also found 
that unsmoothing returns increased the risk level of hedge funds and decreased performance 
measures of traditional ratios by an average of 20%. The common denominator in all of these 
studies is that the ratios will be biased upward when return data are subject to autocorrelation.      
5.3 Risk and return 
The first parameter we wish to analyze is the risk and return of the funds and the benchmarks. 
As we mentioned the most common way of measuring risk is by the use of variance/standard 
deviation, but a better way of measuring risk might be by the use of semivariance and a given 
threshold (risk-free rate, benchmark return, etc.). To start with we checked how the 
parameters changed with regard to the age of the funds. 
 
Monthly values 
 Age Return St. Dev. Semivar. # of funds 
1<=-3 years 0.31 % 2.73 % 0.0086 % 151 
3<=-5 years 0.42 % 2.60 % 0.0091 % 84 
>=5 years 0.46 % 3.59 % 0.0497 % 145 
Table 5-10: Average monthly return, standard deviation and semivariance based on age 
As we see, both risk and return increases as age increases. Except from the risk of funds aged 
3-5 years being lower than 1-3 years, we see no surprising results. Furthermore we also see 
that the distribution of age among the HFT-funds is more or less even. 
Hedge Funds HFR-Database Monthly values 
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Return St. Dev. # of funds 
HFT-funds 0.39 % 3.03 % 379 
All funds 0.70 % 4.46 % 6937 
Table 5-11: HFT-funds vs. all hedge funds. 
After analyzing the distribution of risk and return we compared the risk and return of the 
HFT-funds with the risk and return of the rest of the hedge funds in the HFR database. This is 
shown in table 7-9. 
If we take a look at the distribution of the risk measures we see that the monthly standard 
deviation (Figure 7-1) has an average of 3.03%, while the majority is between 2% and 4% 
(about 76% of the funds). If we take a look at the standard deviance to the semivariance 
(Figure 7-2) on the other hand, we see that this is lower with an average of 1.11%, with 80% 
of the funds less than 2%. 
 
Figure 5-1: Histogram showing monthly standard deviation for HFT-funds.
 
Figure 5-2: Histogram showing monthly semivariance and accumulated percentage. 
Furthermore we see that normal and semivariance standard deviation correlates but with 
semivariance being lower than variance. In figure 7-3 we see an almost perfect correlation 
between normal and semivariance-based standard deviation.  
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 Figure 5-3: Correlation between normal and semivariance std. dev. for each fund 
After finding the characteristics of the risk and return data we measured our HFT-database 
against the hedge fund- and market benchmarks. The following Table 7-12 shows the risk and 
return data for our database and the benchmarks. 
A: Indices Variance 
Standard 
deviation 
Semivariance 
Risk-free rate 
Percentage 
of positive 
months 
Average 
monthly 
returns 
MSCI World index 0.27 % 5.163 % 0.115 % 58.33 % 0.097 % 
S&P 500 Composite 0.25 % 5.029 % 0.106 % 54.49 % 0.115 % 
Eurekahedge Hedge Fund Index 0.02 % 1.546 % 0.006 % 70.51 % 0.794 % 
Hennesee Hedge Fund Index Global 0.04 % 1.920 % 0.013 % 64.74 % 0.502 % 
      
B: Average HFT-funds 0.15 % 3.028 % 0.025 % 59.49 % 0.390 % 
C: Percentage of HFT-funds over 
Index-values Variance 
Standard 
deviation 
Semivariance 
Risk-free rate 
Percentage 
of positive 
months 
Average 
monthly 
returns 
MSCI World index 13.42 % 13.42 % 3.42 % 53.42 % 75.26 % 
S&P 500 Composite 14.21 % 14.21 % 3.68 % 71.05 % 73.68 % 
Eurekahedge Hedge Fund Index 76.05 % 76.05 % 52.89 % 12.63 % 19.21 % 
Hennesee Hedge Fund Index Global 65.53 % 65.53 % 31.58 % 30.53 % 38.42 % 
Table 5-12: HFT-funds compared to benchmarks; Risk and Return. 12 mnth 
Table 7-12 is focused on the risk and return for HFT-funds and the benchmarks. A shows the 
average of the benchmarks’ risk and return within our sampling period (January 2000 – 
December 2012). B shows the average for the measured HFT-funds within the same period. C 
shows the percentage of HFT-funds having higher values than the benchmarks on the 
different parameters (i.e. 76.05% of the funds in our HFT-database have a higher variance 
than the Eurekahedge Hedge Fund Index and 53.24% of the HFT-funds have a higher 
percentage of positive months than the market (MSCI) ). 
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5.4 Correlation and Performance Ratios 
We use the MSCI World Index as our world market, and measure correlation and tracking 
error using this benchmark. 
 
Based on monthly returns 
A: Indices 
Correlation 
with market Sharpe Ratio 
Treynors 
measure 
Jensens 
Alpha 
Tracking 
error 
Information 
Ratio 
Sortino 
Ratio RF Beta 
MSCI World index 1.00 0.019 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.172 1.000 
S&P 500 Composite 0.97 0.023 0.024 0.000 0.013 0.015 -0.173 0.946 
Eurekahedge Hedge Fund Index 0.69 0.513 0.744 0.002 0.043 0.189 0.153 0.206 
Hennesee Hedge Fund Index 
Global 0.76 0.261 0.342 0.000 0.039 0.124 -0.155 0.284 
B: Average HFT-funds 0.26 0.2011 -0.0069 -0.0017 0.0565 -0.0116 -0.6808 0.2037 
C: Percentage of HFT-funds 
over Index-values 
Correlation 
with market Sharpe Ratio 
Treynors 
measure 
Jensens 
Alpha 
Tracking 
error 
Information 
Ratio 
Sortino 
Ratio RF Beta 
MSCI World index 0.00 % 79.47 % 21.05 % 34.47 % 92.37 % 44.21 % 33.16 % 4.47 % 
S&P 500 Composite 0.00 % 78.95 % 19.74 % 35.00 % 91.58 % 38.68 % 33.42 % 4.47 % 
Eurekahedge Hedge Fund Index 11.84 % 7.63 % 0.79 % 23.42 % 80.53 % 4.21 % 23.68 % 
36.05 
% 
Hennesee Hedge Fund Index 
Global 5.26 % 29.21 % 2.89 % 35.00 % 83.95 % 10.53 % 31.84 % 
27.37 
% 
Table 5-13: HFT-funds compared to benchmarks; Ratios. 12 mnth 
In table 7-13 A shows the market (MSCI) correlation for the benchmarks in addition to 
different performance ratios. B shows the average of the HFT-funds different performance 
ratios. C shows the percentage of HFT-funds having higher values than the benchmarks on 
the different parameters (i.e. none of the HFT-funds have a higher correlation with the market 
than the S&P 500, or 36.05% of the HFT-funds have a higher beta than the Eurekahedge 
Hedge Fund Index). 
Furthermore we have measured the returns of the market and the benchmarks in the exact 
period the HFT-funds have been active (i.e. if an HFT-fund was alive from 2009 through 
2010, it has been compared with the market and benchmarks for exactly that period of time). 
This we did to get a compatible set of data to analyze. The average return since inception and 
the percentage of how often the HFT-funds, the market and the benchmarks outperform each 
other can be seen in table 7-14. 
  
Average 
return since 
inception 
Percentage 
above 
market 
Percentage 
above 
Eurekahedge 
Percentage 
above Hennesee 
Percentage 
above HFT 
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HFT-funds 33 % 57 % 40 % 49 % 0 % 
MSCI World index 14 % 0 % 44 % 49 % 43 % 
Eurekahedge Hedge Fund Index 42 % 56 % 0 % 82 % 60 % 
Hennesee Hedge Fund Index Global 27 % 51 % 18 % 0 % 51 % 
Table 5-14: Results compared against market and benchmarks. 
After analyzing the return and compared the performance of the different benchmarks and 
funds, we found it natural to have a look at some ratio targets for the HFT-funds. For the 380 
HFT-funds we have analyzed we set a target for the Sharpe-, Information- and Sortino ratio 
and checked how many of the HFT-funds were rated “Good” or “Bad”. There was a small 
share of the HFT-funds for which we were not able to calculate the information ratio, this was 
mostly due to the variation being equal to 0 (affects the tracking error) for some of the funds. 
HFT-funds 
Sharpe ratio; 
Target 1 
Information 
ratio;   
Target 0.5 
Sortino 
ratio; 
Target 0 
Bad 97.9 % 91.8 % 71.8 % 
Good 2.1 % 0.5 % 28.2 % 
Unattainable 0.0 % 7.6 % 0.0 % 
Total 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 
Table 5-15: Ratio performance HFT-funds. Target=Good. 
Seeing that we have collected hedge funds with four different kind of strategy classification 
(“Black box” from Eurekahedge, “Active Trading”, “Equity Market Neutral” and 
“Quantitative Directional” from the HFR-database) we thought that there might be return 
differences between these classifications. As mentioned earlier we cannot say for sure to what 
extent the hedge funds in each category are using HFT, except for the funds collected from 
Eurekahedge (which are only using high frequency and/or computerized trading algorithms). 
The data we have used is the Return since Inception/January 2000 for the HFT funds, and the 
corresponding returns for the benchmarks. 
 
 
 HFT-funds Active trading 
Eq. Mark. 
Neutral Quant. Direct. Black Box 
Average return: 35.63 % 24.45 % 26.63 % 100.90 % 
 Benchmarks MSCI World Index Eurekahedge Hennesee   
Average return: 14 % 42 % 27 %   
Table 5-16: Average annual return divided by trading strategy. 
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6 Discussion 
6.1.1 Risk and Return 
First of all we checked the general distribution of the risk of the 380 HFT-funds, and found 
that both average monthly return and risk (variance/semivariance) increased depending on 
how long the fund had been alive (as seen from table 7-10). An increase in age (number of 
observations) should lead to lower variance (risk) as the data should get closer to a normal 
distribution, thus canceling the effect of extreme outliers. Although we see from table 7-10 
that this is not the case.  However we have found no conclusive explanation for this, but we 
believe that the reason for this anomaly could be the financial crisis from 2007-2009 (which 
most of the funds aging 5 years and more would be a part of). The main reason for us to 
analyze the dispersion of the monthly return and risk was to check if there was any serious 
outliers before we compared the risk and return of the HFT-funds with the risk and return of 
the rest of the hedge fund database. As seen from table 7-11 the average for the entire HFR-
database of hedge funds is 0.70% for monthly returns and 4.46% for monthly standard 
deviation. This is a substantial difference compared to HFT-funds, and might imply that the 
HFT-funds are producing worse returns than other hedge funds. We see though, that the risk 
of the HFT-funds seems to be lower, which most likely come from the fact that HFT-funds 
often use market-neutral strategies. This could balance the different average monthly return, it 
would all come down to a potential investors relation to risk. 
Furthermore we analyzed the difference between the standard deviation calculated from the 
variance and the semivariance. As we see from figure 7-1 the majority of the funds have a 
normal standard deviation ranging from 2-4%, while the majority of the funds have a standard 
deviation based on semivariance of less than 2%. Referring again to our earlier discussion on 
semivariance we see that by using this as a risk-measure you get a lower risk. We think that 
the use of semivariance is superior to the use of variance. It is a sound argument that it is the 
variance below a set benchmark or goal that is really interesting for the investors. No investor 
with a normal risk aversion would say no to an investment that has only positive returns. This 
investment might still have variance, but as long as this variance is above the benchmark the 
investor feels his returns must be superior to, all investors with the same preferences will take 
this investment. Therefore the semivariance, measuring only the variance under a set 
benchmark, would provide a better measure of risk. We also see from figure 7-3 that the 
normal standard deviation and the semivariance-based standard deviation are correlated with a 
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correlation coefficient of 0.89, meaning that the semivariance and the variance are correlated 
but the fluctuation of the semivariance is slightly lower. 
After the analysis of the risk and its components we compared the risk of the HFT-funds with 
the risk of our benchmarks. As we see from Table 7-12 the average of our HFT-funds does 
not show any immediate superiority towards the hedge fund benchmarks when it comes to 
risk. When we take a look at the risk of the funds in table 7-12 B(using both normal variance 
and semivariance) we see that HFT-funds are less risky compared to the market benchmarks 
but considerably more risky than the hedge fund benchmarks. The average HFT-funds have a 
monthly standard deviation of about 3% while the Eurekahedge and Hennesee have 
respectively 1.5% and 1.9%. By using the values from A as thresholds, and measuring the 
percentage of the HFT-funds having values higher than these, we see from C that the majority 
of the HFT-funds have a higher variance than the HFT-benchmarks. If we take a look at the 
semivariance we see that the HFT-funds perform better (meaning that they have variance, but 
that most of the variance is related to returns above the risk-free rate). The Eurekahedge index 
still outperforms our HFT-funds, but by less, and now “only” 1/3 of the HFT-funds have a 
higher risk than the Hennesee index (compared to over 2/3 when measuring variance). Finally 
we see from both the percentage of positive months and the average monthly returns (also see 
table 7-12) that the HFT-funds have problems performing better than the hedge fund-indices, 
but are easily outperforming the market-indices. In 75% of the observations the HFT-funds 
have a higher monthly return than the average of the MSCI World Index, while the same 
number is only 19% compared to the Eurekahedge index.  
6.1.2 Correlation and Ratios 
As we see from table 7-13 the average HFT-funds have a very low correlation to the market, a 
strong confirmation of the fact that these funds are using market neutral strategies. When we 
check the performance ratios for the HFT-funds there are not many promising results. The 
one ratio that seems to suggest that they are performing ok is the Sortino ratio (ref. table7-15). 
There can be many different reasons for these bad results when it comes to performance 
ratios, but the one that we are leaning towards is that many of today’s performance ratios are 
not compatible with the return dispersion of HFT-funds. Furthermore hedge funds are often 
subject to performance smoothing, and thus performance ratios should be interpreted with 
some skepticism. As discussed in chapter 4.2 about illiquid assets the potential bias this 
possesses differs between hedge fund styles. HFT-funds typically have less illiquid assets and 
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are not subject to performance smoothing to the same degree as other hedge funds. This may 
explain the difference in both performance ratios and the previously discussed risk (variance).  
We also see that the beta of the HFT-funds is relatively low (0.20) implying that they have 
very little systematic risk. This is not unique to HFT-funds, but is rather a typical treat of 
hedge funds. When comparing HFT-funds with the exact same return period for the 
benchmarks, we see some interesting results. In table 7-14 we see that HFT-funds do not 
produce superior results, even though they produce good results. 57% of the HFT-funds 
produce better returns than the market when comparing the market and the funds over the 
exact same time period. This is marginally better than our two hedge funds benchmarks. At 
the end of table 7-14 we see that in 60% of the cases the Eurekahedge Index performs better 
than the HFT-funds, while the same number is 51% for the Hennessee Index.  
After seeing these returns we also divided our HFT-funds in the different strategy 
classifications, and as table 7-16 shows the Eurekahedge-strategy “Black Box” perform 
significantly better than the other strategies. When we found this we started to take a closer 
look at our hedge fund-data from Eurekahedge, and found it to be only positive returns for 
this strategy, with a great deal of extreme returns. We concluded that this must be due to the 
fact that these funds seem to come from a “top-list” of HFT-funds, and that we have only 
gotten return data for the 38 best performing hedge funds using HFT (we only got part of their 
database). But seeing as this is only 38 funds from a total of 380, and the fact that they are 
indeed HFT-funds we see no reason to remove them from our database. If we focus on the 
other strategies we see that active trading seems to be performing better than the other two 
classifications from the HFR-database. But the Eurekahedge Index still seems to perform 
better than any of the classifications from HFR. 
As a final result we see that when we ranked our HFT-funds with 5 different performance 
ratios (table 7-17 and 7-18), we did not receive the same result, with regards to the ranking of 
the funds. In the top 10 it was only fund 2 and 32100 that made any reappearance. For the 
bottom 10 we see a much more clearer trend, with fund 33, 25024, 28812 and 32221 as the 
funds showing up on the bottom 10-list for 4 out of 5 ratios. 
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7 Concluding remarks 
7.1.1 Possible biases and their relevance to the thesis 
The biggest bias, is the fact that hedge funds are not required to publicly disclose their 
activities. Sharing information with a hedge fund database is voluntary and is often done 
because a hedge fund wants to attract new investors.  
We have not ben able to circumvent the earlier mentioned selection bias, as it is impossible 
for us to control which hedge funds are joining the HFR-database. Thus this bias would have 
to be taken into account when interpreting the results of this thesis. 
Both the survivorship bias and the backfill bias has been circumvented in this study, by means 
of manually removing hedge funds in the HFR database, and/or changing their return history. 
The sampling difference has not been circumvented, due to the fact that we have only gotten 
access to the academic HFR-database with all fund-identifying information removed. We do 
not, however, think this bias is a serious source of errors, as we assume that both Eurekahedge 
and the Hennesse indices are compiled of a representative sample of hedge funds. 
The bias of illiquid assets is the bias we believe has the biggest impact on our results. Not so 
much a result on the HFT-funds returns though, as HFT-funds typically have less illiquid 
assets than other hedge funds (often even no illiquid assets). It is the comparability of the 
other hedge funds we believe to be compromised by this bias. Other hedge funds typically 
have portions of illiquid assets to be able to perform performance smoothing. This may 
conflict with us comparing HFT-funds with benchmarks made from hedge funds. 
7.1.2 Conclusion and implications 
The hype for High Frequency Funds has been increasing in the recent years, with their 
popularity increasing proportionally. In contrast to this our research has shown that HFT-
funds deliver no superior return compared to the benchmarks we have chosen. The risk of the 
HFT-funds seems to be lower than for all the market indices. We have also found that HFT-
funds do not have less risk (measured by means of variance and standard variance) than our 
two hedge fund benchmarks. It does not matter which way we measure risk, HFT-funds have 
both a higher variance and semivariance. In addition to having more risk, HFT-funds are 
performing worse with regards to average monthly return, and percentage of positive months. 
When it comes to which of the risk measures should be used when measuring risk of HFT-
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funds, we see from our descriptive statistics analysis that only 40% of the funds are normally 
distributed. Linking this to Markowitz’ (1959), it implies that the majority of HFT-funds 
should have risk measured by the use of semivariance (or other downside risk measures). 
Our results indicate that HFT-funds are using market neutral strategies as their correlation 
with the market is extremely low, which is also shown by the very low beta values. When 
ranking our funds using the traditional performance ratios, we see huge differences. Which 
may imply that the theory, stating that ranking hedge funds with traditional ratios is futile 
since they give the same result, is wrong, at least when it comes to HFT-funds. One of the 
reasons for traditional ratios not being able to rank HFT-funds the same, might be the 
characteristics of HFT-funds; they have very little systematic risk (beta), a big share of 
autocorrelation among the funds and the lack of normal distribution. One thing we can say for 
sure (as long as the theory of Jensen’s alpha holds, and considering our descriptive statistics) 
is that HFT-funds are not providing statistically significant alpha-values, i.e. they are not 
beating the required rate of return as given by the CAPM. 
Finally, when comparing HFT-funds’ returns to the returns of our hedge funds indices, we see 
that HFT-funds are not superior to other hedge funds. At best they are equally good, but very 
often they are performing worse. This is not to say our results are representative for all HFT-
funds, only the ones analyzed in this thesis. Although, the sample of HFT-funds we have 
gathered is quite extensive and could show a trend among all the HFT-funds available in the 
market. Our conclusion using the data and analysis of this thesis is that there does not seem to 
be an edge in the use of HFT. 
As a final comment, we would like to address the fact that the use of HFT has exploded in the 
market during the last decade (Gomber, et. al, 2011). Our findings may suggest that the time 
of extremely high returns from “super robots” using HFT is over.  If we relate this to the 
efficient market hypothesis, it states that if you have a competitive advantage you can 
consistently beat the market (or in this case, hedge fund indices). Since HFT-funds no longer 
seem to be able to do this, we interpret this as proof of the market catching up with the 
technological development HFT used to represent. This can again be related to the recent 
comment from Frederi Viens, Director of the Computational Finance program at Purdue 
University: “… the net profits from high-frequency trading have been falling steadily, from an 
estimated peak of $5bn in 2009 to around $1.25bn in 2012” (Financial Times, 2013). This is 
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not to say that there is no use for HFT in the market, but rather that HFT has become a part of 
the market in creating liquidity and efficiency. 
One of the reasons that this might have happened to the use of HFT is that governments have 
become more rigid in the regulations directed towards HFT. There is now a new EU-
regulation to be passed which will limit the use of quote stuffing, or “the dark arts” of HFT 
(see chapter 2.3); the MiFID II regulation. This may lead to further complications for the use 
of HFT in markets. One example of these kind of regulations is the order to transaction-cost, 
saying that you can only have put so many orders before you have to buy, if not you have to 
pay an extra fee (a ratio of 100/1 is normal). 
7.1.3 Critique 
The first area of uncertainty is the fact that we do not really know for sure to which degree  
our chosen HFT-funds use HFT as a trading strategy. We are subject to the classifications 
made by the HFR-database and in the end what the hedge funds are stating. Furthermore there 
might be someone that thinks we should have used other performance ratios to check for the 
total effect of the discovered autocorrelation. Relating to this we could also have used 
other/more models to find residuals and see how big the change would have been using these. 
We could also have used more data in our analysis, rather than just relying on the HFR-
database. Although, this was difficult for us seeing as we had a rather limited amount of 
resources (read: money) for our research. As a final comment we are fully aware that there 
might be miscalculations in one of our many extensive spreadsheets. We have done our best 
to ensure the quality of our calculations, but since we are not “super-robots” the possibility of 
human errors will always be there.  
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Appendix 1 – HFR Fund Strategies 
As collected from https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/index.php?fuse=indices-str. 
 
Equity market neutral 
EH: Equity Market Neutral strategies employ sophisticated quantitative techniques of 
analyzing price data to ascertain information about future price movement and relationships 
between securities, select securities for purchase and sale. These can include both Factor-
based and Statistical Arbitrage/Trading strategies. Factor-based investment strategies include 
strategies in which the investment thesis is predicated on the systematic analysis of common 
relationships between securities. In many but not all cases, portfolios are constructed to be 
neutral to one or multiple variables, such as broader equity markets in dollar or beta terms, 
and leverage is frequently employed to enhance the return profile of the positions identified. 
Statistical Arbitrage/Trading strategies consist of strategies in which the investment thesis is 
predicated on exploiting pricing anomalies which may occur as a function of expected mean 
reversion inherent in security prices; high frequency techniques may be employed and trading 
strategies may also be employed on the basis on technical analysis or opportunistically to 
exploit new information the investment manager believes has not been fully, completely or 
accurately discounted into current security prices. Equity Market Neutral Strategies 
typically maintain characteristic net equity market exposure no greater than 10% long 
or short 
 
Quantitative directional 
EH: Quantitative Directional strategies employ sophisticated quantitative techniques of 
analyzing price data to ascertain information about future price movement and 
relationships between securities, select securities for purchase and sale. These can include 
both Factor-based and Statistical Arbitrage/Trading strategies. Factor-based investment 
strategies include strategies in which the investment thesis is predicated on the systematic 
analysis of common relationships between securities. Statistical Arbitrage/Trading strategies 
consist of strategies in which the investment thesis is predicated on exploiting pricing 
anomalies which may occur as a function of expected mean reversion inherent in security 
prices; high frequency techniques may be employed and trading strategies may also be 
employed on the basis on technical analysis or opportunistically to exploit new information 
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the investment manager believes has not been fully, completely or accurately discounted into 
current security prices. Quantitative Directional Strategies typically maintain varying 
levels of net long or short equity market exposure over various market cycles. 
 
Active trading 
Macro: Active Trading strategies utilize active trading methods, typically with high 
frequency position turnover or leverage; these may employ components of both Discretionary 
and Systematic Macro strategies. Strategies may contain distinct, identifiable sub-strategies, 
such as equity hedge or equity market neutral, or in some cases a number of sub-strategies are 
blended together without the capacity for portfolio level disaggregation. Strategies employ an 
investment process based on systematic, quantitative evaluation of macroeconomic variables 
in which the portfolio positioning is predicated on convergence of differentials between 
markets, not necessarily highly correlated with each other, but currently diverging from their 
historical levels of correlation. Strategies focus on fundamental relationships across 
geographic areas of focus both inter and intra-asset classes, and typical holding periods are 
shorter than trend following or discretionary strategies. Diversified Trading strategies are 
distinct from other macro in that Trading strategies characteristically emphasize rapid market 
response to new information and high volume of turnover in liquid but frequently volatile and 
unstable market positions. 
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Appendix 2 – Research parameters 
All parameters calculated in Excel. 
1.  Return since inception 
o Accumulated yearly return 
 Sum of yearly return 
2.  Best monthly return 
o Max value of monthly returns 
 Max-formula on monthly data 
3.  Worst monthly return 
o Min value of monthly returns 
 Min-formula on monthly data 
4. Variance 
o Variance of monthly data 
 Var.S.-formula on monthly data 
5. Semivariance RF 
o Semivariance with regard to risk-free rate (0.68%) 
 Var.S if monthly return was lower than risk-free rate. 
6. SVRf STD 
o Standard deviance of semivariance RF 
 SQRT-formula on Semivariance RF 
7. Annualized SVRf STDv 
o Annualized SVRf STD (multiplied by square root of 12) 
 SVRf multiplied with SQRT(12) 
8. Semivariance benchmark 
o Semivariance with regard to benchmark (average of MSCI World) 
 Var.S if monthly return was lower than market benchmark 
9. SVB STD 
o Standard deviance of semivariance benchmark 
 SQRT-formula on Semivariance benhcmark 
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10. Annualized SVB STD 
o Annualized standard deviance of semivariance benchmark (multiplied by 
square root of 12) 
 SVB STD multiplied with SQRT(12). 
11. Standard deviation 
o Standard deviation of monthly returns 
 STDEV.S on monthly data/SQRT of Variance. 
12. Annualized STDv 
o Annualized standard deviation of monthly returns 
 Standard deviation multiplied with SQRT(12). 
13. Kurtosis 
o Kurtosis of monthly returns 
 KURT-formula on monthly data. 
14. Skewness 
o Skewness of monthly returns 
 SKEW-formula on monthly data. 
15. Correlation with market 
o Correlation of monthly data with regard to MSCI World monthly data. 
 CORREL-formula on monthly data and market-data. 
16. Number of months alive 
o Total number of monthly return-data. 
 COUNT-formula on monthly data. 
17. Percentage of positive months 
o Percentage of months with positive return (above 0) 
 COUNTIF-formula above 0 divided by COUNT-formula. 
18. Average monthly return 
o Average monthly return 
 AVERAGE-formula on monthly returns. 
19. Sharpe Ratio 
o Sharpe ratio of yearly returns, average 3-month T-bill rate January 1995 
including February 2013 and Standard Deviation. 
 (Average monthly return-Risk-free rate)/Standard deviation 
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20. Treynors Measure 
o Treynors measure with yearly returns, average 3-month T-bill rate January 
1995 including February 2013, and covariance between yearly return-data and 
MSCI World with standard deviation of market (MSCI). 
 (Average monthly return –Risk-free rate)/Beta 
21. Jensens Alpha 
o Jensens Alpha with yearly returns, average 3-month T-bill rate January 1995 
including February 2013, covariance between yearly return-data and MSCI 
World with standard deviation of market (MSCI) and average yearly market 
(MSCI) return. 
 Average monthly return – (Risk-free rate+(Beta*(average market 
return-risk-free rate)). 
22. Tracking error 
o Standard deviation of active return (active return calculated with monthly 
return and correspondent monthly market return). 
 STEDEV.S of active return. 
23. Information ratio 
o Information ratio calculated with average yearly active return and tracking 
error. 
 Average of active return divided by Tracking error. 
24. Statistical significance of IR 
o Statistical significance of information ratio shown by a t-test between monthly 
active return and monthly market return. 
 T.TEST-formula on Information ratio. 
25. Sortino Ratio RF 
o Sortino ratio with regard to risk-free rate, monthly return data, risk free rate 
and Semivariance RF. 
(Average monthly data – risk-free rate)/(risk-free rate + (Beta*(average market return – risk-
free rate)) 
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Abstract 
For decades, researchers have studied whether and how school and teacher characteristics, school 
expenditures, students’ family background, school management and a range of other factors could explain the 
observed variance in student performance between schools and school districts. However, limited attention 
has been paid to the role of management control systems, and whether design and use of management 
controls systems in schools and municipal education authorities affect student performance. The present study 
seeks to narrow this gap by exploring what types of management control systems schools and municipal 
education authorities have, how they are used, how they relate to each other, and whether design and use of 
management control systems affect student performance. Malmi and Brown’s (2008) management controls as 
a package framework forms the basis for the design dimensions, while the use dimension is based on Simon’s’ 
(1995) distinction between interactive and diagnostic control systems. Head teachers and other employees in 
six schools and three municipal education authorities have been interviewed. In addition, information is 
collected from websites, plans, reports and other types of written material. Preliminary analyses propose that 
differences with respect to design and use of management control systems are related to the degree of 
learning focus within schools and municipal education authorities, to head teachers’ and school administrators’ 
professional background and to school building characteristics. When it comes to effect on student 
performance, more analyses are required.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
For decades, researchers from several research traditions have studied whether and how factors 
both controllable and incontrollable by schools and school authorities influence school efficiency.  
School economics researchers have studied the impact on student performance and school  
efficiency of factors such as school size (Barnett, Glass, Snowdon, & Stringer, 2002; Foreman-Peck & 
Foreman-Peck, 2006; Kuziemko, 2006; Lamdin, 1995), class size (Cooper & Cohn, 1997; Correa, 1993; 
Ding & Lehrer, 2011; Hoxby, 2000), allocation of time on different teaching and learning activities 
(Brown & Saks, 1987; Kuziemko, 2006; Millot & Lane, 2002; Rice, Croninger, & Roellke, 2002), the 
number of teachers relative to the number of pupils (Hanushek, 2002; Stern, 1989), the teachers’ 
education and experience (Hanushek, 2006b; Leigh, 2010) the teacher wage systems and teachers’ 
wage level (Cooper & Cohn, 1997; Southwick & Gill, 1997; Stern, 1989), teacher unions (Hoxby, 
1996), peer effects (Epple & Romano, 2010), grouping pupils according to skills (Betts & Shkolnik, 
2000; Glewwe, 1997; Zimmer & Toma, 2000), school resources (e.g.Hanushek, 1986, 1997, 2006a) 
and pupils’ socioeconomic background (e.g. Coleman et al., 1966). Effects on student performance of 
implementation of reforms such as free school choice (Borland & Howsen, 2000; Friedman, 1997; 
Hastings & Weinstein, 2008; Stevans & Sessions, 2000) and devolved financial management (e.g. 
Grosskopf & Moutray, 2001) have also been studied, as well as whether and how school building 
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characteristics affect student performance  (Earthman & Lemaster, 1996; Higgins, Hall, Wall, 
Woolner, & McCaughey, 2005). In general, this research finds that students’ family background has a 
significant effect on student performance. For factors controllable by schools and school authorities, 
such as teacher quality, school size, class size, school building characteristics and school resources as 
well as for reforms like free school choice and devolved financial management, the estimated effects 
on student performance are more ambiguous  (e.g. Hanushek & Welsh, 2006; Lamdin & Mintrom, 
1997).  
Within the field of management accounting research a number of studies have focused on issues 
related to how schools and local educational authorities respond to implementation of formula 
funding, devolved financial management and local management of schools (Agyemang, 2010; 
Broadbent & Laughlin, 1998; Edwards, Ezzamel, McLean, & Robson, 2000; Edwards, Ezzamel, & 
Robson, 1999; Edwards, Ezzamel, & Robson, 2005; Edwards, Ezzamel, Robson, & Taylor, 1995; 
Edwards, Ezzamel, Robson, & Taylor, 1996; Laughlin, Broadbent, Shearn, & Villig-Atherton, 1994; 
Levacic, 1990). Others have estimated school district efficiency using DEA analysis (Chalos, 1997) and 
stochastic frontier estimation (Dopuch & Gupta, 1997), applied a cost driver approach in order to 
understand cost differences in schools (Bjørnenak, 2000), compared the accountability models in 
education in New Zealand and England (Broadbent, Jacobs, & Laughlin, 1999), and studied Private 
Finance Initiative in schools (Ismail & Pendlebury, 2006) and whether and how formula funding and 
devolved budgeting affect equity in education (Mayston, 1998).  Apart from the number of studies 
focusing on formula funding, devolved financial management and local management of schools, the 
body of management accounting research on schools and education is fragmented with respect to 
topics researched, and few studies focus on the relationship between design and use of management 
control systems and student performance.   
Although studies from the field of school economics research have focused on effects on student 
performance of different management control systems and approaches, and studies from the field of 
management accounting and control research have studied how schools respond to such changes, 
there is still a gap of knowledge with respect to whether and how design and use of the package of 
control systems within schools and local school authorities affect student performance.  This fact, 
combined with the fact that some of the variance in student performance still is unexplained, has 
spurred an interest for studying the relationship between design and use of the package of 
management control systems in education and student performance. Due to limited prior research in 
this field, the objective of the present study is to achieve an in-depth knowledge of what types of 
management control systems schools and municipal educational authorities have, how they are 
used, how they relate to each other, and whether the design and use of management control 
systems, in the following also referred to as controls (Malmi & Brown, 2008), affect student 
performance.  
In the following section, the theoretical framework for the study is further discussed and developed 
while the third section discusses how the research questions best could be explored and why a case-
study approach has been chosen for the present study. The third section also presents the cases and 
discusses why these cases were chosen for the study.  Section four sums up the controls used in the 
different municipal school sectors and schools and how they are used, while the fifth section 
discusses the findings and present some proposals (hypotheses) for further research and testing.  
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 Theoretical framework 
 
Within management accounting research there has been a tendency to focus on specific 
management control systems rather than on a holistic understanding of the package of management 
control systems and how the different management control systems relate to each other (Chenhall, 
2003; Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Malmi & Brown, 2008). It is claimed that studies of only one or few 
management control systems might result in underspecified models and spurious results (Chenhall, 
2003) as well as a “piecemeal” understanding of how management control systems works in 
organisations (Margaret A. Abernethy & Brownell, 1997). To avoid such pitfalls, different holistic 
frameworks for studies of management control systems in organisations has been proposed 
(e.g.Anthony, 1965; Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Otley, 1999; Simons, 1995; Tessier 
& Otley, 2012).  
Comparison of Ouchi’s (1979) framework with school production characteristics indicates that both 
output control and cultural controls such as clan control, rituals and ceremonies might be useful 
control approaches in schools and education. The fact that Malmi and Brown (2008) include both 
cultural controls and  output controls in their management control systems as a package framework, 
and in addition include administrative controls, make it an appropriate framework for a study of 
design dimensions of management control systems in schools and education. Consequently, the 
present study also follows Malmi and Brown and understand management control systems as “all the 
devices and systems managers use to ensure that the behaviours and decisions of their employees are 
consistent with organisational objectives and strategies, but exclude pure decisions support 
systems”(Malmi & Brown, 2008, pp. 290-291). With respect to use dimensions, the present study 
draws on Simons’ (1995) distinction between interactive and diagnostic control systems. 
 
Management control systems design dimensions  
Malmi and Brown (2008) propose to group management control systems, or controls, into five types 
of controls; cultural controls, administrative controls, planning, cybernetic controls, and reward and 
compensations. The way they illustrate the management control system package (figure 1) indicates 
that planning, cybernetic controls and reward and compensations constitute one category of control 
systems, in the following referred to as “traditional management controls”,  while “cultural controls” 
and “administrative controls” constitute two other categories of control systems.  
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Figure 1 The control package (Malmi & Brown, 2008) 
 
 
Cultural controls 
Malmi and Brown  (2008) follow Flamholtz et al (1985) and define organisational culture as “the set 
of values, beliefs and social norms which tend to be shared by its members and, in turn, influence 
their thoughts and actions” (p158), and they define cultural control as consisting of three “aspects of 
cultural control; value based controls, symbol-based controls and clan controls” (Malmi & Brown, 
2008, p. 294). Value based controls are related the control systems called belief systems by Simons 
(1995) and function as a control mechanism by influencing behaviour in the desired direction. Vision 
statements, credos, objective statements and codes of conduct are examples of documents and 
expressions used in order to communicate and facilitate common organisational values, objectives 
and directions for the future (Malina & Selto, 2001; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Simons, 1995).  Value 
based controls are assumed to influence behaviour in three ways;  trough recruitment of individuals 
sharing the organisational values, 2)trough socialisation of the individual employee/groups of 
employees resulting in individual values aligned with the organisational values and 3) when 
individuals behave in accordance with organisational values even if their personal values might 
deviate from organisational values (Malmi & Brown, 2008).  
The second aspect of cultural controls in Malmi and Brown’s (2008) framework  is referred to as 
“symbol based controls” (Malmi & Brown, 2008). Symbols are visible expressions used in order to 
produce beliefs and values (Feldman & March, 1981) and to maintain or develop a particular type of 
culture (Schein, 1997 referred in Malmi and Brown, 2008).  Dress code and design of buildings and 
workspace are mentioned as examples of visible expressions signalling organisational culture (Malmi 
& Brown, 2008).  
“Clan controls” is the third aspect of cultural control (Malmi & Brown, 2008). “Clans” refer to groups 
of individuals with a common understanding of values and believes (Dent, 1991), while clan controls 
refer to the informal social structures within an unique organisation and the common understanding 
of values and boundaries the employees are socialised into when entering the organisation (Ouchi, 
1979)(Malmi & Brown, 2008). In line with Ouchi (1979), who refers to clan control as a separate form 
of control that might be useful under certain circumstances, in the following clan control is 
considered a separate type of cultural controls.  
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In professional organisations, like schools, employees usually have been socialised into a common 
understanding of values and practices during their education. This type of clan control is referred to 
as professional control (Ouchi, 1979). In organisations where the employees belong to one or several 
professional groups, it is reasonable to assume that  employee behaviour might be influenced by 
both professional and organisational values, and that conflicts might occur between organisational 
and professional values and norms and between different professional groups. For that reason, and 
even if it might be difficult to distinguish between them, in the following both professional control 
and clan control are mentioned as cultural controls.  
Researchers consider it possible to influence organisational culture by use of value and symbol based 
controls (Malmi & Brown, 2008) or belief systems (Simons, 1995. However, organisational culture is 
also considered a contextual and contingent variable influencing and pervading the management 
control systems without being a control system or control system element itself  (Ferreira & Otley, 
2009). In the present paper, it is assumed that it is possible for managers to influence respectively 
the organisational and professional values and culture, and thereby influence the clan and 
professional controls by use of “value facilitators/carriers” such as vision, mission and objective 
statements, symbols, education, training, traditions and rituals. However, the opposite might also be 
possible; that the organisational and professional values influence the value facilitators/carriers and 
their role in the organisation. Therefore, the interrelationships between the “carriers/facilitatiors” of 
organisational and professional values and the four aspects of cultural controls might be as 
illustrated in figure 2 below. In the following it is assumed that the value facilitators/carriers are the 
devises that managers have to their disposal in order to control organisational and professional 
values and thereby professional and clan controls.  
 
Figure 2: Cultural controls and  organizational and professional values 
 
 
Planning 
Planning, the second type of control in Malmi and Brown’s management control systems as a 
package framework, is defined as the process where goals for the organisation and the organisational 
units are set, and the “standard to be achieved” and “the level of effort and behaviour expected” are 
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made clear to organisational members (Malmi & Brown, 2008, p. 292). Others define planning  as “a 
process of choosing and setting in train activities to achieve certain goals” (Berry, Broadbent, & Otley, 
2005b, p. 45) and strategic planning as the process where ”decisions are made within the context of 
the goals and strategies that emerged from the strategy formulation activity” (Anthony & Young, 
2003, p. 18). Planning constitutes an ex ante form of control (Malmi & Brown, 2008) and even if 
definitions of planning are some different, the definitions agree that planning is a process where 
future goals, standards, activities to achieve the goals, decisions and expected behaviour and levels 
of effort are decided.  
Malmi and Brown (2008) split planning into action planning which is planning for a short horizon and 
with at tactical focus, and long range planning which has a more strategic orientation .  Although 
short run planning, action planning, could have a time horizon of only a few days (Berry et al., 
2005b), short term planning do often refer to planning with a one year time horizon while long range 
plans might be prepared for several years or even decades (Anthony & Young, 2003; Berry et al., 
2005b) 
Malmi and Brown (2008)  define planning as a separate form of control distinguished from 
budgeting, financial and non-financial performance measurement and the cybernetic control 
process, and they mention that planning could take place without reference to budgets or financial 
measures.  In other conceptual frameworks, for instance in the management control process 
(e.g.Anthony & Young, 2003), planning is coupled to budget and performance measurement and 
constitute one of four phases in a cyclical management control process.  
Planning has been criticized for always been wrong because it is impossible to estimate the future 
accurately  and for the possibility that plans are interpreted rather than followed (Anthony & Young, 
2003). Despite this, planning and plans are considered as potentially important activities and control 
devices and considered a separate type of control system. 
 
Cybernetic controls 
The third type of controls in Malmi and Browns’ (2008)  management control system as a package 
framework is cybernetic controls. A cybernetic control process is a purposive process where actual 
performance is compared to a standard, where any deviation between the two is reported 
backwards and where necessary changes are made to modify activities or systems in order to reduce 
or eliminate the deviation (Green & Welsh, 1988). Malmi and Brown (2008) include budgets, financial 
measures, non-financial measures and hybrid systems, containing both financial and non-financial 
measures, in the “cybernetic controls” type of management control systems.  
From management accounting and control theory, we know that plans, budgets and financial and 
non-financial performance measurement systems might also be used as information and decision 
support systems, to communicate goals and strategies  and to direct attention towards activities and 
behaviour of strategic importance (e.g. Berry, Broadbent, & Otley, 2005a; Malina & Selto, 2001).  
Further, formal management control systems, as well as planning, might be used for legitimating 
purposes (Brunsson, 1989; Edwards et al., 2000; Edwards et al., 1995) and to prevent organisations 
or organisational units from undesirable influence from their superiors (Broadbent & Laughlin, 1998; 
Laughlin et al., 1994).  
117
Planning and budgeting are referred to as ex ante forms of control, and a budget is defined as a plan 
transformed or “translated” into monetary terms (e.g. Anthony & Young, 2003).  In the same way as 
planning might be short term and/or long term planning, budgeting might also be short and/or long 
term. For these reasons, planning and budgeting could have been handled as one type of controls. 
However, the present study follows the “management control process” (e.g. Anthony & Young, 
2003), and refers to planning and budgeting as two separate types of controls.  
The remaining part of the “cybernetic controls” in Malmi and Brown’s  (2008) framework includes 
three types of controls; financial, non-financial and hybrid measurement systems, indicating that 
performance evaluation should be based on formal performance measures.  Ferreira and Otley 
(2009) propose another approach to performance evaluation and include both subjective, objective 
and mixed performance information as well as formal and informal information and controls. 
Organisations, and especially public organisations providing professional services, might have 
ambiguous objectives and/or produce services that are difficult or impossible to measure. Therefore, 
it might be difficult or impossible to only use formal and objective performance measures for control 
purposes (Hofstede, 1981; Ouchi, 1979).  In the present paper, Malmi and Brown’s (2008) financial, 
non-financial and hybrid measurement systems are replaced by a group of control systems referred 
to as “performance measurement and evaluation systems”. This group of control systems  might 
include formal performance measurement and evaluation systems as well as routines such as 
evaluating accounting reports against budgets, actuals performance against plans, and other forms of 
formal and informal performance measurement and evaluation procedures based on subjective 
and/or objective measures and information.  
Rewards and compensations 
Rewards and compensations, the fourth group of management controls in the management control 
package (Malmi & Brown, 2008), might be monetary (compensations) or non-monetary and might be 
given to individual employees and/or to groups of employees. Bonus and salary increases are 
examples of monetary rewards, while recognition, praise, titles, and job and office assignments are 
examples of non-monetary rewards.  Absence of rewards and “naming and shaming”  are examples 
of negative rewards/punishment (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012).  
Rewards could be linked to formal control systems, such as budgets, but also to other and more 
informal control systems and information and/or subjective evaluations (Malmi & Brown, 2008; 
Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012). They might be extrinsic, which means that they are “tangible, 
observable outcomes given to the individual upon completion of a task”, or intrinsic which means that 
“rewards can be received and experienced by the individual independent of the organizational 
evaluation process” (Flamholtz et al., 1985, p. 43). Further, they might be used in order to motivate 
employees to increased effort and performance and to build or maintain cultural control (Malmi & 
Brown, 2008). It is also known that unintended and adverse effects of incentive systems are common 
(Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012).  
In the following, rewards and compensations is maintained as a separate type of control systems 
included in the group of management controls referred to as “traditional management controls”.  
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Administrative controls 
Administrative controls, the fifth type of controls in Malmi and Brown’s  framework  (2008), is split 
into three subcategories; organizational structure, governance structure, and procedures and 
policies.  
Organisational structure refers to “the formal specification of different roles for organisational 
members, or tasks for groups, to ensure that the activities of the organisation are carried out” 
(Chenhall, 2003, p. 144). Consequently, it is about how the employees in an organization are 
organized in groups and hierarchies and it “determines the responsibilities and accountabilities of 
organisational participants; it equally defines the activities that individuals with specific roles should 
not pay attention to” (Ferreira & Otley, 2009, p. 269). In addition, organisational structure influences 
motivation, effort and efficiency of individuals and groups of individuals, as well as the flow of 
information and how control systems are designed (Chenhall, 2003). The organisational structure 
might affect the possibility for and role of clan control. For instance, in schools with little cooperation 
between the teachers and where students and teaching are organized in traditional classes, the 
extent of clan control might be limited. In a more open school where teachers are organised in teams 
and the teaching activities are visible for other teachers, clan control mechanisms are probably 
stronger. Consequently, there might be a relationship between organisational structure and 
clan/professional control.  
In the management control literature, organisational structure is considered a management control 
system contingency factor (e.g. Chenhall, 2003) as well as a control system (e.g. Ferreira & Otley, 
2009; Malmi & Brown, 2008). Since organisational structure is, or at least might be, a result of 
managerial decisions in order to influence behaviour and/or accountability, the present paper 
follows Malmi and Brown (2008) and Ferreira and Otley (2009) and consider organisational structure 
a control system itself.   
Governance structure is related to the organisational structure and it is about board structure and 
composition, management and project teams, the formal lines of authority and accountability, and 
about systems to secure vertical and horizontal coordination of activities within the organisation 
(Malmi & Brown, 2008). However, organisations having the same organisational structure might 
differ with respect to governance structure, for instance, with respect to what the organisational 
units are accountable for. The organisational units in organisations with identical organisational 
structure might for instance be accountable for quantities of inputs used, activities performed, 
quantities produced, revenue, cost and/or profit  and/or responsible for characteristics of the 
production process (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012).  
The third type of administrative controls,  policies and procedures, are referred to as “the 
bureaucratic approach to specifying the processes and behaviour within an organization” (Malmi & 
Brown, 2008, p. 294) and this type of controls include standard operating procedures and practices, 
rules and policies  and action control (op.cit.).   
Standard operating procedures and practices, rules and policies include “the set of written rules, 
procedures, policies, and operating manuals (SOPs)” that are “used to guide managers as they 
administer their departments” as well as “policy guidelines, job descriptions and prescriptions for how 
managers should handle operational situations that might arise” (Macintosh & Daft, 1987, p. 51) 
while action control includes behavioural constraints, preaction reviews, action accountability and 
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redundancy (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012).  Physical constraint such as locks and passwords, 
administrative controls such as restricted decision making authority and separation of duties for 
instance related to payment, are examples of behavioural constraints. Preaction review refers to 
superiors’ review of a subordinate individual or an organisational unit’s plans before the plans are 
approved and carried out.  Action accountability is about holding employees accountable for actions 
performed or expected to be performed, while redundancy refers to “assigning more employees to a 
task than is strictly necessary” or “having backup employees (or equipment) available” (Merchant & 
Van der Stede, 2012, p. 84) in order to avoid that critical operations stop or that tasks are not carried 
out due to lack of employees or equipment (op.cit.).  
A altered management control as a package framework 
The above discussion of Malmi and Brown’s (2008) management control system as a package 
framework, leads up to a somewhat altered framework for studying design dimensions of 
management control systems. The altered framework is illustrated in figure 3. First, the altered 
framework emphasis that all types of control systems and approaches should be based on and 
communicate organisational values and objectives. Organisational values and objectives are typically 
stated in vision, mission and objective statements. Therefore, “vision”, “mission” and “objective 
statements” are mentioned in the top of the illustration even if such statements are also mentioned 
among the “carriers/facilitators of organisational values” that constitute an element in “cultural 
controls”. Further, figure 3 illustrates the assumed relationships between carriers/facilitators of 
organisational and professional values, organisational and professional values and clan and 
professional control, as well as the couplings between planning, budgeting and performance 
measurement proposed by normative theory (e.g. Anthony & Young, 2003) and between 
organisational structure and governance structure.   
 
Figure 3: An altered management control system package framework 
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Use dimensions of management control systems 
Simons (1995) categorizes management control systems into four types of control systems mainly 
according to how and for what purposes the management control systems are used (Ferreira & 
Otley, 2009). The four types of systems are belief systems, boundary systems, interactive systems 
and diagnostic systems.  
Belief systems are “used to inspire and direct the search for new opportunities” (Simons, 1995, p. 7) 
while boundary systems are  “used to set limits of opportunity-seeking behavior” in order to avoid 
risks (Simons, 1995, p. 7). The belief and boundary systems relate to the “cultural controls” in the 
management control system package (Malmi & Brown, 2008). Boundaries might be communicated 
through the same types of documents and other means of communication as for the belief systems. 
For instance, a mission statement might at the same time convey information about what the 
individuals and the organization as such should be and achieve, and about what the organization 
should not carry out or put effort into.  
Diagnostic control systems are systems “used to motivate, monitor and reward achievement of 
specific goals” and they typically contain critical performance variables (Simons, 1995, p. 7).  
Diagnostic use of management control systems refers to comparing actual performance against 
standards, objectives, plans, budget, and/or benchmarks.  Diagnostic control systems could be 
cybernetic control systems, but diagnostic management control systems do also include 
management control systems not fulfilling the strong cybernetic feedback circle. Diagnostic use of 
management control systems and information within an organizational unit is typical carried out by 
one of a few managers (Margareth A. Abernethy & Brownell, 1999).   
The fourth “levers of control” are systems “used to stimulate organizational learning and the 
emergence of new ideas and strategies” (Simons, 1995, p. 7). Systems used for this purpose is 
referred to as interactive management control systems, and are considered useful for organizations 
facing strategic uncertainty (Simons, 1995). The same (formal) control systems might be categorized 
as an interactive or a diagnostic control system dependent on how it is used. Interactive use of 
management control systems is characterized by involvement of managers from different levels of 
the organization. Typically, interactive use takes place as an open-minded interpretation and 
discussion of information conveyed by formal systems and information from other sources 
(Margareth A. Abernethy & Brownell, 1999).    
Interactive and diagnostic use relates to how information provided by systems is used. However, the 
terms “diagnostic” and “interactive” are also used to describe how management control systems are 
or could be prepared. For instance whether budgets are prepared interactively in a process involving 
managers from different levels in an organization or prepared diagnostically by one manager without 
involvement of other managers or employees (Margareth A. Abernethy & Brownell, 1999).  
So far it has been mentioned that the same systems, and/or devises might constitute elements in 
both beliefs and boundary systems, and that the same systems could be both prepared and/or used 
interactively or diagnostically. For instance, performance measurement and management system, 
such as a balanced scorecard, might be prepared and used interactively of diagnostically as well as be 
a means to communicate organisational strategy, values and boundaries to members of the 
organisation and thereby also function as a belief and/or boundary system. Consequently, the same 
measurement control system might fit into all four types of control systems in Simons’ “levers of 
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control”. For this reason, it is uninteresting to ask whether a particular control system is a belief, 
boundary, diagnostic or interactive system.  It is more interesting to ask whether the different types 
of systems and devices are prepared and/or used interactively or diagnostically and to what extent 
managers intentionally use the different systems and devices in order to communicate beliefs and 
boundaries.  
 
Dimensions of time 
Management control systems might be used continually or more or less frequently. In addition, the 
information communicated and provided by formal management control systems might be more or 
less updated, preparation and revisions might take place more or less frequently, and controls like 
plans and budgets might be prepared for shorter or longer periods of time. It is reasonable to assume 
that how often management control systems, or management control system elements, are 
prepared, changed, updated and/or used might indicate the managers emphasis on the different 
control systems or system elements in their control of individuals and organisational units.  
In addition, when systems were implemented or altered is interesting information related to 
discussions of effects of management control systems. Therefore, when and how often the different 
control systems were and/or are prepared, updated, and used are dimensions of time that should be 
added to the dimensions of design and use discussed above. 
Now and then organisations make changes in or implement new management control system.  Either 
an existing system is altered or a new system is implemented it may take some time from the change 
is carried out until intended, or unintended, effects materialize in behaviours and performance. For 
these reasons, studies of effects of management control systems should also focus on whether 
management control systems have been recently altered and, if so, when they were altered.  
 
A framework for studies of design, use and time dimesions of management 
control systems 
 
Inspired by Ferreira and Otley (2009), the above discussion of design, use and time dimensions of 
management control systems is summed up in terms of questions for each type of controls.  
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Figure 4: A framework for studying design, use and time dimensions of cultural controls 
 Questions related to the dimensions of 
Types of controls 
and control elements 
Design Use Time 
Vision, credo 
statement, local 
mission/objective 
statements… 
 
Does the organisation have 
vision, mission, objective …. 
statement? What are they 
focused on?  
Who participated in the 
formulation/preparation of the 
vision, mission, ….?  
If ever, who bring the vision, 
mission.…. into attention and 
how? 
To what extend does the vision, 
mission …. inspire or delimitate 
action and effort?   
When was the vision, mission 
…. formulated? For each 
statement/document: How 
often is it revised? How often 
is it brought into attention by 
school management 
(headmaster) 
Rituals, ceremonies, 
routines,….(organisat
ional and 
professional) 
What types of rituals, 
ceremonies and routines 
does the organisation 
have? 
For each type of rituals, 
ceremonies, routines: To what 
extent do they signal beliefs/ 
boundaries? To what extent do 
organisational members 
follows/use/ participate. Who 
participate in decisions regarding 
what routines,… the organization 
use/have? Who bring rituals,… 
into attention? 
For each (type of) rituals, 
ceremonies, routines…: When 
were it implemented/ 
changed? How often/when is it 
used? How often is it brought 
into attention by school 
management (headmaster)? 
 
Symbols (buildings, 
dresscodes,..)  
What (types of) symbols 
does the organisation 
have? 
Does the organisation 
deliberately use symbols to signal 
organisational values? 
To what extent do they signal 
beliefs/boundaries? 
Who participate in decisions 
regarding what symbols the 
organization use/have? 
When were the different 
symbols introduced? How 
often are they 
revised/changed? 
Education and 
training 
What types of 
supplementary education 
and training do employees 
attend? 
 
To what extent do employees 
attend supplementary education 
and training? Who decide what 
type of education and training, 
and how many (proportion of) 
employees attend? Are 
supplementary education and 
training used as facilitators of 
cultural control? 
How often do employees get 
an opportunity to participate 
in supplementary courses and 
education? How often do they 
attend supplementary courses 
and education 
 
Organisational values 
and clan control 
Do management and 
employees consider their 
organisation to have 
common values? To what 
extent are common values 
shared by all employees 
and managers?  
To what extent do the values 
facilitate/inspire to action and 
effort/direct attention? To what 
extent do common values 
delimitate actions and effort? 
Have there been recent 
changes with respect to 
organisational values and the 
presence and weight on clan 
control? 
Professional values 
and control 
Are the values of the 
professionals in line with 
the organisational values? 
To what extent do 
professional groups follow 
the values of their 
profession rather than the 
value of the organisation? 
To what extent do professional 
values facilitate/inspire to action 
and effort/direct attention? To 
what extent do professional 
values delimitate actions and 
effort? 
Have there been recent 
changes with respect to 
professional values the 
presence of and weight on 
professional control?  
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Figure 5: A framework for studying design, use and time dimensions of cultural controls 
 Questions related to the dimensions of 
Types of controls 
and control elements 
Design Use Time 
Planning What types of plans are 
prepared? 
What do they focus on? 
Are the plans in line with 
objectives, vision, mission,.. 
statements? 
Who participate in the 
preparation of plan(s) and 
how?  How participate in 
evaluation of performance 
against plans, and how?  Who 
participate in revisions and 
how? 
When/how often is the plans 
prepared/revised? 
How long is the planning 
horizon? 
When/how often is 
performance evaluated against 
the plan? 
Budget What types of budgets are 
prepared?  
Is/are the budget/-s coupled 
to plans, objectives,…? Who 
is responsible for the budget 
preparation?  
Who participate in the 
preparation of the budget(s) 
and how? 
Who participate in the budget 
control, and how? 
Who participate in budget 
revisions and how? 
How long is the budget 
horizon? 
How often is budget control 
carried out? 
How often do budget revisions 
take place? 
 
Performance 
measurement 
What types of measures/ 
measurement 
systems/evaluation processes 
do the organisation have? 
Are the measures coupled 
(causal related) to overriding 
objectives, plans and 
budgets? Are they KPIs? 
Who participate in preparation 
of /changes in performance 
evaluation and measurement 
systems and processes, and 
how? 
Who participate in the 
discussion and interpretation of 
performance measures and 
other information for 
performance evaluation? 
To what extent are 
performance measurement and 
evaluation systems considered 
belief and boundary systems by 
employees and management? 
How often are data and 
information collected? How 
often are measures prepared? 
How often/when are the 
measures presented? How 
updated are they when 
presented? 
When was the measurement 
system implemented, and 
whether the set of measures 
and indicators have been 
altered recently? 
Rewards and 
compensations 
What formal and/or informal 
rewards and compensation 
systems exists within the 
organisation? How are such 
systems coupled to other 
formal and/or informal 
controls? 
Who participate in 
preparation/changes/target 
setting and use of rewards and 
compensations systems?  
To what extent do the systems 
communicate beliefs and 
boundaries? 
When was these systems 
implemented and/or changed? 
How often do rewards and 
compensations take place/are 
carried out? 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: A framework for studying design, use and time dimensions of cultural controls 
Questions related to: Design Use Time 
Organisational structure How is employees 
organized into groups and 
hierarchies? 
If the organisational structure 
has been altered recently, 
who participated in 
discussions and decisions? 
When was the organisational 
structure altered?  
Governance structure How is/what characterize 
the governance structure?  
If the governance structure 
has been altered recently, 
who participated in 
discussions and decisions? 
When was the governance 
structure altered? 
Policies and procedures What types of policies and 
procedures exists within 
the organisation?  
Do the different types mainly 
fit into the belief or boundary 
concepts? Are new or altered 
policies or procedures 
prepared/implemented in a 
diagnostic or interactive 
manner? 
How often are policies and 
procedures put into attention 
and altered. When were they 
altered?  
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Method and sample 
 
What management controls schools and school authorities have, how and by whom they are 
prepared and used, why schools use their systems in the way they do, whether and how different 
types of controls supplement or substitute each other, and whether differences with respect to 
design and use of the management control system package might influence school performance are 
questions focused in the present study. These types of research questions, in symphony with the 
request for in depth knowledge and understanding of management control systems in schools and 
education and limited prior research in this field, calls for a case-study approach (Yin, 1994) 
The research questions require some variation with respect to design and use of management 
control systems between the cases. Therefore, three municipal school administrations and six 
schools were selected for the study.  To be able to also address whether and why schools operating 
under the same municipal control systems do not have and use the same internal control systems, 
two schools of similar size and having students with similar familiar background were selected from 
each municipality.  
Municipality M1 is a rural, inland municipality.  M1 has two primary schools (S11 and S12) and one 
lower secondary school.  Municipality M2 is a medium sized city in the Norwegian context while M3 
is a smaller city. All three municipalities are so called “two-level” municipalities having no 
organisational levels between the head teachers and the chief administrative officer.  Nevertheless, 
there are differences between the three. In municipality M1 the head teachers report directly to the 
chief administrative officer, while in municipality M2 and M3 the head teachers report to a head of 
municipal school and childhood affairs in the chief administrative officer’s staff. In addition, 
Municipal M1 and M2 have one educational adviser in the municipal staff while M2 has a 
department for educational and childhood affairs with six employees.  In all three Municipalities, the 
mayor and the majority in the municipal council are from the non-socialist parties. With respect to 
how the political work is organized, municipality M3 has a board (kommuneloven §10) for cultural, 
educational and childhood affairs, municipality M2 has a committee (kommuneloven, §10) for 
educational and childhood affairs, and municipal M1 has neither a committee nor a board for such 
affaires. In municipal M1 all cases related to educational affairs are passed in the municipal council. 
The two smallest schools are the schools located in M1.  These schools has respectively about 200 
(S11) and 120 (S12) students .  The two largest schools,S21 and S22, has about 500 students and the 
remaining two schools, S31 and S32 has respectively about 200 and 170 students.  The two largest 
schools, S21 and S22, are combined primary and lower secondary schools teaching students at grade 
levels one to ten. The other four schools are primary schools teaching students at grade level one to 
seven  
In each municipality, the head of municipal school affairs and the/an educational adviser where 
interviewed. In each school, the interviewees were the head teacher, or a temporarily appointed 
head teacher who use to be a deputy head teacher (S22 and S31), one or two deputy head teachers, 
one or two teachers and one or two assistants. The interviews were carried through as semi-
structured interviews. The interview guide is attached in appendix X. The interview lasted from about 
40 minutes to two hours. Notes were written during the interviews and with one exception, all 
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interviews were recorded. The table below gives an overview over the interviewees and how they 
will be referred to in the following.  
 
Table 1: Interviewees in schools and municipal school administrations 
Municipalities Interviewees Schools Interviewees 
M1 
The chief administrative officer (and 
head of municipal school 
affairs)(rådmann) (M1c) 
1 of 1 educational adviser (M1ea) 
S11 
The head teacher (S11h) 
The deputy head teacher (S11d) 
1 Teacher (S11t) 
1 Assistant (S11a) 
S12 
The head teacher (S12H) 
1 Teacher (S12T) 
1 Assistant (S12A) 
M2 
The head of childhood and youth services 
(Kommunalsjef) (M2h) 
1 of 3 educational advisers (M2ea) 
S21 
The head teacher, (S21h) 
2 deputy head teachers, (S21d1 and S21d2) 
2 Teachers, (S21t1 and S21t2) 
2 Assistant (S21a1 and S21a2) 
S22 
The temporarily appointed head  teacher-  a 
deputy head teacher (S22h) 
2 deputy head teachers, (S22d1 and S22d2) 
1 Teacher (S22t1)1 Assistant (S22A1 and 
S22a2) 
3 
The head of childhood and youth services 
(Kommunalsjef) (M3h), 
1 of 1 educational adviser (M3ea) 
S31 
The temporarily appointed head  teacher = a 
deputy head teacher (S31h) 
1 Teacher (S31t) 
1 Assistant (S31a) 
S32 
The head teacher (S32h) 
The deputy head teacher (S31d) 
1 Teacher (S31t) 
1 Assistant (S31a) 
 
Management controls in schools and municipal school administrations 
 
Norwegian primary and lower secondary schools operates under, and are controlled by, a common 
objective statement and common regulations given in law, regulations and curriculum. According to 
the overriding objective statement, schools should focus on learning and knowledge but also give 
student historical and cultural insight, increased knowledge and understanding of the national 
cultural heritage and the common international cultural tradition, cultural plurality and encourage 
democracy, equality, a scientific way of thinking and provide their student with a lot of other skills 
and attitudes.  
In recent years the Ministry of education has introduced a school output control systems in terms of 
as set of national tests and a national Pupil Survey. The results from the tests and the survey, as well 
as exam results and term marks for students leaving lower secondary school, are published on a web 
site1. However, the results from the national tests are only published at a municipal level.  In 
addition, a new curriculum for primary and secondary school, The Knowledge Promotion Reform, 
was implemented in (2006). Both the Knowledge Promotion Reform and the national tests have a 
strong focus on basics skills in reading, mathematics and English.  
                                                          
1
 Skoleporten.udir.no 
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 Cultural controls. 
 
Vision  
Two of the municipalities have a vision for the municipal educational sector.  For municipality M1 the 
vision is short and it is focusing on well-being, confidence, mastering and learning. The vision is the 
basis for an action plan called “action plan for wellbeing, confidence and learning” prepared mainly 
by school headmasters and the educational advisor, and discussed and passed in the municipal 
council. Municipality M3’s vision is long (147 words) and it highlights that the educational sector 
appreciates and encourages effort, respect, participation, contribution, curiosity, self-knowledge and 
seeks to create motivating learning environments and support left out students. Municipality M2 
does not have a vision. When asked about a vision, the educational advisor referred to their strategic 
map focusing on overriding objectives and measures to be taken in order to achieve the objectives.  
All six schools have a vision. The vision is published on the school web site. For four of the schools the 
vision is a short formulation easy to communicate to employees as well as to pupils, parents and 
other school stakeholders.  For S31 and S32, the vision statements consist of respectively 198 and 
487 words. School S11 has the same vision as the municipal level vision. As we can see from the  
table below, learning and knowledge are key concepts in three of the four short visions. School S12 
focuses on proudness and growth and development within frames of confidence and the visions for 
the two schools in M3 focus on what might be seen as preconditions for learning in terms of 
processes, actions and school climate. They only touch upon school outcome in terms of student 
learning and knowledge.     
 
Table 2: School level visions for four of the schools and central concepts mentioned in the S31 and S32 visions. 
School Vision/concepts and keywords mentioned in the visions 
S11 «Sammen i trivsel og trygghet. Aktiv i læring og mestring.» 
S12 «Vi er stolte av skolen vår og kjenner at vi hører til på en skule som har trygge rammer for vekst og 
utvikling.» 
S21 «Mennesker i utvikling og samspill. Kunnskap, samarbeid og trivsel.» 
S22 «Trivsel, læring, likeverd.» 
S31 Trygge elever, engasjerte lærere og foreldre, gjensidig respekt, tett samarbeid hjem/skole, tydelige 
voksne – gode rollemodeller, tydelig fagmål, aktivt og godt læringsmiljø, stille krav og 
forventninger til elevene mht, fagmål og adferd, variert og engasjerende undervisning, Elevene: 
utfordret, opplever mestring, …Gjøre elvene til selvstendige mennesker, elevene tar ansvar for 
egen læring, tilbakemeldinger, elevene blir sett og hørt, alle like viktige, stå for egne meninger, 
respekt for andres meninger, stolte av skolen , lyst til å lære, glede seg til videre skolegang,  
S32 «Alle barn er alles barn». Trygghet, respekt, mange intelligenser, oppmuntre, sterke sider, ulike 
evner, talent, sterke sider.  Varierte metoder, feedback, læringsstrategier => utvikle sterke sider og 
tro på seg selv gjennom å finne noe de kan lykkes i. Alle får kontinuerlig, ærlig og konstruktiv 
feedback for læring og utvikling. Utvikle til å ta lederansvar, Filosofiske samtaler om etiske 
spørsmål=> modne, moralske borgere. Undring, sette ord på tanker. Høy kvalitet på 
læringssituasjoner, nye impulser, faglig påfyll. Viktigste kjennetegn på kvalitet: høy trivsel og barn 
og voksne som gleder seg til å gå på skolen hver dag. Nytenkende og utviklingsorientert, alle viser 
omsorg og bryr seg om hverandre.  
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The role of vision and mission statements is to influence organizational values. To measure whether 
and how the visions influence organizational values are difficult, but whether or to what extent the 
respondents can replicate the vision might indicate whether the vision is assimilated in the 
organization.  
In school S11, the head teacher (S11h) refers to “trivsel, trygghet og læring” and the action plan 
when asked about the vision. In addition he mentioned that he inherited the vision and the 
connection between the vision and the action plan that has been prepared together with the other 
head teachers and the educational advisor. When he were appointed as a head teacher about 2,5 
years ago, he carried through a process in order to anchor the vision.  The answers from the other 
respondents in school S11 indicate that the vision is known at least by the pedagogical employees. 
The deputy head teacher (S11d) mentioned “trivsel trygghet og læring” when talking about the 
action plan and the teacher (S11t) mentioned “trivsel og læring” when asked about objectives.  The 
interviewed assistant (S11a) knew that the school has a vision, but she did not remember it.  
When asked about the school’s vision, the head teacher (S12h) in school S12 answered “Vi har en 
visjon om at alle skal oppleve mestring og at de skal få oppleve vekst og utvikling i trygge rammer – 
innenfor trygge rammer». She further told that the vision was prepared by the staff some years ago. 
The interviewed teacher referred to the vision as “At vi har det bra, at vi viser respekt og at vi lager 
det slik at elevene opplever mestring» (S12t). The assistant could not replicate the vision, but also she 
knew that it is about confidence. Both the teacher and the assistant referred to words or 
formulations from the vision when asked about school values and what characterizes the school. 
In school S21, the vision was formulated about 7 years ago. The head teacher told that the vision, 
and their pedagogical platform and human resources responsibility platform, are regularly referred 
to in internal meetings. For instance, in terms of “How is what we decided now related to the 
vision….” (S21h) questions. However, when asked about the vision, the deputy head teacher for the 
primary school level referred only to the first part of it and answered: «vi har jo visjonen vår, som går 
på dette med menneskesynet, at alle er like mye verd og muligheter til å utvikle seg og det med tillit 
og respekt. Det er da menneskesynet, eller elevsynet, og visjonen den heter mennesker i utvikling og 
samspill». Sshe continued: «Det er klart at det er jo mye fokus på det faglige, og det skal det være, 
men vi må ikke miste den andre biten. At en bygger hele mennesket.» (S21d1). The interviewed 
primary school teacher did not remember the vision, while the primary school assistant looked for a 
poster on the walls and said “it should be some place here”.  When asked about whether the vision is 
pointed to in meetings and other occasions, she said “Det gjør de nok. Men nå er jo ikke vi assistenter 
så mye med på møter og sånn her» (S21a1).  
By accident, no direct questions concerning the vision were asked to the lower secondary school 
teacher (S21t2) and deputy head teacher (S21d2), and none of them referred to the vision or 
formulations from the vision, when asked about school characteristics and school objectives or in 
other situations during the interviews.  The lower secondary school assistant (S21a2) knew that the 
school has a vision, but he could not refer to any formulations or keywords from it.  
In the other school in municipality M2 the vision consist of three words; “Trivsel, læring, likeverd”. 
According to the deputy head teacher for the lower secondary school department (S22d2), the vision 
was designed by the lower secondary school employees in the 1990s, before the former primary and 
lower secondary schools merged. According to her, what is going on inside the school reflects the 
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vision, but also she also admitted that: “visjonen har vært der, men den har på en måte vært for lite 
blitt tatt tak i så at alle allikevel har et forhold til at dette er et mål.» Even if the vision stems from the 
former lower secondary school, both the interviewed teacher (S22t1) and assistant from the primary 
school level (S22a1) came up with the formulation as soon as they were asked. The teacher (S22t1) 
told that the vision was designed, as a common basis for the future, when the two schools were 
merged. Also the deputy head teacher for the primary school (S22d1) came up with the vision when 
asked, and continued “Den tror jeg sitter i panna (10:47) hos de fleste” (S22d1). 
Opposed to the primary school employees, the temporarily appointed head teacher (S22h) had to 
think it over for a while before he came up with the vision, and he admitted that “Det er ikke sånn 
som jeg på en måte svelget med en gang og tenkte at det var en kjempegod visjon. Så en er vel ikke – 
den er vel ikke «min» sånn sett. Den har ikke vært kommunisert noe voldsomt ut heller. …. Ja likeverd 
er jo noe som – nei, altså, den brukes ikke i noen sammenhenger sånn.” (S22h) The fact that the 
temporarily appointed headmaster has been at the school only for about 3 years, while the other 
primary school employees have been at the school for more than 10 years, indicate that the vision 
has played a more important role some years ago.  All respondents from this school used the 
questions about the vision as an opportunity to tell about a school-wide project called PALS. The 
project focuses on how positive student behavior could be strengthened by use of positive feedback 
and rewards during the school day. 
School S31 is coupled to an international school development program (network). As a part of this 
program, a vision was formulated about five years ago as a result of a process involving school 
employees, parents and politicians. All three interviewees from the school were able to give an 
account of some of the elements in the vision and all of them told how it came about.  
School S32 participate in the same network as school S31, and also for school S32 the vision is a 
result of a process about 5 years ago involving all employees. The head teacher referred to the 
process and the vision as «Det som skjedde var at vi utarbeidet en visjon som gud og hvermann etter 
hvert gjør” (S32h), the deputy head teacher (S32d) referred to the vision and the process leading up 
to it with more enthusiasm. He highlighted that «det overordnede det er skolen sin visjon. Og den 
bærer preg av at vi ser hele eleven», and the fact that if the vision should influence actions and 
efforts, the mental models of the individual employee have to be altered. Also the assistant (S32a) 
and the teacher (S32t) referred to the vision as an important element in the school, although the 
assistant said: «..men så tenker jeg også at hverdagen må på en måte ikke forsvinne vekk i visjonen. 
…. Vi må ikke være så opptatt av at alt skal være så flott og voldsomt at vi av og til glemmer de 
dagligdagse tingene» (S32a). 
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Table 3: Vision – an overview  
    
 S11 S12 S21 S22 S31 S32 
 «Sammen i trivsel og trygghet. 
Aktiv i læring og mestring.» 
Strategic map The educational sector appreciates 
and encourages effort, respect, 
participation, contribution, curiosity, 
self-knowledge and seeks to create 
motivating learning environments 
and support left out students (147 
words) 
The 
vision/vision 
keywords 
«Sammen i 
trivsel og 
trygghet. 
Aktiv i læring 
og 
mestring.» 
«Vi er stolte 
av skolen vår 
og kjenner at 
vi hører til på 
en skule som 
har trygge 
rammer for 
vekst og 
utvikling.» 
«Mennesker i 
utvikling og 
samspill. 
Kunnskap, 
samarbeid og 
trivsel.» 
«Trivsel, 
læring, 
likeverd» 
Trygge elever, 
engasjerte lærere 
og foreldre, 
gjensidig respekt, 
tett samarbeid 
hjem/skole, 
tydelige voksne – 
gode 
rollemodeller, 
tydelig fagmål, 
aktivt og godt 
læringsmiljø, ++ 
(198 words) 
«Alle barn er 
alles barn». 
Trygghet, 
respekt, 
mange 
intelligenser, 
oppmuntre, 
sterke sider, 
ulike evner, 
talent, sterke 
sider. ++ (487 
words) 
Came about 
when? 
3-5 years ago Some years 
ago 
about 7 years 
ago 
in the 1990s About 5 years ago 5 years ago 
Who 
participated? 
Educational 
adviser, 
school head 
teachers 
The staff  The staff in 
the former 
lower 
secondary 
school 
All employees, 
some parents ++ 
All employees, 
some parents 
++ 
Known by the 
other 
interviewees 
than the head 
teacher? 
Yes: S11t and 
S11d  
Yes, they 
know some of 
it 
Yes: S21d1 Yes. S22t1, 
S22d1 and 
S22a1. Not 
the head 
teacher 
Yes, both 
interviewees 
Yes, all 
mention at 
least some of 
the vision 
Brought into 
attention 
when/how 
often? 
      
 
 
School characteristics – school values/culture  
In order to get a first impression of the school and the school culture, all respondents were asked the 
same question before any other questions were asked; “what characterizes your schools”.   
To this question the school S11 head teacher replied: «Dyktige lærere, positive lærere, og 
samarbeidsvillige lærere, veldig god stemning på huset her”, “Veldig driv i personalet. Stort 
engasjement. Stiller krav til rektor. De ønsker pedagogiske diskusjoner.»(S11h)  He also mentioned 
that the school lacked structure and systems when he arrived about three years ago, that they did 
not have common goals and direction in their work, and that he has implemented student 
performance control systems and bought technical equipment such as smart boards. The other S11 
interviewees’ focused on the good social climate both among employees and students, their 
cooperation, and the good internal leadership. The deputy head teacher (S11d) also mentioned the 
lack of male teachers.  
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According to the head teacher (S21h), the focus on the individual student and the wish that each 
student should be seen and met at his/her level, characterizes the school S12 culture. The 
interviewed teacher (S12t) and assistant (S21a) mentioned the high level of employee well-being as a 
main characteristic. In addition, the teacher expressed that the individual student, and what is to the 
best for the student, is not always focused; «Av og til så gjør vi det som er mest lettvint for læreren» 
(S12t). She also mentioned that there exists an internal push for improvement, but that the school 
lacks capacity and has limitations with respect to what is possible to achieve.  
Opposed to (most of) the other interviewees, the head teacher in school S21 focused strongly on 
student achievements, how student test results are analyzed and discussed internally and how they 
discuss how to improve their achievements. He also mentioned the National Pupil Survey and their 
local survey on bullying, their good cooperation with the local Parents' Working Committee, that the 
school is well functioning, having good systems and high level of employee well-being. Also the 
interviewed employees focused on close cooperation, high degree of well-being, cooperation in their 
work towards a common goal and their focus on the individual student. One of them mentioned that 
«De har ikke så store ambisjoner mange, verken elever eller foreldre…. Selvfølgelig er det også de 
ressurssterke hjemmene, men jeg føler at generelt sett, at gjennomsnittlig så er forventningene for 
lave.» (S21d2) and one mentioned the increased focus on learning in recent years: «Den (learning) 
skal jo være i fokus, men jeg tror nok kanskje at vi er blitt litt mer bevisst på det de siste årene at for 
10 år siden var vi kanskje litt mer opptatt av at ungene skulle ha det «gildt»» (S21t1).  
When asked about school characteristics, the temporarily appointed head teacher in school S22 
replied that school S22 is a «veldig inkluderende skole, en raus skole, mange dyktige pedagoger, men 
stor og vanskelig å ha den fullstendig oversikt over som leder» (S22h). The deputy head teacher 
mentioned «God stemning, godt humør og det virker som det er lett å kommunisere på tvers av alle 
nivåer. Vi er på god vei til å bli en samlet skole» (S22d1) and «Det vil jeg si er ivaretakelse av elever og 
åpenhet» (S22d2) The teacher and the assistant also emphasised the cultural diversity; «Vi er en 
skole med mye mangfold. Har mange elever fra andre land, og vi er en skole med – hvor vi prøver å få 
frem det mangfoldet. Og så er vi en skole med veldig stabilt personale. Det er mye humor i 
personalet. Det er mye godt samhold.» (S22t1) ”Ja, en god plass å jobbe, en inkluderende skole, en 
skole med mange nasjonaliteter, mange dyktige medarbeidere (S22a1)  
In school S31 the temporarily appointed head teacher characterized the school as a «we-school» 
having a high level of tolerance with respect to teaching methods and being “Gode på konfliktløsing 
og slikt noe. Det er lite konflikter ute blant elevene» (S31h). The teacher (S31t) highlighted «eleven i 
sentrum», «philosopy for children» and the school-home cooperation (S31t) while the assistent 
replied «Det er stor takhøyde, og så er det masse fantastisk flinke folk og så har vi mange kjekke 
elever her. Spennende.» (S31a) when asked about school characteristics.  
According to the school 32 head teacher has “«… vi får vel kalle de en tradisjon for å være 
nyskapende! … Relativt lite engstelige for å prøve nye ting og slik jeg oppfatter det, et kompetent 
personale på alle nivå. Lojalt, veldig godt arbeidsmiljø. Lite regelorientert» (S32h). The deputy head 
teacher  (S31d) added employee participation as a central school characteristic; «Vi har veldig lite tro 
på top-down-prosesser”, and the social climate as important school characteristics. Further, he 
mentioned their focus at “hele eleven”.  The assistant (S32a) put weight on the cooperation between 
the kindergarten, the school, and SFO, that all employees have been involved in internal processes 
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independent of position. The teacher (S32t) was more critical. She mentioned that the school is 
messy – a lot of things are left in rooms and corridors, and she mentioned that the employees have 
the right to be heard or participate in discussions and decisions, but that this is an “in theory” right.  
The school S32 head teacher also told that they are influenced by Howard Gardener’s theory on 
multiple intelligences (referanse)  and he stated that “Det er ikke sånn at det er et manisk 
styringsprinsipp, men som en tommelfingerregel at la oss nå huske på at det finnes mange forskjellige 
egenskaper og legninger som barn skal ha og som voksne har, og det må en ta hensyn til. En liten 
motvekt til Kristin Clemet og Høyre og nå SV og hele det politiske sitt maniske forhold til testing og 
grunnleggende ferdigheter og sånt. Det finnes mange grunnleggende ferdigheter som ikke lar seg 
måle i nasjonale prøver for eksempel.» This sceptisism against testing was also expressed by the 
deputy head teacher; “«Jeg må si at jeg er litt skeptisk til den bølgen som nå skyller inn over landet i 
forhold til dette med testing. Altså et voldsomt fokus på testing. Vi prøver å ikke ha det…. men vi 
ønsker ikke et veldig fokus på testene selv om vi sier at det er klart at basiskunnskapene er viktig. 
Men det er så mye mer i en skole enn bare disse basiskunnskapene og bare dyrke fram dem.»  
 
Table 4: visions vs. reported school characteristics 
 S11 S12 S21 S22 S31 S32 
The 
vision/vision 
keywords 
«Sammen i 
trivsel og 
trygghet. 
Aktiv i læring 
og mestring.» 
«Vi er stolte 
av skolen vår 
og kjenner at 
vi hører til på 
en skule som 
har trygge 
rammer for 
vekst og 
utvikling.» 
«Mennesker i 
utvikling og 
samspill. 
Kunnskap, 
samarbeid og 
trivsel.» 
«Trivsel, 
læring, 
likeverd.» 
Trygge elever, 
engasjerte 
lærere og 
foreldre, 
gjensidig respekt, 
tett samarbeid 
hjem/skole, 
tydelige voksne – 
gode 
rollemodeller, 
tydelig fagmål, 
aktivt og godt 
læringsmiljø, ++ 
(198 words) 
«Alle barn er 
alles barn». 
Trygghet, 
respekt, mange 
intelligenser, 
oppmuntre, 
sterke sider, 
ulike evner, 
talent, sterke 
sider. ++ (487 
words) 
School 
characteristics 
– main 
impression 
Well-being.  
increasing 
focus on 
student 
performance 
measurement 
systems and 
upgrading of 
technical 
equipment 
Well-being,  
Focus on the 
individual 
student. 
Well-beeing 
Learning-
focused. 
Intensive(?) 
use of 
performance 
measurement 
Samhold 
dyktige 
medarbeidere 
mye humor 
På vei til å bli 
én skole 
Vanskelig å ha 
oversikt 
«vi-skole», gode 
på konfliktløsing 
eleven i sentrum, 
filosofi for barn, 
stor takhøyde, 
flinke folk og 
kjekke elever. 
Kompetent 
personale, lite 
regelorientert, 
god trivsel, 
rotete, «alle 
barn er alles 
barn», mange 
intelligenser, 
skepsis mot 
målesystemer 
 
 
Organisational culture and clan/professional control 
Clan and professional control refers to the mechanisms in action when individual and/or group 
behaviour and effort are influenced (controlled) by  respectively the informal social structures and 
the common understanding of values and boundaries the employees are socialised into when 
entering the organisation control/influence  or during their education (Ouchi, 1979)(Malmi & Brown, 
2008).  
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Most Norwegian teachers have their education either from a teachers college or they hold a 
university degree and have additional pedagogical education and training. In primary schools, 
teachers college is the normal education for the teacher while the proportion of teachers holding a 
university degree in general is some larger in the lower secondary schools (må finne referanse til 
dette hvis det skal være med).  Both types of teachers are socialized into their professional culture 
during their education and it is reasonable to assume that the professional control mechanisms in 
schools are strong. However, over years the professional values and beliefs might change and local 
school cultures might emerge. The answers to the school characteristics question indicate that the 
working environment is great in the six schools. However, they also indicate some differences in 
school culture with possible consequences for the clan/professional control mechanisms.   
It is striking that only three of the six school visions focus on the result of schooling; learning or 
knowledge and that only a few of the 32 respondents mentioned learning focused or a similar 
concept as a school characteristic. Only in school S11 and S21 one or two of the respondents 
mentioned focus on learning and/or student performance. In some of the last interviews the 
respondents were asked why they and others did not mention knowledge and/or learning focus as 
important school characteristics even if learning and knowledge are main school outputs One of 
them answered «Fordi at det er så selvfølgelig tror jeg. Det er en så selvfølgelig del av «elevene i 
fokus»» (S31t) and another said «Jeg tenker jo at det er jo det som er jobben våres. Vi skal jo ha fokus 
på læring. Men hvorfor skal vi si at vi skal ha fokus på læring når det er det som er jobben vår?» 
(S31h).  
 
Objectives/targets and planning/plans 
The educational law, the Knowledge Promoting Reform, other types of regulations and control 
systems and local visions contains and communicate overriding school objectives to school 
employees and other school stakeholders. In addition, the local school might make their own 
strategic choices both with respect to what objectives to be focuses in the coming period of time, 
and with respect to whether the objectives should be stated in measureable terms as specific targets 
to be met. In addition, they might prepare their own plan or strategy to achieve their local objectives 
or targets, and often objectives and targets are presented in the plan(s).  
All Norwegian municipalities should have a long range plan (Plan- og bygningsloven) and each year all 
municipalities should prepare an action program, including budgets for the next four years 
(Kommuneloven). In this action program, some municipalities include an action program for the 
municipal school sector and/or for each school. The municipalities might also choose to prepare a 
separate plan of action for the school sector and the schools might prepare their own local plan/-s.  
 
Municipality M1 
In municipality M1 the schools and the educational advisor have prepared an action plan for well-
being, confidence and learning in primary and lower secondary schools. The plan is discussed and 
passed in the municipal council and the planning horizon is five years, from 2010 to 2015. The 
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objectives in the plan is presented as core values; openness, confidence, development and 
engagement.  
The municipal long range plan does not have a separate chapter focusing on education or school 
affairs, but to get more young people to attend and finish higher education is mentioned as one of 
several challenges for the future. The yearly action program has neither a separate section focusing 
on schools and education, nor separate sections for each school. Specific projects or actions requiring 
additional resources are mentioned.     
When asked about objectives, both the chief administrative officer and the educational advisor 
mentioned that it is an objective that «eleven skal ligge over landsgjennomsnittet” (M1ea) on the 
national tests.  
When asked about objectives at the school level, the head teacher in school S11 responded 
“Målsetningen er jo å gi alle elevene et best mulig undervisningstilbud der de er da” (S11h), and he 
then referred to the action plan for well-being, confidence and learning. When asked whether the 
school has specific targets with respect to student achievements and learning, the interviewed 
deputy head teacher answered “no” (S11d). The teacher answered “Nei, det tror jeg ikke. Der tror jeg 
det er kunnskapsløftet vi styrer etter. Ellers så vet jeg at det er et uttalt mål i kommunen at elevene 
skal svømme ved utgangen av 4. klasse.» (S11t) and the assistant did not know about specific 
objectives or targets beyond the vision. When asked about plans and planning, the respondents told 
about plans related to the teaching activities such as week plans and annual plans per class and 
subject. They also referred to a plan against bullying and an annual cycle.    
In school M12, the situation was about the same. When asked about common objectives and values 
the teacher answered “Nei, da svarer jeg at sånn i utgangspunktet så er det skolens visjon. At vi har 
det bra, at vi viser respekt og at vi lager det slik at elevene opplever mestring» (S12t) and the 
assistant answered «Ja, det er jo at en skal ha trygghet og gode rammer her på skolen alt i fra et en 
skal unngå mobbing til fellesskap, felles på det at barn og voksne har felles aktiviteter – 
aktivitetsdager og ting og tang en gjør da som gjør at det blir fellesskap» (S12a). With respect to 
plans and planning, the head teacher referred to the municipal action plan and the other types of 
plans also mentioned for school S11.   
 
Municipality M2 
The municipal long range plan for 2011 to 2021 for municipality M2 presents 6 overriding objectives 
for the knowledge society. These objectives are followed up in the municipal action program and 
specific targets and actions for each overriding objective for the coming year are presented. That the 
average exam result in mathematics should be 3.1 in 2013 and that the student satisfaction with 
teachers’ supervision and feedback should be 3.4 are examples of specific targets, while a continuous 
emphasis on learning focused assessment (assessment for learning) is an example of actions 
mentioned in the program. The municipal action program also presents a short term action program 
for each school containing objectives, actions and specific targets for the school. The performance 
measures are the same as for the municipal as such, but the targets might differ between schools 
due to local conditions.  
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When asked about a school sector vision, the head of municipal childhood and youth services in 
municipality M2 referred to the strategic map for the school sector. The map contains 15 objective 
formulations split into four categories; three concerning learning and childhood environment, three 
concerning academic progress, five concerning social skills and four concerning cooperation between 
home and the school. Two to six actions are mentioned for each objective category. Although it is 
possible to see a link between the objectives in the strategic map and the mentioned plans, there is 
no direct correspondence between the objectives in the plans and the map.  
When asked about objectives and planning, the school S21 head teacher told about the school level 
action program, and he also mentioned that the performance indicators do not capture all important 
school objectives.  The action program and the performance indicators and targets are known by the 
deputy head teacher and the teacher from the lower secondary school department. The teacher 
mentioned that “Hvert trinn, eller hvert fag, har satt målsetninger for karaktersnitt for eksempel. Det 
har vi – hva gjennomsnittskarakteren skal være» (s21t2). She also told that the targets are hanging 
on the staff room wall. The interviewed primary school employees and the lower secondary school 
assistant seemed to know neither the action program nor any objectives or targets.  
When asked about school level objectives, none of the interviewees in school S22 mentioned the 
objectives and targets in the school action program. The temporarily appointed head teacher twisted 
the focus towards a local project on behavior and how to support positive behavior (PALS). However, 
he mentioned the targets when asked about performance evaluation. The other interviewees did not 
tell about objective formulations and targets when asked about school level objectives. However, 
one of the interviewees knew that the head teacher send something to the municipal level: “Altså 
rektor lager noen visjoner på – som han sender videre til ledelsen i kommunen om at vi skal ha – vi 
skal heve oss på nasjonale prøver, få flere elever opp på nivå fem og vi skal ha null toleranse på 
mobbing og vi skal – altså, det ligger noen planer på det. Men de ligger nok mest på 
administrasjonsnivå på ett vis. Altså, akkurat de der tallene på hvor vi skal ligge» (S22t1), and she 
confirmed that these issues have not been discussed in the staff. The general impression is that the 
action program for the school is not known among the employees, and that other types of school 
level planning is absent. The word “planning” seemed to give associations to a local plan against 
bullying, and plans for teaching activities such as week plans and plans for longer periods of time.  
 
Municipality M3 
In municipality M3 the head of childhood and youth services told that «sektor skoler har da et eget 
kapittel i det handlingsprogrammet. Men i tillegg så har også hver enkelt skole sin del av 
handlingsprogrammet som de skal utarbeide med mål, tiltak, kompetanseutvikling – ja. Som de 
viktigste temaene» (M3h). The school section in the action program sums up resources used, recent 
national test results and some other statistic.  Areas of priority are described but without specific 
objectives or targets. In addition to the yearly action programs, the municipality as prepared a long 
term action plan for childhood and youth services. The section called visions and objectives presents 
the municipal vision for the sector and the planned actions. 
In school S31’s section in the municipal action program, school objectives and actions are presented 
in general terms. No objectives are presented as performance indicators and specific targets. When 
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asked about school objectives, the temporarily appointed head teacher referred to the vision, and 
the interviewed teacher and assistant did not add anything. The temporarily appointed head teacher 
told that this action program is not communicated to the school staff. No school level action plan is 
prepared except an annual circle for all types of events and activities for the school year (S31a).  
In school S32’s section in the municipal action program, four objectives are mentioned; to intensify 
the learning environment work, to keep up the workplace environment, to increase the quality and 
the standing (status) of the school library and revitalize and anchor the work with the plural 
intelligences and philosophy.  In addition, actions to achieve the objectives are mentioned.  
When asked about school objectives, the head teacher referred to the school development program 
and how the staff agreed upon focus areas/projects for the school; for instance feedback, philosophy 
for children, and multiple intelligences.  Also the other interviewees referred to the vision when 
asked about school objectives.   
 
All schools 
In all six schools leaders and other employees tell about week plans, annual plans and other types of 
plans prepared per subject or class. However, there are some differences with respect to whether 
the head teacher or a deputy head teacher control that the teachers prepares such plans as they 
should. Mer 
In all six schools the employees tell about week plans, semester plans and annual plans containing 
objectives for each subject and period of time. In school S11 the head teacher told «Det jeg opplevde 
kanskje var litt rart da jeg kom var at det ikke var så mye struktur på ting i forhold til å dra i samme 
retning. I forhold til ukeplaner, årsplaner, og veldig ulikt. Folk jobbet veldig mye hver for seg. Det vi 
har jobbet med noen år nå da er å strukturere ting litt mer slik at vi har en retning og et mål på ting 
nå og det vi holder på med.» (S11h). 
In school S21 the deputy head masters report they have to follow up the teachers at this matter and 
control that the required plans are prepared; “Jeg har tatt opp på noen møter at det var ikke i den 
eller den klasse n og at dette er for dårlig- eller at dette var veldig bra. At jeg har sett på det og at det 
var noe i hvert eneste fag. … Ja, at det står noe i hvert fag. Har de ikke noe å jobbe med så skal det i 
alle fall stå at vi jobber med et prosjekt, at vi jobber med det på skolen at .. det skal stå noe» (S21d2); 
«En går jo ut i fra at alle lærerne lager en halvårsplan eller en emneplan, men her har jeg frister for 
når de skal leveres inn. Jeg vil ha dem, og jeg printer dem ut, og etterspør når de ikke er kommet inn» 
(S21d1).  Also in school S22 there are time limits with respect to preparation of semester plans “De 
må innen visse datoer både i august og i januar, nesten med en gang skolen begynner. Da skal de 
være ferdige, og jeg sjekker at de er det. De skal også legges sånn at de er tilgjengelige for elever og 
foreldre. Det samme skjer med ukeleksene. Ukeleksene skal ut – de skal samtidig rett ut til elevene 
sånn at – så det er bare å trykke på en knapp for meg så ser jeg at… » (S22d2) 
 In S31 and S32 these types of plans seem to be a routine; “Det er så innarbeidet at det går av seg 
selv. Og det er tilpasset plan i forhold til de elevene som trenger det. (18:41) ja, det er det. Det er ren 
rutine» (S31h); «De gjør det. Det blir gjort. Uten at vi har vært så spesielt strenge med det, men det 
går i ukeplan, og det funker bra for noen barn og det funker dårlig for andre selvfølgelig» (S32h). 
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Table 5: Plans and plan content, school and municipal level 
 M1 M2 M3 
 S11 S12 S21 S22 S31 S32 
School section in long term 
municipal plan? 
No 
Yes 
One chapter (4 pages) 
about the knowledge 
society 
Yes? 
Objectives in long tern 
municipal plan 
No 
Yes, presenting objectives 
and actions 
 
Long term plan for 
school/childhood? 
Yes 
plan for well-being, 
confidence and learning  
2010-2015 (plan for 
childhood and youth 
services) 
No 
Yes 
Plan for childhood and 
youth services (2011-2020) 
Objectives in long term plan 
for school/childhood? 
In terms of focus areas: 
openness, confidence, 
development and 
engagement. 
Yes ??? 
Separate school/education 
section in 4 year municipal 
action plan? 
No Yes Yes 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objectives in 4 year municipal 
action program? 
Yes Yes/Some? Yes 
Yes Yes Yes/Some? Yes/Some? Yes Yes 
Output targets in 4 year 
municipal action program? 
No Yes No 
No No Yes Yes No No 
Plans for subject and/or 
class/group per week/longer 
period of time? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Budget and budgeting  
All three municipalities use devolved financial management, but how the individual school’s budget 
is estimated is some different. In the small municipality, each school’s budget is based on present 
year’s budget and changes in the number of student and classes. Occasionally, changes in student 
special needs and specific school projects are taken into consideration. Based on these factors, the 
head masters participate in discussions and negotiations with the chief administrative officer, chief 
accountant and heads of the other municipal public services.  The chief administrative officer and the 
chief accountant conclude and prepare a budget proposal for the municipal council.  
In M2 the head of municipal childhood and youth services get a total budget from the chief 
administrative officer. Most of this budget is allocated to the individual school according to a 
mathematical model. The model takes into account the number of student and classes in each school 
and some socio-economic factors for each school district. The result for each school is presented for 
and passed by the municipal council. 
Municipal M3 use a similar model as M1; the budget for next year is based on the budget for the 
present year adjusted for changes in the number of students and classes and some other factors. 
However, this municipality has realized that their model has caused undesirable variance between 
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schools, and they are now looking for a more “objective” model for estimation of the individual 
school’s budget. 
At the school level, the main impression from the interviewees in all schools is that budgeting at the 
school level is a task for the head master, that almost all money is spent on fixed wages,  and that 
there are few if any internal discussions with respect to how the money should be used. In municipal 
M1 and M3 the interviewees report that they do not have a feeling scarce resources;  «Jeg synes ikke 
at det er så veldig stort fokus på pengene på den måten at man ikke må bruke pengene» (S11d).  This 
has also been the situation in the M2 schools, but a recent municipal budget deficit has led to cut in 
the school budgets.  
 
Time scheduling 
Time scheduling is budgeting with the most important resource in schools; time. It is about how 
scarce time-resources are allocated to different tasks and groups, and how absolute and comparative 
advantages are utilized.  The time scheduling process follows the same main track in all the six 
schools. It starts with the appraisal interview in the winter in which one issue is to clarify the 
individual employee’s expectations, wishes and boundaries for the next school year. Then the head 
master, or the deputy head master for school S21 and S22, decide who should be the team leaders 
and the contact teachers for each class or group for the next school year and prepare a time schedule 
proposal. In school S11, S12, and S22, and in the lower secondary school department in school S21, 
the head master/deputy head master prepare a detailed time schedule were lessons in all subjects 
are placed on the schedule. Within the first part of June, a first draft for the time schedule is 
presented for the staff, and adjustments are made. In school S31, S32 and the primary school 
department in S21, a resource in terms of teacher work hours is allocated to each grade level. Then 
the teachers discuss and agree upon how the students and teaching should be organized and they 
prepare a time schedule for themselves and the students. However, some lessons are placed on the 
time schedule by the (deputy) head master due to needs for coordination across grade levels.  
 
Table 6: Budgeting and time-scheduling 
 M1 M2 M3 
 S11 S12 S21 S22 S31 S32 
Devolved financial 
management in schools? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal school budgeting Adjustment/negotiations 
based on present budget 
Mathematical model Adjustment/negotiations 
based on present budget 
School level budgeting Head 
master 
Head 
master 
Head 
master 
Head 
master 
Head 
master 
Head 
master 
Time scheduling (“detailed” = 
the head teacher/deputy head 
teacher prepare a detailed 
time schedule for all classes, 
subjects and teachers.) 
Detailed Detailed Primary 
school: pool 
of resources 
allocated to 
each grade 
level 
Lower 
secondary 
school: 
detailed 
Detailed Pool of 
resources 
allocated to 
each grade 
level 
pool of 
resources 
allocated to 
each grade 
level 
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 Performance measurement and evaluation. 
 
Services delivered 
In the present paper, performance measurement and evaluation focuses mainly on output control. 
However, what is school output? Normally, school production process studies use student 
performance as school output measures (e.g. Hanushek, 1986, 1997; Hanushek & Welsh, 2006). 
However, the delivered services in terms of lessons and other services might also be considered 
school output. Regulations from the ministry of education (finn referanse til rundskrivet) states how 
many lessons per subject and in total the students minimum should have during primary and lower 
secondary school. An interesting question in a study of management control systems in schools is 
whether and how schools control that their students get the number of lessons they should.    
With respect to this matter, the interviews revealed that the three municipal school authorities do 
not have any kind of formal control systems for this purpose. The interviews at the school level left 
the same impression. It is up to the head teacher, the deputy head teacher, the individual teacher 
and/or the teachers at each grade level to control to follow these regulations when preparing the 
time schedule. None of the schools have any form of ex post control with respect to this matter. 
However, in all schools interviewees report that to take a lesson off is not accepted. Consequently, 
this matter seems to be regulated by clan/professional control.  
 
Student performance  
Schools have tradition for performance measurement, evaluation and feedback at the student and 
class level. In five of the six schools, one or several interviewees talked about “assessment for 
learning”, which is a methodology for systematic feedback and help for further learning to students 
and their parents introduced by the Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training.   
In the lower secondary schools, term marks and exam results are traditional school 
output/performance measures and in recent years these has been supplemented by results from the 
compulsory national tests and the National Pupil Survey. In addition, the schools can use other types 
of tests and surveys. The compulsory survey and tests provide schools with a lot of information that 
might be useful for evaluation of and reflections on school teaching. However, a prior study indicates 
limited use of available student performance measures and some focus on and use of results from 
the National Pupil Survey (Friestad, 2008). 
All six schools in the present study discuss the results from the national tests internally, but here are 
differences between them with respect to how the tests are considered and how the test results are 
used.  In school S11 the head teacher presents the test results in a staff meeting and he told that the 
deputy head teacher "jobber seg gjennom da for å finne hvor vi må sette inn innsatsen. På om det er 
noe system på hva vi ikke mestrer og hva vi er gode på.» (S11h). The interviews indicate that whether 
the test results should result in altered activities and/or teaching practices is up to the individual 
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teachers.. «Det blir jo diskutert på det personalmøtet hvor man har det oppe. Men hva 5. 6. og 7. gjør 
med det det er jeg litt usikker på rett og slett» (S11t). 
The head teacher expressed some uncertainty with respect to how he should use the tests results 
indicating some skepticism or even resistance to an intensive focus on and use of the tests. He said: 
«Vi har også drøftet resultatene og vi ser at vi har en vei å gå i forhold til NP. Vi lurer jo på hvordan vi 
skal gripe det an og det er jo en balanse det også. Skal vi la NP styre alt eller? Men vi ser jo at det er 
et verktøy for politikerne for å «måle» skolen og så kan man være uenig eller enig om det er et bra 
verktøy, men det er nå det som blir gjort. Det blir kommunisert inn i kommunestyret, spesielt det 
kommunestyret som er nå er interessert i resultatene, og det skjønner jeg jo.» (S11h). Also the 
teacher expressed some skepticism and resistance to possible consequences of a too heavy focus on 
the tests: «Det er snakk om å drille til nasjonale prøver og den typen ting. Det diskuteres jo om over 
hele linja sikkert, og jeg er fryktelig i mot det. Det har jeg sagt høyt og hardt på et personalmøte, og 
jeg har ikke lyst til å være med på den galoppen der. Jeg føler at det vi gjør i klassen må holde for 
nasjonale prøver og hvis vi skal begynne å drille ale elevene så v il jo alle høyne nivået og da blir en jo 
ikke noe bedre uansett. Jeg skjønner ikke hele greia. Det må ligge i bunnen av undervisninga det vi 
gjør tenker jeg i forhold til NP» (S11t) The same teacher were also concerned with how this focus on 
test results influences teacher motivation negatively; «Og jeg vet at det er noen som sier at de ikke 
har lyst til å begynne med første klasse og ha dem for 1. til 4. for de tar det kanskje personlig når de 
nasjonale prøvene kommer. Og det er klart en kjenner jo litt på det» (S11t).  But she also mentioned 
that the test results have potensial positive effects for the teachers;  «Altså, nå i disse nasjonale 
prøver tidene så vil jeg jo tro at hvis det er en klasse som klarer å få gode resultater på nasjonale 
prøver så hadde nok det vært en form for at en hadde fått aksept for da har du faktisk lykkes med 
noe» (S11t). 
Both the head teacher and the deputy head teacher in school S11 told about a strong focus on the 
national tests from the local politicians. “Ja, det er et veldig fokus fra politikerne. Et veldig fokus. 
Skolerådgiveren må jo hvert år levere en sånn tilstandsrapport for grunnskolen som legges frem i 
kommunestyret, men der legges det ikke frem for den enkelte skoler. Det er slik gjennomsiktig…. Så 
resultatene blir slått sammen og delt ut og da kommer vi heldigere ut i år, men altså det er et veldig 
fokus, et politikerfokus. Det blåser en blå vind gjennom bygda her. Og det er veldig tydelig i måling, 
oppnåelse av mål og at det skal settes mål. At det på en måte kostnad/nytte, at det er 
kostnadsbesparende, det er rett og slett kost/nytte prinsippet som blåser nå”  (S11d).  
With respect to the national test results, the head teacher in S12 reported “Så har vi nasjonale 
prøver. De går jeg gjennom først med den som er kontaktlærer, så i plangruppe og så med hele 
personalet». The teacher told that there has been an increased focus on the test results and the 
responsibility of all teachers with respect to the national tests; : «Ja, mer og mer. Både type oppgave 
og begrep som er tatt med og hvilke fag som er involvert i de ulike typene oppgaver for å 
ansvarliggjøre alle lærere. Det er ikke norsklæreren, det er ikke kontaktlæreren men det er alle 
lærerne» (S12t). However, she also said «De er gjennomgått, men det er opp til den enkelte lærer hva 
du gjør med det i klassen» (S12t). The assistant reported that she, and probably also the other 
assistants, are not involved in the national tests. 
The head teacher further told about other types of tests and that the individual student’s results on 
these tests are used not only by the individual teacher; “Andre tester og prøver som vi vektlegger en 
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god del er de nasjonale kartleggingsprøvene i 1. til 3. klasse. Det er jo en helt annen type prøve enn 
nasjonale prøver, men at vi går gjennom de for å se de som da skårer såpass at de er under 
bekymringsgrense eller at det er veldig ulikheter i de ulike testene. Det å ha analyseferdigheter på 
disse prøvene tror jeg er litt viktig, og jeg prøver å engasjere med da. Spesped koordinator er noe inn, 
og kontaktlærer, og slik at vi faktisk ser på hver enkelt elev.» (S12h)  
In school S21 the national test results are analyzed by the head master and discussed in detail in staff 
meetings with respectively the primary school staff and the lower secondary school staff. The 
teachers get a copy of the tests and for each question in the test the proportion of correct answers 
are analyzed and coded with a color code from green, via yellow to red based on the proportion of 
correct answers. The questions having a yellow code are considered to represent areas with the 
highest possibility for improvement for most students. The staff discusses and decides on actions to 
be taken in order to improve student performance in these areas. According to the primary school 
deputy head teacher “For noen av lærerne var det litt aha-opplevelse å virkelig å se hvor vanskelig 
det var disse prøvene».  They realized that they had to inform the parents at the fourth grade what 
are expected of the students at grade five; «Så det er også noe som er kommet ut av dette. Vi må 
faktisk presentere prøvene tidlig på høsten da på fjerde trinn for foreldrene så de ser hva som 
forventes av elevene da på femte trinn»(S21t1) 
In addition to the discussions in staff meetings, in the lower secondary school, the individual 
student’s results are discussed by the teachers at the actual grade level; « For eksempel nå, ved de 
nasjonale prøvene, så tok de inn på hver enkelt elev og hva de har problemer med og analyserte og 
jobbet med hva det var mest fokus på – hva var problemene. Altså. De jobber med det på trinnet og 
ser helt konkret hva var problemet vi må jobbe med.» (S21d2). In the primary school the individual 
student’s scores at the national tests, other tests and results from internal systems used to control 
the individual student’s level and progression in reading are discussed with trinnleder, helsesøster, 
spesped-koordinator and kontaktlærer; «Da har vi et møte hvor vi ser på – hvor vi går i gjennom og 
ser på resultatene og da spør vi er det noen du er overasket over og hvem har overasket positivt og 
hvem har overasket negativt? Og så sammenligner en og ser på prøver og tester de har hatt tidligere 
og da går en nærmere inn på hver enkelt elev. Da gjør jeg det samlet med dem.» (S21d1). However, 
according to the interviewed primary school teacher, these procedures differ between subjects and 
grade levels. For instance, with reference to local tests in mathematics at grade five to seven the 
teacher said «så er det litt overlatt til den enkelte av oss hvordan vi velger å fange opp det som 
ungene kan og ikke kan» (S21t1)  
The lower secondary school teacher gave an example of how they have used the test results. “Ja, vi 
har faktisk, akkurat med vårt kull som vi har nå, så har vi hatt møte med ho lederen i PPT og fått litt 
tips der også i forhold til – så hun var en gang på teammøtet vårt. Nå har vi hatt leseprosjekt etter jul 
der vi tok – altså vi har hatt leseprosjekt med fokus på lesing i alle fag og i norsk (8:50) så har de lest 
litt. Så jeg ser det at vi har blitt mye mer bevisst på det å jobbe med begreper og det å lese tabeller og 
under bilder og analysere bilder og tabeller i naturfag og samfunnsfag og til dels RLE. Der ser jeg at vi  
er blitt flinkere. Så vi snakker mer om de tingene der. Så nå er vi akkurat ferdig med del 
leseprosjektet. Målsetningen var at vi skulle – denne uka her skal de ta nasjonale prøver en gang til 
bare for å se om vi ser noen framgang. For vi har vært bevisst på det med lesing så det er kopiert opp 
og alle de tre 8.klassene skal nå ta de så skulle elevene sette seg et mål om hvor mange poeng de 
ønsket eller håpet at de hadde gått fram da fra sist» (S21t2). She also added: «Målet mitt er at 
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elevene skal bli flinke, uansett om de gjør det bra på nasjonale prøver. Og de skal lære. Nasjonale 
prøver er et middel, og du kan se at der – det skorter litt her og litt der.» (S21t2) 
Each fall, the lower secondary school department has a meeting with the schools from which their 
students are recruited. In the meeting the lower secondary school gives feedback with respect to 
how the students from the different primary schools performed at the national tests when they 
entered the lower secondary school, and signals  what are expected from the students when they 
start at grade eight; “Men vi har nå veldig konstruktive møter med barneskolene. Vi har også med alle 
rektorene sammen med oss og så har vi også fagmøter i norsk og engelsk og matte med faglærerne 
der det blir satt veldig fokus på det som, konkret, det som vi føler er at vi er blitt mer konkret i forhold 
til hvor hullene ligger…. Og det gjør at vi føler at barneskolene har tatt mye mer tak» (S21d2).  
Also in school S22 the results from the national tests are presented for the staff. The head master 
told that "vi samarbeider med skolekontoret i forhold til å se på hva var det som var svakhet med 
opplæringen innenfor de nasjonale prøver. Hvor er det vi skårer dårlig og hva må vi kanskje endre på i 
undervisningssammenhengen for å bøte på, eller forbedre resultater, innenfor de ulike områdene» 
(S22h), and according to one of the deputy head teachers, the test results are discussed differently in 
different forums; «I fellesfora informeres det om med ulike søyler» (S2d2), «Da får du søylene opp på 
de ulike områdene. Men du går jo ikke helt inn i hver oppgave» (S22d1).  «På teamet diskuteres det 
hvordan gikk det med våre elever. På klassenivå så går du inn på – direkte på enkelteleven på å se 
sterke og svake..» (S22d2). In this school, it is up to each teacher whether and how he/she will use 
the test results; «Og etterpå så er det jo opp til den enkelte lærer å bruke det i sitt vurderingsarbeid. I 
forhold til de elevene og etterarbeid» (S22d1). In this school, the teachers that have taught the 
students the years prior to the tests do not get any information beyond the information given in staff 
meetings with respect to how “their students” performed.  
At the municipal level, the educational advisors present and discuss the results from the national 
tests in meetings with head teachers and the teachers teaching the students that have made the 
test. The meetings focus on possibilities for improvement and what actions that should be taken in 
order to achieve a higher level of basic skills in mathematics and reading.   
Also in municipality M3 the results from the national tests are discussed in meetings across schools. 
In this municipality test at grade eight are also discussed with the primary schools and test results 
from the upper secondary school are discussed with the lower secondary schools.  
The temporarily appointed head teacher in school S31 told that «vi har faste rutiner på at vi går inn 
sammen med de som har nasjonale prøver og ser på resultatet som kommer hvert år. Hva er det som 
gjør at resultatet er blitt som det er blitt – sitter vi og reflekterer over.» (S31h)   and in this 
municipality  the results are discussed with the teachers at the lowergrade levels ; «Lærerne 
ungdomstrinn og lærerne 5. til 7. trinn har en fast samling hvor de snakker om – for da har de fått 
sine 8. og 9. klasse resultat og vi har våre 5. klasse resultat så da er det «hva er det vi ser» og snakker 
litt om hva kan vi gjøre for at dette eventuelt skal bli bedre.  … Og så hadde vi i år for aller første gang 
prøvd å få – eller da laget vi en samling for alle lærere i 1.-4. klasse i alle sentrumsskolene ble invitert 
og der vi på en måte gikk gjennom samme type runde.» (S31h). With respect to how the results are 
used by the teachers, the assistent told: «Jeg vet at vi pleier å være samlet litt på team og snakke med 
ledelsen, inspektør og kanskje diskutere resultatene. Men jeg tror ikke at det er noe spesielt system 
etterpå. Det hadde vi faktisk en diskusjon på for ikke så lenge siden at vi kanskje – vi etterspurte det 
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litt og tenke at vi burde kanskje ha gått inn og sett bak resultatene, hvis det var store avvik» (S31a). 
However, a too strong focus on test results might be difficult for some teachers; “Så det har vi 
diskutert, men så er det noen som synes at det blir litt vanskelig å – ja – din klasse gjorde det så bra 
og din klasse gjorde det så dårlig så kan det bli litt sånn…Så vi diskuterer hvordan vi kan bruke 
resultatene. Men vi har liksom ikke gått inn på hvert resultat sånn i plenum kan du si» (S31t) 
Even if both the school S32 head teacher and the deputy head teacher flagged a skepticism to a 
strong test regime, the results are discussed in teacher staff meetings;. «Da går vi som regel gjennom 
prøvesetta og så går vi gjennom skåren, ikke på elevnivå. Men vi ser etter mønster. Er det spesielle 
områder her som viser seg å gi dårlige utslag….hvis dette er en – en trend som gjelder gruppe, så må 
en jo gå i seg selv og finne ut hva er det som må forbedres på» (S32h) and it is mentioned that the 
results are discussed in meetings across schools and grade levels. However, the way the deputy head 
teacher referred to the tests indicate some difference between internal and external objectives and 
expectations; «Men så synes jeg at utfordringen er at både med nasjonale prøver og 
kartleggingsprøvene - det er at hvis vi blir for ivrig på det, så kan vi dreie fokuset til lærerne i en 
retning vi egentlig ikke vil. Jeg vil ikke ha «teaching the test» og jeg vil ikke at lærerne skal være altfor 
opptatt av nasjonale prøver. Samtidig så ser vi jo på en måte i andre enden at det er jo så klart en viss 
forventning om at det blir fulgt opp og en del sånne ting.» (S22d).  
 
 Table 7: School output control systems  
 M1 M2 M3 
 S11 S12 S21 S22 S31 S32 
“service delivered” control       
Formal ex ante service 
delivered control system? 
No No No No No No 
Service delivered controlled by 
clan control 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
National tests:       
Results discussed in staff yes Yes Yes Yes   
Level of focus/details when 
discussed in staff 
Medium Low High Low? Low Low 
Feedback to former teachers?       
Discussed in meetings across 
schools 
No? No? yes Yes Yes Yes 
Who participate from the 
school in meetings across 
schools? 
      
Teachers’ responsibility 
“How they are 
used is up to 
the teachers in 
grad 5, 6 and 7 
Focus on 
making all 
teacher 
responsible 
    
Exam results       
Term marks       
National Pupil Survey        
Local control systems 
Sol, “alle 
teller”? 
er I ferd med å 
innføre Vokal 
Lus, “alle 
teller”, er I 
ferd med å 
innføre 
Vokal 
LUS    
Local bullying/well-being 
Survey 
Yes ? Yes    
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 Student well-being /learning environments (the Pupil Survey ++) 
To be analyzed/summed up. 
 
Financial control and reporting 
 
To be analyzed/summed up. 
 
 
Table 8: Financial control routines and focus 
 M1 M2 M3 
 S11 S12 S21 S22 S31 S32 
Accounting reports to the 
municipality each:  
4 months 4 months 3 monts 3 monts month month 
How often does the head 
teacher control the financial 
standing 
“Have a 
feeling” – each 
4. Month and 
more frequent 
in the end of 
the year 
Each third 
week 
(substitute 
teachers) 
  
“Hun 
(rector) har 
stålkontroll” 
(temp. app. 
Head 
teacher) 
Each 
month 
“Money-focus”  low low     
 
 
Organizational structure and school building characteristics 
 
All school buildings, except the building used by the primary school department in school S21, are 
traditional classroom school buildings. In school S11, S12 and S22, and in the lower secondary school 
department in S21, the students are organized in ordinary classes, and in the time scheduling process 
resources are allocated to each class.   
In the primary school level in S21 the number of student per grade level is about 40 and each grade 
level has a “base” to their disposal. Each base has one small class room (formidlingsrom) and one 
larger room for individual or group work with desks for all students and space for other activities. In 
the time scheduling process, resources in terms of teacher and assistant man work years are 
allocated to each base. Usually, at least two teachers use all, or almost all, their time in one base. 
These teachers agree upon how they will organize the students and the teaching activities, and who 
should teach each subject.  
Municipality M3 has decided that all classes with more than 18 students should have two teachers. In 
school S31 and S32, the number of students per grade level is between 25 and 35. Therefore, each 
grade level has 2 teachers to their disposal in all lessons. The teacher resources are allocated to each 
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grade level, and it is up to the teachers to decide on how they will organize the students and the 
teaching activities. School S31 has a å lot of class room to their disposal. According to the head 
teacher, the teachers make different decisions with respect to how they organize students and 
teaching. Some split the students in two classes and each of them teach one class. Others cooperate 
closely, and organize the students in groups of different sizes over time and in different subjects. In 
school S32, the room capacity is more limited, and the number of students per grade level some 
smaller than in S31. In this school, the students are usually organized and taught as ordinary classes.  
School S21 and S22 are organized as three departments; the primary school department, the lower 
secondary school department and respectively a department for students with heavy special needs 
(S21) and immigrant students that have not yet learned enough Norwegian to follow ordinary classes 
(S22).  Each department is headed by a deputy head teacher/head of department. 
In all the six schools, the teachers and assistants are organized in teams (more about teams and team 
leaders’ role).  
 
Table 9: School building characteristics and how students and the staff are organized 
 S11 S12 S21 S22 S31 S32 
School building 
Traditional  Traditional  Grade 1-7: 
Base school 
Grade 8-10): 
Traditional  
Traditional  Traditional  Traditional  
Students/teaching 
organized in 
classes 
Yes Yes 
Grade 1-7:: 
No 
Grade 8-10: 
Yes 
Yes. 
(one grade 
level: Base) 
Dependent on 
the teachers 
at each grade 
Yes 
Teams 
Grade 1-2, 
2-4 and 5-7 
Grade 1-4 and 
5-7 
Grade 1-2, 
2-4, 5-7, 8, 9 
and 10 
Grade 1-3, 4-
5, 6-7, 8, 9 
and 10. 
Grade 1-4 and 
5-7 
Grade 1-4 and 
5-7 
 
 
 
Governance structure 
To be summed up 
 
Routines and procedures? 
To be summed up 
 
 
Other factors 
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Table 10:  Respondents’ professional background (education) 
 M1 M2 M3 
Chief 
administrative 
officer/head of 
educational and 
childhood affairs 
Master’s degree in public 
management 
Mathematics/science Teachers college 
Educational 
adviser 
Preschool teacher education 
and degree in science of 
education 
Mathematics Teacher college 
 S11 S12 S21 S22 S31 S32 
Professional 
background 
Teachers 
college 
Teachers 
college 
Mathematics/ 
science 
Teachers 
college 
Teachers 
college? 
Linguistics 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions - preliminary findings/thoughts 
 
The table below sums up some of the information revealed in the interviews and documents. in 
addition, the six schools are ranged according to the average of two year ‘s scores on the fifth grade 
national tests in reading and mathematics. It should be noticed that the scores are not adjusted for 
the students’ socio-economic background. However, for each pair of schools the socio-economic 
conditions in the districts are quite similar.  
 
The impact of the head teacher’s professional background 
 
Although a general impression of small differences between municipalities and schools, some 
interesting patterns emerge from the cases.  One interesting finding from the analyses of the cases is 
the difference between school S21 and S22. Although the two schools operates under the same 
municipal control systems focusing on student performance and having specific target with respect 
to student performance, there are difference between them. The differ with respect to the head 
teachers’ focus on students’ learning when asked about school characteristics, the way the results 
from the national tests are used and analyzed, and the achieved test results. While the head teacher 
in school S21 focused on students’ learning and how the school work in order to improve student 
achievements when asked about school characteristics, the head teacher in school S22 mentioned  
characteristics such as inclusive,  generous and competent staff,  and how difficult it is to get an 
overview over such a large school. While both the head teacher and the deputy head teachers in 
school S21 talked enthusiastically about how the test results were analyzed and used in order to 
achieve enhanced student learning and test results, the head teacher in school S22 talked 
enthusiastically about their project to strengthen positive student behavior. These differences raise 
at least two questions. The first is why these differences between the schools with respect to focus 
on student performance and use of performance measures despite the fact that they operates under 
the same superior control systems and authorities? The other is whether there is a relationship 
146
between learning focus, detailed and interactive use of performance measures and student 
performance?  
With respect to the first question, the cases propose one possible answer; the head teachers’ 
different professional background. It is interesting to observe that the head teacher who has the 
strongest focus on learning and test results, not only of the two but of all six schools, is the one with 
a mathematics/science background. On the other hand, the head teacher expressing most skepticism 
against performance measurement was the one educated in linguistics/languages (S32h). One 
possible reason might be that a person trained in mathematics and science, also is more familiar with 
and trained in use of statistics and analyses of quantitative data like test results. It is interesting to 
observe that the head of childhood and youth services and the interviewed educational advisor in 
M2 also are trained in mathematics/science.  Based on these findings it is reasonable to propose that 
P1) Head teachers educated in mathematics and/or science will to a larger extent focus on learning 
and student performance and apply output control systems than head teachers having another 
professional background, especially when superiors focuse on learning and student performance and 
apply output control systems. 
P2) Head teachers having teachers college and/or education within social sciences tend to focus less  
on learning and student performance and more on other school objectives, student well-being and 
processes than other head teachers independent of superior focus and control systems    
P3) If the municipal school authorities want to focus more on student learning, test results and formal 
control systems they should hire head teachers educated in mathematics/science.  
 
Learning focused culture and controls  
 
The present case study also proposes that:  
P4: there is a positive relationship between learning focused management controls/output controls 
and student performance. 
This fourth proposal is supported by school management research which mentions learning focus  as 
a core characteristic of effective school leadership  (e.g. Hallinger, 2010; Leithwood, Harris, & 
Hopkins, 2008) 
 
School building characteristics and clan control 
 
Among the case schools, school S21 has a non-traditional school building for the primary school. In 
this school building students, teachers and other employees are organized in “bases”. This way to 
organize the students and the teaching activities facilitate stronger clan control than traditional 
schools. Consequently the primary school level in this school is exposed to both intensive and 
interactive output control and strong clan control.  
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 Table 11: Case key characteristics  
 S11 S12 S21 S22 S31 S32 
Vision keywords «trygghet, 
trivsel, læring, 
mestring, 
aktiv 
trygge 
rammer, 
vekst, 
utvikling, 
stolte av 
skolen 
Kunnskap, 
trivsel, 
samarbeid, 
samspill, 
utvikling 
 
Læring, 
trivsel, 
likeverd» 
Trygge elever, 
engasjerte lærere 
og foreldre, 
gjensidig respekt, 
tett samarbeid 
hjem/skole, 
tydelige voksne – 
gode 
rollemodeller, 
tydelig fagmål, 
aktivt og godt 
læringsmiljø, ++ 
(198 words) 
Alle barn er 
alles barn. 
Trygghet, 
respekt, mange 
intelligenser, 
oppmuntre, 
sterke sider, 
ulike evner, 
talent, sterke 
sider. ++ (487 
words) 
School 
characteristics – 
main impression 
Well-being.  
increasing 
focus on 
student 
performance 
measurement 
systems and 
upgrading of 
technical 
equipment 
Well-being,  
Focus on 
the 
individual 
student. 
Well-being 
Learning-
focused 
(S21h),. 
Intensive 
use of 
performanc
e measures 
Samhold 
dyktige 
medarbeider
e mye humor 
På vei til å bli 
én skole 
Vanskelig å 
ha oversikt 
«vi-skole», gode 
på konfliktløsing 
eleven i sentrum, 
filosofi for barn, 
stor takhøyde, 
flinke folk og 
kjekke elever. 
Kompetent 
personale, lite 
regelorientert, 
god trivsel, 
rotete, «alle 
barn er alles 
barn», mange 
intelligenser, 
skepsis mot 
målesystemer 
Separate 
school/education 
section in 4 year 
municipal action 
plan? 
No Yes Yes 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objectives in 4 
year municipal 
action program? 
Yes Yes/Some? Yes 
Yes Yes Yes/Some? Yes/Some? Yes Yes 
Output targets in 
4 year municipal 
action program? 
No Yes No 
No No Yes Yes No No 
Level of 
focus/details 
when NP results 
are discussed in 
staff 
Medium Low High Low? Low Low 
Chief 
administrative 
officer/head of 
educational and 
childhood affairs 
Master’s degree in public 
management 
Mathematics/science Teachers college 
Educational 
adviser 
Preschool teacher education 
and degree in science of 
education 
Mathematics Teacher college 
 S11 S12 S21 S22 S31 S32 
Professional 
background 
Teachers 
college 
Teachers 
college 
Mathematic
s/ science 
Teachers 
college 
Teachers college? Linguistics 
NP results       
Mathematics 
(year 1 + year 
2)/2  - range 3 2 1 6 4 5 
Reading  (year 1 + 
year 2)/2  - range 
5 4 1 3 2 5 
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Budgets in festivals – a case study 
-Research ideas- 
Oppdal 9.10.2013 
Per Ståle Knardal 
Motivation 
• The critique of budgeting 
– Budgeting – an unnecessary evil (Wallander, 1999) 
– Like steering a car by looking in the rear mirror 
• The relevance of the critique 
– The annual budget is not yet ready for the scrap 
heap (Ekholm and Wallin, 2000) 
– Budgets continue to be used for control purposes 
and are perceived to be value-added (Libby and 
Lindsay, 2010) 
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Context 
• The festival – a large Norwegian festival  
– 200 arrangements – late July/beginning of August 
– Revenue MNOK 30 (45 % public funding) 
• Crisis in 2008, deficit = MNOK 7 
– New budget system – pwc 
– Contextually aligned 
– Perceived to be an important control tool 
The levers of control framework 
Business strategy
Risks to Be 
Avoided
Core Values
Critical 
Performance 
Variables
Strategic 
Uncertainties
Boundary 
System
Interactive 
Control System
Diagnostic 
Control System
Beliefs System
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Research question 
• How is the budget used in alignment with the 
levers of control framework? A study of a 
festival going from deficit to surplus.  
 
Discussion (1)  
Business strategy
Budget
Budget Budget
Budget
Risks to Be 
Avoided
Core Values
Critical 
Performance 
Variables
Strategic 
Uncertainties
Boundary System
Interactive 
Control System
Diagnostic Control 
System
Beliefs System
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 Discussion (2) 
Budget frame
Beliefs system
Boundary system
P2 P3 P4
P5
P6P7P8
P9
Budget use 1st November – beliefs and boundary system 
Discussion (3) 
Project 2
Project 3
Project 6
Project 4
Project 5
Project 1
Budget 
frame
Budget use 1st February – interactive use 
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Discussion (4) 
Project 2
Project 3
Project 6
Project 4
Project 5
Project 1
Budget 
frame
Budget use 15th May  - diagnostic use 
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The coexistence of different logics after 
hospital mergers 
 or  
problems with management control at 
distance? 
 
First draft 
Workshop: Management accounting and control –  
the diversity and opportunities in research and research methods 
9th  - 11th October 2013, Oppdal, Norway 
 
 
 
 
Elsa Solstad, Harstad University College &  
Trondheim Business School 
& 
Inger Johanne Pettersen, Trondheim Business School  
 
 
 
 Most hospitals reforms represent a 
rationalist logic that follows managerial 
principles - mergers 
 The managerial logic may be in conflict 
with both the identity and values of the 
professional employees in hospitals 
(professional logic) 
 Mergers imply management control both 
close to production and at a distance 
Background 
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 The data show that there are problems 
with different logics, and problems with 
management control at distance? 
 Different logics? 
 Difference in closeness and distance? 
 
Problems 
Professional/managerial 
logics? 
              or 
Vertical/horizontal 
management control? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical framework? 
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 Two surveys 
 2005 
 Population: three small hospitals 
merged into one hospital enterprise 
 2013 
 Two small hospitals  (two of the three 
hospitals from 2005) and a large 
hospital merged into one hospital 
enterprise 
 
The study  
 
Empirical findings? 
What should we focus on? 
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 To study this phenomenon we include the population 
from 2005  and 2013 
 But the problem is that the populations are different, and 
then there will be problem with the comparability 
 All professional employees in the two hospital 
enterprises at two different periods 
 Data from both 2005 and 2013 
 
 
 
 
Different logics? 
 
The administrative top leaders have a good dialogue with 
the professional employees in the hospital enterprise 
 
 
Strongly 
agree/ 
partly 
agree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
 
Strongly 
disagree/ 
partly 
disagree 
 
Total (%) 
Total 
respondents 
2005 2,3 % 11,6 % 86,1 % 100 % 258 
2013 8,0 % 35,2 % 56,8 % 100 % 681 
 
 Alternatively, we can compare the two hospitals that 
are the same in 2005 and 2013 
 Focus on the two small hospitals that are involved  in 
both mergers 
 Focus on vertical/horizontal management control 
 Distance and closeness 
 Data both from 2005 and 2013  
 
 
 
 
 
Management control close to 
production and at a distance 
Hospital 1  Hospital 2 2005 2013 
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 Vertical/horizontal management control 
 Management control close to production and at a 
distance (the top leaders are located at the large 
hospital) 
 Two small hospitals  (two of the three hospitals from 
2005) and a large hospital  
 Data from 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
Further research? 
Large 
hospital 
Two small 
hospitals 
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29.10.2013 
Research in Progress 
Case study of the Festival  
by Eva Lechner 
Contents 
• Context of the case study 
• The Phenomenon under research 
• The Diversity and Opportunities in Research 
and Research Methods 
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Religious 
education for 
children 
Pilgrimage 
Religious 
events 
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Talks 
Fun for 
children History 
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St. Olav’s Days 
Experiences that moves 
• Concerts 
• Talks 
• Fun for children 
• History 
• Church Services 
• Pilgrimage 
• Religious education 
• Religious events 
 
Tradition 
Religion Culture 
St. Olav’s Days – The goal(s)… 
• Experiences that moves 
 
• “To reach the number of unique high quality experiences.” 
 
• To restore and strengthen Trondheim as a national clerical 
and cultural “kraftsentrum”* 
 
(å gjenreise og styrke Trondheim som nasjonalt kirkelig og 
kulturelt kraftsentrum) 
 
* Accepted by the board meeting December 17, 2008  
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2008 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Profit/Loss -1,35 1,16 0,31 0,02 0,34 0,96 -0,29 0,04 0,02 0,17 -1,83 -0,29 -6,88 1,66 1,26 1 0,548
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Profit/Loss Account 
Sources: Trondheim kommunerevisjon, 2008, Olavsfestdagene, 2013 
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 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Profit/Loss -1,35 1,16 0,31 0,02 0,34 0,96 -0,29 0,04 0,02 0,17 -1,83 -0,29 -6,88 1,66 1,26 1 0,548
Equity -1,13 0,03 0,35 0,37 0,73 1,68 1,39 1,44 1,45 1,62 -0,21 -0,81 -7,7 0,575 1,83 2,83 3,38
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
Profit/Loss vs. Equity 
Sources: Trondheim kommunerevisjon, 2008, Olavsfestdagene, 2013 
Number of events 
1998 112 
1999 98 
2000 113 
2001 136 
2002 148 
2003 153 
2004 200 
2005 179 
2006 188 
2007 169 
2008 228 
2009 197 
2010 190 
2011 258 
2012 239 
Revenues 
5,22 
9,08 
8,83 
10,65 
12,38 
14,48 
17,7 
21,59 
26,79 
22,96 
24,76 
24,98 
26,97 
28,48 
33,95 
Costs 
23,24 
31,631 
23,33 
25,78 
27,6 
33,62 
Profit 
-0,28 
-6,871 
1,65 
1,19 
0,88 
0,33 
How Come? 
Sources: Trondheim kommunerevisjon, 2008, Olavsfestdagene, 2013 
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 Per Kvistad Uddu Randi Wenche Haugen 
How Come? 
Petter Myhr 
Festival years: 
 1998 – 2007 
Festival years: 
   2009 - 2013 
Festival years: 
  2014 - Present 
“ To achieve national 
breakthrough in the 
church and the rest of the 
population's awareness. 
And in the media.” 
Number of events 
1998 112 
1999 98 
2000 113 
2001 136 
2002 148 
2003 153 
2004 200 
2005 179 
2006 188 
2007 169 
2008 228 
2009 197 
2010 190 
2011 258 
2012 239 
Revenues 
5,22 
9,08 
8,83 
10,65 
12,38 
14,48 
17,7 
21,59 
26,79 
22,96 
24,76 
24,98 
26,97 
28,48 
33,95 
Costs 
23,24 
31,631 
23,33 
25,78 
27,6 
33,62 
Profit 
-1,83 
-0,28 
-6,871 
1,65 
1,19 
0,88 
0,33 
How Come? 
Sources: Trondheim kommunerevisjon, 2008, Olavsfestdagene, 2013 
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How come? 
• The role of the sponsor 
 
• Role of The board of Directors:  
– 2 members from state level 
– 1 member from Sør-Trøndelag region 
– 1 member from Trondheim municipality 
– 1 member from the church 
 
 
 
Phenomenon 
1. Festival week and festival planning phase – How do they do it?  
 
Permanent employees (8) –> Temporary employees (10) –> Volunteers (360) 
The role of the church and the board 
Artistic impact 
 
=> management control systems and their role in managing tensions between social 
and economic imperatives in non-profit sector 
 
 
2. How was festival rebuilt after the huge deficit? 
 
 
3. How do they deal with uncertainty? 
 
Risk management at the operational level  – security, weather, illness of artists, …  
and risks at top-management level 
 
=> activities which contribute to overall management control systems 
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The Diversity and Opportunities in 
Research and Research Methods 
Case Study Research Challenges 
- Physical requirements 
- …. 
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On the limitations on the control processes of a dominated actor 
from taking part in Joint Venture 
 
Abstract 
New public management has suggested a wide range of new solutions to efficiency 
and control problems within municipalities. Joint Ventures have been suggested to 
enable organizations to gain access to scarce resources and achieve economy of scale. 
However, Joint Ventures limit autonomy for municipalities. In this article, we explore 
the consequences of this for municipalities as dominated owners of Joint Ventures, 
with respect to internal control processes. Based on a qualitative case study, we find 
that the use of a Joint Venture to provide municipality service might induce a lack of 
competence regarding services, necessary to perform control over these services. We 
also show how services provided by Joint Ventures might have a crowding out effect 
on services provided internally. 
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On the limitations on the control processes of a dominated actor 
from taking part in Joint Venture 
Introduction 
New Public Management has induced a search for more efficiency in the public sector, where ”copying 
” of solutions from the private sector has been a prime theme (see Hood, 1995, for a review). In recent 
years, the use of different forms for interorganizational cooperation has been incorporated in this 
development (Cäker och Siverbo, 2011). Baretta and Busco (2011, 213) claims that “The development 
of new cooperation agreements and innovative forms of organizing within the public sector have been 
portrayed as possible ways of increasing performance through more efficient use of resources, greater 
competitiveness, and improved customer service.” This development forces management of public 
sector organization to face new challenges, as Barretta and Busco continues “In this context, cooperation 
among partners needs to be constantly monitored and managed through an appropriate governance 
structure” (213). So far, research on this topic has been limited, Barretta and Busco (2011, 211) claims 
that ”limited attention has been dedicated to studying the role of management control practices within 
inter-organizational relationships in public organizations”. 
 
Especially small municipalities are today encouraged to seek cooperation with each other, larger 
municipalities and other external actors in order to cope with contemporary challenges. Many of the 
services that municipalities are liable to provide require substantial investments in knowledge and 
physical capacity. To cooperate may enable municipality to share to burden of required investments 
(Cäker and Siverbo, 2011).  
 
However, interorganizational cooperation has implications for the internal operations of a firm. From the 
private sector, for example Mouritsen et al (2001) has shown how cooperation put pressure on reshaping 
internal processes and Cäker (2007) has shown how close customer relations put pressure on changing 
accountabilities within the organization. Such external pressure and limitations on internal routines may 
also be problematic to public organizations, with a legal requirement on serving their clients within a 
limited budget. This can be expected to be especially problematic to dominated actors in 
interorganizational relationships. Earlier research from the private sector has shown how dominated 
actors are limited in their freedom to develop accounting and control routines for outsourced activities, 
with social controls as the remaining possibility (Cäker, 2008; Donada och Nogatchewsky, 2006). To 
our knowledge, the situation of a dominated actor in public sector cooperative arrangements remains 
unexplored. 
 
In this article, we investigate how the cooperative organizational form of Joint Ventures inflicts on a 
small municipality’s internal control processes. Regarding public joint venture, Cäker and Siverbo 
(2011) has shown a mainly positive effect on the advancement of control routines for Joint Ventures 
with the presence of a dominating owner. However, these results arise out of the dominated actor taking 
on a responsibility to align the control of Joint Ventures with other internal processes. This would open 
up for a potential problem of dominated owners, being forced to adapt to the JV and indirectly to the 
dominating owners. We aim to describe how such pressure might limit the internal processes of a 
dominated owner.  
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The article is based on a qualitative study with 12 interviews as primary data collection. Interviews have 
been done with both politicians and administrators in six municipalities and with managers from a Joint 
Venture. This is the first version of our paper, which will be developed concerning all parts. 
 
Frame of reference 
Joint Ventures are one form of interorganizational relationships, where organizations cooperate in order 
to fulfill some aim. In establishing a Joint Venture, this cooperation is organized as a separate entity, 
where different owners have strategic and/or financial expectations on the JV (Büchel, 2003). Through 
establishment of a JV, an organization can secure long term access to different resources, physical or 
immaterial, without acquiring them or explore new possibilities by matching resources with those of 
another organization. The motive for a JV can therefore be risk minimization, cost efficiency and 
development.  
 
Management control is used in organizations to enable fulfilling of organizational objectives. Public 
organizations have the objective to produce public value (Spano, 2009). However, as Spano points out, 
this is done under a restriction of costs. In many countries, this restriction is regulated by law; public 
organizations are obligated to provide services with respect to a budget in balance. Management control 
in public organizations should therefore enable to fulfill objectives under a financial restriction.   
 
The general pros and cons with using joint cooperation to achieve this relates to the gain in access to 
resources versus the loss of autonomy (Pfeffer och Nowak, 1976). Outsourcing of activities to an 
external organizations, for example a joint venture, does not relieve for example a municipality from its 
obligations. This induces a complexity to the control process when a municipality engages in joint 
ventures (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976). An external actor needs to be controlled by the municipality, since 
it will have an influence on the ability of the municipality to fulfill its objectives. This regards both the 
quality of service provided and the cost of these services.  
 
Regarding quality of service, the literature on interoganizational relations has highlighted the potential 
of sharing and pooling of knowledge (see Hardy et al, 2003, for a review) (Hardy et al., 2003). 
Collaboration in for example joint ventures has been identified to enable both transfer of existing 
knowledge and building of new capabilities. Hardy et al (2003) claims that knowledge issues are often 
the central strategic effect of collaboration, enabling organizations to cope with tasks they otherwise 
could not handle. 
 
Interestingly, however, Hardy et al (2003) conclude that high level of involvement in the 
interorganizational activity is necessary to achieve knowledge transfer. This would problematize to 
engage in Joint Venture without devoting internal resources to the same, if an intended outcome 
concerns a high quality of service. Through outsourcing, a municipality can get access to knowledge 
resources without having to acquire them. However, municipalities still have the responsibility to control 
that the quality of the service provided matches demands of the public. Therefore, knowledge about 
services outsourced is still needed in order to perform this control and without resources devoted to this, 
the opportunity to gain this knowledge through cooperation may be lost.  
 
Cost of services provided through outsourcing can generally be financed in two ways; either by fees paid 
by the public directly to the Joint Venture, or by funding from the municipality’s tax revenues from the 
public. In both cases, the task of the municipality is to control for the value of money. However, an 
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additional complexity arises concerning funding through tax money. Taxes are collected for a number of 
services provided by municipalities. More money to one area implies less money for another area. The 
loss of autonomy that Pfeffer and Novak discuss is of potential relevance here. If the engagement in a 
Joint Venture results in a loss of autonomy regarding the level of spending, a pontential problem arises. 
 
Therefore, in order to fulfill its objectives when engaging in Joint Ventures, municipalities must find 
way to control these Joint Ventures. A Joint Venture implies challenges regarding control in both the 
horizontal and the vertical dimension. The vertical dimension is the control of the owners by the Joint 
Venture. This dimension is consistent with the classical control, and earlier joint venture researchers 
have used general management control typologies to study this (Cäker och Siverbo, 2011; Groot och 
Merchant, 2000). Results control affects behavior through creating expectations of what to achieve and 
providing freedom to act inside the Joint Venture to use local knowledge to achieve these 
expectations/targets. Action control influences behavior through rules and regulations about how to act. 
This is a more direct form of control, which requires that knowledge about suitable actions resides 
among the owners of the Joint Venture. Furthermore, social controls are aimed at influencing the values 
and beliefs that guide action within Joint Ventures. Social controls are often claimed to be interlinked 
with trust. With social control as the most indirect control, often leaving actions unsurveilled for long 
periods of time, trust in that Joint Venture will have the knowledge and good will to make decisions in 
line with the interests of the owners is required. 
 
The horizontal dimension concerns how different owners find ways to correlate their actions with 
respect to the Joint Venture (Cäker and Siverbo, 2011). This is a complexity that is specifically added 
from the organizational form of Joint Venture, where the interests of different owners need to be 
correlated to each other in order to provide coherent signals to the Joint Venture. Cäker and Siverbo 
(2011) note that a substantial part of these issues need to be handled in the legal agreement that 
constitutes the Joint Venture. However, unexpected conflicts among owners and an initial skepticism to 
being able to foresee future development may require horizontal controls. Cäker and Siverbo (2011) 
suggests that social controls are most likely to be important here, but that these can be supported by 
actions rules that regulates continuous interaction between the owners.  
 
In this article, we explore the situation of a dominated JV owner. The distribution of power in an 
interorganizational relationship has, not unexpectedly, been shown as decisive to the formation of 
management control. Especially, the formal action and results control have shown to be under the 
influence of the dominating actors (Donada and Nogatchewsky, 2006; Cäker, 2008). Dominated actors 
are to a large extent left with social controls as the possibility to influence the relation. Both these 
articles investigate controls on both operative and strategic levels in the relationships, and find that the 
social controls are most active on the operative level. Cäker (2008) claim that this means even if the 
social controls may facilitate the exchange process, they are less influential regarding “setting the 
agenda” for the relation. However, studying a municipality owned joint venture, Cäker and Siverbo 
(2011) find social controls on the strategic level, which enables dominated actors to influence also the 
strategic development of a Joint Venture. 
 
Case description and analysis 
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Introduction 
Three municipalities (A, B and C) formed the JV in 2007 to supply fire services to their inhabitants. 
Later, in July 2012, four new municipalities (D, E, F and G) joined the JV. The municipalities are of 
very different size, and their share in the JV is based on their original fire budgets:  
Municipality Share in the JV 
A 78,2 
B 6,5 
C 3,0 
D 4,7 
E 4,2 
F 1,9 
G 1,5 
 
 
The owners finance the company based on their holding. For the small owners this accounts for 1-2 per 
cent of their total budget, while the corresponding proportion for owner A is 0.4 per cent.  The JV now 
includes 12 fire stations and 330 employees.  
 
The JV company has two major governing bodies. The Supervisory Board is the highest body, including 
the Mayor of the owners and six additional delegates from owner A. The Mayor of municipality A 
serves as chairman. The Supervisory Board elects a board of directors with seven members. At least 
three members are appointed by owner A, including the chairman of the board.  
 
A municipality has a legal responsibility to provide adequate fire services to its residents. Even if 
services are ordered from the JV, the responsibility still remains within the municipality. A partnership 
agreement regulates the authority and responsibility between the owners and the company. Each 
municipality is responsible for creating an annual risk and vulnerability analysis (RVA). Based on the 
RVA, the JV company designs a fire plan for the municipality indicating the activities for the following 
years.  
 
When the JV was established, the main objective was to improve the quality of service, both in terms of 
emergency response and efforts to prevent fire. New national fire regulations made it difficult especially 
for the small municipalities to fulfil all demands:  
 
“The new fire regulations put such high demands on the fire service. It is inappropriate to 
manage it within a small municipality,... It's much more effective to work with municipalities that 
already have everything up and running.” (Informant B) 
 
Out of one of the dominated municipalities, the question of the objective with the JV should be fairly 
simple; to have a fire service that enable them to keep the population safe. In relation to this objective 
there is a broad consensus among the participants that the partnership has raised the quality of services. 
As one of them puts it: 
 
“We get to have a fire service which in a way is "state of the art".  It works as a modern fire 
service is supposed to work, as opposed to the option which would be a "here is what we can 
afford-" type of fire service. “[Informant B] 
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 Some of the owners also had expectations about reducing costs for fire services. 
  
«One was that they wanted to operate more efficiently, thus saving money. And the second was 
that they wanted to raise the competence, the quality of services”. [Informant B2] 
 
Different level of ambitions is an obvious challenge in this collaboration. It is generally agreed that the 
company has ambitions to grow larger and that there are economies of scale that can be exploited. 
However, there is also a fear that the dominant owner and the CEO of the JV have higher ambitions than 
the small holders: 
 
“Show me the city in Norway which has a similar modern fire department as (we) will eventually 
get. It does not exist. And that has probably something to do with the manager here; he has some 
ambitions that are slightly larger than the JV”. [Informant B] 
 
”.. if growth causes synergies which make it less expensive for the current owners, the growth 
most certainly is wanted. But if this means that the company will be difficult to run... This 
company was established to promote efficiency, not to be huge. And it is actually already very 
large. A is a giant compared to the rest of us. So for me it is not necessary that all municipalities 
in the district join the JV. This may not be very effective.” [Informant B2] 
 
Each owner is required to cover a fixed percentage of the total costs. The cost for each owner is thus not 
linked to the activity in its region. If owner G points to an initiative in its RVA which is taken into their 
fire plan, then G has to cover 1.5 percent of the costs associated with this, while A must cover 78.2 
percent. On the other hand, G has to cover 1.5 percent of costs for all activities in the other 
municipalities. Thus, the individual owner has little influence of the overall level of activity. In addition 
the quality of service and cost-efficiency in the production of services is controlled by the JV company. 
This poses a huge risk for the owners. 
 
Vertical control 
The partnership agreement is supposed to regulate the activity within the JV. According to some of the 
respondents, the original agreement did not communicate the element of costs and the objective of 
achieving synergies well enough. The original agreement focused mainly on quality, which made the 
company eager to build a great fire service, not necessarily a cheap one. This has led to quite large cost 
increases.  
 
”A major concern with this company is that costs have increased tremendously. And this is 
probably not quite in line with many of the owners' objectives. On the contrary, they might have 
a goal of reducing costs, right. Or at least keep the same level, and still increase the quality. 
Thus, the partnership agreement was changed, so if you read today's partnership agreement, it 
focuses on achieving cost effects, synergies through merging and efficiency increases”. 
[Informant B2] 
 
According to the partnership agreement the Supervisory Board is proposing a total budget for the JV 
which is then approved by the Board. This is the formal part of the budgeting process and is supposed to 
take place in May. Within the municipalities, the political discussions about their annual budget take 
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place in the autumn after the annual grant from the State is received. This difference in timing is a 
challenge. Thus, the CEO of the municipalities and the management of the JV meet in May to informally 
agree on the budget frames for the JV. According to our respondents, this situation is characterized by 
the municipal CEO, wanting to save money, and the CEO of the JV, wanting to spend money:  
 
“He (the JV CEO) obviously has the ambition to build a modern and well-functioning fire 
department. And we have a dilemma, the money he wants to spend in the JV, is also needed 
elsewhere in the municipalities. [Informant B2] 
 
The CFO-forum is an informal control mechanism that makes it possible to agree on a budget before the 
summer. However, it is considered a democratic problem that the level of costs for fire services is 
removed from political control in the municipalities.  
 
“What happens when we go to the municipal council and reveals what it costs, is that there is no 
real discussion. This is not what we are discussing; we discuss whether we should have two 
additional school places or whether we should add three more nursing beds. That is what we are 
discussing, and not how much the cost of the JV has increased. That is something that our CEO 
will take care of, it just has to be solved.” [Informant B] 
 
Moreover, the input from the forum of municipal CEOs is further processed by the Supervisory Board. 
If they decide to increase the budget, the owners have to accept it and find a solution to the situation. 
This is perceived as a strange solution, since bodies within the JV company really determines what the 
municipal council is going to grant, leaving the municipality with rather limited influence on a budget 
item that is significant for them.  
 
 “This is the dilemma of the inter-municipal company the way I see it, it is sort of "foul play” 
(Urent trav)“ [Informant B2] 
  
Quality assessment 
Increased quality of services is considered the greatest benefit from the partnership. All actors seem to 
agree on this point. Different drivers of quality are highlighted; access to better equipment, more 
expertise, and a professionally run company. 
 
”Just look at the machinery in the JV, versus what we had ourselves. It's like night and day. 
Consider the expertise within the JV, as opposed to what we had  - cooks and bakers and 
plumbers, right. Clearly, it cannot be compared.  It is like two different worlds.”[Informant B] 
  
Quality assessment is based on the legal requirements for fire services. These include conditions such as 
response time, required capacity, the number of preventive controls etc. According to the formal control 
system, the JV company is responsible for verifying quality. However, according to our respondents, 
there is no information system reporting on the level of quality to the owners on a general basis. The 
company is obliged to report to the owners when they find that the quality requirements are not met. For 
the owners, it is considered difficult to assess the quality. 
 
“No. .. The company has the responsibility to report to us if they do not deliver what is legally 
determined, that is, what is required for a fire department. Beyond that we have no ability to test 
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it, we have not…we have nothing, there are no quality parameters, so of course it's difficult.” 
[Informant B] 
 
By outsourcing fire services to the JV,  the owners no longer need to have detailed knowledge of the 
production of fire services or the legal requirements for such services. Now they can rely on a 
professional company to take care of this. On the other hand, the owners perceive themselves as 
increasingly distanced from the company's operations; they no longer have the necessary expertise to 
evaluate the company's activities. Thus, the autonomy of the JV company is assumed to be one of the 
main challenges for the small co-owner. 
 
”Perhaps A has the competence, I do not know. But for our part, it is totally unacceptable to 
interfere - other than having a passive mailbox they can send information to. ” [ Informant B] 
 
The lack of knowledge also makes it difficult for the municipalities to design their own RVA. In 
practice, experts from the JV company contribute to this process, making the JV even more in control of 
their own activity.  
 
The RAV analysis of (the municipalities) was prepared with a great deal of support from the 
administration of the JV company - especially from the fire chief. From our side, the plan 
manager, contributed. He reports to me, so in that respect the municipal CEO participated 
indirectly. But the influence from the company itself was significant.” [Informant B2] 
 
Thus, it seems as if both the volume of services, the composition of services and the quality of services 
is beyond the control of the dominated municipalities. However, the owners trust the company to have 
the necessary competence to make the right decisions and supply high quality services when needed.  
 
”We perceive the company as highly professional in many ways .. Definitely. We have 
outsourced an important service to, let’s say, a serious player. We expect it (the company) to be 
in full control (of the quality)” (Informant D) 
 
 
The dominating owner… 
In the formal governance system of the company, municipality A is given a dominant position through 
their representation in the supervisory board and in the board of directors. On several occasions the 
Supervisory Board has made decisions were the small owners disagreed. This is mainly explained by the 
presence of the mighty Mayor of the dominant owner;  
 
“Yes, it has happened and it is mainly due to the fact that (name of the Mayor of A) is sitting 
there, and she is powerful.” Informant D 
 
There is a general perception that the dominant owner exploits their position of power. 
 
“Power rules ( Det er makta som rår), to respond specifically to it. I somehow feel that A takes 
the other owners seriously .... However, and you have probably heard this from the others as 
well, I have the feeling that A may have used their power in certain areas. It will hopefully get 
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better. If not, I think that might open up for someone exiting the collaboration. That may 
happen.” (Informant D) 
 
All respondents are critical to the partnership agreement because it is vague and incomplete. This formal 
contract cannot possibly cover all conditions. This allows for informal influence. Since expertise and 
capacity are key factors, this leaves municipality A in a unique position. 
”It really just means that A is better prepared to meetings than we are. They are in a position to be 
prepared, we are not.....You can say that A is in the driver's seat; they are large and they have the 
resources to investigate things. Thus, they have the ability to get things on the agenda that we do not 
have the capacity to engage in” [Informant B]  
 
Discussion 
On a general level, our case involves owners with diverging interests in and power over the joint 
venture. A dominant owner has a significant higher ambition and power than all other owners. In the 
following, we outline the effects on the dominated owners of this, pointing at some structural difficulties 
for the internal control processes with potential theoretical relevance. (The next version of this paper 
will also contain an outline of the controls available to handle these structural difficulties)  
 
Knowledge related processes 
The JV in the case was initiated due to an institutional pressure through regulations demanding 
improved quality of fire- and rescue services. Small municipalities were thereby induced to enter as 
dominated owners in a JV with A, to share investments needed to improve quality of service. The 
dominated owners do see a substantial raise in quality as an outcome. However, our study shows that 
there is a fundamental disagreement of how far improvements in quality should be driven. Since A and 
the JV management seems to be in agreement of developing the JV into providing a state-of-the-art fire 
and rescue service, the apprehension from the dominated owners is that there is a difference in the 
current ambition of the JV and the level of service quality that is required by regulations.  
 
However, a key observation from the case is that the dominated owners have problems to back this 
opinion by knowledge. The dominated owners in our case have not enrolled in active involvement in the 
JV operations to gain knowledge themselves (Hardy et al, 1993). This is shown by numerous general 
statements from the dominated owners and more specifically by how they rely on the JV also to analyze 
their own needs (RVA). The JV thereby has strong influence on deciding what to deliver. This 
informational advantage further strengthens the position for the JV to set the agenda for development. 
 
This signalizes an overly strong belief in that entering the JV would handle all questions concerning fire- 
and rescue services, which now have made the small owners not only dominated by size and ownership, 
but also by knowledge. Looking at the construction of the JV agreement, the choice of not keeping in-
house resources after entering the JV can be understood. The share in the JV agreement was based on 
the fire budget before entering. With an initial expectation on that the total budget of the JV should be 
the sum of the entering owners’ initial budget, resources devoted to keep in-house competence for the 
dominated owners would lead to an increase in the budget at the starting point. This is a hypothetical 
reasoning, but it is reasonable that it restricted the dominated owners, since they signalized that their 
initial expectation was to achieve better quality and economic efficiency due to economics of scale. 
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This lack of knowledge to control service quality has multiple potential effects. First, as we reason 
above, it is a bit ironic that it might contribute to the increase in cost due to the lack of information to 
counter-argue the suggestions from the JV about the investments they claim is necessary. Second, there 
is a potential negative effect regarding the adaption of fire- and rescue services to local needs. Earlier 
research has shown that coordination on local levels in interorganizational cooperation often is based on 
social coordination between well informed actors (Cäker, 2008). The lack of knowledge among the 
dominated owners might give rise to lack of operational input, for example in the RVA-analysis. Third, 
the lack of knowledge among the dominated owners may problematize the option of exit. One of the 
dominated owners see this as a viable alternative if the cost of the JV does not stops going up. However, 
after entering the JV ad having down-played the knowledge about these services, to insource these 
services would be restricted. 
 
Financial processes 
Our case shows how the loss of autonomy (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976) over municipality services taken 
over by a JV implies a pressure on keeping the restriction on costs (Spano, 2009). The pressure on cost 
comes from the higher ambition with JV services from both JV management and the dominating owner. 
The dominating owner is seen as influential both through the formal influence and informational 
advantage due to their higher capacity to devote attention to the JV. The JV management is influential 
due to a knowledge advantage regarding services.  
 
As the partnership agreement is written, the dominated owners are forced to pay their share of 
investments in the JV, no matter if it regards services they have use of or not. This share is bigger as a 
share of the municipality budgets for the dominated owners than for the dominating owner. Since the 
share in the JV was based on previous spending on fire services in the municipalities, we can only 
assume that this was higher among the smaller municipalities due to fixed cost for basic capacity, the 
same no matter how many inhabitants there are in the municipalities. This means that the cost of fire 
services is potentially of greater concern among the dominated owners.  
 
The structural situation, with the lack of knowledge and power to stop the increasing cost, is problematic 
in itself. However, it is interesting how this is further amplified by the financial decision processes. 
Since the negotiation of JV finances for next year occurs before the budget process in the different 
municipalities, this puts the dominated owners in a twofold problematic situation. First, in discussing the 
finances for the JV, they have limited knowledge about other demands on their internal budget for next 
year. This is of potential relevance regarding informal understanding from the other owners, especially 
the dominating owner, about financial difficulties that could be an argument for relieving a municipality 
from the financial burden of the JV. Second, since the financial requirements of the JV is decided before 
the rest of the budget for the municipality is negotiated, fire services might have a crowding out effect 
on other services as long as tax raises not is seen as an option. The loss of autonomy over the outsourced 
services thereby also has a potential effect on other services provided by the individual municipalities.    
 
Conclusion 
In this descriptive paper, we investigate how the cooperative organizational form of Joint Ventures 
inflicts on a small municipality’s internal control processes. Based on a case study of a JV, with one 
dominating and five dominated owners, we offer two conclusions. First, regarding quality of service, the 
expectation from dominated owners that a JV will contribute to improved quality of service may 
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undermine development of in-house knowledge with potential effects for the internal control processes. 
The ability to influence the JV is hindered, concerning both to control for efficiency in JV operations 
relating to municipality internal processes and financial efficiency of the JV. With the responsibility for 
municipality to ensure operational and financial viability of services that are outsourced, there is a need 
for in-house knowledge about outsourced service for control processes.  
 
Second, a JV agreement that enables external actors to influence cost levels of the municipality give rise 
to a potential risk of outsourced services to crowd out other municipality services. Besides this fairly 
obvious observation for a dominated actor, we highlight the influence from uncoordinated financial 
processes. To preserve the opportunity to balance activities that are outsourced with in-house activities, 
a coordination of the financial processes among the owners of a JV appears to be necessary.  
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to develop our understanding of the relationship between accounting 
and delineated entities of inter-dependent activities and resources in networks. Specifically we 
aim at an increased understanding of the role of accounting in the creation of boundaries, but also 
as a tool that enables transcendence across boundaries. Such an understanding includes an ability 
to map out how something plays out in various empirical settings by explaining the mechanisms 
behind it. In this paper we seek to identify and deconstruct the social mechanisms that control the 
relationship between accounting and the creation of boundaries around certain sets of activities 
and resources – the performative role of accounting. We review the literature on accounting and 
on boundary objects, which is then used to conceptualize the boundary creating and transcending 
capacity of accounting in networks. We show how the concept of boundary objects can be used to 
develop an understanding of the performative role of accounting in networks. We end with the 
formulation of a set of propositions, which can be used to inform further empirical investigations 
into the matter.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the traditional accounting and organizational control literature, the economic object is pre-
given in terms of the legal entity of the company. Boundaries are assumed unproblematic and 
taken for granted. Accounting is used to coordinate activities, resources and actors within the 
company and any coordination with other companies is done via the market mechanism 
(Chandler & Daems, 1979). Voices have been raised from the field of accounting urging research 
to expand the horizon beyond the established legal entity of the company (Hopwood, 1996; 
Otley, Broadbent, & Berry, 1995). The development of the modern business landscape to become 
increasingly networked also indicates a need to look beyond traditional company boundaries. 
Strategic alliances, outsourcing, supply chains and R&D cooperation is part of everyday activities 
in many of today’s companies (Castells, 1996; Håkansson, Ford, Gadde, Snehota, & 
Waluszewski, 2009; Håkansson & Olsen, 2012; Malerba, 2006; Miller & O’Leary, 2007; Zeitz, 
1980). This development leads to new questions about the meaning and importance of boundaries 
and the relationship between accounting and boundaries (Ford & Håkansson, 2010; Håkansson, 
Kraus, & Lind, 2010a). The company as a bounded entity becomes no longer the only, perhaps 
not even the obvious, object of interest. More important, the boundaries of where a company 
begins and ends are no longer evident.  
One important issue which have been identified in the growing field of research on accounting in 
networks (Håkansson, Kraus, & Lind, 2010b) is the one concerning boundaries. What alternative 
boundaries can be relevant? Some research focus on accounting in inter-organizational relations 
where the boundary have been drawn around two organizations and their relationship (Neumann, 
2010; Dekker, 2004; Berry, Coad, Harris, Otley, & Stringer, 2009) or around a joint venture and 
its owners (Groot & Merchant, 2000; Kamminga & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007). But why draw 
the boundary there? A network is by definition without boundaries; stretching out in all directions 
and without any center (Prenkert & Hallén, 2006), and it is possible to think of alternative 
boundaries around certain specific activities and resources (Håkansson et al., 2010a: 344). For 
example, Lind and Thrane (2010) identify five different ways to understand and analyze inter-
organizational relations, ranging from a dyad to complex networks through chains, many 
counterparts up- or down-stream and various customers and suppliers. How and where the 
boundary is set is arbitrary, always making any given network partial, under construction and 
dependent on who draws the boundary and by which tools (Prenkert, 2012). Furthermore, 
networks have no hierarchy (Håkansson, et al., 2009) and no strategic center (Mouritsen & 
Thrane, 2006: 242). From an accounting perspective this poses great challenges.  
 
PURPOSE AND CONTRIBUTION 
The purpose of this paper is to develop our understanding of the relationship between accounting 
and delineated entities of inter-dependent activities and resources in networks. Specifically we 
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aim at an increased understanding of the role of accounting in the creation of boundaries, but also 
as a tool that enables transcendence across boundaries.  
Such an understanding includes an ability to map out how something plays out in various 
empirical settings, but also to be able to explain the mechanisms behind these developments. This 
paper focus on the latter and in so doing we seek to identify and deconstruct the social 
mechanisms (Gross, 2009; Mason, Easton, & Lenney, 2011) that control the relationship between 
accounting and the creation of boundaries around certain sets of activities and resources – the 
performative role of accounting. 
In order to develop a better understanding of the relationship between accounting and boundaries 
in networks, we review the literature on accounting and on boundary objects, which will be used 
to conceptualize the boundary creating and transcending capacity of accounting in networks. This 
literature review will provide the basis for a conceptual analysis of the relationship and what the 
concept of boundary objects can contribute with to enhance our understanding of this issue. We 
end with the formulation of a set of propositions, which can be used to inform further empirical 
investigations into the matter.  
In this paper we show how the concept of boundary objects (Hendersen, 1991; Star & Griesemer, 
1989) is helpful to develop an understanding of the role of accounting in networks. Boundary 
objects have been used to understand the role of private labels as resources in industrial networks 
(Prenkert, forthcoming) and to explain power dynamics in networks (Harrison, Hoholm, Olsen, & 
Prenkert, 2011).  
This paper contributes with an understanding of the performative role of accounting in networks 
explaining how it creates effects in terms of specifically delineated and bounded sets of 
interconnected activities and resources with the purpose to economize on certain contexts and 
situations. We also contribute with conceptualizations of these effects and their underlying 
mechanisms, which lead up to a set of propositions.  
 
THE PERFORMATIVE ROLE OF ACCOUNTING IN NETWORKS 
A common point of departure in inter-organizational accounting literature is that the boundary 
setting is a result of management decisions on minimizing costs and that accounting control is 
wielded within these set boundaries (Anderson & Dekker, 2010; Kulp, 2002). In an inter-
organizational context this focus have spurred investigations of accounting control in 
relationships between two parties and only a few exceptional investigations of formal networks 
(Håkansson & Lind, 2007; Håkansson & Lind, 2004; Kajüter & Kulmala, 2005; Mouritsen & 
Thrane, 2006). A recurrent theme in the extant research has been on how to design accounting 
control systems so as to minimize opportunistic behavior (Baiman & Rajan, 2002; Neumann, 
2010). Some studies have directed attention on how accounting control is used to coordinate 
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activities across company boundaries (Agndal & Nilsson, 2009; Dekker, 2004). The common 
trait in these studies is that the company boundary and the role of accounting for the creation and 
function of boundaries are not problematized.  
In this study we emphasize the performative role of accounting in networks. This means that we 
focus on the role of accounting for the creation, use and function of boundaries in inter-
organizational contexts. We address the overall issue of how accounting is used to both break up 
and uphold existing boundaries. How a given actor use accounting in a network affects how 
boundaries are drawn (Håkansson et al., 2010a) and how what ends up inside these boundaries 
are organized (Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006). We are concerned with how accounting is used as a 
tool to perform the task of defining boundaries and in this circumstance it is fruitful to draw on 
the concept of boundary objects (Hendersen, 1991; Star & Griesemer, 1989). Seeing accounting 
as a boundary object allows us to problematize how and why accounting can be used as a tool for 
boundary setting while providing a conceptualization of the performative nature of accounting.  
 
Accounting and Boundary Objects 
Drawing on the notion of boundary objects to cast light on the performative nature and character 
of accounting in networks requires us to first clarify what we mean with boundary objects.  
A boundary object is defined as an object that is “...plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the 
constraints of several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity 
across sites” (Star & Griesemer, 1989: 393). This means that it is something that can adapt to 
various contexts yet retain a unique and stable identity, or perform a stable role irrespective of 
varying contexts. The main feature of a boundary object (as opposed to, for example epistemic 
objects (Knorr Cetina, 1997)]) is its specific ability to enable actors to “...specify and learn about 
differences and dependencies...” (Nicolini, Mengis, & Swan, 2011: 5) across various contexts and 
boundaries. It also provides “...a form of reification around which the practices of the various 
actors [...] can be coordinated” (Nicolini et al., 2011: 5). 
Boundary objects functions as important tools to create common frames of reference among 
actors in dynamic contexts characterized by such network features such as a lack of hierarchy and 
a strategic centre and where resources and knowledge are distributed (Oswick & Robertson, 
2009). The concept has been used to understand the role of private labels in networks (Prenkert, 
forthcoming) and to understand power dynamics in networks (Harrison et al., 2011). Empirical 
studies have shown that power is an important aspect of boundary objects (Bechky, 2003; Kim & 
King, 2004) because they can both induce change and be used to draw new boundaries by acting 
as ‘bridges’ and ‘anchors’ (Star & Griesemer, 1989: 414. In addition, boundary objects can act as 
‘barricades’ and ‘mazes’ meaning that they can function as hinders for change and as smoke and 
mirrors to confuse actors (Oswick & Robertson, 2009: 190. In the former case, boundary objects 
are used to connect things, whereas in the latter they are used to disconnect things. This duality is 
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an important feature of boundary objects for our purposes of discussing the connecting and 
disconnecting of things in networks. This is because connecting two specific things always imply 
not connecting to other things and sometimes oven disconnecting some other things before the 
new connecting can be done. This is because very seldom in networks are there any free 
resources floating around ready to be connected and utilized. Rather, resources are usually 
already ‘taken’ and already connected to other resources, actors and activities. The 
conceptualization of boundary objects comprising not only bridging and anchoring capacities, but 
also barricading (or hindering) and mazing (or confusing) capacities as well, is important and 
useful when applying it on accounting in networks.  
 
The Capacities of Boundary Objects in Networks: Discussion and Propositions 
Viewing the use of accounting in networks as a type of boundary object with four core capacities 
allows us to systematically discuss the implications in a networked context. In this way we can 
explore the performative role of accounting in networks. In this section we shall detail what we 
mean by this and substantiate our claims. If the use of accounting in networks follows the 
capacities of boundary objects, then we can begin with acknowledging its bridging features. 
Following from this it seem plausible that accounting can be used to bridge across boundaries. 
This is probably the most straightforward understanding of boundary objects and stem from the 
now classic work of Star and Griesemer (1989). From a network perspective this means that an 
actor using accounting in this capacity deploys a connecting process to connect to other activities, 
resources and actors. Such complex multiple connections between activities, resources and actors 
in networks have been defined as business relationships (Håkansson & Johanson, 1992; 
Håkansson & Snehota, 1995), but for our purposes it is conducive to re-conceptualize such 
connections as network interfaces. The reason is that business relationships often connotes to thin 
links connecting between fat nodes, and this is an imagery that is very far from our 
conceptualization here of accounting in its performative role as a boundary object in networks. 
Rather, this conceptualization of the role of accounting in networks produces a business 
landscape made up of complex, multilinked, multimodal, multidimensional interfaces between 
sets of activities, resources and actors. In addition, such interfaces can be created and bound 
around any given set of activities, resources and actors, independently of the legal status of any 
entity that relate to these network elements. Therefore our use of the term network interface 
rather than business relationship. 
Now, returning to the bridging capacity of accounting, this means that an existing boundary is 
being transcended in a process of opening up to explore the partly unknown. This induces truly 
novel connections and changes the current network forming new connections and network 
patterns. The motive behind this use of accounting is an ambition to reach out into the network 
and to discover and explore alternative novel connections – to explore network interfaces. This 
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type of use of accounting in its bridging capacity seem plausible to find in empirical accounts of, 
for example, new ventures, market development, and innovation and technological development 
during the explorative phases where this connecting mechanism is utilized. 
An example of this is the cooperation in buyer-seller relationships where open-book accounting 
can be used to improve efficiency and to bridge and connect the two entities tighter to each other. 
Accounting can also be used to anchor something in an existing structure in the network. In 
network terminology this equals mobilisation of support for a certain set of connections between 
activities, resources and actors – what we here have called network interfaces. Such network 
interfaces are continuously challenged and contested by alternative constellations and anchoring a 
certain interface in the network by the use of accounting in its anchoring capacity creates stability 
and predictability to it. This use of accounting functions as a way to set, or to establish firmly a 
suggested novel network interface that may have been discovered during a transcending process 
utilizing the first boundary object capacity of accounting. In this case, the motive behind this use 
of accounting is to bring in and to bind the previously unbound and to set a boundary around a 
given constellation of activities, resources and actors – to define a certain network interface. 
Examples of this type of use of accounting in its anchoring capacity seem plausible to find in 
empirical accounts of in technological development and cooperative arrangements around 
product and process-development where a novel boundary is set by this reinforcing mechanism 
so as to withheld change attempts from other actors. Accounts of cooperative agreements, 
contracts and joint ventures can all be empirical manifestations of this anchoring capacity used to 
define network interfaces and to give them a shared identity. 
In both these capacities discussed above, accounting is used to connect network interfaces to each 
other. But accounting can also have the performative role of disconnecting network interfaces, or 
prevent attempts at exploring and defining network interfaces. This is the network process 
involved in the use of accounting in its barricading and mazing boundary object capacity. 
Accounting can be used to barricade a certain network interface preventing it from being 
accessed by others and disconnecting it from other interfaces, thus having an isolating effect. In 
this capacity it seem plausible that accounting can be used to uphold a certain boundary set 
around a certain network interface in order to protect it and to buffer it from change attempts. 
This type of network process and interface effect is crucial to any actor seeking to stabilize and to 
economize in networks, as it enables predictability and stability so as to create economic returns. 
Without this isolating effect, it is very difficult to accomplish anything in a network where 
interfaces are continuously challenged and subjected to change attempts. It seem therefore highly 
plausible that this type of use of accounting in its barricading capacity can be found in empirical 
examples of accounting in networks as a way to stabilize and economize in networks. The motive 
behind this use of accounting is to protect a given pre-defined constellation of activities, 
resources and actors – to isolate a network interface. This type of use of accounting in its 
barricading capacity seem plausible to find in empirical accounts of, for example, technological 
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cores (Thompson, 1967) where the core is buffered from the surrounding network through the 
isolating mechanism of the barricading capacity of accounting in networks. This is probably one 
of the most common empirical accounts of the performative role of a boundary object in business 
networks. 
Finally, drawing on the conceptualization of accounting as a type of boundary object with a 
mazing capacity, it can be used to hide a boundary by attempting to confuse other actors. In this 
way, an actor can attempt to hide the specifics of a network interface from discovery by others, or 
disguise it to look like something it is not, etc. By applying the old and well-known smoke-and-
mirror trick, actors can cloak the appearance of interfaces in order to confuse other actors. The 
motive behind this use of accounting is to confuse others about the specifics of a given pre-
defined constellation of activities, resources and actors– to cloak a network interface. This type of 
use of accounting in its mazing capacity seems plausible to find in empirical accounts of, for 
example, innovation, R&D, and product-development projects, where the disclosure of certain 
details concerning some interfaces is reduced by this mechanism. 
An example of the mazing capacity of boundary objects in networks can be found in some 
modern retail organizations where certain boundary objects are used to cloud matters and to 
create opaqueness and non-transparency (Harrison et al., 2011). In another sector of our 
economy, the creative use of various types of financial instruments and accounting techniques in 
relation to the reporting of the standings among banking institutions during the most recent 
financial crisis is yet another example of the same use of boundary objects in accounting. 
Table 1 summarizes the discussion of the performative role of accounting in networks 
conceptualized as a type of boundary object so far. It depicts the four boundary object-capacities 
to the far left and details the related network processes, boundary issues, motives and effects on 
the network interfaces, respectively. 
 
Table 1. The performative role of accounting in networks 
BO-capacity Network process Boundary issue Motive Network 
interface effect 
Bridge Connecting Transcend boundary Reach out Explore 
Anchor Connecting Set boundary Bring in Define 
Barricade Disconnecting Uphold boundary Protect Isolate 
Maze Disconnecting Hide boundary Delude Cloak 
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Relying on the discussion above we suggest the following four propositions for the performative 
role of accounting in networks. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Accounting can be used to bridge across network interfaces in networks 
to make novel connections. In this way, accounting can be used to 
explore network interfaces. 
PROPOSITION 2: Accounting can be used to anchor a given network interface in other 
interfaces in order to stabilize novel connections. In this way, accounting 
can be used to define network interfaces. 
PROPOSITION 3: Accounting can be used to barricade a network interface in order to 
protect it from novel connections. In this way, accounting can be used to 
protect network interfaces. 
PROPOSITION 4: Accounting can be used to hide network interfaces from others in order to 
delude novel connections. In this way, accounting can be used to cloak 
network interfaces. 
 
From this, it seem as if the creation of new network interfaces comprise the utilization of all four 
capacities of accounting in its performative role, starting with the first and ending with the fourth. 
In the earlier stages of network interface creation the bridging and anchoring capacities enabling 
the exploration of interfaces and the subsequent definition is crucial. Once this is accomplished, it 
becomes important to protect and sometimes even to cloak interfaces in order to prevent them 
from being hi-jacked, and changed in some other actor’s favour.  
In this way, the dynamics of networks can be conceptualized as processes of wielding the powers 
of boundary objects in its four capacities. As already recognized, power is an important aspect of 
boundary objects (Bechky, 2003; Kim & King, 2004), and the conceptualization of the use of 
accounting in networks as a type of boundary object emphasize this in its performative role. Our 
discussion here is in line with the findings of Mouritsen and Thrane (2006) discussing the 
obtrusive and non-obtrusive effects of accounting. Based on our discussion above, we can show a 
detailed, systematic and nuanced conceptualization of the way in which accounting is obtrusive 
respectively un-obtrusive, by what mechanisms, and in what likely circumstances.   
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
In this paper we have conceptualized accounting in networks in a way that comes close to 
Mouritsen and Thrane (2006) discussing accounting as obtrusive and un-obtrusive. But while 
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drawing on the work of Mouritsen and Thrane (2006), we have extended the analysis to include a 
refined understanding of the role of accounting in transcending and setting boundaries in a 
networked context, not only in a dyad. Furthermore, while not drawing on Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT) as Mouritsen, Mahama and Chua (2010) do, we have developed a similar understanding 
of accounting as fulfilling a performative role in defining and drawing boundaries around certain 
collections of activities and resources, in addition to Mouritsen and Thrane (2006) that discusses 
the structural role of accounting in a pre-given dyadic context. Overall, our main findings 
emphasize the performative role and importance of accounting to draw boundaries around certain 
collections of interdependent activities and resources in networks – what we term network 
interfaces.  
If we assume that one can see accounting as a type of boundary object that is used to transcend 
boundaries as well as with the power to protect old boundaries and to create new ones, an 
interesting array of questions emerges that are worthy of further inquiry. First, are accounting (as 
a boundary object) robust enough to perform these roles irrespective of different contexts? For 
example, can one find situations where accounting becomes too ‘weak’ to be able to transcend, 
protect and create boundaries? Can we find empirical examples of when the accounting withers 
and disintegrate due to contextual pressures? Second, are accounting (as an object) plastic enough 
to be adaptable to different contexts? When are accounting too ‘strong’ to have an important role 
in setting boundaries? Can we find empirical examples of when the accounting dominates over 
contextual pressures? These are all questions requiring empirical investigations and such research 
efforts are probably a natural extension if this study. We hope that such research efforts are 
presented in the future. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper explores how combination of budget oriented and the Balanced Scorecard (BSc) oriented 
control system can create confusion and tensions for top and line managers in a telecom company 
under financial distress. We are interested in the link between experiences of being in a crisis and 
attention giving to different management control information tools (such as budgets and BSc). 
Previous studies in the strategy literature have shown that under normal circumstances managers of 
surviving firms pay equal attention to the information of the internal and the external environment. 
When a crisis of demand decline occurs, they pay more attention to the critical aspects of their 
external environment. In contrast, managers in failing firms deny or ignore output factors during 
crisis and pay more attention to the input and internal environments (D’Aveni and MacMillan, 1990). 
  
In the management control literature there is very little done in order to understand organizations 
under financial distress and especially what information managers focus their attention on and why 
under these conditions. There is however a comprehensive literature on the use of the BSc and 
when it can be a suitable tool (Catasus et al, 2007; Olve et al., 2003, REF). In this paper we are 
however not interested in the use of BSc as such, instead we are interested in what kind of 
information that are given attention when a company comes in distress and what consequences that 
have for decision making.  
 
To date, there has been very little empirical work on the focus of attention by managers at different 
levels, who are in severe trouble. There is research describing how organizations make excuses when 
not fulfilling the financial obligations such as keeping the budget (Nyland and Pettersen, 19xx) but 
not on attention giving. In this paper we answer a call for research focusing on how attention is 
giving to information when in a severe crisis (D’Aveni and MacMillan, 1990).    
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Theoretically, we use theories that explain how attention is giving to strategic and operational 
information. The argument is that firm behavior is the result of how firms channel and distribute the 
attention of their decision-makers. The theories help us to understand what decision-makers do 
depend on and what issues and answers they focus their attention on (Ocasio, 1997; March & Olsen, 
1976). In line with Ocasio and Joseph, (xxxx) we view strategy formulation processes as fragmented 
and contested, with multiple foci of attention, rather than an explicit objective function, and both 
top-down and bottoms-up processes capable of generating changes in the strategic direction of the 
firm. Therefore, we focus on both top managers and line manager’s attention. 
 
In this paper, we explore tensions experienced by line managers in a telecom company under 
financial distress regarding the use of information for operational decision-making and control. 
Investors and top managers in the company experience financial distress and their perception seems 
to differ concerning what should be done in order to improve organizational performance compared 
to the perception of the line managers. These two perceptions came into conflict when the investors 
and the board wanted a more financially performance-oriented focus. Financial information found in 
the company’s budgets should signal the new organizational course of action to the line managers. 
However, this was very different to what the line managers experienced they should do, motivated 
by use of the company’s Balanced Scorecard (BSc). As MIS can be conceptualized as a package of 
different control tools (Malmi & Brown, 2008), the actors of the organization studied seemed to use 
different parts of the system for different purposes and sometimes even for conflicting purposes.  
 
The aim of this paper is to provide an understanding of how these conflicts in information attention 
emerged and in what sense these tensions could be attributed to the conflicts built into the design 
of the company’s MIS. Particularly, whether and how the use of information from MIS is difficult to 
reconcile based on combining budget-oriented and BSc-oriented systems? 
 
The paper is structured in the following way. First, we position the paper in an attention perspective; 
then, we provide a literature review where we focus on addressing information conflicts between 
budget-based vs. BSc-oriented (BSc) control systems. Thereafter, we present the data collection 
strategy used in the study. The empirical part consists of a description of the telecom company, 
including narratives about how attention is giving to information by managers. Discussion and 
conclusion follow. We also provide directions for further research. 
 
2. Crisis and attention on information 
198
 
 
We define a crisis as any relevant or condition that threatens the survival of the organization 
(Starbuck et al. 1978). One such crisis is declining or stagnant demand resulting in bankruptcy. 
Several theories predict how senior managers might respond to an external crisis such as decline in 
demand, but these theories gives contradictory answers. Under the threat-rigidity responses theory 
and crisis-denial theories, a crisis is expected to divert a manager’s attention away from the locus of 
the crisis (Kriesler and Sproull, 1982). Environment scanning and stress theories predict that 
managers will pay more attention to the external crisis because of the importance, and uncertainty 
of the issue (Dutton, 1985). D’Aveni and McMillan (1990) explain the differences in the literature 
with the argument that it depends on if firms are survivors of a crisis or not. D’Aveni and McMillan 
(1990) further argue that the differences in behavior are related to the focus of attention from top 
management.  
 
We agree with D’Aveni and McMillen (1990) and will also in this paper focus on how managers focus 
their attention. We however, differ in the sense that we do not only study the top managers but also 
the line managers. Furthermore, we do not only focus on the information given to investors but also 
the interaction and information with the line managers.  
To make our analysis we use Shrivastava (1983) framework – 4C. This frame suggests that crisis 
studies can focus on four key aspects of the crises: causes, consequences, caution and coping. 
Causes include the immediate failure that cause the crisis and the antecedent conditions that 
allowed failure to occur. Consequences are the immediate and long-term impacts. Caution includes 
the measures taken to prevent or minimize the impact of a potential crisis. Finally, coping comprises 
measures taken to respond to the crises that have already occurred. By using the 4 C framework we 
highlight the similarities and differences between the top management and the line manager’s views 
and integrate them into a crisis management model.  
 
Before we describe the case, we theoretically describe the difference between the budget and the 
BSc. Resent research in MIS has focused more on the integrative rather than the conflicting nature of 
information packages (Malmi & Brown, 2008). Conflicts and tensions between the use of control 
tools in an organizational control package is thus a less researched topic (Vaivio, 1999; Jørgensen 
and Messner, 2010). We are interested in finding out to what extent the use of budgets is/can be 
coordinated with the use of BSc and do these two tools operate synchronically or in competition? In 
this part, we explore research literature regarding these questions. First, we focus on discussions of 
what are the design principles and characteristics of MIS based on Budget vs. BSc. Second, we focus 
199
 
 
on different use aspects of budget vs. BSc-based MIS. Finally, we explore the possible tensions 
between budgets and BSc in an organization that experiences distress. 
 
2.1. Budgets vs. BSc: Differences in Design Principles 
In theory, systems of controls should be designed to balance and allow adaptation to the 
information needs on each organizational level (Otley, 1980), which means flexibility that meets 
needs on different levels (Nilsson, 2002). According to Bjørnenak & Olson (1999), organizations need 
many types of MIS as different systems can be used for different purposes. The extremes would be a 
local MIS, focusing on operative processes, vs. a strategic MIS, supporting processes on the strategic 
level. There should be a system coordinating between the levels.  
 
There are, however, different ways to achieve alignment between systems on different levels and 
the nature of this alignment can have different implications for decision-makers in the organization 
(e.g. Dossi & Patelli, 2008). The Budget (which here means the annual budgets) and the BSc can 
separately fulfill the coordination role between the central and local systems. The problem, 
however, will be the implementation of both systems at the local level. Local systems should focus 
on needs of the line managers acting in this sense against information embedded in centrally 
institutionalized systems in order to stimulate organizational learning (Bjørnenak & Olson, 1999) and 
helping managers to better understand their business environments (Hedberg & Jönsson, 1978). 
From this perspective, the Budget and the BSc are in many ways two principally different 
information systems as they aim at different purposes and essentially have different characteristics 
(see table 1).  
Table 1. Differences in Design Principles of Budget and BSc-based MIS 
 Budget BSc 
Field of accounting Responsibility  
accounting 
Strategic management 
accounting 
Purpose Corporate Governance/ 
Financial control 
Strategic adaptation/              
Strategy implementation 
Time focus Annual/short term Strategy/long-term 
Scope One-dimensional,                      
financially  
oriented indicators 
Multidimensional, both 
financial and non-financially 
oriented 
Intended use Individual controllability  
and  
accountability 
Organic decision-making and 
communication for strategic 
renewal 
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Implications for local managers Coercive Enabling 
 
Budgets are mainly adopted as a device for organizing responsibility accounting in divisionalized 
organizations (e.g. Scapens, 1995; Pelej, 1958). One of the most important functions of budgets is to 
assign responsibilities and enable top-down control. In this sense, budgets are tools of corporate 
governance at a distance in a chain of hierarchically assigned responsibilities and performance 
expectations (Quattrone & Hopper, 2005), e.g. from investors to top executives and further towards 
managers of corporate divisions and units. Understanding it in this way, corporate investors can 
have important impact on the design of organizational MIS and the investors’ focus on the financial 
performance can legitimize the use of budget (Ryan, 2007). Because capital markets have power 
over organizations, the use of budgets can provide external organizational credibility and legitimacy 
by being a tool for communication between investors and top managers in both formulating 
expectations for and monitoring realized financial performance. 
 
This notion of a budget as a governance tool is in sharp contrast with the critique of budgets from 
the perspective of management accounting practice. For instance, the relevance lost critique (e.g. 
Johnson and Kaplan, 1997) is attributed to the extensive use of financially oriented information in 
the organization, which is also relevant for the use of budgets. As a management accounting tool, 
financially oriented information is less relevant for decision-makers in order to achieve 
organizational renewal and strategic adaptation, especially in conditions of turbulent business 
environment. Budgets are also perceived as problematic for strategic management since they focus 
on short-term cost minimization rather on long-term value maximization (Atkinson, 2006). 
 
Designing a MIS that provides relevant information for strategy formulation and implementation is a 
main emphasis in relevance regained literature (e.g. Johnson, 1992). BSc is a proposed solution to 
improve the relevance of information for local decision-makers as well as its alignment with the 
information needs of top managers (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). Strategy should be formulated and 
translated to all parts of the organization through the set of the balanced financial and non-financial 
indicators, which are supposed to be linked into a coherent multidimensional managerial model 
(Nørreklit, 2000). Thus, BSc is designed to address a number of significant weaknesses of traditional 
management systems, which are usually associated with budgets and promises to establish a better 
link between strategy and operations (Atkinson, 2006; Lynch & Cross, 1995). In this way, BSc can 
function as a communication device that can unite interests of investors and managers regarding 
information on different levels of hierarchy around the strategy.  
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From Table 1, the conclusion is that the basic design principles of MIS based on the Budget and the 
BSc are very different. While the BSc rhetoric focuses on strategic renewal by enabling organic 
decision-making and communication, the budget stresses individual level controllability and 
accountability in the schemes of responsibility accounting. In terms of Ahrens & Chapman (2004), by 
creating specifications in advance of possible eventualities and showing little adaptation to local 
needs and changing organizational circumstances, budgets constitute a “coercive” MIS design. On 
the contrary, the BSc is more “enabling” in its design by its focus on discrete information selection 
and promise of a better match to local information needs without undermining the established 
hierarchical relationships.   
 
From the discussion above, it is not necessarily clear that a combination of budget and BSc in one 
MIS should be a problematic affair. On the one hand, from the point of view of MIS designers, the 
integration of budget and BSc is compatible (Otley, 2001; Bungay & Goold, 1991). Malmi & Brown 
(2008) considered these two systems as two parts of a wider organizational control package. For 
Simons (1995), the budget and the BSc could coexist as part of both diagnostic and interactive levers 
of organizational controls. There is, on the other hand, a rising critique from practitioners that 
stresses the impossibility of combining budget and BSc as a control tool - not because their design is 
principally incompatible, but because of the incompatible organizational behavior arising from this 
combination (Bogsnes, 2009; Ahn, 2001; McNair et. al. 1990). The question, therefore, is what are 
the implications for use when having both a BSc and a Budget in one control system.  
 
2.2. Budgets vs. BSc: Conflicts in Use? 
In general, the use of information can deviate dramatically from what is intended by MIS design 
(Mouritsen, 2005; Mellemvik, et. al., 1988). For instance, strategy oriented MIS can be used for 
administrative/controlling purposes (Bogsnes, 2009) while administrative tools can sometimes be 
used for strategic purposes (Marginson, 2002). Even the same control tool can be used in different 
ways depending on an organization or a situation, e.g. in a coercive or enabling way (Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2004). Thus, a well-functioning MIS package as a whole will require adjustments, learning 
and resolution of information conflicts between the different elements built into the system 
(Nilsson, 2002).  
 
Paying attention to the above-mentioned statements, it seems that concern is rising in the literature 
about the simultaneous use of budgets and BSc-based systems in organizations (Bogsnes, 2009). The 
critique comes from at least two directions. Firstly, it is recognized that there is an increasing 
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incompatibility between corporate top executive use of budgets and BSc for different purposes of 
external and internal management. The intended role of corporate managers is to manage 
organizations that are entrusted in their hands in order to create economic value for investors. 
Annual budgets can be thus considered as a convenient tool for the corporate level in the 
organization to monitor responsibilities of subordinates and also serve as a communication device 
with the capital markets. Indeed, the use of budget still signals legitimacy to external stakeholders: 
that the organization is under control and manageable (Bhimani, 2009). Kraus & Lind (2010) found 
that pressure from capital markets for financially oriented information legitimizes the use of short-
term financial indicators: meaning that e.g. there is very limited impact of using BSc for external 
purposes. In this sense, it can be problematic for corporate managers to use one set of measures for 
communicating with external actors and another for internal actors. Following from that, corporate 
managers can emphasize the use of MIS, which are easily suited to both purposes of external 
legitimation and internal responsibility accounting, i.e. where they would be more able to focus on 
budgets and downplay the BSc. 
 
Secondly, the use of budgets and use of BSc can have different behavioral consequences in 
organizations. Implications of the simultaneous use of both systems can be difficult to reconcile at 
the local level. There can be a dynamic tension between the coercive and enabling uses of different 
MIS (Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008) and between the use of financial and non-financial 
information (Bhimani & Langfield-Smith, 2007). While budget presupposes the coercive use of MIS, 
what is probably needed in modern organizations on their local levels is to enable the use of MIS 
(e.g. with more emphasis on use of BSc). In this sense, new types of organizational structures 
introduced in many larger organizations (e.g. team/project based, local networks) and maintenance 
of budgets as a main control tool is becoming increasingly incompatible. Bogsnes (2009) claims, for 
instance, that a combination of BSc and budget is a complicated marriage because information has 
different and often conflicting implications for managerial behavior.  
 
Despite the fact that some organizations can reconcile the dysfunctional behavior consequences of 
the use of budgets by complimenting these with other types of (more informal) control mechanisms 
for strategic renewal (e.g. Frow et. al., 2005), there is still little evidence of how the conflicting 
behavioral implications of using both budgets and BSc are reconciled. In organizations with strong 
hierarchies, local managers can have difficulties in bypassing the formally established authority lines 
of responsibility accounting. Implemented by senior managers and anchored in the use of budget, 
these formal power lines can make it difficult for local managers to ignore or sabotage the budget as 
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a control tool in favor of other control tools (for instance, what is possible in organizations with 
strong professional values and cultures; see e.g. Abernethy & Vagnoni, 2004; Nyland, Pettersen and 
Østergren, 2009). A budget also has a comforting role for managers; while use of stand-alone BSc 
systems are risky as they may cause decision-makers to have much greater uncertainty (Bourmistrov 
& Østergren, 2011; Bogsnes, 2009). This means that in a game of performance it is easier and safer 
to rely on information from “budgets” then on information from the BSc. In summary, the use of 
Budgets and BSc simultaneously can be rather problematic in an organization because they can 
produce different behavioral implications for the local managers, which can induce tension between 
the managerial levels. The next question is how the conflict of using budget and BSc is nuanced in a 
company that experiences a crisis situation. 
 
2.3. Use of Budgets vs. BSc in Financial Distress Situations 
Situations of financial distress are an interesting context to study because the use of controls and 
changes in their use are becoming more visible compared to situations of organizational prosperity 
(Czarniawska-Joerges, 1988). The natural response of managers to economic problems is to tighten 
controls in order to maintain legitimacy regarding the internal and external parties and to signal that 
a crisis has arrived and something should be done about it. More generally, in hostile (e.g. stressful, 
dominating, restrictive) and turbulent (e.g. risky, unpredictable, fluctuating, ambitious) 
environments, a situation of crisis can be a more permanent phenomenon and in such situations, 
organizations tend to rely on formal control tools such as a budget because they can also function as 
organizational stabilizers in times of turbulence (Chenhall, 2003). The problem is that tightened 
controls will result in organizations losing their flexibility and ability to respond to local opportunities 
and problems. Thus, organizations in crisis or with extreme pressure from their environment, which 
causes them to initially tighten control. However, over time they are faced with a need to replace 
this tight control with a more flexible control (Chenhall, 2003; Czarniawska-Joerges, 1988). Another 
way to deal with extreme pressures and crisis is to de-couple or loose-couple the use of controls and 
realized actions (Høgheim et. al. 1989, Nyland and Pettersen, 1996; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
 
Based on the discussion above, it is interesting to study how organizations which operate in 
turbulent environments under the conditions of financial distress, are dealing with problems of how 
to balance the use of a budget and a BSc. The literature review suggests that the budget can be an 
important tool for tightening control in times of financial distress. What is the role of information 
from the BSc in such situations for the line and corporate managers? What are the tensions from the 
perspective of behavioral implications of using both a budget and a BSc? 
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3. Method  
The choice of the company for this study was in some way a coincidence. One of the authors had 
supervised master candidates who attended management control specialization courses during the 
master program and wrote a project work assignment about a company where they were working as 
controllers. However, this routine assignment, which was meant to focus on a description of 
management control systems (MCS) in TelCo, has  turned out to be somewhat unusual as the 
students discovered that there seemed to be tension, frustration and confusion related to how 
management control was functioning in the company. The empirical context was especially 
interesting since the confusion and tension were related to the company being in financial 
difficulties and also the ways information in which both budgets and the Balanced Scorecards were 
used. These settings attracted attention from the authors of this paper as both of them were at the 
same time also involved in a larger research program focusing on studying the new generation of 
MCS systems (sometimes termed “Beyond Budgeting”) as part of the critique of the annual 
budgeting as well as the philosophy behind it.  
 
This interesting and unusual setting in TelCo motivated the authors of this paper to establish a 
research group for planning and realizing data collection, analysis and interpretations. The main idea 
was to study in-depth how these conflicts in information use emerged and in what sense the tension 
could be attributed to the conflicts built into the design of the management control system. The 
primary data collection was performed in several steps: partially in the fall of 2009, but mainly 
during the spring of 2010 (see Gabrielsen & Jelstad, 20101). Some additional enquiries and 
clarifications were made in early in the spring of 2011. This primary data collection was combined 
with data collection from both closed sources (e.g. TelCo’s budgets, reporting guidelines) as well as 
open sources, including newspaper publications about the company, analytical articles and 
information on the Internet, etc. 
 
Our strategy in developing this empirical material can be summarized as follows. We used the 
interviews to collect and create the description of how respondents perceive challenges for 
management control functioning. We chose to collect data though a convenience sample from the 
managers to which we had access. There could be a danger in that choosing these managers could 
have created a bias where our respondents were more critical towards MCS. However, we evaluated 
                                                          
1
 Gabrielsen, S. & Jelstad, L. (2010) ‘Beyond Budgeting – Den rette medisin? En studie av 
økonomistyring i TelCo’, Master Thesis.  
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this as not being a problem, since we were not interested in finding out whether the respondents 
were negative to MCS practice, but to explore what is the nature of the challenges they experienced 
and why, thus providing us with necessary information about conflict and tension. 
 
Even though we have had close contacts with the company, the case study conducted was of an 
exploratory, non-interventionist nature (Lukka, 2005). The target was to refine prior theory (Keating, 
1995). Our aim was to understand the social world of managers and the functions of such social 
constructs as management controls in the light of the context of managerial work (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg, 1994). We asked open-ended questions to allow interviewees to explain the challenges 
they experienced and to link these challenges to both their managerial practices and the information 
they put attention on. Thus, the focus in each semi-interview was on the following major themes: a) 
what caused the crisis, b) how did they cope with the crisis and what caution action was taken, and 
c) what kind of consequences did they expect from the crisis and how could the in what challenges 
did they meet with the existing information from the management control systems (for more 
detailed interview guide see Table A.1 in Appendix A). Primarily, data was collected from 5 semi-
structured interviews, each taking around 1 hour (see Table B.1 in Appendix B for respondents). The 
respondents were 2 top managers on the level of the corporation and 3 line managers.  
 
In order to increase the validity of our own subjective understanding of the data, we transcribed and 
analyzed all information piece-by-piece. We also verified the interpretations by sending all interview 
transcripts back to the informants for feedback. They commented on facts and also provided us with 
more background to some issues in the interviews. We also discussed the meaning of findings in the 
research group. The experience of interpreting the confusion and challenges expressed by the 
managers was close to interpreting a “foreign text”. The interpretation work done by the group can 
be understood in more general terms as “following the steps of hermeneutic cycle”, i.e. the study of 
any kinds of texts in the hermeneutic tradition. We searched for deeper meanings behind the 
constructed texts and understanding emerged as a result of a dialogue between the text, the 
interpreter and the interpreter’s emerging knowledge of the text (Lee, 1999; Alvesson & Sköldberg, 
1994). When writing the paper and presenting data from interviews, concepts and categories, the 
intention was also to be inter-subjective, i.e. allow the readers of the article to disagree with our 
interpretations. This has been done by including the practical examples, references and quotations. 
 
4. The Case Management Control in a Telecommunication Company TelCo 
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Today, the TelCo Company is the second largest producer of complete telecommunication services 
to private and businesses customers in Norway. The company is owned by several Norwegian 
regional and national energy and broadband companies. The vision of the company is to be the 
largest and the best challenger of established providers of telecommunication services in the 
Norwegian market. This vision is intended to be materialized by providing the best customer 
experience through effective service and by increasing the range of high-speed broadband and 
mobile telecommunication services offers.  
 
The articulated competitive advantage of the company is said to be the access to a rather wide 
telecommunication infrastructure, a large customer database and the wide range of services 
provided. The company was built through a chain of strategic expansions and has expanded its 
operational volume during the last several years by a number of takeovers and acquisitions of other 
regional and national telecommunication companies. The strategy was to acquire broadband 
companies with an established customer portfolio and infrastructure in order to gain economy of 
scale and cost-efficiency. Some of companies TelCo has taken over had gone bankrupt or were on 
the edge of bankruptcy. 
 
Today, the company owns the fiber optic networks, which were built in connection with the network 
of railroads and electricity supply infrastructure all around Norway. The fiber network controlled by 
the company links around 80 cities. The fixed telephone and broadband networks have a high level 
of reliability of services because information flow can be redirected to alternative routes in case a 
breakdown in one part of the network should occur. In addition, this network is under surveillance 
24 hours a day in such a way that the network is operational 99.99% of the time.  
 
TelCo operates in a dynamic industry with a high level of turbulence and with many dramatic 
changes. Many acquisitions and buyouts are essential characteristic of TelCo’s domestic market. This 
means that the number of major market actors is constantly decreasing at the same time as TelCo 
becomes larger. Under such conditions, price competition becomes more serious. This is also a result 
of interventions from the domestic telecommunication authority2. The increasing price competition 
requires a cost efficient production for the companies. In addition, continuous technological changes 
require the continuous monitoring of innovations and a readiness to quickly make necessary 
investments in new technologies to be able to stay and compete in this market. 
                                                          
2
 The Telecommunication Authority stipulates reduction in the prices that companies require when their 
customers call to other customers at other companies (reduction by 75% until January 1,  2013 from the level 
at which it is currently). 
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Traditionally, TelCo specialized in fixed line telecommunication services for business customers, but 
over time, the company decided to expand into the market of mobile telecommunication for both 
private and business customers as well as to include services related to fixed and mobile broadband. 
However, it seems that the company has not yet managed to find a way to compete in this new and 
competitive market. Experts analyzing the company claim that there is a clear deviation between the 
stated vision of being a low cost producer and TelCo’s actual prices for its services. For example, 
advertisements focus on cheap subscription prices, but benchmarking with competitors reveals large 
deviations in prices meaning TelCo is not yet a low price producer. Thus, the main focus for more 
successful operations on the mobile telecommunication market is mostly related to private 
subscriptions that are limited to customers who are family members of those who are part of the 
company subscriptions – traditionally the main market of TelCo.  
 
4.1. The worsening financialsituation 
The strategy of growth in TelCo has not been translated into positive financial figures over the last 
several years. In 2009 and 2008, the figures in consolidated accounts were respectively -389 million 
NOK and  -208 million NOK. In year 2010, the company budgeted an EBITDA3 of 400 million NOK, but 
the profit after taxes was budgeted to a figure of -207 million NOK. After the first quarter of 2010, 
the EBITDA figure deviated negatively by 13 million NOK from what was budgeted and the adjusted 
annual financial forecast showed the negative budget deviation was 50 million NOK. As a result of a 
negative EBITDA over several years, the owners of the company and its creditors have all requested 
that TelCo has to show a positive cash flow in 2010. Because of this requirement, negative budget 
deviation reported in the first quarter of 2010 had an immediate impact on the annual investment 
budget approved by the board. The corporate managers were asked to review the investment 
budget earlier approved for 2010 and reduce it by 50 million NOK to secure the net cash flow 
planned for 2010.  
 
4.2. Management Control in TelCo: Combination of annual budgets and BSc 
TelCo uses traditional budgets together with the Balanced Scorecard (BSc). The purpose of the 
budgeting process in TelCo is to establish quantitative objectives and action plans for the coming 
year. The budget is seen as a foundation for management in the organization and follows it up by 
use of recurrent financial reporting and corresponding corrective actions. The main outline of 
budget used in TelCo is presented in Figure 2. 
                                                          
3
 EBITDA – Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization 
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Table 2. Budget outline in TelCo (simplified) 
                         Budget Account Deviation 
External revenue        X X X 
 Internal revenues       X X X 
 Variable cost of revenue       X X X 
 Gross margin 1        X X X 
 Fixed cost of revenue       X X X 
 Gross margin 2        X X X 
 Sales, General and Administration costs     X X X 
 Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA)  X X X 
 Depreciation and amortization      X X X 
 Earning Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT)      X X X 
 Net financial costs       X X X 
 Profit before taxes        X X X 
The planning and budgeting process in TelCo is a mix of top-down and bottom-up processes that 
usually starts in the beginning of September. The committee (consisting of corporate top managers) 
meets in the beginning to set up the financial targets and priorities for the company for the coming 
year. In this phase, only top managers of the company are involved in determining the main 
objectives for the coming year, including the most important parameter for the company – the 
EBITDA. The first round forms the first draft of the budget proposal, which represents the 
expectations of the organization for the coming year including sales volume, the level of production 
activity and investments. However, since this top-down approach may reduce the ownership of the 
budget at the line managers' level, the top-down approach was traditionally supplemented with a 
bottom-up approach where middle-managers were involved in setting up their local budgets based 
on the budget numbers provided from the top. The CFO expressed it like this: 
“It is important for TelCo that line managers have ownership and responsibility for 
meeting their budgets. At the same time, we have to avoid using unnecessarily much 
time to revise unrealistic budgets. The combination of a top-down budget followed by 
a bottom-up approach has therefore been a solution for us”. 
 
Usually, it takes a series of adjustment rounds until the budget is approved by the top management 
of TelCo and finally presented to the board at the end of the year. 
 
Since 2005, in addition to the traditional budgeting process, TelCo has introduced the Balanced 
Scorecard (BSc). The strategic map for the Balanced Scorecard in TelCo is presented in Figure 1. The 
BSc framework measures and communicates a number of KPIs, which are related to the company’s 
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visions and its three strategic areas of competition: efficient services, high-speed broadband and 
customer experience. The main idea for the introduction of the BSc was to move the focus away 
from the bottom line of the budget and its accounts towards the vision of the company and the way 
it should work to attain these visions in the everyday activities of the company. In the beginning of 
the use of the BSc a very large number of KPIs where introduced which by many was more confusing 
that creating of a holistic picture. However in the present system budgets work together with KPIs in 
the BSc, and action plans are the most important management control tools with respect to deciding 
the priorities of activities and the use of resources. The company has also practiced preparation of 
forecasts for 12 months ahead. 
 
Another important aspect of the budget and the BSc is their relationship to the incentive system. 
Line managers have bonus arrangements, which are divided into two parts: one common bonus 
related to the realization of the EBITDA parameter in relation to the corporate budget and an 
individual bonus related to KPIs. Examples for such KPIs can for example be different requirements 
for the reduction of costs of salaries for the concrete unit of responsibility or to implement 
successful renegotiation of large supply agreements that reduce the costs for the company. Bonuses 
can be also related to the fact of simply the keeping cost frameworks instituted by the annual 
budgets.   
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Figure 1. Strategic map at TelCo as a foundation for its Balanced Scorecard (simplified). 
 
4.3. Challenges for management control in TelCo 
During the last few years, it was difficult for the top and middle level managers to come to an 
agreement during budget adjustments and discussions. Worsening financial situations and more 
demanding requirements from investors have influenced the budgeting process. The culmination 
came during the fall of 2009 when the budget preparation for the year 2010 took a much longer 
time in relation to the initial time frame set up by the board. Negotiations between the top and line 
managers to establish a realistic budget were very difficult. This resulted in several immense cost 
cuts elaborated by the top management in the final version of the budget for 2010 without 
consulting the middle managers. The understanding of what caused the crises was different 
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between the top managers and the line managers. Below, we provide stories told by line and top 
managers regarding the situation. 
 
Stories from line managers - lost balance between cost and value focus 
Story 1 – Customer and operation attention 
As a first story, we report our discussions with the director of the service delivery department in 
TelCo. The director had complained many times about the delivery time for the fiber connections. 
The director explained:  
“Our customers complain that it takes too much time to deliver. It is impossible to get 
new customers when our reputation tells them that it takes too much time for us to 
deliver compare to our competitors! I am pretty sure that delivery time has increased 
because of the large focus on cost cuts. I stumble between the tough requirements for 
the quality of services and the demands of cost cuts. The main operational KPIs for my 
department are related to “delivery time” and “delivery in accordance with 
specifications”.  
 
These two KPIs are on a collision course with financial indicators such as “cost of services delivered”, 
which is related to the budget. For the year 2010, the department has a financial goal of cutting the 
cost of services delivered by 8 million NOK. He exclaimed: 
“It is difficult to cut costs and at the same time maintain the high level of delivery”. 
 
The manager means that the focus on management by the use of budgets stimulates short-term 
orientation. He argues that it is an “evil circle”: budget cuts are results of poor previous long-term 
strategies. A budget does not provide an incentive to work more on improving long-term strategies, 
but instead facilitates the execution of short-term measures. For example resulted this budget 
attention on cutting out “expensive” agreements with sub-contractors but it also resulted in losing 
large parts of the sub-contracting network which was damaging from a longer perspective.   
 
The budget has not given much ownership and empowerment to line managers; the bottom-up 
process no longer works in the company. The line managers argue that with poor financial 
performance, corporate managers have too much decision authority over the local matters without 
understanding the nuances of work in the different divisions. Thus, budget is exclusively used as a 
cost cutting device. This hinders corporate managers from giving authority to the line so that they 
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can act in order to reach the KPIs in the Balanced Scorecard, which translates TelCo’s long-term 
strategy.  
 
In sum the story shows how the line managers argue that the causes of the crisis are based on a 
decreased demand from customers and the consequences are reduced income. The top managers 
tries to cope with this by moving the focus from information based on the BSc to information based 
on the budget. This implies that it becomes an extreme cost focus instead of balancing it with what 
gives values to the company.  
 
Story 2 – decentralized of centralized decision making  
In the second story, the technical director in TelCo also experienced frustration. His job is to make an 
investment budget for TelCo and he has authority to initiate planned investments. However, lately 
he needs approval from corporate management for all investments over 250,000.00 NOK As an 
example, he indicates that the network between two big cities should be built in order to handle 
large and important customers in Northern-Norway. It will require a one time investment of a 
relatively small amount of NOK (300,000.00), and this amount was previously elaborated in the 
budget of the department for 2010. The timing of the investment is crucial because it can take up to 
12 weeks for delivery of equipment from a subcontractor. However, under the new regime, a final 
approval is required by the top management before the construction can take place. If extra time is 
spent on waiting for the approval for this investment application, valuable time will be lost. The 
technical director explained the dilemma like this:  
“We use too much time in order to make investment applications that are good 
enough to get funds for activities we mean are right to do. We often get the 
application back with questions about whether it is possible to implement the 
investment with lower costs. This shows a lack of confidence from top managers in 
our local interpretation of the long-term strategy. I think we know best about what is 
most profitable in the long-term. Time spent on evaluation of applications is better 
spent on value creation in the company. There is too much focus on getting the lowest 
possible level of costs and not on having the right cost level”.    
 
Therefore, the technical director does not understand why this detailed control really is needed. 
There is little dynamic in the way investments are done today, which he argues is dangerous. In his 
opinion, the line managers and employees at the departments know best where investments should 
be made to realize the indicated strategies. According to the technical director, the corporate 
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managers should spend more time on communication of the corporate strategy and empower the 
line managers with the authority to make the necessary decisions, rather than be in charge of 
budget cuts.  
 
In sum, this story shows how the top management copes with the crisis by increasing the commond-
control structure. They centralize the decision making to increase control. As a consequence the 
bureaucracy increases and the frustration among line managers increases. However, it does also 
create an attention on investment decisions.   
 
Story 3  - attention of KPIs 
As a third story, we provide a report from the interview with the director of sales. The director 
cannot make good sales agreements for the salespersons he is responsible for and he blames the 
current system for this. The business unit is measured by how many new sales they produce. But 
new sales are only part of the story as there are two types of salespersons. The “hunters” are those 
who are out in the market obtaining new customers, while the “KAMs” (key account managers) are 
those who work maintaining the largest and therefore the most important customers. Their 
performance is measured based on their maintenance of the customer portfolio. For KAMs, it is 
important to work with service quality and customers satisfaction in order to maintain customers. 
According to the company's strategy, both categories of salespersons are important, but using the 
budget to design the incentive system provides challenges. For instance, it is difficult to get reliable 
information to design good incentives for KAMs under the condition of budget domination. As for 
“hunters”, a budget-based bonus system introduces the “ceiling” in the bonus system, meaning that 
the best sales persons who could bring in more customers will not be motivated to extend their 
efforts as soon as their sales meet the budget. When elaborating sales budgets, individuals are very 
conservative. He expressed it in this way: 
“Wide use of sales bonuses related to sales budgets leads to a defensive budgeting of 
sales volumes”.  
In sum, this story shows how the top managers introduces budget related to sale budgets. They try 
to cope with the crisis by giving more attention to sale activities. However, this seem to be done 
with little understanding of how the sale department work, which result in a dysfunctional bonus 
system. 
 
Stories of corporate managers 
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The CEO presented the undated financial forecasts in March. He recognized that it would be 
necessary to reduce the annual EBITDA requirements after the first quarter in the budget with 50 
million NOK compared to what was originally planned. He could not find any other solution than to 
reduce the investment budget accordingly in order to secure a positive cash flow at the end of the 
year. At the same time, the CEO introduced a tougher investment policy at TelCo. Owners of the 
corporation were preoccupied with the EBITDA and the corresponding cash flow. The short-term 
goal was by all means to secure a positive cash flow and the CEO defended this short-term goal with 
the following arguments:  
“If we don’t earn enough money, what would we have to manage afterward? The 
answer is the cash flow – if we don’t have cash flow, the bank stops. Before, the 
company could have compensated for higher costs with higher sales, but now the 
marked is stabilized and we don’t have the growth situation we experienced before. 
Thus, we need to consolidate our efforts and see how things will develop”.  
Thus, the CEO is preoccupied with securing liquidity and the satisfaction of investors. It is clearly the 
solving of the short-term financial problem that is on his mind. 
 
The annual budget and accounts play an important role as the formal communication devices 
between corporate management and the board. Investors in TelCo have not gained any money from 
their investments in the company during the period 2007 – 2010. Some investors argue publically 
that TelCo is still in the market establishment stage and therefore their investment in TelCo should 
be considered a long-term investment strategy. However, the owners have set goals for their 
investments in TelCo and need to defend development with respect to their investments in TelCo to 
their corporate boards. For this reason, budget and accounting information from TelCo is required 
by the owners. Although many hope that profit will come in the future, some of the investors have 
run out of patience since the value of their investment is decreasing over time. Some investors have 
even chosen to write off some of the investment in TelCo in their financial accounts due to the fact 
that the financial results were not as expected.  
 
Annual budget and financial information is also important for the banks, which ask for 3-year 
financial plans. Each year, the financial plan is defended along with rolling financial forecasts for the 
next 3 years. Sometimes these financial plans will even be stretched to 10 years for the purpose of 
the long-term company capital valuation. Without showing positive liquidity, TelCo could have huge 
problems in refinancing their loans from the banks as banks have very strong covenants and 
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conditions related to loan agreements. There are also demanding requirements with respect to 
auditing company accounts each year in order to defend the capital valuation of the company. 
 
Therefore, corporate managers identify the budget as an important link between investors and their 
work to influence the organization for which they have responsibility. The budget has an important 
role of translating ambitions and goals for financial plans, which will provide the foundation for the 
final investment budget on the local level. The most important thing is for the budget to focus on 
revision of strategy plans each time the budget is discussed. According to the top managers the most 
important function of the budget is to identify and cut costs that are not related to creating value.  
Furthermore top managers argues that the message of cost cutting, which is sent each time to the 
line managers, is good because it is a motivation for trying to do things differently and more 
efficiently. Since March 2010, TelCo’s corporate management tightened controls and restricted the 
delegation of authority to the line managers. Top managers  mean that line managers should fight 
for each decision, and they believe that this is functioning as the amount of investments required to 
meet their target went down. 
 
This story has showed us that  there is a long-term strategy at TelCo, and at the same time short-
term measures are becoming more important. The message has been clear from the investers – 
there will be no more investments from owners: meaning that the company should manage 
investments on its own. This is the direct cause of the crisis for TelCo. Under these circumstances, it 
is important to construct a plan about how to get out of the difficult financial situation. Banks and 
owners want predictability and security, and the demanding financial plans and policies are 
important in demonstrating that. 
 
However, top managers are not naïve in terms of relying only on the annual budget for managing 
the organization in conditions of a rapidly changing business environment. The CFO in TelCo for 
instance expressed: 
“In this industry we don’t know how the world will look in the next quarter of the year!”  
 
It seems to be an intensified attention on information from both budgets and BSc. Budget, thus, is 
recognized as rigid and inflexible, therefore top managers have to use other tools to monitor what is 
going on in the business environment. Use of the annual budget is supplemented with continuous 
financial forecasts at the corporate level. According to the CFO, the budget is actually no longer 
actively used after the first quarter of the year because the annual budget is already “dead” as such 
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and thus abandoned as a management tool. Management on the corporate level is performed by 
the active use of forecasts, which are produced monthly on the aggregate level starting from March 
each year. These are forecasts related not only to financial indicators but also to salaries 
(incorporated as Sales, General and Administration costs (SG&A) in the budget). Based on these 
forecasts, corporate managers can establish new priorities in order to take advantage of newly 
emerging opportunities in the market and to use money for measures that should be given a 
priority.  
 
Top managers argue that it is important to do realistic forecasts at the level of corporate 
management. However, not all the information that is available for the corporate managers from 
these forecasts goes to the board. Managers at the corporate level argue that information presented 
to the board should not be too optimistic, so that the board could be “blinded” for instance by good 
current sales figures. So, what is discussed internally by corporate managers and what is presented 
to the board and other external parties is carefully selected in order to make a “credible story” to 
the board of how the current financial situation is at the moment. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
The aim of the paper is to provide an understanding of how conflicts in information attention 
emerged and in what sense these tensions can be attributed to the conflicts built into the design of 
the company’s MIS. Particularly, whether and how the use of information from the MIS based on 
combining budget-oriented and BSc-oriented systems is incompatible for line and top managers.  
 
We have shown that in theory the design of budgets and the BSc does not necessarily need to be 
difficult. From the view of designers, the integration of the budget and the BSc is compatible (Otley, 
2001). When it comes to design, the budget and the BSc are understood as two different tools in a 
control package (Malmi and Brown, 2008) or as two different tools that both can be used side-by-
side in a beneficial information and dialog relationship (Simons, 2005).  However practitioners argue 
that budgets and BSc can never act side-by-side as equals. Instead the focus from the top managers 
will decide what tool wins the attention game. Previous studies have shown that even if a company 
starts to measure a specific area, it will not become the focus if top management does not 
emphasize it and give it attention (Catasus et al, 2009). In other words, it is not “what get measured 
that gets done” but “what the top managers give attention that gets done”. If the budget is 
emphasized, the BSc will be less prioritized and the other way around.   
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Our case study shows how TelCo uses both traditional budgets and the BSc together and this creates 
tension. Line managers only use the budget as a planning tool in order to establish quantitative 
objectives and action plans for the coming year, while the top managers, via the board, use the 
budget as the main strategic and management control tool. The line managers try to place more 
attention on the BSc but have had difficulties in getting their arguments through, especially after the 
company started to have financial difficulties. This creates a dilemma for the dialog between the 
corporate level and the line management level. 
 
5.1. Problems with information use: different logics and knowledge bases of managers 
We have shown how conflicts arose between the line managers and the top managers along two 
areas: time horizon (short/long-term) and different focus on information (internal/external). The 
two first stories of line managers concern the time horizon conflict between budgets and the BSc. For 
the budgets, the time frame is short; while it for BSc, it is long (see Table 1). The time frame for the 
budget is one year and the idea is to establish the priorities in advance and follow these priorities 
the whole period. The BSc, on the other hand, has a long-term time frame that focuses on important 
KPIs related to customers and quality. The length of the time frame is not explicit, but the idea is to 
make cause-and-effect relationships between the financial dimension and other dimensions such as 
customers, employees and processes.  
 
The conflict in our case is related to how the time horizon is understood because top and line 
managers operate with different logics steaming from their practices. The top managers act out of 
the board's financially oriented logic, where costs have first priority. While the line managers act out 
of the market logic, focusing on their main challenge in the market, for example maintaining short 
delivery times. Cost cuts and delivery time are conflicting measures and the main focus on the 
budget from the board forces the top managers to focus exclusively on cost cuts.  
 
In the second story we also identify a conflict related to time horizon. The story describes the 
investment policy that has changed so the line managers need an extra authorization in order to 
make investments. As a consequence, it takes longer time to make an investment. In the story, the 
line manager argues from a market-based knowledge perspective and the need to be quick in 
making the investments, while the top mangers (in line with the board) want to centralize the 
decisions in order to be cost efficient and have control. 
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An explanation as to why the conflicts arise is that different knowledge bases are used. The top 
managers (in line with the board) base their decisions on internal accounting information based on 
historical data, where they have identified a downward financial trend. Top managers’ interpretation 
of the best solution is to cut costs and be more careful in decision-making situations. The line 
managers, on the other hand, also see a downward financial trend, but their interpretation is that 
the only possible solution is to adjust rapidly to market changes and follow the new strategy.  The 
cause to the crisis is understood in the same way while the coping with the crisis is very different.  
 
A consequence of these two interpretations of the situation, the top managers are reluctant to 
decentralize autonomy to the line managers because they will then use their knowledge about the 
market and make decisions from that specific knowledge. This means in the first story that delivery 
time would come in focus instead of just cost cuts and in the second story that the line manager 
would make the investment if he meant that it was strategically correct.  
 
5.2. Information conflicts: “information de-coupling” and “information suppression”  
The stories from top managers show how they try to find a balance between the concerns for 
strategy and the requirements from the board and the owners. Instead of providing the board with 
all the information, the top managers act selectively and only provide enough information for “a 
credible story”. Internally, however, even though they have to allow the line managers to act out of 
the market information in order to follow the strategy, the cost focus has to be emphasized much 
more. In other words, the information becomes divided into two different stories. One story is 
internal, focusing on cost cuttings and actions to survive, and one for external actors (boards and 
stakeholders), focusing on a credible story about how successfully they are heading out of the crises 
by implementing cost control measures.  
 
In this sense, top managers have a possibility to de-couple the use of information in the MIS 
depending on the receiver and act selectively in communicating information depending on the story 
that should be told. The top managers’ knowledge base is related to their experience of acting as a 
link between the board and line managers. Having control over the MIS, top managers don’t seem to 
have problems with having both budgets and the BSc, since each one gives a better space for 
maneuvering. When they sense that the present information tools do not provide the information 
needed, they can easily institute and mobilize other tools as deemed necessary (e.g. introducing 
forecasts when budgets were becoming problematic) or switch between the tools.  
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Contrary to that, line managers cannot de-couple the use of information when there is an 
information conflict. In our case, the use of both budgets and the BSc put line managers in a difficult 
situation where the effects of using both were difficult to reconcile. Information coming from 
budgets motivates actions that contradict the market logic of line managers and that are supported 
by use of the strategy-oriented BSc system. But, line managers cannot sabotage the attention of the 
budget in favor of the BSc because the budget is linked to their performance evaluation. In this 
sense, use of BSc as a management tool for line managers is “suppressed” by the attension to  the 
budget, limiting line managers’ ability to balance the use of other types of information, thus having a 
controlling rather than enabling effect on line managers (see e.g. Mundy, 2010). Therefore, 
“suppression” of the BSc by attension to the budget can be seen as a rational behavior of top 
managers to satisfy the board of directors, external shareholders and investors. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to provide an understanding of tensions in the use of information for 
operational decision-making and control that were experienced by line managers in a telecom 
company under financial distress. We have shown that the use of MIS combining both budget-
oriented and BSc-oriented systems produce information conflicts for managers. In explaining these 
findings, 4 C framing  offers a useful vocabulary to illuminate these processes of how strategy is 
exercised by the use of two accounting tools – both budget and BSc – and the conflicts that can arise 
when this is done. These conflicts are based on usage of information anchored in different 
knowledge bases of top and line managers. The line managers’ knowledge base is a routinized type 
of behavior based on their experience of acting in the market. This experience is constituted and 
kept together by several elements such as their practical understanding, which creates his or her 
ability to identify, perform and respond to the events within a practice, but also on a more general 
understanding based on the context in which they act. The top managers' knowledge base is in a 
more political arena, where they have to handle both the investors’ demands (on the board 
meetings) and the top-down administration of the company. Conflicts and tensions in information 
attention and use were more difficult to reconcile for line managers than for top managers because 
top managers have more freedom in instituting the MIS needed for their purposes, can more freely 
de-couple information use towards external and internal members of organization and can use the 
budget to “suppress” of alternative information tools like the BSc.  
 
TelCo, which is discussed in this chapter, was torn apart between two translations of lack of 
profitability and a corresponding focus on the need for cash flows, on the one hand, and flexibility, 
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market adjustments and maintenance of the current quality of production, on the other. Confusion 
and tension can be a good way to create dynamic interactions between top and line managers and 
discussion about how to find ways out of economic crises. However, the story told in the case of 
TelCo demonstrates that confusion and tension in respect to usage of different MIS can also be 
counterproductive in the case of financial crises, when budget and cost cutting suppresses the use of 
the BSc and realization of strategy. It remains to be seen how top and line managers in TelCo will 
handle their financial situation and how the information problems of line managers will be resolved.  
 
By using the 4C framework by Shrivastava (1993), our study has managed to shed light on the 
dilemma that comes out of how attention is given to different management control tools – BSc and 
budgets. As mentioned in the theory part crisis creates increased attention on information. This 
study help us to understand that this increased information attention by top managers also can 
result in conflicting understanding of the situation by different groups. We also showed in the theory 
part that D’aveni and MacMillan argued that failing firms react to a crisis in the output environment 
by engaging in maladaptive behaviours that are predicted by the decline, crisis-denial, and threat-
rigidity response models. Managers of successful firms, in contrast, engage in different behaviors 
after the crisis strikes. These different behaviors enable the survivors to adapt appropriate, and they 
are predicted by scanning and stress theories. Our study shows a surviving firm that the top 
managers take the crisis seriously and act out of that. Still there are serious challenges in order to 
survive based on where different actors put their attention. Our study has contributed to 
understand how surviving firms struggle to find a way out of the crisis.  
The top management version argued that there would be a trend shift in the company's financial 
situation by using a command-control regime and clear cost cuts on specific areas. The logic behind 
this argument is based on the story top managers had to tell the board in order to show action 
orientation and control in a difficult situation. In contrast, the line managers’ version of management 
control stressed increased market orientation and close relationships to the customers. Instead of 
placing the focus on the information as such, the focus was on the activities. 
 
These versions of management control expressed different concerns for the control “spaces”. The 
top managers’ version attempted to control production at a distance so that each space was fitted 
into an information representation that could fit into the credible story they had to tell the board 
and the investors (which in this situation is understood as the main actors). To do this, they needed 
information from both the budget and from the BSc. They had to signal a short time horizon and an 
internal focus. This was a challenge to the line managers’ version, which emphasized the differences 
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between “spaces” regarding people, production and politics. There was, in contrast, a more focused 
attention to the local conditions that made sales difficult. This demanded a longer time horizon, 
where resources were needed to create an increased degree of competiveness. The focus could not 
only be on internal issues, but also had to take external issues into account.  
 
Our findings show the benefits in using the 4 C framework and attention giving in order to better 
understand dilemmas and conflict that can arise out of design of management control systems. The 
trend of management control systems is to increase the number of tools in order to get more and 
better information for the different actors in the organization. However, as our study shows, this can 
also have many challenging aspects. Therefore, new information should not be implemented 
unquestioned, even if the information as such can be valuable; it has to be related to whom should 
use the information and how can it work together with the existing information.  
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Appendix A. General Interview guide 
 
 
This is a description of the main topics for discussion in semi-structured interviews.  
 
Theme 1 – Introduction about the context and respondents  
Presentation of interviewers and the aim of the project, including issues of research ethics 
Presentation of respondents, their background, responsibilities and daily tasks 
 
Theme 2 – Use of information 
Description of information used to handle main managerial tasks, especially in relation to: 
- Strategy work/planning 
- Budget work 
- Performance management system and incentives 
 
Theme 3 – Use of management control systems: challenges and solutions 
Perceived problems in how management control is functioning in TelCo  
Perceived reasons for these problems 
What are the ways these problems are handled/possible solutions 
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Appendix B. Overview of respondents in TelCo 
 
 
Table B.1. Overview of respondents and their positions in TelCo. 
 
TelCo 
Respondent 1 CEO of TelCo 
Respondent 2 CFO of TelCo 
Respondent 3 Director, technical department, investments in infrastructure (cables and 
networks) 
Respondent 4 Director, unit responsible for sales to business market  
Respondent 5 Director, unit responsible for deliveries of telecom services/solutions 
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international accreditation of business 
schools and programmes:  
some thoughts and critical reflections 
Sami Saarenketo, Vice Dean of the School of Business,  
Lappeenranta University of Technology 
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AGENDA 
1. What are the accreditations? 
• AACSB, EQUIS, AMBA, EPAS 
2. Why do they matter? 
• The Benefits for the stakeholders (and costs) 
3. How to pursue an accreditation?  
• Some personal thoughts, experiences and 
reflections based on our EPAS journey so far 
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There are about 13670 BS in the 
world and this number is likely to rise  
–less than 10 % hold accreditation. 
What are the accreditations? 
229
AACSB 
AACSB (The Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of 
Business) is a US based in 1916 established accreditation 
organisation. AACSB evaluates a business school’s 
mission, faculty qualifications and contributions, 
programmes, and other critical areas on a five year review 
cycle. Particular important for AACSB are the assurance of 
learning standards. Student learning being the central 
activity of higher education, schools should have learning 
goals in place that encourage continuous improvement in 
educational programmes.  
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AMBA 
The Association of MBAs (AMBA) is a London-based in 
1967 established international organisation that accredits 
postgraduate business programs at business schools 
worldwide. The Association is one of the three main global 
accreditation bodies in business education. It differs from 
AACSB and EQUIS as it accredits a school's portfolio of 
postgraduate business programs rather than the entire 
business school. 
EQUIS 
EQUIS (European Quality Improvement System) was 
created in 1998 as part of the European Foundation for 
Management Development EFMD, a Brussels-based 
organization that seeks to improve education and research 
in the field of business and management. 
The EQUIS accreditation is awarded to business schools 
based on general quality. The process also takes into 
account the business school's level of internationalization, 
which is not a strict requirement for accreditation by the 
other two major international accreditation bodies. 
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European Countries with  
Triple-Accredited Schools 
Why, how and whom do they matter? 
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Benefits of Accreditation (EFMD) 
− International recognition of excellence: international development 
− Legitimacy to internal and external stakeholders that you have a 
strong international reputation (donors, alumni, government) and 
that your school meets the high standards of the best business 
schools in the world 
− Mechanism for international benchmarking with the best 
− Sharing of good practice and mutual learning 
− Agenda for quality improvement and future development 
− Become part of a network of top schools to develop relationships 
with fellow accredited schools for research, exchanging best 
practices on programmes, etc. 
− International Legitimacy vis-a-vis - recruiting international students; 
creating double degree partnerships; forming international exchange 
relationships; recruiting new faculty 
 
Why bother? The stakeholders 
Partners 
Employers 
Students 
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For the students it is a guarantee that: 
− Their degree will be recognized wherever they want to 
work in the world 
− Their business education meets the highest standards, 
measured against the world’s best schools 
− Their teachers meet the professional standards set by 
the accrediting bodies 
− The services the school offers to support them 
academically and in extra-curricular activities are world-
class. 
 
Source: QUT 
The employers can be sure that: 
− The graduates have the skills necessary to meet their 
needs 
− The content of the degrees accords with the 
expectations of employers globally 
− The programs are underpinned by high quality research 
and an international perspective. 
Source: QUT 
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The partners of the school will 
know that: 
− The quality and scope of research is at an international 
level, with an orientation towards applied practice 
− The school is committed to offering joint academic 
programs for students, including student exchange 
− The school has a growing range of linkages in the 
corporate world and with professional bodies 
− International cooperation and relevance are key aims in 
all that the school does. 
Source: QUT 
What are the costs of Accreditation? 
− Deadweight costs: Bureaucracy to gather data, complete forms, 
costs of accreditation visits 
− Strategic costs: May require change of mission or unwanted change 
to strategy 
− AACSB’s focus on university: may prevent b-schools in 
universities with other management programmes from applying 
− AMBA’s rule that MBA entrants require three years’ work 
experience: Harvard Business School, Wharton, Stanford GBS 
all do not meet this requirement 
− EQUIS’s rule that b-school’s must be autonomous: works against 
b-schools which are fully integrated into universities (most b-
schools in Finland are, for example) 
 
Source: NTU 
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How to pursue an accreditation? 
- Insights from our EPAS Experience 
Dean’s view on EPAS 
“In conditions of intense international competition EPAS is 
indicative of the high quality of the degree and the 
institution. In the face of so much choice among 
universities, accreditation has become a yardstick with 
which to judge the quality of service. Most high-quality 
universities will only partner with universities with a 
recognized status. Such a status therefore adds to the 
value of the degree of our graduates and is advantageous 
in terms of their career and salary development.” 
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LAPPEENRANTA 
St. Petersburg Helsinki 
FINLAND & LAPPEENRANTA 
SCANDINAVIA 
GREAT BRITAIN 
RUSSIA 
Brussels 
Moscow 
FINLAND 
Stockholm 
London 
Paris 
• Founded in 1969, combining technology and business from the start 
• Over 10.000 have obtained a Master’s degree in technology or business, and 
nearly 500 have obtained a doctorate in technology, business or philosophy 
• Approximately 1000 staff members 
• 5 700 undergraduate students: technology 76%, business administration 24% 
• 23% of technology students and 50% of business students are women 
• 386 degree students (7.4%) are foreign nationals, 14% of first-year students 
foreign nationals 
• 47 different nationalities at LUT 
• Life-long learning: 1 697 students in continuing professional education,  
1 490 students in open university education 
LUT FACTS & FIGURES 
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 −to offer focused programmes and contribute to new knowledge on sustainable 
competitive advantage among firms in global markets for the benefit of the 
international academic community, the students, and society in general. 
−As part of a university of technology it emphasises the interface between 
business and technology, and has specific expertise on Russian markets. Its 
efficiency is rooted in a results-oriented and collaborative culture. 
THE MISSION OF LUT SCHOOL OF BUSINESS 
About the MIMM programme 
− The MIMM programme is a two-year full-time pre-experience Master’s 
degree corresponding to 120 ECTS. It is built at the intersection of 
three pillars: Marketing, International Business, and Technology 
Management (including Innovation). 
− All MIMM courses are worth 6 ECTS and represent 160 student 
learning hours. In-class hours vary between 20 and 50, with 
compulsory courses during the first year of the programme comprising 
35-40 in-class hours. 
− Three courses (18 ECTS) have to be taken in each pillar; they are 
complemented by (at least) one language course, one course on 
Methodology, four courses in a Minor subject (recommended minor is 
Russia) and a Master’s thesis worth 30 credits. 
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Our EPAS journey 
Stage of the process Timing 
Inquiry* June 2010  
Application submission Early August 2010 
Eligibility EPAS Committee meeting, 14 Sep, 2010 
SAR submission June, 2011 
PRV  27-28 September 2011 
Accreditation EPAS Board meeting, 22 February 2012 
 
*Meet up with Ulrich Hommel during EFMD Annual Conference in Wiesbaden  to 
discuss the potential application (on the basis of a draft data sheet) 
 
From eligility to SAR 
− Gameplan: Do not rush into SAR writing before you are 
ready! 
− Strategy-level: What needs to be done before starting 
the documentation? 
− E.g. more explicit faculty-level strategic targets 
− Programme-level: What needs to be done before starting 
the documentation? 
− E.g. core programme team composition 
− The programme contents must be polished 
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Key development process on 
programme level for SAR: 
Constructive alignment 
Programme objectives 
Intended learning outcomes 
Learning and teaching 
activities 
Assessment methods 
MIMM Programme Objectives 
• To turn out Master’s-level practitioners in the field of 
international marketing management capable of securing 
competitive positions in dynamic global markets. Compliance 
with the high standards set for international Master’s 
programmes ensures the competitiveness of MIMM 
graduates, measured in terms of time to employment and 
starting salary. 
• To educate professionals capable of applying academic 
theories and tools in resolving business problems. Special 
emphasis is laid on combining academic rigor with practical 
application.  
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 MIMM programme structure 
Strong focus on: 
− Intended learning outcomes (ILO) 
− Company relevance and cooperation 
− International competence of graduates 
Intended learning outcomes: What are 
the knowledge, skills and attitudes that 
our students acquire?  
After completing the programme, students will be able to: 
1. Understand and assess the challenges of turbulent business 
environments 
2. Evaluate and design strategies in such environments in marketing, 
international business and/or technology management and at their 
intersection 
3. Apply relevant business skills 
4. Acquire relevant additional knowledge and skills to support subject-
based expertise and international readiness 
5. Conduct an independent scientific research project and report it 
6. Utilize strong analytical skills and apply the tools required in 
professional practice 
7. Demonstrate a global, innovative, market-oriented and ethical mind-
set 
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Closing the knowing-doing gap: 
Importance of ‘transferable skills’ 
Skills development in MIMM courses 
242
 Learning and teaching activities 
Grading scale - key purpose is to 
monitor student attainment of learning 
outcomes 
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SAR 
SAR: some key lessons 
− Motivate and commit people early into the project! Good 
way to do this is to send many people to EFMD seminars 
and events. (this is not a paid ad ) 
− It is not a one man band! Form a team and build a 
project plan, agree on tasks (e.g. who will write which 
sections). However, you need an overall editor to make it 
coherent.  
− Follow the standards & criteria: Build a well-organized 
and coherent report! 
− Back things up with facts, charts, tables whenever 
possible. You need to organize the data collection. You 
may need to produce data that your former systems and 
administrators are not ready to produce. 
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SAR: some key lessons 
− It is about evaluation of the current status of your 
programme, not about how great future plans you have. 
− Remember the ”critical self-evaluation” part. It is not 
about sales pitching.  
− Do not hide your weaknesses, they will be discovered. 
Rather mention them and state that you have a solid 
plan to tackle them.  
− ”Put some color and life in your report”. 
 
Our ”Practical EPAS strategy” 
− Our starting point: good programme and fit with EPAS 
criteria BUT school having low international educational 
visibility and reputation (liabilities of smallness, newness 
and foreignness). 
  strategy: Overdeliver with documents! 
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From SAR to PRV 
PRV: some key lessons 
− Arrange a ”mock peer review” to practice your faculty, 
staff and stakeholders for a smooth PRV.  
− Make people actually read SAR 
− Internal communication: What are our main messages? 
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PRV: some key lessons 
− Organize the visit as professionally as 
you can: 
− How to make the baseroom comfortable 
for the PRV team? 
− Materials 
− Catering 
− Managing expectations and aligning 
with the prior phases of the process. 
The base room should be built as a 
logical extension, your ”SAR as a live 
experience”. 
 
Some key conclusions 
− Achieving international accreditation has become an objective 
for many European b-schools 
− There are many benefits from accreditation, which come at a 
cost 
− Have a strategy and gameplan for your accreditation effort: 
− What needs to be done before eligibility, before SAR, before PRV? 
− Read instructions carefully and ”choose your battles” on what to 
improve 
− Build on your strengths and manage your weaknesses! 
− It is about changing the culture. This may take more time than 
finetuning processes and practices. 
− It is about committing your faculty, staff and stakeholders 
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Benefits of EPAS 
1. Process Improvement 
− Going through EPAS encourages schools to re-evaluate and reform their 
programmes on the basis the EPAS Standards 
− School realizes learning curve effects for an ongoing EQUIS accreditation 
project (EPAS as a catalyst for change) 
2. Brand Value Enhancement 
− EPAS accreditation certifies the achievement of a high level of programme 
excellence 
− Creates cross-border recognition for the programme & the school 
3. Networking Benefits 
− Use the EPAS platform to link up with the other EPAS institutions (learning 
and partnering) 
4. Service Benefits 
− Benefit from ongoing support from EFMD Quality Services 
Source: EFMD 
Still one more thing… 
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Thank you for your attention! 
sami.saarenketo@lut.fi www.lut.fi 
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Calculating outsourcing and a 
trial of strength 
Mark Christensen 
Peter Skærbæk 
Kjell Tryggestad 
Literature 
• Some within accounting (Cäker & Nyland) to be 
reviewed 
• Mahama and Chua, outsourcing of warehousing 
to a telecommunications company. (the 
constitutive role of accounting explored) 
• Huge non-accounting body of literature 
• Constitutive role of accounting (Miller, LSE) 
• Calculations as mediators (Latour, Christensen 
and Skærbæk) 
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Research question 
What is the role(s) of accounting in the major 
battles of calculating saving potentials of facility 
management outsourcing. 
 
How the two emerging strategic alternatives 
became valued up against each other 
 
How we can explain the final decision to do 
outsourcing as a Big Bang strategy. 
Actor-Network Theory and a trial of strength 
• Some accounting literature focusing on ”Trials” (Revellino and Mouritsen, 2009; 
Briers and Chua, 2001). 
• Though not used in its advanced notion ”of strength” 
• Callon and Latour (1981, p. 292): “Strength thus resides in the power to break off 
and to bind together. More generally, strength is intervention, interruption, 
interpretation and interest.” 
• “The scene is set for a series of trials of strength whose outcome will determine 
the solidity of our researchers problematization” (Callon, 1986, p. 207).  
• “To describe enrolment is thus to describe the group of multilateral negotiations, 
trails of strength and tricks that accompany the interessements and enable them 
to succeed. “ (Callon, 1986, p. 211) 
• “When imposing such a trial of strength they are faced with spokespersons and 
what (or whom) these persons speak for.” (Latour, 1987, p. 78) 
• “It (a separation) cannot be obtained without a trial of strength, any more than a 
boxer can claim to be world champion without convincingly defeating the 
previous world champion. (Latour, 1987, p. 78) 
• Depending on the trials of strength, spokespersons are turned into subjective 
individuals or into objective representatives (Latour, 1987, p. 78) 
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ANT (cont.) 
• Framing and the establishing of boundaries  
• Inclusion/ exclusion , what can be done and 
not done. 
• That strategies and their (strategic) objects 
can overflow as mediators (not 
intermediaries). 
Pre-history 
• 1972 Denmark becomes member of EU 
• ?? EU Commission recommends outsourcing in the public sectors of 
membership countries. 
• EU court: That EU cannot command outsourcing  
• 1991 MoF launches its White Paper on outsourcing 
• 1992 MoF launches a guideline on outsourcing 
• Council for outsourcing established by MoF 
• 1994 First Danish Law on outsourcing 
• 1996: MoF informing the parliament that little outsourcing has taken 
place 
• From 1996 Agencies have to report outsourcing degrees to MoF 
• 1999: Consultancy company hired by MoF to evaluate outsourcing 
degrees in the state.  
• 2000: Outsourcing council publishes report 
• 2000: Danish Defence in Vision 2010 mentions outsourcing 
• 2000: New law on a contest right for private companies 
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 Case: Outsourcing in the Danish Defence 
Forces and its Facility Management 
• Cleaning, launmoving, window polishing, 
cantine services, lighter maintainence and 
repairs. 
• Period 2000 -2013 Longitudinal study 
• Primarily archival. Several hundreds of pages 
• Interviews currently 16 including telephone 
conversation, but not informal conversations.  
Bifurcation of outsourcing strategies 
• Potentially many ways of outsourcing 
• Defence forces with many different barracks and 
establishments. 
• At least 5 different types of service (expanding) provisions 
• Barack by barack, service by service? 
• Multiple packages 
• Integrated and/or regional? 
• Big Bang (few regions and integrated) 
• Mega Big Bang (one region and integrated) 
 
• How to arrive at solutions (as strategies)?? 
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 The containment strategy       
• 2001 – 2008 
• Internal optimization first then gradual step by step 
tendering with control bids and then possibly 
outsourcing.  
• Full-blown internal optimization with unions’ 
participation 
• 5 minor attempts of outsourcing in the 2002-2006 with 
little results and outcome. 
• Rationale: Military officers’ attempts of containing the 
outsourcing due to military preparedness 
considerations (resistance), cold war thinking! 
• Gradually the strategy overflowed.  
Actions to enable BB 
• New law on transfer of staff to private companies 
• 2004 MoD conclude that internal optimization will end by 2006, then 
outsourcing 
• Parliament decides to expand outsourcing 
• 2004: MoF notes that MoD has handed in a plan for efficiency strategies. 
• 2005: McKinsey and parliament that more outsourcing is needed. 
• 2005: MoF notes that MoD does not calculate outsourcing degrees.  
• 2005 MoF quotes OECD that recommends outsourcing (15 %) 
• 2005 MoD, minister have meetings with FM industry. 
• 2006: DCD Quality Division,  
• 2007: FBE established 
• 2007: Control document (MoD) that outsourcing degree must be 20 % 
• 2007: MoD faced with the fact that outsourcing degree is only 17 % 
• Early 2009: McKinsey calculates 30 % savings due to outsourcing! 
 
24/6 2009: Parliament decision to Big Bang outsourcing.  
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Big Bang outsourcing 
• 2006 till final decision by parliament 2009 
 
• Big Bang from 2009-2017 
• 2011 Bids for East contract integrated 
 
• 2013 Bids for West contract integrated 
 
• FBE out of the game as service providers and possible benchmark. 
 
• Final tenders show 25 % savings close to McKinsey’ 30 %. 
 
• Mega Big Bang prepared from 2017. (Only one contract and more 
services to be included!) 
General Hvidt 
Chief of Defence from 1996 to 17/5/02 
Jørgen Steen Knudsen 
FBE, CEO -
1/8/06 - 
20/12/08 
Colonel Michael Bundegaard Colonel and FBE, Deputy (from FBE start to end 2010) 
Tim Slot Jørgensen Chief of Staff from - to; Chief of Defence: 1/8/08 - 4/10/09 
Bjørn Bisserup (Putin) FKO 2003 - 2008??; Chief of Staff 2008 to present 
Jesper Helsø 
Chief of Staff from - 
to?? 
Chief of Defence : 17/5/02 to 1/8/08 
Laila Reenberg MoD, CFO: 200 to present 
Anders Troldborg 
Permanent Secretary of Defence: early to 2008 
Lars Findsen Permanent Secretary of Defence: 2008 to present 
Preben Elnef FBE CEO: 15/7/09 to 1/5/12 
Claus Uttrup FBE CEO: interim between Knudsen and Elnef 
Carsten Heiselberg 
Niels Gotfredsen 
MoF Civil 
Servant 
working on 
defence 
issues 
(FKO, MoD) 
FKO, CFO: Nov'09 to Mar'11 MoF, CEO Agency for Modernisation of the State from Mar'11 
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Explaining the Big Bang outcome 
• The containment strategy overflowed 
• Massive built up of paper ”guns” 
• Experts, McKinsey, OECD. 
• Calculations 
• Moving persons 
• Appointing persons 
• Dismissing and retiring persons (as consequences) 
• Huge test of strength just in the period up to 
decision. 
 
 
 
Contribution 
• To show how two strategic alternatives became 
evaluated in a major trial of strength 
• That choosing involves a kind of massive battle with 
winners and loosers 
• How accounting devices create boundaries 
(inclusion/exclusion) in an unending stream of 
mediators. 
• That the strategic centre of outsourcing shifted 
gradually to become confirmed with the parliament 
decision.  
• That the strategic centre becomes the kind of objective 
representatives of the BB-solution. 
• Showing how accounting calculations became 
decisive/convincing to decision-makers. 
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 The displacement of the accounting technology in accrual 
accounting (anti)modernization 
 
Abstract 
Actor network theory (ANT) is applied in this study to unravel the controversies in the debate 
over accrual accounting at central government level in Norway, including the ways in which 
the accounting technology was given the properties of an actor, and how this became a very 
controversial issue. The debate had two main camps, one led by those constructing and 
experimenting with the accounting technology, namely the Ministry of finance and its 
associates. The other camp was led by the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions 
(NCTU) and its associates. With the passage of time, the debate became deadlocked, action 
was overtaken, whereby the focus shifted from a discussion about accounting toward the 
networks and individual actors composing the debate. Rather than approaching each other and 
reaching a consensus, the discussants slipped further and further apart, grasping polar 
positions. One side—led by the Ministry of Finance, purified the technicalities of the newly 
developed (and tailor-made) accrual accounting model. The other side—led by the NCTU, 
purified the cultural aspect of the accrual accounting change endeavor. The NCTU achieved 
this by leaning on the experience of others—arguing that accrual accounting technology 
invokes a democratic problem, depriving the public sector of its resources. This represents an 
overflow effect whereby the alleged properties of other (and different) accrual accounting 
models became much more important than what could be deduced from the accounting model 
in question—effectively inverting the accrual accounting implications. This paper contributes 
by depicting the variety of actors (and devices) that might be mobilized in accounting debates. 
More specifically, the paper adds to the literature on accrual accounting in the public sector 
by unpacking how purification can bring the accrual accounting debate and policy making 
into an impasse. In this position, action and results are overtaken by politics, driven by 
overflowing effects and inverted accounting model implications. As such, ignorance of the 
hybrid properties of the accrual accounting technology disrupts the role of accounting in 
accounting change endeavors, thereby obscuring (the debate over) accounting in practice. 
Key words: Accrual accounting, central government level, Norway, Actor network theory. 
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 1 Introduction 
 
Accrual accounting has been implemented in several countries (Blondal, 2003). This has 
gradually attracted a greater interest and debate with respect to what it means to implement 
accrual accounting. For instance, studies can be found on reasons for accrual accounting 
adoption (Carpenter, 1991; Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Monsen & Näsi, 1998; Ryan, 1998)) 
and the implementation (process) of accrual accounting (like, Arnaboldi & Lapsley, 2009; 
Connolly & Hyndman, 2006). Others have studied assumed effects of accruals in the public 
sector—herein in terms of unintended consequences (Ballantine, Forker & greenwood, 2007; 
Ellwood & Newberry, 2007; Newberry & Pallot, 2005; Olson, Humphrey & Guthrie, 2001; 
Vinnari & Näsi, 2008), if users want such information and find it to be useful (Brorström, 
1982; Pauli, 1999; Paulsson, 2006) or otherwise whether it is worthwhile the effort (Carlin, 
2006; Guthrie, 1998; Robinson, 1998; Ter Bogt, 2008). Conceptual discussions are also 
present, emphasizing differences between public and private sector. The differences are said 
to make it difficult to apply the same accounting model in both the private and the public 
sector (e.g. Barton, 2002; Falkman, 1997; Monsen, 2002), thereby (arguably) making accrual 
accounting unsuited in the public sector.  
 
The aforementioned displays the richness in the debate over accrual accounting in the 
international academic literature. The variety of viewpoints and research angles also suggest 
that accrual accounting is a controversial and complex issue. Moreover, given the many 
concerns, different stakeholders are conspicuously involved, favoring and opposing such 
accrual initiatives. Still, less is known about whether and how various accrual accounting 
related controversies (as mentioned above) impact on local debates on accrual accounting. 
There is however a set of contributions relying on neo-institutional theory, arguing that 
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 accrual accounting is implemented in different countries because of legitimacy concerns, 
herein due to isomorphic pressures. Examples include Carpenter & Feroz (2001): Guthrie 
(1998). Nonetheless, it is not clear how such structural forces manifest locally. Particularly, 
there is a paucity of research examining in greater detail how international viewpoints and 
experiences impact on local initiatives and debates concerning the decision to adopt or avoid 
accrual accounting (in individual countries). As a result there are several unknown features of 
the accrual development in various countries. For instance, who are involved in the local 
debates? What controversies are especially pertinent? What mechanisms are relied on to front 
various viewpoints as different spectators are seeking to win the debate? 
 
Learning more about local debates also illuminate what features—local or global—are being 
discussed and end up influencing the local decision in terms of whether and potentially how to 
approach accrual accounting. In such debates, as different parties seek to win the 
argumentation and potentially influence local policy making, it is plausible that issues beyond 
those primarily pertinent to accrual accounting might become influential. However, little is 
known about this in the literature, which overall has taken a rather rationalistic view while 
attempting to sort out the status quo of accrual accounting in the public sector (arguably with 
a few exceptions, including that of neo-institutional theorists). 
 
Thus, the purpose of this study is to learn more about what is dominating local debates on 
accrual accounting. With respect to the data collection, the research focus is delimited to one 
local accrual accounting debate. 
 
The empirical setting of the paper is a debate over accrual accounting in Norway with respect 
to the extent to which Norway should implement accrual accounting at central government 
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 level. The debate was set off by an accrual accounting pilot project commencing in 2004 and 
ending in 2009. 
 
The approach taken in this study is to examine the Norwegian accrual accounting debate by 
relying on actor network theory (ANT), a school of thought that is more regarded as a method 
than a theory and that is heavily influenced by the works of e.g. Latour (2005) and Law 
(1992).  
 
This paper contributes by depicting the variety of actors (and devices) that might be mobilized 
in accounting debates. More specifically, the paper adds to the literature on accrual 
accounting in the public sector by unpacking how purification can bring the accrual 
accounting debate and policy making into an impasse. In this position, action and results are 
overtaken by politics, driven by overflowing effects and inverted accounting model 
implications. As such, ignorance of the hybrid properties of the accrual accounting technology 
disrupts the role of accounting in accounting change endeavors, thereby obscuring (the debate 
over) accounting in practice. 
 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Firstly accrual accounting literature 
pertinent to focus of this paper is reviewed before actor network theory is outlined as the 
approach taken in this study. Thereafter follows the method section and subsequently the 
description of the case. This is then discussed, followed by concluding remarks. 
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 2 Approach taken to study accrual accounting discussions at central government level 
 
2.1 Actor network theory 
 
ANT seeks to reassemble the social (Latour, 2005), thereby stressing the notion that we 
should not start by assuming the presence of well-defined social structures (Latour, 2005; 
Law, 1992).  Starting by assuming the presence of social structures represents a position 
Latour (2005) refers to as the “sociology of the social”. The ANT view—that nothing is social 
by itself, but is only made social through various mediators—is what Latour (2005) refers to 
as the “sociology of associations”. ANT as a framework or method is not applicable to all 
settings, especially not slow moving settings, “but in situations where innovation proliferates, 
where group boundaries are uncertain, when the range of entities to be taken into account 
fluctuates, the sociology of the social is no longer able to trace actors’ new associations. At 
this point, the last thing to do would be to limit in advance the shape, size heterogeneity, and 
combination of associations … you have to ‘follow the actors themselves’” (Latour, 2005, pp. 
11-12). In the latter situation, characterized by accelerating changes and where entities are 
multiplied, “a relativistic solution has to be devised in order to remain able to move between 
frames of reference and to regain some sort of commensurability between traces … (Latour, 
2005, p. 12)”. Latour later spells out “the aim of this sociology of associations more 
precisely: there is no society, no social realm, and no social ties, but there exist translations 
between mediators that may generate traceable associations” (Latour, 2005, p. 108). 
 
In continuing down this path of reasoning, “… social, for ANT, is the name of a type of 
momentary association which is characterized by the way it gathers together into new 
shapes” (Latour, 2005, p. 65). In another phrasing, Latour (2005, pp. 64-65) depicts the term 
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 social as “a movement, a displacement, a transformation, a translation, an enrollment. It is 
an association between entities which are in no way recognizable as being social in the 
ordinary manner, except during the brief moment when they are reshuffled together.” In his 
book Latour (2005, p. 59) in a nutshell explicates the ANT approach as one that: “pictures a 
world made of concatenations of mediators where each point can be said to fully act.” Latour 
(2005, p. 72) also states that “the project of ANT is simply to extend the list and modify the 
shapes and figures of those assembled as participants and to design a way to make them act 
as a durable whole.“ Nevertheless, the network part of ANT is easily misunderstood: 
“Network is concept, not a thing out there. It is a tool to help describe something, not what is 
being described” (Latour, 2005, p. 131). 
 
Latour (2005) suggests an ANT study is best undertaken by approaching five uncertainties 
(which he also refers to as controversies) relating to the social sciences—depicted to be the 
nature of groups, actions, objects, facts and the type of study being done (or more precisely, 
how it is accounted for, that is, written up as text). These five uncertainties represent “… 
controversies about what the universe is made of” (Latour, 2005, p. 21).  Latour’s (2005) 
critique of the sociology of the social centers on the standard presumption of the existence of 
the social (forces) as fixed, durable sources—working as an input, and an essential source of 
explanation of a certain phenomenon. Latour (2005) advocates the need to see the social as an 
output of dynamic interactions amongst various actors, something that ought to be illustrated 
from their relative interrelated actions. As such, the five controversies are called upon to 
render the traces of the social more visible, and therefore represent essential building blocks 
in Latour’s (2005) sociology of associations. We elaborate on each of these controversies 
below. 
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 No group, only group formation: To trace the social Latour (2005) suggests we should seek to 
map the controversies of group formation, rather than starting with a readymade group with 
established connections. One starting point is to identify spokespersons (and their 
belongings). Second, groups always position themselves by relating to other competing ties. 
Therefore, Latour (2005, p. 32) suggests that a list of anti-groups should be set up, allowing 
the researcher to rely on the actors themselves to map “the social context in which they are 
placed”. Third, each group, led by their spokesperson(s) will seek to define themselves, by 
drawing up boundaries: “every group formation will be accompanied by the digging out of a 
wide range of features, mobilized to make the group boundary hold against the contradictory 
pressures of all the competing anti-groups that threaten to dissolve it” (Latour, 2005, p. 33).  
Fourth, Latour (2005) accentuates the need to think broadly about the group (formations) to 
also include what might be called group supporters:  “among the many spokespersons that 
make possible the durable definition of groups, one must include social scientists, social 
sciences, social statistics, and social journalism.” These expanded group members play a role 
in making groups durable or might inadvertently or deliberately lead to the group decaying or 
disappearing. Furthermore, to fulfill the aim of rendering the social visible, Latour (2005) puts 
forth performance at the center of attention, referred to as the performative definition, 
representing “the means necessary to ceaselessly upkeep the groups and to the key 
contributions made by the analysts’ own resources” (Latour, 2005, p. 35). Two essential 
concepts to Latour’s (2005) reasoning of what it means to produce the social are “mediators” 
versus “intermediaries”. Even though these concepts are located in relation to group formation 
they are repeatedly referred to by Latour (2005) across his other outlined uncertainties. “An 
intermediary … is what transports meaning or force without transformation: defining its 
inputs is enough to define its outputs. … [with ]mediators, … their input is never a good 
predictor of their output; their specificity has to be taken into account every time. Mediators 
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 transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to 
carry” (Latour, 2005, p. 39). As such, mediators “make others do unexpected things” 
(Latour, 2005, p. 106). 
 
Action is overtaken: The second source of uncertainty “sees action as not transparent. Action 
is not done under the full control of consciousness; actions should rather be felt as a node, a 
knot, and a conglomerate of many surprising sets of agencies that have to be slowly 
disentangled” (Latour, 2005, p. 44). The actor concept is vital in ANT, but it is not given the 
ordinary meaning of the word, as Latour (2005, 46) explains: “To use the word ‘actor’ means 
that it’s never clear who and what is acting when we act since an actor on stage is never 
alone in acting”. It is furthermore suggested that the actor metaphor must be unfolded, 
triggering the researcher to look for “a complete dislocation of the action, warning us that it 
is not a coherent, controlled, well-rounded, and clean-edged affair ... action is dislocated … 
borrowed, distributed, suggested, influenced, dominated, betrayed, translated” (Latour, 2005, 
p. 46). While following the actor, Latour (2005) underscores that the analyst (of the social) 
should avoid the temptation to think of him/her self as superior to those being studied and by 
so doing fail to listen attentively to the actor. Failing this task easily leads the analyst to 
equate the actor’s statements with more familiar and well-established social theories and 
concepts. As a result Latour (2005, p. 48) asks: “Will we have the courage not to substitute an 
unknown expression for a well-known one?” This point is fortified by throwing the following 
challenge: “We have to resist pretending that actors have only a language while the analyst 
processes the meta-language in which the first is ‘embedded’” (Latour, 2005, p. 49). 
Moreover Latour (2005, p. 52) points out: “agencies are always presented in an account as 
doing something.” The presence of the social has to be demonstrated through the actors 
(Latour, 2005, p. 53). Latour (2005) also explains the concept of figuration, viewing it as 
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 variations on a theme in the sense that the same phenomenon or actant may appear in different 
figurations. In a similar vein, figuration can be seen as the many ways in which actions take 
character. Moreover, according to Latour (2005, p. 56): “actors also engage in criticizing 
other agencies accused of being fake, archaic, absurd, irrational, artificial, or illusory.”  
 
Objects too have agency: A main point in this regard is that the type of actors at work should 
be increased (see Latour, 2005, pp. 64-70). One of the peculiarities of ANT is the way it 
makes objects participants in the course of action. While addressing this topic, Latour (2005, 
p. 71) expounds on the meaning of actor and actant: “… if we stick to our decision to start 
from the controversies about actors and agencies, then anything that does modify a state of 
affairs by making a difference is an actor—or if it has no figuration yet, an actant.” Latour 
(2005, p. 72) underscores that essentiality of thoroughly exploring who and what participates 
in the action, even to the extent of considering the role of non-humans. However, studying 
non-humans are trickier than studying humans since objects help trace social connections only 
intermittently (Latour, 2005, pp. 74-78). When elaborating on the subject matter, Latour 
(2005, pp. 79-80) makes the following point: “Objects by the very nature of their connections 
with humans quickly shift from being mediators to being intermediaries … but still, there is a 
difference: once humans become mediators again, it is hard to stop them. … whereas objects 
… tend to recede into the background very fast, interrupting the stream of data—and the 
greater their importance , the faster they disappear.” To alleviate the task of the analyst 
Latour (2005, p. 80) offers the following list of situations where an object’s activity is made 
easily available: First: study innovations in the artisan’s workshop, “In these sites objects live 
a clearly multiple and complex life through meetings, plans, sketches, regulations and trials.” 
Second, Latour (2005, p. 80-81) offers the following reasoning: “… even the most routine, 
traditional and silent implements stop being taken for granted when they are approached by 
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 users rendered ignorant and clumsy by distance.” Three types of distance may enable the 
implement more alive, namely distance by means of time, space and skills (as in learning). 
The third type of occasion that makes object’s activities more easily visible “is that offered by 
accidents, breakdowns, and strikes: all of a sudden, completely silent intermediaries become 
full blown mediators.” A fourth alternative is to bring objects back to life by using archives, 
documents etc. Last, “when everything else has failed, the resource of fiction can bring—
through the use of counterfactual history, thought experiments, and ‘scientifiction’—the solid 
objects of today into the fluid stats where their connections with humans may make sense.” 
 
Matter of facts vs. matters of concern: While readdressing epistemology and ontology, Latour 
(2005) makes the point that people in general, but also scientists, have tended to believe in 
facts about how things work, what is real, etc. More recently however, researchers have 
started to question even more fundamental beliefs about these issues, whereby they shift 
status from matters of fact to matters of concerns. “The mapping of scientific controversies 
about matters of concern should allow us to renew from top to bottom the very scene of 
empiricism—and hence the divide between ‘natural’ and ‘social’” (Latour, 2005, p. 114). He 
continues, making the point that with the shift from matters of fact toward matters of 
concerns: “It is the thing itself that has been allowed to be deployed as multiple” (Latour, 
2005, p. 116). Thus, the thing in question can often do more things or is more unstable than 
previously imagined. This is also regarded as a move from metaphysics to ontology. 
Controversies over the latter “turn out to be just as interesting and controversial as 
metaphysics” (Latour, 2005, p. 118). Another to do list is offered by Latour (2005): First, 
scientific facts are fabricated and therefore “exist in many different shapes and at very 
different stages of completion.” These sites are no longer confined to laboratories. Social ties 
will thus increasingly, with the development of science and technology, be rendered 
267
 physically traceable. Third, experiments generate controversies something that makes it easier 
to obtain information. “Fourth, … the very difference between matters of fact and matters of 
concern has been made publicly available by the growing intensity of controversies over 
‘natural things’ ” (Latour, 2005, p. 119). 
 
 
3 Data collection methods 
 
This study relied on both internal documents and external documents (i.e., official documents 
that were released to the public). In the Norwegian accrual accounting project, specific and 
general guidelines and standards were namely prepared by the project group and distributed to 
all the pilots to guide their work in the project. These internal documents covered several 
topics ranging from the agencies’ history and competence, draft versions of accounting 
standards, material that was made available for presentation at the seminars, e-mail 
communication between project participants (when it was made available to the researcher), 
templates for the work that had to be performed on the opening balance sheet, and questions 
and answers relating to the project evaluation. One set of document relied on in this study 
include evaluation reports covering the evaluation of experiences and summary descriptions 
of the accrual accounting project. This, then, includes publically available documents, such as 
official governmental publications (e.g. central government budget reports and the report by 
the commission disclosed in 2003 (Ministry of Finance, 2003a) engaging the question of 
whether accrual accounting seemed suitable for the central government. The study also relied 
on the roadmap paper (Ministry of Finance, 2006c) to obtain insights about the overall policy 
assessments at an early stage in the pilot project. Nevertheless, newspaper articles (see 
Section 4.2) serve as the main ingredient in the description that follows of the public debate 
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 regarding accrual accounting and the pilot project. These newspaper articles were identified 
via different search techniques, including search in databases covering national newspapers 
(typically available on the newspapers’ home pages), cross referencing in the articles, 
whereby one or more previously published viewpoints are targeted in the discussion—a 
method similar to the snowballing approach (see Saunders, 2000). Finally, the Google search 
engine was also used as a general instrument to locate newspaper articles, reports and similar 
relating to accrual accounting at central government level in Norway. 
 
4. Case description 
 
4.1 The birth and early phases of the accrual accounting endeavor at central government 
level  
 
An accrual accounting pilot project took place at central government level in Norway during 
2004-2009. It started formally with a government appointed committee (the Ministry of 
Finance, 2003a) considering whether Norway would benefit from introducing accrual 
accounting at central government level. It gave a favorable assessment. The Ministry of 
Finance, the central government, and the parliament in Norway viewed having accrual 
accounting at central government level as promising, but were uncertain about the extent or in 
which form it should potentially be implemented (see, the Ministry of Finance, 2003b). To 
gain more experience with accrual accounting before deciding the matter, an accrual 
accounting experimental (pilot) project was established in 2004. The first step taken was 
determining and interpreting project goals and objectives. Next in line was the task of 
developing preliminary accrual accounting standards and testing them in the pilot project, 
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 involving ten (later eleven) subordinated central government agencies and their head 
ministries.  
 
A project group, consisting partly of auditors with most of their experience from the private 
sector, met with each of the initial ten (later eleven) pilots approximately two-three times a 
year in pilot meetings. The majority of the time during pilot meetings was spent on discussing 
technical details about the last accounting disclosure by the agency in question. In this way, 
pilot meetings served as a valuable way of checking the pragmatism of the reporting package. 
Organizational issues were also discussed frequently. This allowed participants to get to know 
each other, as well as to remain up to date concerning organizational changes. Project 
administration was also given some attention, such as questions concerning the future of the 
project. Yet, the pilots’ primary concern seemed to be to learn how to account for a 
transaction or event and to ensure compliance with the reporting package. 
 
The project was evaluated in 2006 (see Statskonsult, 2006, The Ministry of Finance, 
2006a, The Ministry of Finance, 2006b). It was concluded that too little experience had been 
gained, particularly about potential benefits from accrual accounting, to allow for a final 
conclusion to be made about the way forward. Thereafter, a new project period followed, 
ending in 2009 (see The Government Agency for Financial Management, 2009a, The 
Government Agency for Financial Management, 2009b), with the conclusion that there will 
be no formal change in central government accounting (see Halvorsen, 2009). This decision 
was made although the overall project experiences were generally speaking reported to be 
favorable. It is therefore of interest to learn more about underlying controversies and who 
took an interest in discussing the accrual accounting development in Norway. In particular, 
included in the Ministry of Finance’s (2009) summary view of the pilot project was a 
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 reference to unintended functions and effects that may result from accrual accounting. This 
included the comments made by the NCTU in their consultative paper, where they expressed 
their view concerning the pilot project. Hence, NCTU appear as a key stakeholder in debate 
on accrual accounting. However, what or whom did it mobilize to exert influence on the 
Ministry of Finance (including the Minister of Finance)? What controversies were pertinent, 
and did they shift along the way during the debate? Basically, this begs the question 
(presented in the introduction): what was dominating the public debate on accrual accounting 
at central government level in Norway? To learn more about this the paper continues by 
unpacking the public debate on accrual accounting. 
 
4.2. The flamboyant and influential Norwegian public debate on accrual accounting 
 
During the accrual accounting project, some presentations were made at different external 
seminars by employees from the Ministry of Finance and the SSØ as well as by some of the 
representatives for the pilots. Similarly, some articles were also published (Klepsvik, 2005; 
Olgyai, 2007) that were primarily of a formal character, intended to inform about the work 
being performed in the accrual accounting project. In contrast, other articles took a stand 
either for or against accrual accounting or provided normative views on matters they believed 
to be important (e.g., Bredal, 2003; Johnsen, 2003). Neither of these presentations or articles 
created much turmoil. However, the debate escalated in 2005 when an employee (Voldnes, 
2005) of the NCTU wrote the following: 
 
The use of the Norwegian Accounting Act at the municipal and central government 
level implies a full opening for commercial rules of conduct in public service 
production. This is a dramatic violation of the basis of the welfare state. 
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The quote represents an ideological statement by the NCTU worker (Voldnes, 2005), and it 
sends an alert about the problems that accrual accounting will bring to the public sector 
(according to Voldnes). On this issue, Voldnes (2005) decided to mention the local 
government level even though the accrual accounting project in question solely targeted the 
central government level. A plausible reason for this was that in principle, if accrual 
accounting was found to be successful at the central government level, it could later be 
implemented at the local government level as well. Voldnes (2005) argued that the Norwegian 
Accounting Act, which regulates private sector accounting rules in Norway, lay the basis for 
transferring public goods to the private sector. Voldnes (2005) continued by asking whether 
efficiency was truly the goal of implementing accrual accounting or whether there were other 
underlying motives. Marianne Andreassen, the leader of the SSØ, an agency subordinated the 
Ministry of Finance, commented on Voldnes’ article. Andreassen dismissed the alleged 
connection between accrual accounting and privatization, arguing instead that accrual 
accounting provides new information that can lay the foundation for the more efficient use of 
resources (Andreassen, 2005). Voldnes (2006) nevertheless continued the debate, primarily by 
maintaining her earlier statements (see Voldnes, 2005), and stressed that the implementation 
of accrual accounting and the reliance on private sector accounting solutions are closely 
connected. To support her viewpoint, Voldnes (2006) pointed to the experience of New 
Zealand, adding the following: 
 
The rules in question are not primarily about accruing of expenses as many believe, 
but rather about international accounting rules aiming for free float of capital.   
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 The experiences of Sweden and New Zealand were introduced as illustrations of countries 
that had not experienced efficiency gains from implementing accrual accounting, and another 
employee of the NCTU expressed similar viewpoints in a subsequently published article 
(Sandås, 2006): 
 
Is accounting in the public sector from now on going to follow the same 
bookkeeping rules as the private sector with a bottom line…? …will Parliament lose 
political control over the taxpayers’ money? 
 
In August 2006, the NCTU arranged a seminar and invited Susan Newberry, an accounting 
scholar, to speak. She discussed the experiences with accrual accounting in New Zealand and 
advised that Norway should ensure that Parliament remains in constitutional control over the 
central government’s funds, even after accrual accounting is (potentially) implemented. At the 
seminar, in which the researcher participated, one of the representatives from NCTU stated 
the following: 
 
We (i.e., NCTU) will do whatever it takes to stop this reform. 
   
Aligned with this statement, beyond simply writing articles about accrual accounting and 
the pilot project, the NCTU also began to fund research projects focusing on accrual 
accounting, in which academics and a research organization called Fafo were involved. The 
NCTU, being a co-founder of Fafo, assigned Fafo to conduct studies about accrual 
accounting. The findings of these studies (e.g., Jensen, 2007; Tranøy, 2009) were generally 
critical in nature regarding the merits of accrual accounting and advocated other accounting 
models or solutions, such as cameralistic accounting (see, e.g., Monsen, 2008), when 
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 considering what accounting model could best replace the existing modified cash accounting 
model. 
Via informal conversations with pilot project participants, I learned that NCTU, when 
taking an interest in the pilot project, sought to obtain as much information as possible about 
the project. While pursuing this matter, they contacted the Ministry of Finance and asked for 
more information. Early on, the Ministry of Finance hesitated to give NCTU more access than 
other parties that were not formally part of the pilot project. The NCTU soon grew frustrated 
by this lack of full information and transparency. For this reason, they spoke of the pilot 
project as “the secret project”. Nevertheless, the NCTU continued to exert pressure on the 
Ministry of Finance, demanding to receive more information about the project. In response, 
the Ministry of Finance disclosed more information. Preliminary drafts of the accounting 
standards and some project reports and documents were, for instance, made official during 
this period. Moreover, the Ministry of Finance had meetings with the NCTU in which the 
pilot project was discussed. Paradoxically, part of this discussion included the accounting 
solutions that had been tailor-made during the pilot project to prevent them (the solutions), in 
a variety of ways, from having steering effects (for a discussion, see the Ministry of Finance, 
2006c; 2008).   
Nevertheless, the NCTU was apparently not reassured by what they read or were told, and 
they continued the public debate, which intensified in 2008 and gained additional momentum 
during the spring of 2009. The criticism focused on two main issues: the idea of having 
accrual accounting at the central government level in Norway and the role of the SSØ. 
Roughly speaking, there were three main parties in the debate: one for accrual accounting, 
one against accrual accounting, and one being a facilitator. The latter function was 
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 preoccupied by Lie,
1
 who served as a facilitator by fuelling the debate, and he did so by 
writing several newspaper articles based on interviews with representatives from the two sides 
and by gathering information from documents and meetings (particularly meetings arranged 
by the NCTU). The side for accrual accounting was represented primarily by the pilot project 
organizers (representatives from the SSØ and the Ministry of Finance) and the Norwegian 
Institute of Public Accountants (represented by Harald Brandsås, the Technical Director). 
Those against accrual accounting were represented primarily by representatives of the NCTU 
(providing information to Lie) and researchers (primarily those who conducted research 
funded by the NCTU, e.g., Monsen, Jensen, Tranøy and Østre). The two sides were unable to 
agree on the functions of accounting (e.g., Mellemvik et al., 1988; Newberry and Pallot, 
2005), including the role or appropriateness of accruals at the central government level. 
Moreover, the debate turned into a discussion about what role the SSØ should have at the 
central government level, and remarks were made about the need to shut down the SSØ. 
Rather than reaching a consensus, the parties seemingly moved further apart as the arguments 
became more intense and people became more agitated. Most of the debate was held through 
a newspaper called “Klassekampen”, which is dedicated to the political left in Norway 
(according to its homepage
2
). An overview of the titles, contributors and dates of many 
articles (published in Klassekampen) written on the subject is displayed in Table 3 below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Svenn Arne Lie has been an agricultural researcher, afiliated with Fagforbundet (a section within NTCU) and a 
journalist at the newspapers “Klassekampen” and “Nationen”. 
2
 http://www.klassekampen.no/om_oss  
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 Table 3  
Headings of articles in Klassekampen that focused on the accrual accounting debate 
14
th
 February 2009: “A central government without steering” (Lie, journalist at 
Klassekampen) 
28
th
 February 2009: “Does not support market-oriented steering” (Lie, journalist at 
Klassekampen) 
4
th
 March 2009: “NCTU reprimands the SSØ” (Lie, journalist at Klassekampen) 
13
th
 March 2009: “Increased development and interaction at central government level” ” 
(Marianne Andreassen, Director, SSØ) 
21
st
 March 2009: “A tool for the community” (Ole Morten Geving, Secretary of State, 
Ministry of Finance) 
26
th
 March 2009: “Foggy wording: What does new public management mean?” (Stein Østre, 
Professor) 
4
th
 April 2009: “From ‘Foggy wording to complete confusion’” (Marianne Andreassen, 
Director, SSØ) 
21
st
 April 2009: “Still foggy from Stein Østre’” (Marianne Andreassen, Director, SSØ) 
28
8th
 May 2009: “Auditors rules” (Lie, journalist at Klassekampen) 
30
th
 May 2009: “Hanssen rejects the SSØ” (Lie, journalist at Klassekampen) 
3
rd
 June 2009: “In opposition with its own government” (Lie, journalist at Klassekampen) 
3
rd
 June 2009: “Wrong about management control” (Ole Morten Geving, Secretary of State, 
Ministry of Finance) 
4
th
 June 2009: “Not our note” (Lie, journalist at Klassekampen) 
4
th
 June 2009: “Accounting in the public sector” (Norvald Monsen, Professor) 
6
th
 June 2009: “Copying the private sector” (Lie, journalist at Klassekampen) 
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 9
th
 June 2009: “Minister without power?” (Lie, journalist at Klassekampen) 
9
th
 June 2009: “The democracy may be weakened” (Bjarne Jensen, Professor) 
13
th
 June 2009: “A democratic problem” (Bent Sofus Tranøy, Associate Professor) 
17
th
 June 2009: “A democratic problem?” (Harald Brandsås, Technical Director, the 
Norwegian Institute of Public Accountant) 
20
th
 June 2009: “Reply regarding central government accounting” (Bent Sofus Tranøy, 
Associate Professor) 
24
th
 June 2009: “No change in central government accounting” (Kristin Halvorsen, Minister 
of Finance) 
 
The level of frustration became increasingly obvious as the debate continued, which could 
be observed from the content of an article published in the Klassekampen on 3
rd
 June by 
Geving
3
 (2009). Geving decided to retaliate against the fierce criticism directed toward the 
Ministry of Finance and the SSØ: 
 
Klassekampen has in recent days published several stories about the SSØ and the 
work undertaken on testing (new) central government accounting standards. It is 
portrayed as if the Ministry of Finance and the SSØ actively facilitate privatization, 
outsourcing and new steering principles in the direction of new public management. 
This is as wrong as it gets. The articles contain factual errors, undocumented claims 
and a large dose of conspiracy theories regarding the roles of the Ministry of Finance 
and the SSØ … . I must say that I do not understand what kind of reality they live in, 
those who seriously allege and believe that this central government and the Ministry 
                                                          
3
 At the time, Geving was a secretary of the central government (a political position) in the Ministry of Finance.  
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 of Finance, led by Kristin Halvorsen, run a grand and secretive work to facilitate 
such a development. This is unbelievable.  
 
However, despite the various contributions to the debate, it never came close to 
reconciliation until the Minister of Finance, on June 24
th
, 2009, posted an announcement on 
the Ministry of Finance’s home page referring to the aforementioned debate in the newspaper 
“Klassekampen”. The public announcement made by the Minister of Finance (Halvorsen, 
2009) was entitled, “No change in central government accounting.” The substance of the 
announcement re-addressed core issues advanced by the opposing side of the public debate 
and orchestrated by the NCTU. The article specifically contained the opposing party’s 
rhetorical phrases and concerns, with assurance being given that this (i.e. what the opposing 
party feared) would never happen. It is noteworthy that this announcement was made prior to 
the Ministry of Finance’s pre-set announcement of its recommendation regarding the pilot 
project. Earlier, it was stated that the final CBA and the conclusions would be reported while 
presenting the central government’s budget for the year 2010 (scheduled to be presented in 
early October 2009).  
With this, little doubt was left as to the NCTU’s influence on the accrual accounting 
project. This view was substantiated by statements made by the Ministry of Finance in the 
pilot project summary assessment, with references made to privatization and overall steering 
reform via accrual accounting. In its submission, where the NCTU had been invited to 
comment on the project alongside other stakeholders, the NCTU cautioned about precisely the 
same things, such as parliamentary control with public money, market orientation and 
preparations being made for privatization (Ministry of Finance, 2009, p. 106). Therefore, it 
seems as though the Ministry of Finance (2009) targeted the NCTU when emphasizing that 
the developed accrual accounting standards had nothing to do with privatization. 
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 During the fall of 2009, researchers from Fafo published a report that they had been 
assigned to prepare by NCTU. The report focused on various actors’ attitudes and experiences 
with the accrual accounting solutions. The researchers interviewed representatives from the 
University of Oslo and two of the pilot project agencies. The University of Oslo has 
experience with the accrual accounting solutions because its head ministry (of education and 
research) had made the accrual accounting solutions (developed in the pilot project) 
mandatory since 2007. Having closely monitored the public debate on accruals and reflected 
on it as well as having conducted the aforementioned interviews, (the Fafo researchers) Berge, 
Hagen and Trygstad (2009, p. 70) concluded the following:  
 
The objective, what is to be achieved, is the starting point for every initiative. At the 
same time, the initiative incurs costs. Studies of a field that is strongly value loaded 
with advocators and opponents imply challenges for the research undertaken. The 
more complicated a matter is, the more challenging it gets. The advocators will 
strongly emphasize positive traits and seek to promote the negative effects as less 
severe than the positive ones – it is embedded in the (ex ante) objective. The 
opponents will emphasize the known and unknown costs. A strong positive or 
negative attitude toward accounting model changes will probably affect the way in 
which the actors interpret the costs and benefits. In this project, we have clearly 
registered these (vivid) attitudes in the public debate. We acknowledge that despite 
there being differences between our informants´ perceptions and assessments, we do 
not recognize (in those statements) the polar positions that are seen in the public 
debate over the new central government accounting standards.  
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 They also stated that the informants’ opinions have, to a greater or lesser extent, been formed 
by the public debate (Berge, Hagen and Trygstad, 2009, p. 23). 
 
Even though the public debate on accrual accounting at the central government level in 
Norway ended in 2009, with the Minister of Finance reassuring that no change would be 
made to central government accounting, a group of parliamentarians decided to re-address this 
issue. On March 7
th
, 2012, they presented a proposal that was made subject to a vote in the 
parliament in the near future, suggesting that accrual accounting be implemented at the central 
government level. In doing so, this group paraphrased the Ministry of Finance’s (2009) 
positive assessment and acknowledged that little had changed since then. They later made a 
statement that informed the public about the challenges experienced when debating the 
potential for applying accrual accounting at the central government level: 
 
We have witnessed considerable opposition in the central government administration 
with regards to implementing accrual accounting (Parliamentarian proposal 73 S, 
2012, p. 2). 
 
Subsequently, the need for the Ministry of Finance to emphasize that the accrual 
accounting solutions would not represent a threat to privatization or changes in governmental 
steering was noted. Furthermore, the point was made that it is rather sad to see that a technical 
matter such as the potential implementation of accrual accounting at the central government 
level has become a subject of ideology (Parliamentarian proposal 73 S, 2012).  
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 5 Discussion 
 
(THIS SECTION IS NOT COMPLETED) 
 
The case description points to several controversies creating turmoil, frustration and changes, 
including the following: 
- Controversies over what the project was all about 
- Technically speaking, there was a controversy over the meaning and content of the 
standards 
- Overall, controversies regarding the outcome of applying accrual accounting, which in 
ANT terms represent a dispute over the extent to which accounting is an intermediary 
or a mediator. 
- Controversies over the role of the SSØ 
- Controversies regarding NPM 
 
What started off as a fragmented and rather careful debate, ended up with two main group 
formations, those speaking on behalf of the project and favoring the experimentation on the 
one hand on those opposing the notion of accrual accounting on the other hand. The opposing 
side was led by NCTU. They formed a group consisting of researchers and various individuals 
within its organization. In the debate the following types of researchers could be identified, 
and related to NCTU:  
 - Hired researchers 
 - Fafo researchers 
 - Susan Newberry 
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 During the debate, several translations were made by the spectators, including the following 
translations:  
- Translations of technical standards into a societal and political problem 
- Transformation of the experience from other countries into becoming Norwegian 
equivalents.  
- Transformation from an accounting issue toward a core NPM element subsequently 
made out to be some sort of systemic plague 
- The translation of silence or plainly ordinary practices into being a secretive/hidden 
agenda.  
- Various translations take place as different actors with the same actor groups take turn 
on responding to the viewpoints from the other side. 
 
Although different media channels were enrolled in the debate, the newspaper Klassekampen 
was at the centre of attention, publishing more stories about the accrual accounting project 
than other newspapers. These cases were predominantly written by one journalist, namely Lie. 
He spoke with many people and ended up fuelling the debate. Essentially, Lie served the role 
as an instigator and thus ended up acting as a mediator rather than seizing a mere intermediary 
role as a journalist.  
 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
 
This paper examines the debate over accrual accounting at central government level in 
Norway. The purpose is to learn more about what or whom is dominating such debates and 
thereby shaping the accounting policy making.  
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The debate had two main camps, one led by those constructing and experimenting with the 
accounting technology, namely the Ministry of finance and its associates. The other camp was 
led by the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (NCTU) and its associates. With the 
passage of time, the debate became deadlocked, action was overtaken, whereby the focus 
shifted from a discussion about accounting toward the networks and individual actors 
composing the debate. Rather than approaching each other and reaching a consensus, the 
discussants slipped further and further apart, grasping polar positions. One side—led by the 
Ministry of Finance, purified the technicalities of the newly developed (and tailor-made) 
accrual accounting model. The other side—led by the NCTU, purified the cultural aspect of 
the accrual accounting change endeavor. The NCTU achieved this by leaning on the 
experience of others—arguing that accrual accounting technology invokes a democratic 
problem, depriving the public sector of its resources. This represents an overflow effect 
whereby the alleged properties of other (and different) accrual accounting models became 
much more important than what could be deduced from the accounting model in question—
effectively inverting the accrual accounting implications. 
 
This paper contributes by depicting the variety of actors (and devices) that might be mobilized 
in accounting debates. More specifically, the paper adds to the literature on accrual 
accounting in the public sector by unpacking how purification can bring the accrual 
accounting debate and policy making into an impasse. In this position, action and results are 
overtaken by politics, driven by overflowing effects and inverted accounting model 
implications. As such, ignorance of the hybrid properties of the accrual accounting technology 
disrupts the role of accounting in accounting change endeavors, thereby obscuring (the debate 
over) accounting in practice. 
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Revenues - a driver for sporting success in Norwegian football? 
 
 
Morten Kringstad and Tor-Eirik Olsen 
 
 
Work in progress: Note that results are preliminary. We have only recently gained access to 
new data (2011 season). At the same time we are waiting for the final league standing for the 
2013 season. Some results (only results, the paper has not been rewritten and does not take 
these changes into account) are presented for the 2011 season as well as for the seasons 
combined.  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Although previous research has shown that there is an association between sporting success, 
measured by final league standing, and budgeted revenues, where richer teams (e.g. with 
larger budgets) typically perform better at sport than the other teams, this was not supported 
by a recent Norwegian newspaper article. Drawing on the 2012 season in the Norwegian top 
division, the newspaper article concluded that there were only traces of evidence suggesting 
that the teams’ level of budget prior to the season actually impacted on the final league 
standing. 
 
Using the same data as in the newspaper article, we show that these claims are somewhat 
misleading and at best true only to some extent. As an extension of this, what is interesting is 
that in our simple regression model, budgeted revenues explain about 33 % of the variation in 
final league standing. This is high given that we are analysing only one season. It is also high 
compared to findings in other studies (e.g., Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999). Interestingly, and 
in defence of the newspaper article, findings show that a duality is present. Whereas there is a 
significant association between final league standing and budgeted revenues for the bottom 
half, no such association was found in the top half. Analysing this in more detail, we found 
that the association for the bottom 12 was even more prevalent than for the bottom eight (of 
16 teams). These findings hold for both final league standing and point percentage. 
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Introduction 
 
In a recent Norwegian newspaper article1 it was argued that final league standing (among the 
16 teams) in the Norwegian top division in football for the 2012 season was more or less 
independent of the teams’ level of the budgeted revenues prior to the season. This is 
surprising given the findings from other sports, football included. To illustrate, in terms of the 
latter, Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) found a very strong relationship between sporting 
success, measured by final league standing, and wage expenditure across 20 seasons. In their 
regression analysis, wage expenditure explained 92 % of the variation in final league 
standing. 
 
Although budgeted revenues and costs are different by nature, in the context of sporting 
success a strong correlation between the two is expected. Further, the reason to believe that 
higher level of costs will increase the probability of performing better goes back to the 
seminal paper within sports economics by Rottenberg (1956). Moreover, it can be argued as 
in Buraimo (2008), who is referring to Simmons and Forrest (2004) and Hall et al. (2002), 
that wage costs should be a strong driver for the sporting quality of a team. Today this is even 
more topical with a nearly free labour market for football players in Europe, where (the 
possibility for) player mobility is high and (also) “players move between teams in order to 
maximize their salaries” (Buraimo, 2008, p. 516). Further, Hall et al. (2002, p. 150) claim 
that “Not only are soccer clubs free to buy a better team in the market but the market 
worldwide is large enough to ensure that such a team can be assembled relatively quickly, 
and consequently spending determines success.” The same arguments also hold for revenues. 
As such, revenue distribution is a driver for sporting outcome because differences in the 
ability to attract playing talent mean that wages can be one way of winning player signatures. 
 
The motivation for this paper is twofold. First other than the newspaper article, we have only 
limited knowledge of the association between budgeted revenues and final league standing in 
the Norwegian top division. Even more important, the claims set forth in the newspaper 
article are derived from a rather crude analysis. Although it is tempting, at least at first 
glance, to claim that no such association exists, we extend this analysis by adopting a more 
refined approach. As such, drawing on the same data as in the newspaper article, a more 
thorough statistical analysis of the association between budgeted revenues and final league 
standing is carried out building on correlations and regression models. In this respect, we 
distinguish between three separate levels of analysis: i) the total sample, ii) top half and 
bottom half, and lastly, iii) we use quartiles along with the bottom 12. Based on these 
analyses, we claim that although there is some sense of truth in the claims set forth, they are 
far too aggregated to portray the whole story. 
 
In line with this, our main hypothesis is based on evidence from earlier literature, both 
empirical and theoretical, that larger-budget clubs perform better in sport compared to 
smaller-budget clubs in Norwegian football in the 2012 season. Thus, this paper will focus on 
the relationship between financial strength and sporting outcome. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews literature dealing 
with the relationship between financial strength and sporting performance. The third section 
                                                 
1 Solem (2013). 
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 covers methods, whereas in the fourth section, data and models are presented. The empirical 
results are presented in the following section, followed by conclusions and discussion in the 
final section. 
 
 
Literature review  
 
Our theoretical framework is presented in Figure 1. This figure shows that the revenue 
distribution among the teams in a league is hypothesized to be a driver for the final league 
standing. The hypothesis is based on the assumption that differences in revenues reflect 
different teams’ ability to attract playing talent, where wages are the means to win player 
signature (partly) through an auction process. The final league standing is expected to be a 
function of this distribution of playing talent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The relationship between distribution of revenues and final league standing 
 
The literature on the economics of professional team sports has concerned all of these parts, 
as well as their relationship(s). For example, final league standing is a part of the competitive 
balance literature (see, for example, Kringstad and Gerrard, 2007), while how teams can 
perform better than what would be expected from the revenue distribution is related to the 
Moneyball terminology (see, Gerrard, 2007). 2  
 
On a more general basis, sports leagues have always been engaged in the relationship 
between competitive balance and the distribution of financial capacity among the teams. 
Rottenberg (1956) also shows this problem, referring back to the first professional league (in 
baseball) and the problems with an open labour market in a league with teams of different 
financial strength.  According to Fort (2011) the next professional league, the National 
League in baseball, founded in 1876, was also organized under a free market. However, by 
1889 all teams in the league had included regulations and restrictions in the labour market, 
such as the reserve clause. On the other side of the Atlantic, too, labour market restrictions in 
form of the retain-and-transfer system were introduced before the 1893/94 season in English 
                                                 
2 Gerrard (2007, p. 207): “Michael Lewis' bestseller, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (2003),  
tells the story of how the Oakland Athletics in Major League Baseball (MLB) have achieved a sustained 
competitive advantage over an eight-year period despite being one of the lowest wage spenders.”  
Distribution of revenues 
Distribution of wages 
Distribution of playing talent 
Final league standing 
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 football (Green, 1953), just a few years after the formation of the Football League in 1888. In 
addition, according to Green, maximum wages were introduced before the 1901/02 season, 
preventing the bigger teams from outbidding the smaller teams for their best players. Of 
course, the purposes of these restrictions were dual, as they also included a form of financial 
protection of the teams in the league as a collective. 
 
Academically, Rottenberg (1956) argued through what is referred to as Rottenberg’s 
invariance proposition that, for example, restricting the free agency system for transfers of 
players is not a tool for improving competitive balance. Downward and Dawson (2000) claim 
that the same arguments can be used for salary caps as well. The arguments here are related 
to the distribution of revenues and marginal revenue product.3 In the case of strong 
regulations on the labour market, wage costs may not be as good a predictor for the 
distribution of sporting quality as in a free-agent situation. Therefore, prediction of the 
distribution of sporting quality has been measured using both the distribution of revenues and 
the distribution of wages (e.g. Hoehn and Szymanski, 1999; Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999; 
Gerrard, 2006; Fort, 2011). However, a problem when applying wages is that external 
accounting may only register the total wage costs, without clearly distinguishing between the 
sporting and administrative parts. Thus, against this background it is possible to argue that 
revenues and total costs might be as good predictors of sporting quality as total wage costs. 
Especially in European team sports revenues and costs should be very strongly correlated. 
Further, the difference (i.e. profit) is expected to be small. As such, going back to the 
literature focusing on the objective owners in professional team sports in Europe, it might be 
a question of win maximization, subject to financial restrictions rather than profit 
maximization (see, for example, Sloane, 1971 and Késenne, 1996).  
 
In Szymanski and Kuypers (1999), the R-square referred to in the introduction may be 
affected by the sampling which is across the four levels of the professional hierarchy in 
English football. This implies that teams may compete on a sporting level (a given division in 
a hierarchy) that more or less fits with the teams’ financial capacity or level. In addition, parts 
of wages (i.e. bonuses) may be driven by sporting success. In other words, it should not be 
taken for granted that the independent variable is independent of the dependent variable 
(interaction between the dependent and the independent variables).4 
 
Based on the discussion above, the distribution of total budgeted revenues or costs in a league 
may therefore be hypothesized to be an appropriate predictor of differences in sporting 
quality between the teams in a league. Therefore, for example, total costs per point or per win 
can be seen as measures of sporting efficiency on a given level of costs (Gerrard, 2007). In 
this paper, budgeted revenues will be applied as a proxy for predicting the relative ex ante 
sporting quality between the teams. The argument for applying distribution of revenues as a 
predictor of sporting success also goes back to Rottenberg (1956), and the invariance 
proposition mentioned above, through a hypothesis that playing talent will be distributed 
among the teams on the basis of their marginal revenue product. Therefore, the main 
hypothesis is that budgeted revenues are a positive and significant driver for sporting 
outcome. 
 
                                                 
3 Marginal revenue product is a concept used to describe a player’s contribution to the team’s revenues (see 
Scully, 1974, for a comprehensive description of this concept). 
4 Addressing causality, Granger causality test is often used. However, this requires time-series data. Thus, this 
test is not applicable for this dataset. 
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 The background of this paper is based on the hypothesis that financial inequality is a 
significant driver for the distribution of the sporting quality among the teams in a league. 
However, there are a number of issues associated with this relationship. The budgeted 
revenues are of course a prediction of the revenues in a future period of time, and are 
therefore not an observation of an exact state. In other words, issues of relevance may occur 
between the finalization of a budget and the exact ex post measure of the distribution of 
sporting outcome (such as the final league standing). In addition, the budget may also be 
affected by subjective expectations that may differ between the teams, such as predictions of 
the financial value of player trading. Especially in what Gerrard (2007) refers to as “complex 
invasion team sports”, such as football, many elements of the play can be expected to 
increase the unexplained variation in a regression analysis, where sporting performance is the 
dependent variable on budget, compared to, for example, a less complex team sport such as 
baseball. The number of seasons should also be relevant here, and it is therefore not 
surprising to observe that the explanatory power is much smaller when analysing single 
seasons compared to an aggregate number of seasons. This was also evident in Szymanski 
and Kuypers (1999) for English football and in Hall et al. (2002) who compared English 
football and Major League Baseball (MLB). Even if Hall et al. (2002) found that the 
explanatory power (measured by R2) was generally smaller in the MLB, their season-to-
season analysis of wages as a driver for win percentage shows that throughout the 1990s this 
driver has become significant, and hence had increased to an average of about .43. On this 
basis, Hall et al. (p. 150) state that “...the sharply growing revenue disparities in MLB since 
1990 have reopened the opportunity to differentiate team performance through payroll.” This 
was also evident in Fort (2011), where the Gini coefficient for revenues in the MLB for the 
1990s averaged to .15 before the strike in the 1994/95 season and .20 after the strike. The 
corresponding Gini coefficients for payroll were respectively .15 and .21.   
 
Finally, an issue to be aware of when conducting studies comparing sporting performance 
and financial power is that accounting items will be affected not only by accounting 
principles, but also by how a club is organized. In sports, these may be affected by broader 
strategic issues, such as whether the club owns its own stadium or, alternatively, is renting 
the stadium. Another point of relevance here is that in a smaller league, teams may have a 
different focus on player development, with some seeking to establish cooperation with 
bigger clubs abroad, while others strive towards being totally independent. Such a strategy 
can affect both the cost and the revenue aspects of the accounts. For example, achieving 
sporting success with players on loan may on the one hand give lower costs, but on the other 
hand prevent the club from profiting on potential player transfers. Even in a situation where 
the net outcome would have been the same for two teams (same net costs), the value on the 
cost side and the revenue side of the profit and loss account may differ, something that will 
affect the budgeted levels to a greater or lesser degree. Although these issues are important, 
they are nonetheless beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Methods 
 
When investigating the association between budget and final league standing, three different 
levels of analysis are employed in which the selection criteria draw on the final league 
standing attained. For one, the total sample (n=16) is the starting point. However, in addition 
the sample is split into two separate parts; top half (n=8) and bottom half (n=8). Finally, the 
third level of analysis drawn upon in this study is quartiles (n=4 in each quartile). Different 
methods are used for the different levels of analysis. These are described in the following 
(sub) section. It is also worth noting that it is expected that the relative level of budgeted 
revenues is a driver for sporting performance in a league (such as final league standing and 
point score). This in turn implies that the tests conducted should be one-sided, in the expected 
direction. This is also the approach taken in this paper. 
 
Given the small data sample, we first want to investigate the different samples applied in this 
study to decide whether parametric or non-parametric tests should be used. According to 
Field (2000, pp. 37-38), it is important to address the following assumptions underlying 
parametric data: 1) normally distributed data, 2) homogeneity of variance, 3) interval data, 
and 4) independence. In the context of this study, the assumption of independence can be 
questioned as envisaged by game-theoretical approaches (e.g., Haugen and Solberg, 2010). 
Overall, caution should be used in claiming independence, as the actions taken by one club 
(e.g., increasing budgeted revenues) may also impact on the actions taken by other clubs in 
the same league. Due to the relatively small sample sizes used here, the assumption of 
normally distributed data was given serious consideration. In this respect, several approaches 
were taken, including inspections of histograms5 coupled with skewness and kurtosis along 
with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov6 test and the Shapiro-Wilk test.7 Overall, tests indicated some 
normality problems. This was in particular the case for the whole sample8 as well as quartile 
2. Therefore, both parametric and non-parametric methods are used. 
 
Four groups of methods will be applied when analysing the relationship between budgeted 
revenues and performance. These are correlation analysis, two-sample tests, regression 
analysis with budgeted revenues as the main driver, and analysis of possible structural breaks 
in the relationship between budgeted revenues and sporting performance. 
 
First, correlation analysis forms a natural starting point for investigating the relationship 
between two variables. Here, this is done by calculating the correlation coefficients between 
the level of budgeted revenues and the final league standing. In some of the analysis the final 
                                                 
5 Although histograms are a very useful starting point in addressing deviation from normality, ‘they do not tell 
us whether this deviation is large enough to be important’ (Field, 2000, p. 48). 
6 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was originally a nonparametric test. However, a modified version can be used 
to for testing the normality of the distribution. Other alternatives are the Shapiro-Wilk test and the Anderson-
Darling test. According to Stephens (1974), these tests are actually more powerful than the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test when it comes to addressing normality.  
7 The Shapiro-Wilk test was included because it is more powerful than the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test when 
addressing normality (Stephens, 1974). 
8 It should, however, be noted that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the Shapiro-Wilk test gave conflicting 
results. However, since the latter is more powerful in this context, assuming normality can be questioned. 
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 league standing (rank of sporting performance) is replaced by point percentage, as argued in 
Hall et al. (2002).9 This is done using the Pearson correlation coefficient, r (Kanji, 1993). 
 
In addition to Pearson’s r, the sports economics literature (e.g., Daly and Moore, 1981) has 
applied the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (SRCC) when measuring performance 
persistence in the context of competitive balance.10 This method is non-parametric. For the 
purpose of this paper, it is possible to rank sporting performance both through the final 
league standing and by the budgeted revenues.  
 
Second, differences between teams in the different sub-samples of the final league standing 
(final table) are analysed by drawing on a number of methods for comparison. Two-sample t-
tests are used here to analyse differences between top half and bottom half, the top four 
against the rest of the teams, as well as differences between the different quartiles in terms of 
the relationship between final league standing and budget. Assuming that variances are 
unknown, different formulas should be used depending upon whether the variances of the 
different (sub) samples are equal or unequal (see for example Kanji (1993)). To test if 
homogeneity of variances can be assumed, we used Levene’s test11 where the null hypothesis 
(H0) is that the variances in the two groups are equal whereas the alternative hypothesis is 
that the variances are not equal (Field, 2000). 
 
Also, since parts of the empirical analysis in this paper apply mean and standard deviation (or 
variance) for comparing different sub-samples, the coefficient of variance (= standard 
deviation as a ratio of the sample mean) is also useful as it provides additional information 
about the various sub-samples.12 This is based on the notion that (sub-samples of) weaker 
teams will have lower budgeted revenues, on average, compared to (sub samples of) that of 
stronger teams (better performing teams). Thus, equal means and standard deviations 
(variances) are not expected across the different sub samples (different groups of teams). 
Non-parametric two-sample tests are conducted using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum 
test of two populations by Kanji (1993), where we want “to test if two random samples could 
have come from two populations with the same mean” (p. 86). 
 
Third, a simple regression analysis is used to investigate whether budgeted revenues are a 
significant driver of sporting success. This relationship will be analysed in Model I: yi = b0 + 
b1xi + ui, where yi is the final standing by team i, xi is the budgeted revenues by team i, and ui 
is the error term, anticipated to satisfy the assumptions behind regression analysis.  
 
Performance persistence is one of the three basic dimensions of competitive balance in a 
sports league (see, for example, Kringstad and Gerrard, 2007). A high level of performance 
persistence is an indication of weak competitive balance in a sports league, and is related to 
the possibility that performance in season t-1 is an appropriate predictor of sporting 
performance in season t. Following Gerrard (2006), Model II includes this lagged variable, 
controlling for the persistency effect.13 This gives Model II; yi = b0 + b1xi + b3yi, t-1 + ui..  
                                                 
9 Hall et al. (2002) argue for using win percentage instead of ranking (final league standing). 
10 Note that Groot (2008) argues for Kendall’s tau in the context of competitive balance. 
11 For a definition of Levene’s test statistic, see for example Brown and Forsythe (1974). 
12 It has already been mentioned that the team ending as number three in the league may be seen as an outlier 
when it comes to budget, something that will affect both mean and variance in the given sample. 
13 The promoted teams are taken into account by giving them a lagged rank equal to the rank of the relegated 
teams from season t-1, and the internal rank between these promoted teams reflects the rank difference in the 
second level division in season t-1. 
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The models above have an ordinary dependent variable reflecting the final standing rank. 
However, this is not the advice given in Hall et al. (2002, p. 152), claiming that “winning  
percentages are a more accurate measure of success than rank of winning percentages 
because a team with the season’s highest winning percentage will generally be deemed more 
successful if it achieved this with a .65 rather than a .60 record“. Thus, this is accounted for 
in model III. However, to ensure compatibility with final league standing, we use point 
percentages (pp) rather than winning percentages.14 Thus Model III is the point percentage 
version of Model I; ppi = b0 + b1xi + ui.. 
 
Panel data methods (preliminary) 
 
Dummy variable regression, which is the same as a fixed effect model (Wooldridge, 2009): 
 
yit = b0 + b1xit + Di + uit, where Di is dummy variable for teami. The time effect is captured by 
the subscript t (i.e. 2011, 2012 and 2013 season). xit is the relative deviation from average 
budget in season t, taking into account possible inflation effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Since it is difficult to rewrite the models with lagged dependent variable into point percentages models, 
because of the promoted teams, we only modify model I and II into point percentages for the dependent 
variable. 
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 Data  
 
The budgeted revenues among the teams in the Norwegian top division in football were 
collected from a newspaper article and are based on the standard used at the Norwegian 
football association (NFF). In this respect, all teams are obliged to report their finances to the 
association. Thus, the budgeted revenues are valid. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1: Final league standing and budgeted revenues  
 Final league standing Budgeted revenues (mill NOK)  
Team 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013  
Molde 1 1  78 90 99  
Strømsgodset 8 2  55 55 64  
Rosenborg 3 3  205 195 195  
Tromsø 2 4  72 65 67  
Viking 11 5  100 109 99  
Brann 4 6  110 110 110  
Haugesund 6 7  45 49 57  
Vålerenga 7 8  125 117 107  
Lillestrøm 13 9  55 90 90  
Odd Grenland 5 10  68 61 57  
Aalesund 9 11  73 74 70  
Sogndal 14 12  25 26 29  
Hønefoss BK  13   42 42  
Sandnes Ulf  14   38 37  
Fredrikstad 12 15  60 60   
Stabæk 10 16  70 34   
Start 15   60  60  
Sarpsborg08 16   20  30  
Average    76.31 75.94 75.81  
Standard deviation    43.96 42.52 41.45  
Minimum    20.00 26.00 29.00  
Maximum    205.00 195.00 195.00  
Range    185.00 169.00 166.00  
Gini coefficient    0.28 0.28 0.27  
Observations, n    16 16 16  
Sources: Dagens Næringsliv (January 11, 2012; February 4, 2013; February 22, 2013) 
 
 
The average budgeted revenues for the 2012 season were NOK 75.94 million. It is also worth 
noting the relatively large standard deviation (42.52). This is attributable to the observed 
range of 169, which is the difference between the highest budget of NOK 195 million and the 
lowest budget of NOK 26 million. Both the range itself and the standard deviation indicate 
that there are differences in financial strength in the Norwegian top division. However, the 
Gini coefficient provides a more accurate picture of the distribution of financial strength. 
Drawing on the budgeted revenues for the teams in the Norwegian top division, we find that 
the Gini coefficient is equal to .28. This is illustrated in Figure 2, where the Gini coefficient 
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 represents the area between the 45-degree line and the curve (also referred to as the Lorenz 
curve). In general, the larger the area between the 45-degree line and the curve is, the more 
unequal is the distribution of revenues.  
 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of the Gini coefficient on budgeted revenues for the Norwegian top division in 2012 
 
Interestingly, the Gini coefficient for the Norwegian top division is higher than for both 
“payroll imbalance” and “revenue imbalance” in all North American major leagues (Fort, 
2011). In turn, these results indicate more financial inequality in Norwegian football 
compared to the major league. On the other hand, in the English FA Premier League our 
calculations show the Gini coefficient on reported wage distribution from Deloitte (2012) to 
be between .30 and .35 based on the rank for the 2011/12 season and wages for the season 
before. The former is based on the teams participating both seasons, while the latter also 
includes the promoted teams (with wages from the second level division). 
 
 
 
Results 
 
Looking at the relationship between final league standing and budgeted revenues in Table 1, 
it is tempting to reach the same conclusion as in the newspaper article. However, the Gini 
coefficient indicated financial inequality. Moreover, the Gini coefficient is a useful starting 
point as financial inequality to a large extent is a driver for final league standing. In turn, this 
prompted us to undertake additional tests to examine the relationship between budget and 
final league standing in more detail. Thus, a simple regression model using budget as the 
independent variable and final standing as the dependent variable was employed, and is 
illustrated in the graph below. It is noteworthy to observe that R-square for the 2012 season is 
quite high (.33) compared to similar relationships in other leagues (see, for example, 
Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999, and Hall et al., 2002). The simple regression model gives 
strong indications of a negative association between budgeted revenues and final league 
standing. 
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Figure 3: The relationship between final league standing and budgeted revenues 
 
 
The Pearson correlation coefficient between budgeted revenues and final standing is -.55 
(p<.05) and -.57 (p < .05) respectively for the 2011 and 2012 season. For the two seasons 
combined, the Pearson correlation coefficient is -.56 (p<.05). The sign of the correlation 
coefficient is negative as expected. In turn, this implies that increasing the budget 
corresponds to a lower standing on the final league table. Put differently, increasing the 
budget is likely to be accompanied by a better sporting outcome. Moreover, this is interesting 
because it gives strong indications that the final standing is not irrespective of the budget 
prior to the season. The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is -.61 (p < .01) Results are 
similar when applying point percentage (Model III) instead of ranking. Here, the Pearson 
correlation coefficient is .54 (p < .05). The association between budgeted revenues and point 
percentage is positive as increasing the budgeted revenues also will increase the point 
percentage obtained. These results are also confirmed in the different models of the 
regression analysis shown below:15 
 
Table 2: Summary of models for the 2012 season (standard error in brackets) 
yi = standing Model I Model II Model III 
Constant 13.35*** 
(2.12) 
5.77* 
(3.15) 
0.34*** 
(0.06) 
Budget  - 0.06** 
(0.03) 
-0.03  
(0.02) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
Final standing previous 
season 
 0.59**  
(0.21) 
 
R2 .33 .59 .29 
Observations 16 16 16 
Significance (two-sided): * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
 
 
Overall, Model I shows that budgeted revenues are a significant (p < .05) driver of the final 
league standing in Norwegian football for the 2012 season, consistent with the literature. In 
                                                 
15 The assumptions underlying regression were given serious consideration. However, special emphasis was 
placed on multicolinearity. VIF indexes only indicated potential problems related to model II. This is, however, 
somewhat expected.  
R2 = .33 
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 Model II, we have added the final league standing obtained in the previous season to Model I. 
When this is done, budgeted revenues are no longer a significant driver of the final league 
standing. Final league standing previous season is, however, highly significant (p < .05).16 
The explanatory power of the model is remarkably high compared to Model I. Using a 
different measure of sporting success, namely point percentage, as in Model III, yields results 
that are in line with those of Model I. 
 
So far, the analysis drawing on correlation coefficients and the regression analysis suggest 
that the higher the relative level of budgeted revenues is, the better final league standing is 
expected. Even though this is consistent with previous literature, it is contradictory to the 
main conclusions drawn in the newspaper article referred to earlier. This focus 
(disagreement) can be explained by the fact that “larger” teams were beaten by “smaller” 
teams. To illustrate, the budget of team number 1, 2 and 4 combined was only about 7.7 % 
higher than the budget for the third ranked team alone.  
 
Due to the inconsistency between the newspaper article and the results above, a deeper 
analysis is conducted by splitting the sample into different sub-samples. Because the league 
consists of 16 teams it can easily be divided into, for example, four quartiles (4 teams each) 
and two halves (8 teams each). Mean budgeted revenues and standard deviation for each 
quartile (based on the final league standing) are presented below (mean and standard 
deviation are based on millions of NOK):  
 
Table 3: Summary statistics for quartiles 2011 season 
  Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
Mean budgeted revenues 116.25 73.25 75.75 40.00 
Standard deviation 61.47 35.76 17.10 20.41 
Coefficient of variation 0.53 0.49 0.23 0.51 
 
Table 4: Summary statistics for quartiles 2012 season 
  Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
Mean budgeted revenues 101.25 96.25 62.75 43.50 
Standard deviation 64.21 31.70 27.22 11.47 
Coefficient of variation 0.63 0.33 0.43 0.26 
 
Table 5: Summary statistics for quartiles 2011 and 2012 aggregated 
  Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
Mean budgeted revenues 108.75 84.75 69.25 41.75 
Standard deviation 58.74 33.61 22.16 15.44 
Coefficient of variation 0.54 0.40 0.32 0.37 
 
Although it is acknowledged that the low number of observations within each quartile can be 
problematic when it comes to investigating whether differences between quartiles are 
significant, we have run t-tests along with the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank 
sum test of two populations. Table 4 shows that when moving from Q1 to Q4, mean budgeted 
revenues are decreasing. Moreover, the analysis indicates that the only statistically significant 
differences are found between Q1 and Q4 (p < .10), Q2 and Q3 (p < .10), and finally, Q2 and 
Q4 (p < .05). Although mean differences are large in relative terms between Q1 and 
respectively Q3 and Q4, the difficulty in obtaining significant findings is nonetheless not 
                                                 
16 p = .0102 
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 unexpected statistically speaking. This can to a large extent be attributed to the small sample 
sizes and the subsequently large standard deviations (also observable by the coefficient of 
variation (.63)). 
 
One interesting feature of Tables 3-5 is that there are indications of relatively weak sporting 
performance amongst the small budget teams. This is based on the notion of the low mean 
budgeted revenues along with the relatively low standard deviation found in Q4 as compared 
to the other quartiles. This is also evident for the 2012 season, as only three teams in the first 
three quartiles had lower budgeted revenues than the corresponding budgeted revenues found 
in Q4. Consequently, this may indicate that teams having small budgeted revenues are also 
more likely to attain a weaker final league standing. In addition, there are indications 
suggesting that teams with the highest budgeted revenues are also among the top-half teams 
(top 8 of the final league standing). Interestingly, this was also confirmed when testing the 
top half against the bottom half, as shown in Table 6 below: 
 
Table 6: Summary statistics for different sub samples 2011 season 
  Top half Bottom half Q1 Q2-Q4 
Mean budgeted revenues 94.75 57.88 116.25 63.00 
Standard deviation 51.92 25.86 61.47 28.84 
Coefficient of variation 0.55 0.45 0.53 0.46 
Difference in mean budget 36.88** 53.25** 
Significance (one-sided): ** p < .05 
 
Table 7: Summary statistics for different sub samples 2012 season 
  Top half Bottom half Q1 Q2-Q4 
Mean budgeted revenues 98.75 53.13 101.25 67.50 
Standard deviation 46.96 21.91 64.21 32.10 
Coefficient of variation 0.48 0.41 0.63 0.48 
Difference in mean budget 45.62** 33.75 
Significance (one-sided): ** p < .05 
 
Table 8: Summary statistics for different sub samples 2011 and 2012 combined 
  Top half Bottom half Q1 Q2-Q4 
Mean budgeted revenues 96.75 55.50 108.75 65.25 
Standard deviation 47.87 23.28 58.74 29.93 
Coefficient of variation 0.49 0.42 0.54 0.46 
Difference in mean budget 41.25*** 43.50*** 
Significance (one-sided): *** p < .01 
 
For the 2012 season (Table 7), the budgeted revenues for the teams in the top half are on 
average close to 86 % higher than for the teams in the bottom half. This difference is also 
significant (p < .05). It is also worth noting that there is no evidence in favour of any 
differences between Q1 and the three other quartiles combined. Again, note the relatively 
high standard deviation in Q1 (also observable by the coefficient of variation).Thus, it seems 
as if there are two different properties inherent to the association between budgeted revenues 
and final league standing. First, it seems as though this association is of a random character 
for the top half. This can help explain the rationale behind the claims set forth in the 
Norwegian newspaper article. Secondly, and perhaps more interestingly, there seems to be a 
marked difference in this association when it comes to the top half and the bottom half. To 
further investigate this, the correlation between budget and sporting performance, measured 
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 as: i) final standing and ii) point percentage, is analysed for both the top half and the bottom 
half. To obtain an even more nuanced picture, the top 4 and bottom 12 are also included. 
Results are presented in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Pearson correlation coefficient and SRCC for association between budgeted revenues and final league 
standing for top 4, top 8, bottom 8 & bottom 12 (2012 season) 
 Budgeted revenues, Pearson’s r Budgeted revenues, SRCC 
Correlation 
coefficient 
Final league 
standing 
Point 
percentages 
Final league 
standing 
Point 
percentages 
Top 4 .13 .00 .00 .00 
Top 8  - .03 .07 .14 -.18 
Bottom 8  - .65** .59* - .67** .65** 
Bottom 12 -.75*** .69*** -.73*** .71*** 
Significance (one-sided): * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
 
Based on the above discussion, the lack of association in top 4 (equivalent to Q1) and top 8 
(equivalent to top half) in Table 9 comes as no surprise. This is confirmatory of earlier 
findings. Further, when analysing relative budget on the basis of rank (SRCC), the sign is 
opposite of what was expected. However, for the bottom 8 the situation is very different as 
results show that there are significant associations between budgeted revenues and sporting 
success, as demonstrated by final league standing and point percentages. These are 
significant at the 5 % level in all cases but one. Results are even more remarkable for the 
bottom 12 as all correlation coefficients are significant at the 1 % level.  
 
The fixed effects model (2011 and 2012) [Will be expanded to three seasons]. Model with 
final league standing: 
 
Table 10: Fixed effects model with final league standing 
                 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)       21.2497     4.0640   5.229 0.000163 *** 
TeamBrann          0.5863     2.7609   0.212 0.835118     
TeamFredrikstad    1.4336     2.1303   0.673 0.512766     
TeamHaugesund     -7.5554     2.4356  -3.102 0.008414 **  
TeamHønefoss BK   -1.8056     2.9526  -0.612 0.551404     
TeamLillestrøm     0.8534     2.0129   0.424 0.678533     
TeamMolde         -7.3909     2.0846  -3.545 0.003588 **  
TeamOdd Grenland  -3.8790     2.0656  -1.878 0.083014 .   
TeamRosenborg     12.3594     6.8531   1.803 0.094529 .   
TeamSandnes Ulf   -1.4193     3.0719  -0.462 0.651699     
TeamSarpsborg     -2.1962     3.7103  -0.592 0.564060     
TeamSogndal       -4.3466     3.1984  -1.359 0.197252     
TeamStabæk        -0.2977     2.3009  -0.129 0.899052     
TeamStart          2.9110     2.5639   1.135 0.276719     
TeamStrømsgodset  -7.8317     2.2288  -3.514 0.003811 **  
TeamTromsø        -7.7668     2.0289  -3.828 0.002093 **  
TeamVålerenga      4.7684     3.1778   1.501 0.157370     
TeamViking         2.7462     2.5746   1.067 0.305539     
RelBud           -11.6512     3.9427  -2.955 0.011161 *   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 2.012 on 13 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.9226,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.8154  
F-statistic: 8.608 on 18 and 13 DF,  p-value: 0.0001528 
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The fixed effects model (2011 and 2012) [Will be expanded to three seasons]. Model with 
point percentage: 
 
Table 11: Fixed effects model with point percentage 
                 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)       0.13224    0.11408   1.159  0.26723    
TeamBrann        -0.10779    0.07750  -1.391  0.18764    
TeamFredrikstad  -0.02497    0.05980  -0.417  0.68314    
TeamHaugesund     0.15899    0.06837   2.325  0.03688 *  
TeamHønefoss BK   0.05240    0.08288   0.632  0.53819    
TeamLillestrøm   -0.04030    0.05650  -0.713  0.48829    
TeamMolde         0.17122    0.05852   2.926  0.01181 *  
TeamOdd Grenland  0.07228    0.05799   1.247  0.23454    
TeamRosenborg    -0.41904    0.19238  -2.178  0.04839 *  
TeamSandnes Ulf   0.05863    0.08623   0.680  0.50851    
TeamSarpsborg     0.01484    0.10415   0.142  0.88888    
TeamSogndal       0.13529    0.08978   1.507  0.15576    
TeamStabæk       -0.04574    0.06459  -0.708  0.49131    
TeamStart        -0.10210    0.07197  -1.419  0.17952    
TeamStrømsgodset  0.20221    0.06256   3.232  0.00655 ** 
TeamTromsø        0.13832    0.05695   2.429  0.03040 *  
TeamVålerenga    -0.16641    0.08921  -1.865  0.08484 .  
TeamViking       -0.10628    0.07227  -1.471  0.16519    
RelBud            0.32910    0.11068   2.974  0.01077 *  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.05649 on 13 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.9016,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.7653  
F-statistic: 6.616 on 18 and 13 DF,  p-value: 0.000623 
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 Conclusions and discussions 
 
 
The analysis based on budgeted revenues and sporting performance, measured by the final 
league standing in the top division of the Norwegian football league for the 2012 season, 
provides a number of interesting results. Despite the claims set forth in the Norwegian 
newspaper article, we found a statistically significant correlation between budgeted revenues 
and sporting performance. The simple regression model also confirmed this association as the 
adjusted R2 was equal to .28 and relatively high compared to other studies (e.g., Szymanski 
and Kuypers, 1999). Put differently, budgeted pre-season revenues are a significant predictor 
for sporting success. This holds for regression models using both final league standing and 
point percentage to measure sporting success. Moreover, this is also in line with the reported 
Gini coefficient (.28) for the dispersion of budgeted revenues. Additional support is also 
provided when dividing the table in two halves as the average budgeted revenues in the top 
half are significantly higher compared to the average budgeted revenues in the bottom half. 
However, equally important, within the two halves patterns are quite different. While the 
correlation between budgeted revenues and performance is significant for the bottom half, 
this was not the case in the top half. To illustrate, three of the bottom four teams were also the 
ones having the smallest budgeted revenues. This duality prompted us to undertake further 
analysis by drawing on quartiles. However, findings were somewhat inconsistent, an issue 
that can be partly attributed to the large standard deviations, in particular in quartile 1. In this 
respect, the only highly significant difference in mean budgeted revenues was found when 
comparing Q2 and Q4. That being said, the differences between Q1 and Q4 as well as Q2 and 
Q3, were both significant at the 10 % level.  
 
Due to the difficulties related to quartile 1 (e.g., relatively high standard deviation) we  
investigated the correlation between budgeted revenues and final league standing in detail 
using the Pearson correlation coefficient as well as Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. 
For the top 4 (equivalent to quartile 1), no significant correlations were found. Results were, 
not surprisingly, similar for the top 8. For the bottom 8, however, we found a significant 
correlation. Even more important, when looking at the bottom 12, results were highly 
significant and in all cases significant at the 1 % level. These results hold for both final 
league standing and point percentage.  
 
To summarize, for the 2012 season of the Norwegian football league, the pre-season 
budgeted revenues were a significant predictor for the final standing. However, the pre-
season revenue budget had both predicting and non-predicting elements for the final league 
standing. This duality was evident throughout the paper, and mirrors the main conclusion in 
that although no association was found in the top half, budgeted revenues seem to be a key 
driver in reducing the risk of ending in the bottom 4. Moreover, it seems reasonable to claim 
that elements beyond an acceptable level of budgeted revenues play a more prominent role in 
relative terms. Interestingly, this may indicate that the Norwegian top division for the 2012 
season had room for playing “Moneyball”.  
 
As for the limitations of this study, caution should be taken in generalizing the results as they 
are based only on one season (but is now expanded). Analysing a single season in 
professional team sports involves a high degree of uncertainty and randomness that may 
affect the final league standing. Examples of relevance are coincidences in matches of high 
significance (Jennett, 1984), injuries and performance of important players, and financial 
abilities to take advantage of transfer windows, to mention just a few.  
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Therefore, it can be of interest to conduct further research to see if the pattern from the 2012 
season can be reflected on a more general basis. Hence, there is a call for studies covering 
several seasons, or alternatively including additional leagues. In addition, a deeper analysis of 
the financial side is warranted. Here, differences such as strategies on the player market and 
consequences of owning a stadium compared to renting a stadium are important.  
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research methods workshop: “Everything old is new again” - Russian government budgeting reform 
initiative and its implementation in Leningradskaya oblast’ county 
 
Abstract 
The proposed research has to be a significant part of the research project, devoted to budgeting reforms 
in Russia: “Local government budgeting reforms in Russia: implications and tensions” (NORRUS project), 
placed at the High North Center and Bodø Graduate School of Business at University of Nordland 
(Norway). The idea of this particular piece of research is to investigate how Russian central government 
performance budgeting and program budgeting initiatives were translated from the federal level to 
Leningradskaya oblast` county level since the very beginning of their  implementation in 2004 until today 
(end of 2013) within “travel of ideas” (Czarniawska and Sevón, 2005; Sahlin-Andersson and Sevón, 2002; 
Sahlin-Andersson, 2001, Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996) theoretical perspective using “norms-practice-
use” (Mellemvik and Olson, 1996) methodological framework.  
Motivation and literature review 
Doing research on Russian public finance, especially on government accounting and budgeting is a very 
inspiring job for business researcher, first of all because the topic of state and its reconstruction has 
been attracting  increasing attention among practitioners and academia in the world for the last three 
decades, what is referred to as New Public Management international trend (Timoshenko, 2008) and 
second, as during recent 10 years public finance have played and play more and more important role in 
Russian economy both through partially or fully state-owned companies, state corporations and budget 
(public) enterprises and through pure budget expenses on federal and regional levels meaning state 
investment programs and public services. The issues of decision-making, accounting norms and 
practices, relation between economic growth, development of local national and international business 
and state budget are widely discussed, but still there are a lot of blind spots to investigate on the map of 
Russian public finance and many interesting cases to study. 
If we make a brief literature review about changes in regional public finance in post-Soviet Russia apart 
from some relevant publications in Russian language, which definitely can be helpful for research in 
Russian context, we find again mostly Russian authors or joint publications dating from the end of 90-s 
to 2013 that include both quantitative and qualitative research with accents on economical, political, 
financial and geographical aspects of transition, centralization and decentralization, tax revenue 
redistribution, “marketization”, international and interregional connection-building.  
Perhaps one of the most detailed and at the same time broad qualitative research on local government 
accounting in Russia with time range from 18th century to the beginning of 2000`s was made by Anatoli 
L. Bourmistrov in his doctoral thesis (2001), where using norms-practice-use framework, adopted from 
Mellemvik and Olsen (1996), author brings three perspectives of the study: historical, technical and 
users perspective, having taken Leningradskaya oblast` county – one of the border regions in the North-
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West of Russia as an object for research. Several articles by Anatoli L. Bourmistrov, some of them joint 
with Frode Mellemvik anticipate or develop findings of the thesis. One of them (Bourmistrov & 
Mellemvik, 1999) explores changes in accounting norms during first decade of transition from Soviet 
planned economy into market-oriented that were partially influenced by political reforms, nowadays 
associated with political freedoms as well as decentralization and increasing local autonomy, and 
investigate how these has influenced local practices in Leningradskaya oblast` county. Another 
comparative study (Bourmistrov & Mellemvik, 2002) explores connections and tensions between the 
realities portrayed in the accounting systems and the governance structures in local governments in 
mentioned Leningradskaya oblast` county and Nordland county (Norway), trying to figure out 
interrelations between accounting and democratic governance in two different contexts. Several 
qualitative researches are devoted to Russian public sector reform started in 2004 seeing accounting as 
social and institutional practice (Timoshenko, 2008, Timoshenko and Adhikari, 2009) touching such 
initiatives as management by results (Russian concept, internationally known as performance 
budgeting) and analyzing the attempts of state administration to implement IPSAS and shift from cash 
accounting to accrual accounting. One of the latest papers of this kind finds out decoupling between 
public sector accounting practices and declared accounting norms in Russian central government and 
states that although the ideas of increasing efficiency, transparency as well as accrual accounting 
ideology fits well Russian top political context of legitimization of Russian state on the international 
arena, it comes into strong contradiction with Russian accounting tradition (Antipova & Bourmistrov, 
2013).  
There are several studies on regional projection of changes made during 90-s covering not one or 
several regions but more or less the whole territory of Russian Federation, of those we can mention 
investigation of degree of financial independence of cities from regional governments and the resulting 
incentives for these cities to provide public goods (Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya, 2003) made using a set 
of data on the budgets of 35 large Russian cities in 29 regions for the 1992 to 1997 period, where 
authors claim that transfers from a higher-level government budget may affect the incentives of lower-
lever governments to foster their tax base. The next paper (Desai, Freinkman, Goldberg, 2005) analyze 
fiscal data from 80 Russian regions from 1996 to 1999 and argues that unearned income streams, 
particularly in the form of revenues from natural resource production or from budgetary transfers from 
the central government transform regions dependent on these income sources into reinter regions. 
Another research is devoted to municipal perspective of public finance in Russia present three case 
studies (Mitchnek, 2007): Yaroslavl', a provincial capital in central Russia, Leninskii district (later merged 
with Centralny district into Admiralteyskiy district) and Petrodvorets - a satellite town, both within St. 
Petersburg, trying to answer several questions around centralization and decentralization of public 
finance. There are also interesting reflections on equalization policy, conducted by authorities since mid 
90-s to mid 00-s (Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 2008), claiming that national equalization policies 
often are concerned with the quality and accessibility of services delivered at the lowest (or local) level 
of government, with examination of fiscal equalization outcomes for about 2000 Russian local 
governments (municipalities) in 72 regions (subjects of Russian Federation) to assess and explain the 
extent of equalization differences between and within regions. One of the latest articles by Vladimir 
Gel’man (2012) presents an analysis of “informal institutionalization” in post-Communist Russia in 
theoretical and comparative perspective to enhance understanding of negative effects of subversive 
informal institutions on informal governance. 
 Not surprisingly most significant publications devoted to Russian public finance as well as the recent 
ones either explore historical perspective and concentrate on changes within after-Soviet period linking 
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them to political agenda, or investigate the recent public sector reform outcomes on the central 
(federal) level. However, there seems to be a lack of qualitative research on changes or reforms in 
governmental accounting made on regional level within last 4 or 5 years (after 2009) while during that 
period Ministry of Finance of Russia continued its attempts to modernize public finance, as some 
experts say, according to Western models within New Public Management guidelines (Romanov, 2008, 
Timoshenko, 2009) on regional and local levels. Although these changes mostly influenced state-owned 
enterprises (public entities), such as universities and research institutions, compulsory education system 
(schools and colleges) and kindergartens, state healthcare sector and other public organizations,  there 
were remarkable systematic changes in legislation with accent on regional budgeting, including regional 
perspective of mentioned above management by results or performance budgeting and program 
budgeting initiatives. And maybe one of the most interesting to study, are quite narrow, even surgical 
initiatives that were made by federal authorities within mitigation of 2008-2009 financial crisis negative 
impact on regional budgets using both traditional and newly-established financial instruments.  
Therefore, the preliminary research questions for my research will concentrate on: what are the roles of 
Russian central and regional authorities in framing and implementing budgeting reforms on regional 
level, what are the links of these reform initiatives to international trends and what consequences they 
bring for local welfare production. 
Theoretical framework and methodology 
General theoretical framework for my research will further develop the argumentation in a line that 
accounting is considered as an organizational practice assisting local actors to manage local economy 
and welfare production, meaning that budget provides finances and an important element in 
democratic governance where the wishes of individuals (e.g. electorate) as well as resources are meant 
to be converted into collective action by discovering and implementing policy coalitions (March & Olsen, 
1995). In local governments, local politicians discuss the decisions on budget allocations, which local 
administrations put in practice. Therefore changes in local budgeting practices can have impact on local 
governance and welfare production.  
Changes in budgeting practices are widely investigated through reform approach meaning by it rational 
top-down implementation of norms and building local practices on centrally developed guidelines. In 
this research I want to study the implementation of performance budgeting and program budgeting in 
Leningradskaya oblast regional government through conceptualization of organizational change as 
“travel of ideas”, i.e. change as a sequential step-by-step process of objectifying and transfer of ideas 
from their time and place of origin and its materialization passing through a sieve of local legitimation 
(Czarniawska and Sevón, 2005; Sahlin-Andersson and Sevón, 2002; Sahlin-Andersson, 2001, Czarniawska 
and Joerges, 1996). In this sense links between international public sector reform ideologies, their 
perception on federal government level and appearance on regional level can be seen as materialization 
of reform ideas through translation, indicating that the outcome of the reform may be surprisingly 
different that was planned on the initial stage. In this sense the importance of local context in 
reinventing the reform pattern should not be underestimated (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996; Gherardi 
and Jacobsson, 2000). 
The mentioned research questions and proposed theoretical framework demand appropriate 
methodology, by which I consider norms-practice-use framework, rooted in the institutional approach 
to social systems consisting of systems norms and systems of action (Bergevärn et al., 1995) with the 
system of action brought up by Mellemvik and Olson (1996) into system of practice and system of use.  
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Main data collection methods for normative research will be documentary analysis with open, semi-
structured and in-depth interviews. Budget and Tax law books, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Economic Development and Ministry of Regional Development guidelines as well as regional legislation 
will help me to perform this task. To study the practices of budget process I would like to make a case-
study of implementation of performance budgeting and program budgeting initiatives in Leningradskaya 
oblast county within time range from 2004 to 2014. Analytic reports, articles and other official and 
media resources will be analyzed to study how, by whom and in what way the mentioned changes are 
perceived by users as well as probable interviews with politicians from regional parliament will be taken.  
Assumptions, findings and conclusions 
Keeping in line with Nordic management and business administration research tradition, known as 
empirical and qualitative, being theoretically rooted in organizational theories (Pettersen et al, 2002), 
we find an investigation of the sequence of budgeting reforms in Sweden (Czarniawska-Joerges and 
Jacobsson, 1989) that reminds me much of situation in Russia for recent 10 years and concludes again 
that there is a crucial importance in relating budgeting to the context surrounding it. Considering 
geographical, economic and financial diversities of Russian regions, complexity of relationships between 
Russian federal authorities and regional governments, I can assume that, being translated several times 
the ideas of effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of central government initiatives, recognized as 
being addressed to New Public Management ideology, could have been perceived differently, while 
being institutionalized in regional governments, than just legitimacy-biased, as it seem to happen on 
federal level (Timoshenko, 2009). Thus these ideas could serve as enhancing instrumentality for local 
users, constructing a space for creativity and leading to organizational innovations inside regional 
financial departments, and therefore bringing more fruitful results for the purposes of local welfare 
building and business development. As a brief example of this I would like to mention 2004 “The 
regional finance reform program” made by Leningradskaya oblast’ financial authorities and published as 
initial point of regional budgeting reform where instead of literal addressing the central government 
rhetoric, much accent is made on the perspectives of implementing Balanced Scorecard system to 
manage regional finance following “successful experience of USA and Finland” (The regional finance 
reform program of Leningradskaya oblast’, 2004). Although further legislation and program documents 
are made strictly within normative guidelines provided by Russian Ministry of Finance, this example of 
creativity looks quite inspiring. Since the early stage of research, some further findings and conclusions 
will be presented on the workshop. 
Validity, accessibility, gender and ethical issues 
There is a challenge that has to be mentioned while making research on Leningradskaya oblast` region, 
which has the population close to 1,8 mln., gross regional product of 504 billion rubles (12,6 billion 
Euros, 2010) and annual budget of 58 billion rubles (1,45 billion Euros, 2012). On one hand, it has been 
an object for research by Anatoli Bourmistrov (1999, 2001, 2002), so a good comparative study can be 
made, and on the other hand, there is high probability of merging it within the next 2 years with Saint-
Petersburg, a city of federal jurisdiction, that has 3 times bigger population, more than 3 times bigger 
gross regional product and 6 times bigger budget, and that can make data collection more complicated 
as well as several validity challenges can arise. But as a general remark I would like to say that I do not 
expect much troubles with validity in my research as most of public funds according to Russian 
legislation have to be transparent and all procedures of their collecting and spending are strictly 
regulated by guidelines on all levels. 
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Gender issues will be considered while planning the interviews and ethic questions will be addressed as 
well because as I see the core meaning of such kind of research for society besides knowledge building is 
to make the work of state authorities more transparent and close to public that corresponds to my 
understanding of my mission as a researcher.  
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Abstract 
 
The paper discusses about changes of control mechanisms in supply chain settings within the 
network of inter-organizational relationships (IORs) in the light of actor-network approach. Control 
mechanisms are like a mediator in building links between entities within the network. Also supply 
chain management (SCM) integrates all businesses processes, links them and thereby accumulates 
interdependencies around its activity. In this paper we imagine SCM as a network of 
interdependences in IORs which aligns different heterogeneous elements where management control 
systems (MCSs) can act as certain “actors” who are active and innovative in developing a particular 
knowledge and technology.  
Using the qualitative approach the paper is based on case study of a horizontal network 
including two mining industries and a shipping company located in the Russian High North. The 
paper focuses on how changes of MCSs in SCM of one mining industry within the network can 
affect organizational actions of other heterogeneous elements (or industries), especially if a new 
actor, either a new control mechanism or a new technology in cargo transportation, is embedded into 
the network. Also there is a special attention to the interdependence of one mining industry on 
organizational actions of another one aligned into the same network. 
Keywords 
MCS, SCM, Actor-Network, Inter-organizational relationships.  
 
 
“Change has been with us forever, and it always will be, 
but the idea of change itself is changing” 
Abrahamson (2000, p.79) 
“Where the road ends, Northern realities begin” 
Joël Plouffe (2010, p.12) 
1. Introduction 
Both quotes above are used to anticipate the research idea and context. The research raises 
issues in the design and use of management control systems (MCSs) in supply chain settings in the 
perspective of inter-organizational relationships (IOR). 
At the heart of the research there have been put change processes of control mechanisms and 
technologies involved in the development of supply chains in the High North over time.  
According to Mouritsen (2005) “a MCS is never stable and tends to get new functionality as 
time goes because it is thrown into new situations and episodes” as well as changes in MCSs 
“constantly incur change to organizational action”. Being encouraged by this idea, we endeavour to 
undertake a promising journey into management control (MC) change processes through the lenses 
of Actor-network theory (ANT) with a focus on the interpretations of control changes in the 
transportation operations and supply chain design of mining industries in the Russian High North, 
especially located in remote areas with sparse transportation systems. 
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1.1. Problem Statement. 
While management accounting has been an instrument for reporting to the government and tax 
authorities in most parts of the Western world where the role of accountants has changed (Moilanen, 
2008; Burns&Scapens, 2000; Loft, 1986; Tomkins & Groves, 1983), the design and use of 
accounting differs somewhat in the former Soviet Union (Moilanen, 2008) and has still been 
different in the Russian contemporary economic practice after reforms of 1990s (Bourmistrov, 2001; 
Timoshenko, 2006; Panteleeva, 2013). Transformations in the Russian political system and economic 
reforms of 1990s significantly affected the Russian institutional environment (Polterovich, 1999; 
Bourmistrov, 2001), social ideology (Bourmistrov, 2001) and, therefore, changed Russian public 
sector accounting (Timoshenko & Adhikari, 2009) as well as accounting norms in organizations with 
the enactment of new obligatory accounting procedures on organizational activities (Bourmistrov, 
2001; Shleifer & Treisman, 2005). Control objectives on information demand and resource flows 
also underwent reorientation (Polterovich, 1999).  
Foremost the reforms of 1990s were marked with a huge economic decline in production and 
crisis (Shleifer & Treisman, 2005, Granberg, 1997). Due to the territory of Russia has been unevenly 
developed the economic crisis especially affected remote areas in the High North and Siberia with 
weak administrative management and tendency to rapid degradation (Utkin & Denisov, 2001) or “the 
regions along the Northern Sea Route (NSR)” (Granberg, 1997). Industrial enterprises, ice-breaking 
fleet, ports got into a hard financial situation due to price liberalization and change in the credit 
system (Granberg, 1997). Extractive and metallurgical industries operated in the High North 
drastically reduced their operations since the dissolution of the Soviet Union because of the general 
economic downturn in domestic market and the sharp fall in defense industry production which was 
a major consumer of ferrous and non-ferrous metals (Levine, 1999; Granberg, 1997). Material and 
technical supply from other regions was interrupted. Commercial navigation on the Northern Sea 
Route also went into decline, and tariffs on sea shipment including ice-breaker assistance flied up 
due to the reduction of cargo volumes. Most of industrial enterprises located in remote High North 
areas with limited choice of supply chains found themselves virtually isolated and cut off from the 
Mainland (Granberg, 1997).    
If during the Soviet period a powerful governmental resolutions released and enforced special 
procedures for the development of transport routes, the organization of material and technical supply 
to remote areas of the High North, as well as specific accounting routines and tax regulations for 
enterprises located in the areas inhabited by northern indigenous peoples (Resolution of the Cabinet 
of Ministers of the USSR, Council of Ministers of the RSFSR dated March 11, 1991 #84), that 
indicated stability and guaranteed security of uncertainty and risks, but then ”in times of change” 
(Timoshenko & Adhikari, 2009) industries in remote areas were thrown into the harsh environment 
of new market conditions to overcome new realities of economic crisis without state support when 
they had to adapt only by their own efforts and resources (Granberg, 1997).  
Also investment activity in the High North remote areas changed during 1990s. If earlier 
enormous investments were received from the state, then in 1995 the most volume supported by own 
means of enterprises and organizations (Granberg, 1997). In order to survive some extractive 
industries in the High North started to invest into developing own infrastructure to reestablish links 
with the mainland and to toughen control over their own transport flows, in spite of these 
investments were made in non-core assets. 
Inspite of mentioned above in an official document we find that just mining and metallurgical 
industries in contrast to other industries located in the Russian High North regions turned out 
resistant to economic crisis of 1990s and their activity provided relative stability for these northern 
areas due to they were “vertically integrated companies, worked on the so-called stationary markets 
and incorporated into long supply chains under control of their parent companies” (Annex to the 
Resolution of the Government of Murmansk region # 693-PP/15dated December 23, 2011). 
To sum up mentioned above, control mechanisms in the Russian practice have undergone 
significant changes since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These changes have been particularly 
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 perceptible in the High North for industries located in remote areas with limited choice of supply 
chains, where logistics and regular transport connection with the Mainland really matter. Here, it is 
interesting to find out what control mechanisms have been applied by Arctic extractive and mining 
industries in order to compensate their bad remote location and organize the supply chain design in 
such a way to make their location more favourable and gain stable linkages with the market. Also it 
is not realized how the change processes of MCSs have influenced on the organization of transport 
links between remote areas in the High North or, quite the contrary, how specific characters of cargo 
transportation  in Arctic harsh natural conditions through the ice fields have affected the design of 
MCSs in individual mining industries. 
The challenges of Arctic extractive industries, mentioned above, are stimulating us to start this 
research.  
1.2. Motivation to the research. 
The review of 101 articles prepared by Jeschonowski et al. (2009) and consecrated to the area 
of MCSs in logistics and SCM shows that theoretical and practical aspects of MC issues associated 
with supply chain settings are covered quite poorly and not enough in the literature for today. 
Jeschonowski et al. (2009) found that over the last 20 years (to be exact since 1988 till 2008) the 
number of such researchers grow quite slowly: intra-organizationally focused articles are just at 2.5 
articles per year and inter-organizationally focused articles are at 5 articles per year. That gives a 
potential for our research about MCSs in SCM based on case study to penetrate into a practical use 
of MCSs in supply chain settings.  
In turn, Burns and Scapens (2000) argue that most of existing researches attract attention to 
MC change as “an outcome” rather than try to explain how an organization’s MC “becomes what it 
is or is not over time, in other words MC change as “a process”. 
Also one of the findings disclosed by Dechow & Mouritsen (2005) awakes our special interest 
in that while supply chain structure mostly remains “plastic” and can be changed at any stage of 
practice, the accounting structure is “plastic” only on the pre-practice stage. Subsequent corrections 
or retranslations in MC technologies are supposed to cause changes already in the organizational 
actions in order to make them visible (Dechow & Mouritsen, 2005). 
All mentioned above has been motivating us to proceed to the study of change processes of 
MCSs in SCM. 
 
The paper purpose is to develop the knowledge about How? MCSs in SCM can change and 
affect organizational actions within the network in the context of mining industries located in the 
Russian High North.  
The focus is on the change processes of MCSs in SCM in order to attempt to make a 
contribution to theoretical development about the nature and character of MC change in local 
contexts. 
The research purpose is assumed to be reached through providing insights into the following 
research questions: 
− What kinds of MC tools in SCM have been applied by extractive and mining industries in 
the Russian High North? 
− How do MCSs act among mining industries involved in the network of inter-organizational 
relationships in the Russian High North? 
− How does the change of MCSs in SCM unfold and affect organizational actions of mining 
industries in the Russian High North? 
 
2. Theoretical perspective 
2.1. Management control systems (MCSs) in IOR 
The research literature is replete with a variety of definitions and descriptions about what a 
MCS is. However, they are either complementary or quite different from each other, and encompass 
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 quite broad conceptions (Malmi & Brown, 2008; Fisher, 1998) expanding the notion of a MCS to 
strategic development or narrowing down to employees’ behavior (Malmi & Brown, 2008; Otley, 
1999).  
In this paper we perceive a MCS in SCM as an “actor” or an active force helping to mediate, 
shape and construct inter-organizational relationships (Mouritsen&Thrane, 2006) and also the 
boundaries of networks (Kraus and Lind, 2007; Mouritsen et al., 2001) integrating networks through 
information flows. So, we view a MCS in SCM as an integrating mechanism which assists in the 
establishment and development of inter-organizational relationships and affects all relevant interests 
of other “actors” both human and non-human including other organizations within the network 
(Mouritsen et al., 2001; Mouritsen&Thrane, 2006; Kraus and Lind, 2007). 
 
2.2. Supply chain management (SCM) and interaction with MCSs 
“MCSs do not operate in isolation” (Malmi & Brown, 2008, p. 287) and we study MCSs in 
SCM. 
SCM as a scientific phenomenon is relatively new in the literature (Cooper et al., 1997) and 
characterizes by the presence of different research paradigms, the diversity of objects and the 
prevalence of academic literature focused on the practical needs of businesses (Jeschonowski et al., 
2009; Fedotov & Krotov, 2011). 
The Global Supply Chain Forum (GSCF), a group of non-competing firms and a team of 
academic researchers, provides the following definition of SCM: “SCM is the integration of key 
business processes from end user through original suppliers that provides products, services, and 
information that add value for customers and other stakeholders” (Lambert & Cooper, 2000).  
Chen & Paulraj (2004) also state that the term of SCM has been applied “to explain the 
planning and control of materials and information flows as well as the logistics activities not only 
internally within a company but also externally between companies”.  
Thus, SCM is more than just logistics as it is driven beyond internal organizational actions into 
the integration of business operations in the supply chain as well as acts across inter-organizational 
boundaries (Cooper et al., 1997). For all that a typical supply chain can be depicted as “a network of 
materials, information, and services processing links with the characteristics of supply, 
transformation and demand” (Chen & Paulraj, 2004). 
According to Wickramasinghe & Alawattage (2007), SCM ensures a continuous flow of 
products and services along the production and distribution chains. So, SCM can be viewed as a 
system of relationships (Fedotov & Krotov, 2011; Wickramasinghe & Alawattage, 2007) which 
integrates all businesses processes and links them across intra- and inter-organizational boundaries 
(Cooper et al., 1997; Lambert & Cooper, 2000). SCM creates a special field for multiple 
interdependencies between organizations (Wickramasinghe & Alawattage, 2007).  
Wickramasinghe & Alawattage (2007) emphasize that the development of such 
interdependencies between organizations reshapes the design of MCSs and their use. MC regarding 
supply chain actions can function as information and communication technologies which facilitate 
operations within inter-organizational relationships. Thus, SCM extends MC routines and practices 
beyond the organization into the network. MC acts as an enabling institution which makes 
relationships and interdependencies visible and possible for the “actors” within the network of IOR 
(Wickramasinghe & Alawattage, 2007). Though the nature of this “enabling institution” of control 
and its involvement in the constitution of networks are still poorly investigated (Wickramasinghe & 
Alawattage, 2007).  
Dechow & Mouritsen (2005) investigate how an information flow of such a MCS as ERP 
based on financial data can coexist with the physical business-process oriented logistics based on 
non-financial data. Their findings disclose that while supply chain structure mostly remains “plastic” 
and can be changed at any stage of practice, the accounting structure is “plastic” only on the pre-
practice stage. Then the corrections or retranslations in MC technologies are supposed to attract the 
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 non-financial data just to make organizational actions visible (Dechow & Mouritsen, 2005). This 
rejects some casual assumptions about the need to develop some specialized technologies for MCSs 
in supply chain settings (Jeschonowski et al., 2009). 
Lambert and Cooper (2000) try to revise the original definition of logistics as a part of SCM 
provided by Council of Logistics Management (CLM) in 19861 and argue that companies aim to 
manage their supply chains to the point of consumption, because whoever has the relationship with 
the end user has the power in the supply chain. Their point of view can stands out through the whole 
our research devoted to industries located in remote areas with sparse transportation systems where 
SCM is of vital importance in order to survive.  
Regarding our research context which is addressed to extractive industries’ issues associated 
with their remote location and limited access to markets, the geographic aspect takes on a special 
significance in SCM. Supply chains can also be viewed as linkages between organizations and 
regions. These linkages like bridges transfer products or services and thereby bind organizations in 
one network (Darwent, 1969) creating inter-organizational relationships (IOR). Information flows 
and control “technologies” move through supply chains or “an axis of development” (Pottier, 1963 in 
Darwent, 1969) from one local contexts to others. 
SCM can be viewed as an environment or network consisted of different “actors”. This helps 
us look into the emergence of interdependencies within the IOR and the process of regulation of 
interdependencies by MCSs. The last point follows the ideas of Mouritsen & Thrane (2006), who 
found that the control mechanisms are involved in the construction of network boundaries, and hence 
they control, and (re)translate by own efforts the communications between actors, i.e. supply chains 
between partners within one network. 
 
2.3. Change of MCSs through the perspective of actor-networks in IOR 
The paper discusses about control mechanisms and interdependencies within a supply chain 
network through the lenses of ANT. 
Actor-network approach is based on the interaction between human and non-human elements 
in the structuring of society (Latour, 2005).  Actor-network theory (ANT) explains the roles played 
by humans and non-humans such as technology, science and nature (Latour, 2005). Humans and 
non-humans are presented as “certain “actors” who are active and innovative in developing and 
propagating a particular science and technology” (Wickramasinghe & Alawattage, 2007). MC is 
regarded as a technology of decision-making which is subject to the actions of “actors” through 
networks.  
 ANT provides framework for studying and comprehending “the fabrication of a specific 
phenomenon through a process of debate, dialogue and struggle” (Mouritsen et al., 2001, p.736). It 
focuses on “translating knowledge” when previously accepted facts are translated into new 
knowledge. It is also supposed that the network exists in its current form in a short-time period only 
to undergo further development or change and take on a new reality (Latour, 2005). The network 
attains its objectives through “boundary objects” which assist to translate a well-known technology 
into local contexts (Wickramasinghe & Alawattage, 2007). Thus, the translation of technologies such 
as MC can be driven from a distance (Wickramasinghe & Alawattage, 2007). This fact brings actor-
network approach to Czarniawska & Joerges’s framework regarding the travel of “ideas” such as 
control procedures in time and space and their subsequent (re)translating in local contexts that was 
mentioned above. 
“Actors” form “networks” by circulating “intermediaries” among them. “Intermediaries” align 
different actors for the network’s own interest and assist “actors” to communicate and influence each 
                                                 
1 The Council of Logistics Management defined logistics management as: The process of planning, 
implementing, and controlling the efficient, cost-effective flow and storage of raw materials, in-process of inventory, 
finished goods, and related information flow from point-of-origin to point-of-consumption for the purpose of conforming 
to customer requirements. 
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 other in a “network” through the “translating” process of one actor’s existing structures/objectives 
into new forms (Wickramasinghe & Alawattage, 2007). “Networks” such as MCSs cannot be studied 
without thorough examination of the nature of “intermediaries” such as rules and procedures which 
have to operate in a certain manner under particular circumstances (Wickramasinghe & Alawattage, 
2007).   In order the network operates successfully the circulation of intermediaries needs to be 
coordinated and regular. 
Some authors (Chua, 1995) have applied ANT as a lens to explain accounting in a social 
context, others (Quattrone & Hopper, 2001; Jones & Dugdale, 2002; Hansen & Mouritsen, 2005) 
associate it with the “translation” processes of control mechanisms over time rather to present a 
process of strategy implementation and there are just little researches (Mouritsen et al., 2001; 
Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006) devoted to studying networks of formally independent organizations.  
In order to identity a variety of practices in inter-organizational relationships (IORs) such as 
strategic partners, supply chain, business and outsourcing relationships (Kraus & Lind, 2007), ANT 
has tried to explain MC change through conducting interpretive case studies with a rich number of 
empirical illustrations (Wickramasinghe & Alawattage, 2007). Below we would like to give a few 
examples of case studies in order to look at how actor-network features can be reflected concerning 
MC change processes. 
Quattrone & Hopper (2001) apply actor-network concepts in order to understand the 
evolutionary nature of MC change processes. They try to imagine accounting as “a process of 
fabricating knowledge (Latour, 1999) and argue that though MC change is initiated centrally on the 
top, the very process of change in the local context takes a decentralized nature because of the 
interaction of human and non-human elements. Quattrone & Hopper (2001) emphasize that if human 
and non-human elements interplay with unpredictable outcomes then the change process will be 
driven through unpredictable ways. The authors judge that the essence of MC is no longer to 
prescribe the right course of organizational actions, but rather to describe and guide the possible 
course of actions. According to them, the control task is no longer to facilitate organizations to 
become isomorphic to a certain knowledge (be it real or socially constructed), but rather to facilitate 
to construct knowledge through organizational actions (Quattrone & Hopper, 2001). However, their 
approach pays little attention to how MCSs influence on other actors (Mouritsen, 2005). 
Also through a network of human and non-human elements Jones & Dugdale (2002) trace the 
development of activity-based accounting (ABC) from its rise (when ABC was still a possibility) to 
widespread adoption in practice (when ABC became a certainty). Being a control system ABC is 
viewed by the authors as a network which consists of “actors” and “intermediaries” where the last-
mentioned define the relationships between actors. Jones & Dugdale (2002) discover ABC as “a 
global expert system” which is mutually formed with the construction of the actor-networks which 
create it and claims to help managers gain control in the modern world. The main idea is that control 
mechanisms can experience different kinds of change but translating processes can lead to very much 
unpredictable outcomes because the knowledge comes from certain actors and networks. Jones & 
Dugdale (2002) warn about new forms of risks when the “bandwagon” of a control mechanism may 
become hitched to the “juggernaut of modernity”2 being crushed by the wheels of these 
unpredictable outcomes.  
So, according to Jones and Dugdale (2002) the knowledge can never be guaranteed and thus is 
not ultimately trustworthy. The modern world is changeable and if we likened it as a runaway engine 
of enormous power that we try to drive but fear can rush out of control at any moment. There is 
something that is always out of our control (Wickramasinghe & Alawattage, 2007).  
In turn, Hansen & Mouritsen (2005) study the “translation” processes or “mobilisation” of the 
                                                 
2 Jones and Dugdale (2002) made the best use of two metaphors in their research where “bandwagon” means a 
fashionable movement attracting more and more people and “juggernaut” means an idea people blindly worship and 
follow (mainly with tragic consequences) as well as an incarnation of Vishnu, during the festival in the Indian city of Puri 
the devotees rushed into his processional chariot, considering the great good fortune to die under it. 
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 BSC as a control mechanism in four Danish companies where they consider BSC to be a plastic and 
enough flexible tool which managers can reshape or translate to particular local contexts. The notion 
of “mobilisation” was suggested by Mouritsen (2005) as a process which intervenes into a “design” 
of MCSs and creates supplements to change the conditions for the design to work, and thereby 
causes transformations in the organizational actions. Mouritsen (2005) also mentions that resistance 
nevertheless exists and “is part of the mobilisation of accounting”. So, “mobilization” process is not 
intended to abandon the existing design but rather to repair and revise its assumptions and 
consequences “in making the design perform in relation to organizational concerns (Mouritsen, 
2005).  
Hansen & Mouritsen (2005) demonstrate that the BSC gains its unique colourful shade in the 
spectrum of local contexts. At the same time the authors argue that it is so mush plastic that is able 
“to keep an identity” to existing practices that travels between the local contexts of its application.  
Mouritsen & Thrane (2006) try to penetrate into the network of formally independent 
organizations in order to explore control mechanisms which hold and interlock actors within one 
network keeping its integrity. The network is represented as an integrated entity with a common 
objective but with unequal flows of resources and knowledge. The authors argue that the partners 
have a different degree of interdependences across the network and may not benefit equally from 
resulting decisions. That can provoke “contradictions” in the network (Wickramasinghe & 
Alawattage, 2007).  
Mouritsen & Thrane (2006) come to a rather exciting conclusion that MC technologies are 
involved in building the boundaries of networks. Control technologies define the relationships 
between partners (“actors”) and their operational actions within and beyond the network. Thus, 
through MC an “actor” and the network itself constantly redefine each other because one is 
dependent on the other.  
Summarizing all the above, ANT assists researchers “to follow “actors” who mobilize new 
technologies” and to investigate how new MC technologies are translated and fabricated into local 
contexts. However, what is happening when a new actor is embedded into a network, be it a new 
control mechanism or an own fleet for cargo transportation? how does a network respond in this 
case? At the same time adding a new actor into the network of IORs can increase its convergence or 
divergence. How can we assess the meaning of an intermediary in this new situation? These 
questions are still remaining opened in theoretical aspect. 
In order to add some criticism to our research approach ANT tries to investigate “boundaries 
of translation” in IORs rather than describing intra-organizational operations (Wickramasinghe & 
Alawattage, 2007).  
According to Kraus and Lind’s review (Hopper et al., 2007, Ch.13) some companies enter 
inter-organizational relationships in an attempt to increase revenue by gaining access to 
contemporary resources, to improve product development, and to get better access to customers. 
Other companies attempt to decrease costs by achieving economies of scale by engaging in joint 
research projects and/or joint marketing or production activities. The formation of inter-
organizational relationships also creates barriers to entry for competition, by securing long-term 
relationships with key suppliers in order to exchange knowledge and to cooperate in technological 
development. Thus, we can suppose that companies have more positive outcomes within the network 
of interrelationships in order to achieve flexibility, obtain the objectives of efficiency and reduce the 
negative effects of competition for further effective implementation of their strategies. 
However, relationships within the network are characterized by emerging interdependencies 
between the partners. As it was explained by Kraus and Lind (2007) the interdependence can be 
created through the adaptation of activities and resources within the individual business relationships. 
They imagined inter-organizational relationships as an element within a network of relationships 
which are interdependent with other elements of the network. Interactions between two companies, 
for example A and B, can have an influence through network effects on company C. Also 
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 interdependencies between organizations can connect competitors to each other, even though they do 
not any direct interactions. 
Thus, we consider actor-network approach to be meaningful to investigate interdependencies 
between actors within IORs and how the actions of one actor affect the actions of others. 
Actor-network approach is interesting to explore “How?” the networks get formed, hold actors 
together and how MCSs are created among actors. This helps us to learn the mechanism of MCSs 
mobilization in a certain organizational action exploring the continuous transformation of MC 
practices in the development of SCM which may generate changes even in the external institutional 
environment (Modell, 2009). 
We imagine SCM as a network of interdependences in IOR. Inside the network actants become 
actors, “entities that do things” (Latour, 1992).   A network aligns different heterogeneous elements 
where MCSs act as certain “actors” who are active and innovative in developing and propagating a 
particular knowledge [science] and technology (Wickramasinghe & Alawattage, 2007).  
MCSs are products of the network which has inter- and intra- organizational effects and, as 
such, can be mobilized and used to shape not only the relationships but also the boundaries of 
networks (Kraus and Lind, 2007; Mouritsen et al., 2001).  
Investigating only inter-organizational relationships we focus on the network stabilization 
process to find out how “actors” are aligned in the network through intermediaries (products or 
services) in the context of mining industries in the Russian High North.  
Modell (2009) discusses that the last tendencies of institutional researches on MC make more 
emphasis on the recognition that there are some particular “actors” who may emancipate institutional 
constraints and resist even institutional change.  He points that it is quite a new research direction in 
institutional theory which is not so much studied to relate ANT as a compliment to institutional 
theory. Modell (2009) also points out the lack of knowledge about how changes operate across 
different levels of operational actions and how MCSs practices are applied in everyday actions in 
order to change and stabilize interdependencies in the network of inter-organizational relationships.  
And if MC mechanisms are involved in constituting the boundaries of network (Mouritsen & 
Thrane, 2006), the mobilization of one partner’s control technologies may result in mobilization of 
interdependent relationships within the whole network. 
Through actor-network approach we investigate the change processes of MCSs within one 
particular organizational action. It gives a chance to add the knowledge in the literature what the 
change of MCSs is in details. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Research design 
In order to investigate and understand the research phenomenon in its context-settings 
(Näslund, 2002) or how MCSs act in its everyday organizational context (Tomkins & Groves, 1983) 
we apply a naturalistic approach. Our investigation tries to produce findings arrived from the real-
world environment where the “phenomenon of interest unfold naturally” (Patton, 2001, p.39) and, 
thereby, we build the qualitative research.  
The research is both descriptive to provide the research with “concrete states of affairs” and 
find the explicitly adequate explanation (Latour, 2004, p.65) of how MCSs modify when the links 
between actors are retranslated within the network and explorative to understand and develop the 
knowledge about the processes taking place in the interaction of the research phenomenon and 
context (Morris and Wood, 1991).  
The philosophical reflections are determined in dichotomy between ontological and 
epistemological perceptions. However, the application of actor-network method in our research in 
contrast to social constructivism actor-network method emphasizes that reality is constructed by the 
interaction of more than one actor and has mostly epistemological foundation offering to explain 
how MCSs are adopted within the reality. Interpretations as re-translating processes take a special 
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 place in ANT. Translation is the circular process of “interpretation” or as Callon (1991 in Cordella 
and Shaikh, 2006) puts it, the definition that every actor makes of other actors in the actor-network. 
For interpretivism reality is created socially in the individual’s mind. However, in the aspect of ANT 
reality emerges outside the individual’s consciousness, “out there”, more objective. Thereby, ANT 
suppresses its own ontological assumptions (Cordella and Shaikh, 2006) and we take the research 
context of mining industries located in the Russian High North as a given objective reality which 
does not require an interpretive explanation for the data it accumulates (Latour, 2004).  
We just “prefer to follow [our] actors” (Latour, 2004, p.75) during our investigation because 
we assume that actors, its activity and interdependencies between them are able to lead us to what 
has been really happening in cargo transportation of mining industries located in the Russian High 
North. 
Case study approach is applied about extractive industries located in areas of the Russian High 
North in order to find the answer on the question “how?” MCSs are modifying which is addressed to 
actor-network approach applied in the research. According to Yin (2003) a case study method helps 
to investigate a phenomenon within its real-life context especially when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. Case study provides us with a detailed examination 
of MCSs in real action making it possible to “dug” into what happened behind closed doors of the 
research phenomenon (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
According to Fedotov & Krotov (2011) the researches in the field of SCM often based on the 
dualistic relationships and exclude an analysis of extensive sampling. That results in conclusions 
based on unreliable data. The authors also emphasize that researchers often analyze detached 
fragments of a supply chain, but research findings are extrapolated to the whole supply chain. 
Fedotov & Krotov (2011) argue that one of available solutions in this case and to obtain more 
reliable data can be researches based on a larger data sample from at least three links in the supply 
chain.  
That’s why our case study is based on the network which involves more than dualistic 
relationships.  
 
3.2. Empirical data collection 
Empirical data is based on a horizontal network which aligns mainly three heterogeneous 
enterprises, namely two mining industries located in the Russian High North and one transport 
company which coordinates all cargo flows along the supply chains of the same mining industries. 
The network is still studying with several techniques applied for data collection: 
1. Face-to-face semi-structured and in-depth interviews- we “probe” answers, where we want 
our interviewees to explain, or build on their responses. Also it helps us hear interviewee’s “thinking 
aloud” about things he or she may not have previously thought about. This is very helpful to make 
the discussion easier and clearer. We take interviews with high experienced executives involved in 
control operations and strategic decision making. For achieving vslidity empirical data received from 
interviews is written and sent back to interviewees in order to receive their approval regarding the data 
processed and interpreted during the research. 
2. E-mail questionnaire – Respondents are mainly executives and top-managers who used to 
be continually busy for the whole day. That’s why it is important to give them a chance to complete 
questionnaire at a time convenient for them (Scwarc, 2005).  
3. Secondary data - including organizations’ internal documents, survey and general plan 
consisting of company descriptive information, both historically, present and predicted prognosis and 
video-taped observations, web-sites. 
4. Observations – actually this type of data collection is quite limited because there is no 
access to group or partnership meetings. However, we were able to observe the organizational life 
through exercusions at the enterprises, during long interviews. Also we had a chance to be engaged 
in  the transshipment of feintein and metal products in Murmansk port delivered from port Dudinka. 
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 At the same time we plan to be engaged in observation of unloading operations during spring flood 
in the port of Dudinka. We are like external experts watching the phenomenon in the process. It 
enables us to share the practice and routines of case studied company in reality what actually 
happens and feel deeply the observed phenomenon (Gill and Johnson, 1997). It is very useful to 
increase the quality and appropriateness of the research taking a “look-and-see” approach.  
 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1. The network of IOR 
The horizontal network of inter-organizational relationships is illustrated on Figure #2 and 
represented by the following heterogeneous enterprises: 
- MMC "Norilsk Nickel", polar division – the world’s largest producer of non-ferrous metals 
located in the remote area of Krasnoyarsky region in the Russian High North, namely town 
Norilsk and port Dudinka. Its extremely remote location makes this industry strategically 
dependent on the availability of strong transport links with the Mainland and global markets 
or other industries. The only transport connection for MMC “Norilsk Nickel” to distribute 
over-sized and heavy weight metal cargos outside is the Northern Sea Route (NSR) from port 
of Dudinka to port of Murmansk.  
- Kola mining company – the largest mining industry and non-ferrous metals producer in the 
Murmansk region. We study only one of Kola mining capacities, namely refinery plant in 
town Monchegorsk which processes matte (feinstein) received from MMC “Norilsk Nickel” 
located in Norilsk. 
- Transport branch of MMC “Norilsk Nickel” which is located in town Murmansk and 
coordinates all cargo flows along the supply chains of the same mining industries. 
All three entities are in the same operational system in spite of the fact that their locations are 
distant from one another. They are subordinated to “Norilsk Nickel” corporation headquartered in 
Moscow, relationships with which we do not consider in this paper.  
 
 
At the same time the studying network is assumed as a partnership between two mining 
industries located in the Russian High North because each of them is quite separate enterprises. All 
these actors within the network are intended to be aligned to achieve particular mutual organizational 
objectives, to perform a certain organizational action which explains why these certain enterprises 
enter inter-organizational relationships.  
Commercial 
cargo 
mines 
metal 
metal 
metal 
Copper & nickel 
concentrate 
Figure #2. Interdependencies in the network of inter-organizational relationships 
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 This network forms a special space filled with control mechanisms and technological 
standards in order to ensure a regular delivery of matte (feinstein) from MMC “Norilsk Nickel”, 
polar division to refinery plant in town Monchegorsk where the transport company takes a role of 
controlling and organizing the transportation and logistics services between both industries. Such an 
organizational action as the matte delivery affects other organizational actions of these actors within 
the network. The intermediate which assists to align these actors into the network is defined as 
feinstein (nickel matte). Also it helps the actors communicate with each other as well as they are able 
to translate one actor’s purposes / strategies for others and retranslate control mechanisms of one 
actor into new tools in the process of interaction between actors.  
The emergence of this network is a defining of a necessity of this organizational action. Since 
1990s the quality of ore mined in Murmansk region began gradually to decline. After the partnership 
between both mining industries was established in 1998 the standard of produced non-ferrous metals 
was required to be the same on both industries to be sold on the international markets. However, the 
quality of metals produced by Kola mining industry has ceased to match the quality of metals 
produced by MMC “Norilsk Nickel” in Norilsk. There emerged the necessity to concentrate the ore 
additionally. But it was not enough feinstein produced in Murmansk region. Thus, it resulted in 
emerging a need to deliver feinstein from the similar refinery plant located in town Norilsk. Feinstein 
has to be delivered regularly and any delay in delivery is able to result in blowing-out of blast 
furnaces in Monchegorsk that wastes a huge amount of Kola mining company’s money. As MMC 
“Norilsk Nickel” is a partner of this company, its operational activity can also suffer in the case of 
disruption in Feinstein delivery. So, all these actors within the network are also aligned by achieving 
a particular mutual goal.  
When the partnership was organized, both mining industries were involved in inter-
organizational relationships of outsourcing services performed by a third-party organization. That 
outsourcing company provided its own ships and ensured the whole process of cargo transportation 
from the port Dudinka to the port Murmansk. At the same time cargo shipping in this direction was 
historically performed only in convoy of several ships escorted by icebreakers to make a passage 
through ice fields. Control over the process of cargo transportation was only in the hands of the third-
party shipping organization. 
However, the economical crisis of 1990s in Russia resulted in the fall of industrial output in 
the Russian High North and the interruption of regular deliveries of cargoes (Granberg, 1997). 
Freight traffic on the direction from prot Dudinka to port Murmansk reduced that made the third-
party shipping company considerably icrease transportation prices. At the same time the Arctic fleet 
became obsolete, the nuclear ice-breaker fleet required the renovation and replenishment. Thus, 
uncertainty, high prices of ship outsourcing and ice-breaker services as well as the vital necessity of 
regular transportation of feinstein to blast furnaces of Monchegorsk refinery plant made MMC 
“Norilsk Nickel” find new strategic solutions in building its own fleet of state-of-the-art ice-class 
vessels in order to obtain its transportation independence, to maximize the control over own supply 
chains and ensure regular transportation of feinstein and metal products to the market through the 
creation of its own transportation infrastructure. 
Building and putting into operation of its own arctic fleet was like a new actor which was 
embedded into the horizontal network. This new actor has affected the relationships between other 
actors and their organizational actions and the level of interdependencies within the network. 
Outsourcing relationships with the third-party shipping company were almost broken off. 
MMC “Norilsk Nickel” managed to modernize its supply chain design and provide adaptive control 
over all cargo flows including feinstein deliveries.  
Modifying the supply chain design MMC “Norilsk Nickel” created the necessary prerequisites 
for extending the level of supply chain efficiency through increasing delivery speed and decreasing 
transport costs as well as the level of supply chain flexibility through faster adaptation to changing 
conditions for cargo transportation in ice fields.  
In spite of the limited choice of available transport linkages with global markets and other 
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 industries, MMC “Norilsk Nickel” has historically looked for the ways to diversify its supply chains. 
Its own Arctic fleet allowed to open new routes and capacities for cargo transportation. MMC 
“Norilsk Nickel” established regular cargo connection between the industry and the market that made 
it possible to react faster on changing market conditions satisfying client requirements and realizing 
its purpose of 100% production distribution with direct contracts around the world.   
Figure 3 illustrates the location of MMC “Norilsk Nickel” and nowadays supply chain design 
for the transportation of metal products from Norilsk region to global markets. 
 
Figure 3. Metal Delivering from Norilsk Region. 
MMC “Norilsk Nickel” uses the next available transportation links:  
1. Railway from MMC “Norilsk Nickel” to the port of Dudinka where metal production is 
transshipped from goods vans to ice-class vessels operated in Arctic waters; 
3. The NSR from the port of Dudinka to the ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk – the main 
linkage for the year-round transportation of finished products (nonferrous metals): 
- to the port of Murmansk for further export; 
- to the port of Arkhangelsk as cabotage for the Russian market. 
4. Railroads from the ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk to domestic customers; 
5. The European Arctic corridor from Murmansk to Rotterdam/ Hamburg ports and North 
American market by own ice-class vessels and by third-parties ships; 
6. The eastern part of the NSR from the port of Dudinka to Asian region mainly to China since 
October, 2010. The length of the round trip Dudinka-Shanghai-Dudinka via Northern Sea route 
is 12,342 nautical miles and it takes just 57 days including the steaming time of 41 days at 
average speed of 12,6 knots and 16 days in ports. In contrast, the distance via Suez Canal is 
24,100 miles and total steaming time is 84 days (Norilsk Nickel Press releases, November, 
2010). Time delivery is reduced in 2,5 times according to Igor Uzdin, Director of Polar 
division of MMC “Norilsk Nickel” (Gunina. 2010). 
The main portion of the freight along the NSR now falls on the Norilsk industrial region. 
Figure 4 illustrates nowadays supply chain design of the transportation of supplies and 
commercial cargo to Norilsk region. 
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Figure 4. Industrial and Commercial Cargo Delivering to Norilsk Region. 
2. Via the river Yenisei only for the summer period from the port of Krasnoyarsk by MMC 
"Norilsk nickel's" barges - cabotage (construction and industrial) suppliers and commercial 
cargo. 
3. To the port of Dudinka by own ice-class vessels: 1) from the port of Arkhangelsk - 
commercial and cabotage cargo, including dangerous cargo, 2) from the port of Murmansk - 
commercial and cabotage cargo, excluding dangerous industrial cargo. 
 
The embedding of such a new actor as the own Arctic fleet capable of breaking the ice without 
icebreaker support has affected the standards of transportation within the network between these two 
mining industries located in the Russian High North. MMC “Norilsk Nickel” Arctic fleet became a 
new technological standard in cargo transportation in the High North which was incompetible with 
the historically technological one as cargo transportation only accompanied by ice breakers. Both 
technological standards co-exist in the current Arctic shipping, but are rather contradictory than 
complementary. 
The embedding of the new actor into the network between both industries also reflected in 
control mechanisms. The control of cargo transportation was enhanced by using satellite systems and 
continuous monitoring how MMC “Norilsk Nickel” vessels move during the voyages between port 
of Dudinka and port of Murmansk. Also both mining industries implemented a system of balanced 
scorecard to improve MC performance.  
As noted by the managers of both industries during interviews, after MMC “Norilsk Nickel” 
was able to increase flexibility in the supply chain design, its transportation system itself has created 
a system of Just-in-time. It is wondering but it means that initially control mechanisms were not 
represented as Just-in-time control tool. The system of Just-in-time was received as an output in the 
process of modernization of supply chain design. MMC “Norilsk Nickel” tried to built a MCS for 
regular delivery of Feinstein and metal products. However, then this control system has turned into 
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 Just-in-time mechanism.  In such a way it worked out in such a local context as the High North 
where mining industries face with many transportation challenges.  
At the same time Just-in-time mechanism works only in the networks of inter-organizational 
relationships. This mechanism needs the availability of interdependencies to ensure its own 
existence. 
Before building MMC “Norilsk Nickel” own fleet such a MC tool as Just-in-time strategy has 
not been effective and has never applied in the context of the Arctic navigation. Thus, the 
introduction of such a new actor as the fleet which was built to meet MMC “Norilsk Nickel” own 
needs, had particular influence on the activities of other actors within this network.  
 
5. Preliminary Conclusions 
 
In this paper we tried to find an answer to the question “How?” the change processes of MCSs 
in SCM affect organizational actions of mining industries in the Russian High North. Quality 
standards as a control mechanism organize a special independence of one mining industry from 
another and the circulation of intermediary or in our case feinstein delivery within the network of 
IORs. We just followed our “actors” who mobilized technological standards and even embedded new 
ones in cargo transportation in the High North and thereby changed control mechanisms historically 
developed and applied. This helped us to retrace how MCSs can migrate beyond the organizational 
borders into a supply chain network of IOR, adapt to other actors’ activity, retranslate themselves 
and retranslate interdependencies in this supply chain network.  
Based on our case study we come to the following conclusions: 
1. Control mechanisms in order to fulfill the company's strategy retranslate the context in 
which they operate. In our case study the introduction of a balanced scorecard system modified the 
supply chain design. 
2. Modification of supply chain design influences the level of flexibility and efficiency. In 
my case it ensured regular delivery at certain time and in given directions (even to Asia by own 
vessels) 
3. Control mechanisms are able to retranslate the content of supply chain features.  For 
industries located in the High North remote areas flexibility means is not a quick response to 
changing conditions, but begins to mean a fast adaptation to new conditions and keeping a strong 
linkage with other regions for regular transportation.   
4. Control mechanisms are able to retranslate the design and use of a supply chain network 
into a new MCS. The introduction of  balanced scorecard and the subsequent increase in supply 
chain flexibility have allowed the transportation system itself to create a system of Just-in-time as an 
output in the process of modernization of supply chain design.  
5. Control mechanisms and MC tools can be applied both for industry adaptation within the 
institutionalized environment and beyond it if the environment can not satisfy the industry’s needs 
and purposes. But every modification of supply chain design makes industries change or retranslate 
their control mechanisms. It provokes a cyclical reaction to new retranslations in future because 
supply chain design requires to be periodically modified under changing market environment and 
conditions under the pressure of company’s strategy implementation. There is no right choice of 
supply chain design for your product once and for ever, it can be only an appropriate supply chain 
design in order to satisfy the company’s specific needs in a short period of time.  
The findings confirm that networks really aim to become more heterogeneous including and/or 
attracting additional elements just to keep all other elements in place and, thereby, to ensure old 
actors’ existence and its own stability. 
However, the question arises “Why?” the translation happens and its logic according to which 
the network is constructed (Callon, 1992). It should be interesting to learn the historical perspective 
about what preconditions/factors have influenced on the development and evolution of such 
networks as SCM in the High North where path dependence will be undergone in the synergy with 
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 institutional theory. That gives us an opportunity to investigate what made existing actors as MMC 
“Norilsk Nickel” within the network of inter-organizational relationships to embed a new actor (as in 
our case its own Arctic fleet) and thereby retranslate interdependencies among already existing actors 
because as W. Shakespeare said in the Tempest that “what is past is prologue”.  
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Working title: Management 
Accounting (and Control) in 
Norwegian festivals – an exploratory 
study 
Stine Rye Bårdsen 
 
2 
Plan 
• Background/motivation 
• Ideas for the current study 
• Main question: 
• Are festivals interesting to study from a management accounting and 
control perspective at all? 
• If yes, how should I proceed? 
• Theoretical approach 
• Research design 
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 Why festivals? 
• Increasing in numbers (list of 610 on mic.no) 
• Increasing attention in other research areas 
• Receive attention in the media  
• Radio shows 
• News Papers 
• Both positive and negative  
• Make places more attractive 
• Impact effects 
• Limited knowledge about the management accounting and controls 
• But do we need such knowledge? 
 
3 
4 
A previous study of Norwegian festivals: 
 
• Examined financial reports of 60 Norwegian music festivals from the years 
2005-2008 (These are now being updated to include the years up to 2012) 
• Some findings: 
• The oldest festival in the sample (Festspillene i Bergen) was established in 
1951, but approximately 80% established after 1990 
• High variance in revenues (both in size and source) and operating margins 
• +/- 50 % of the festivals had negative operating margins  
• Negative equity capital appears to be a common problem 
• Very few festivals vanish – but 2007/2008 appeared to be hard for some 
• Appears to have survival skill despite a poor financial situation 
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If assumed interesting – what next? 
• Theoretical approach and research question 
• Simple or holistic? 
• The budgeting (and accounting)process? 
• Design or use? 
• Or both? 
• Correlation btw. configurations of budgeting/accounting procedures and 
income structure? 
• And/or top management characteristics? 
• Other approaches? 
• And the “problem” regarding performance measurement… 
• Research design 
• Survey 
• But maybe some case studies as well? 
• Exploratory, yes. 
• But only descriptive? 
• Or are there relationships which can be of interest 
 
7 
So please… 
• …help me  
8 
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Presentation based on: 
• Presentation is based on published articles: 
– The validity of management control topoi. Towards constructivist pragmatism. Nörreklit, 
Nörreklit & Israelsson (MAR, 2006) 
– Towards a paradigmatic foundation for accounting practice. Nörreklit, Nörreklit & Michell 
(AAAJ, 2010) 
– The rise of the balanced scorecard! Relevance Regained? Nörreklit, Nörreklit, Michell & 
Björnenak (JAOC, 2012) 
 
• Notes from presentations (Lennart, Hanne, Will, Falconer) 
• Examples of it’s use 
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Sør-Trøndelag University College, 
Trondheim, Norway 
Problems 
• Utilitarian ethos  
– positive value – pleasure  
– negative value – pain.  
• Success                 positive values & Negative values              Failure 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
Problem
s 
profit 
market domination 
competitive advantage 
loss  
crises 
trauma  
war 
bankruptcy 
defeat  
death 
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Success & the gap between the 
present and the future 
• Fundamental issue of time 
– Organizing is about  a future existence.  
– Without future – profit, market shares, wealth, health, etc. is irrelevant  
– Every action has a future goal 
 
• Definition of success of actions is whether the future goal is reached 
– Control and planning ensure that sufficient conditions to reach future goals are at hand 
– In a changing world the future is significantly different from the present 
• Facts, possibilities, values and communication changes.  
• Can we manage the present-future gap? 
Integration: 
combining four dimensions 
• Facts: Action needs to rest on basis of facts. The more uncertain the basis, 
the higher is the risk that plans regarding the future are unrealistic 
• Possibilities: Actions must realize factual possibilities. Actions may be 
possible, but possibilities must be factual. Speculative possibilities may not 
be real possibilities.  
• Values: Values must lie within the range of factual possibilities. – If the 
(factual) possibilities do not represent values, then they motivate no action. 
Without values no performance.  
• Communication: Communication is the means to connect and coordinate 
different actors and units. Communication conveys the task and its meaning 
– including the values and relevant factual possibilities.  
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Sufficient conditions: Integration of the four 
dimensions 
• When there is a factual basis of the act  
• When the possibilities pursued are factual  
• When  the values that drive the endeavor are within the range of the factual 
possibilities  
• When the coordinating communication conveys the necessary facts, 
possibilities and values  
• Then activities will be performed and likelihood of success increases 
 
 
Reality 
• Reality –the world is real and functional – is a construct based on 
integration 
• Integration is constantly re-molded  
• Reality is therefore a moving construct  
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Dimensions are actor-world relations - reality 
• Actors relate to the environment in order to act to maintain or create a future 
• Each dimension represents a type of relation 
• The relation connects the actor the world 
• PC claims that the four dimensions must be connected 
• If not integrated, the understanding of reality is misleading 
• Thus realism to PC is a functioning integration of these four relations. 
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Reality-Construction 
Actor Environment 
Perception Facts 
Reflection Possibilities 
Feeling Values 
Communication Other actors 
Sør-Trøndelag University College, 
Trondheim, Norway 
In
te
g
ra
tio
n
 
Facts 
• Well documented and evidence based 
• Actor side – observational basis and collection of evidence  
• Environment/world side – the things and phenomena observed 
 
339
Three types of facts 
• Objective 
– Physical existence eg. land, buildings, equipment, etc.  
• Institutional 
– Constructed by societal actors, eg. observable market values, and the adoption of currency 
as a measurement basis 
• Subjective 
– Assumptions about the future, eg. estimates made of asset lives to measure depreciation, 
pension scheme liability, consumer preferences for certain assets 
– Pragmatic theory of truth not applicable, at best we have learning theory of truth 
 
Sør-Trøndelag University College, 
Trondheim, Norway 
Possibilities 
• Observation tells us what is there. Reflection aims at determining what 
might alternatively be there, i.e. what is possible.  
• Possibilities are the result of systematic, logical reflection.  
• Factual possibilities are possibilities embedded in the facts.  
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Values 
• Values are things that we want to have in our world 
– Basic values are subjective and motivate our actions and activities 
– Basic values uncover themselves through our emotional reactions 
– Instrumental (social) values are means to achieve the basic values. 
– Instrumental values are those valued considered to be important to society 
 
• Coherence between subjective and social values is vital 
 
 
Communication 
• Communication and the social dimension 
– Integration of facts, possibilities and values lead to action 
– Communication is needed to realise social action 
– Enables people to cooperate 
– Objectification of facts, values and reasoning 
• Communication and accounting 
– Central to accounting practice 
– Information output has to be communicated to information users 
– Manifestation of the profession’s values applied to their identified facts and possibilities 
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Construct causality 
• Integration provides a framework of values, facts and possibilities 
conceptualized in a unit topos  
• Plans and decision is realized if based on a viable topos  
• The managerial control task is to maintain or construct functioning causal 
relations 
– Managing business is thus about constructing a system of functional relations in which one 
action or event triggers the next action /event until the goal reached 
– Every manager is responsible to establish such strings of constructed causal relations so that 
his/her unit can perform its task  
• The difference between functioning links and non functioning links is the 
degree of integration established 
• The ability of the causal event to trigger the intended effect depends on the 
degree of integration: values with possibilities with facts expressed in the 
communication of control 
 
 
Accounting facts and organisational change 
Applying the PC framwork 
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General assumptions 
• Performance measurement (PM) is important 
• Accounting facts are commonly used 
• PM underpins the values a company wishes to emphasise 
• Incoherence between facts and values create distrust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baldvinsdottir, Burns & Strid 
The general framework 
 
• Constructive pragmatism 
– Coherence in facts, possibilities, values and communication may create trust 
(where trust is justified) 
– Integration of the dimensions (facts, possibilities, values and communication) is 
fundamental to organize construct causalities 
 
• Trust and distrust 
– Not opposite ends of a single trust-distrust continuum 
– Trust and lack of trust 
– Distrust and lack of distrust 
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What is looked upon in the paper? 
– Contradictionary topos in and between the various employee groups 
created distrust 
– Problems of distrust were “solved” by greater coherence of the 
management/company topoi and the various employee groups topos 
– Accounting facts did have a role in this process 
 
Baldvinsdottir, Burns & Strid 
Constructed causality 
• Organizations work through cooperation 
• Cooperation is based on communication 
• Trust is a condition for Communication 
• Integration of facts, possibilities and values presuppose communication 
• Communication of the factual condition, the possibilities this creates and the 
values that are at stake, represents the integration process and expresses 
the condition for successful business (constructed) causality  
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The case  
 
•Method - Interviews, meetings, discussions & workshops with employees & 
customers 
•4th largest energy company in Sweden 
•Owned by the municipal and employees around 1000 people 
•From energy delivery to energy services 
– Financially oriented terminology introduced  
– Contradictory messages created problems of trustworthiness – internally as well 
as externally 
 
 
 
 
 
“We find it rather strange that you (the company) now wants to take care of us and even save 
energy for us. I don’t think I have ever talked to anyone from you before, the only contact I have is 
when I get an invoice.” (Customer 1) 
Incoherence  
 - beginning of the studied period 
Management  Sales Department (SD) Energy efficiency 
service group (EES) 
Facts Deregulation Deregulation Deregulation 
Possibilities Environmentally friendly 
profile 
Energy efficiency 
services 
Knowledge of the 
markets 
New technology and 
competence 
Values Help customers do 
decrease energy use 
Sell as much energy as 
you can 
Sell as little energy as 
you can 
Communication Statements in AR, press 
releases, mass meetings 
Sales reports 
Informal meetings within 
the group 
Formal meetings with 
EES group 
Story telling 
Direct communication 
with customers 
Random meetings with 
SD 
 
Topoi – Competitive 
advantage through 
customer 
satisfaction 
Topoi – Competitive 
advantage through 
high sales 
Topoi – Competitive 
advantage through 
customer savings 
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Conflicts within… 
• The new vision: 
– “Our business concept is first and foremost to sell light, power and heating together with helping 
our customers to achieve low energy costs, partly through being effective ourselves and partly by 
effective energy solutions for the customers.” (Company Annual Report, 1992, p. 4).  
• The sales department view of the energy efficiency services: 
– They really think they are something. They think that their energy services are high-tech and 
complicated, but is this so called ‘new concept’ a rocket science? Is it? How difficult can this be? 
We actually know the market, and the market doesn’t want this (Salesman 1)  
• The energy efficiency service view of the sales department: 
– “They are useless. They do not contact customers; they do not deal with customers’ needs. And if 
they would visit a customer – which is against the odds – they would try selling one product at a 
time, never suggesting a total solution for the customer. Also, all of them want to sell to the big 
customers. " (EES engineer 1) 
 
 
Getting the facts right 
• Selling points of the EES were 
presented by narratives and 
anecdotes. 
 
 
• Accounting facts supporting the 
benefits for the company as whole 
where absent.  
 
PRE-EES 
(EUR) 
Post-EES 
(EUR) 
Cost of electricity 14 146 9 217 
Savings for the 
customer 
  4 929 
 Real Estate Company’s electricity cost savings, post adoption of EES  
“…and best of all, we have managed to lower their 
energy costs by 50%!” (Engineer 2, EES 
department) 
“Why should we sell EES if it results in lower sales 
of energy, and thereby a lower income for us?” 
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Coherence (?) 
 - end of the studied period 
Management  Sales Department (SD) Energy efficiency service 
group (EES) 
Facts (Institutional) Oligopoly market conditions Oligopoly market conditions 
 
Oligopoly market conditions 
Possibilities Customer lock in 
Price setters 
 
Large and passive customer 
base 
Difficult for customers to 
change energy supplier 
Long term customer 
relations 
Targeting the cost 
conscious customers 
Value Profitability Profitability through sell as 
much energy as you can 
Profitability through sell as 
little energy as you can 
Communication Financial measures, statements 
in AR, press releases, mass 
meetings, formal and informal 
meetings with smaller employee 
groups 
Performance measures, 
informal meetings within the 
group 
Formal meetings with EES 
group 
Profitability reports to 
management and sales, 
direct communication with 
customers 
Formal meetings with SD 
Topoi – Competitive 
advantage through 
profitability 
Topoi – Competitive 
advantage through 
profitable sales 
Topoi – Competitive 
advantage through 
profitable long term 
relations 
Getting the facts right 
• Long-term relations with customer created greater profitability 
• Profit sharing 
• Changes in company values integrated with facts 
• A movement from lack of distrust to lack of trust is possible through 
cooperation 
• Relevant accounting facts reduced the distrust and meaningful 
communication could be established 
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Concluding remarks 
• Trust is associated with sharing of values and beliefs about the future.  
• Absence of shared values hindered meaningful communication and 
cooperation 
• Perceived lack of integrity on both parties behalf created distrust 
• Possible to restore relationship when changes in the value dimension were 
backed up by accounting facts 
 
Accounting itself cannot create trust 
But: 
–Accounting information can be used successfully to restore relations that 
have become characterised with distrust since accounting information is 
generally regarded as some objective measure of extensive control that can 
be more reliable and trustworthy than other types of information 
–Accounting facts can reduce the suspicion surrounding distrustful relations 
–Accounting facts can thus facilitate the establishment of acceptable working 
relations between groups who distrust each other 
–When distrust is replaced by lack of distrust, the process of achieving the 
stage of lack of trust can be initiated 
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Construct causality 
• Organizations work through cooperation 
• Cooperation is based on communication 
• Trust is a condition for communication 
• Integration of facts, possibilities and values presupposes communication 
• Communication of the factual condition, the possibilities this creates and the 
values that are at stake, represents the integration process and expresses 
the condition for successful business (construct) causality  
 
The case  
 
• Middle sized European bank 
• Privately owned and with over employees around 1000 people 
• Profitability just about average compared with similarly sized European 
banks 
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Change in the performance measurement 
 
• The change was (partly) a reaction to the financial crisis 
• The bank reflected a desire of changing the topoi, i.e. less focus on 
individual performance than previously 
• Individual vs. team based performance 
• From “Bonus Card” to Balanced Scorecard 
• From departmental (only) to individual scorecards (in addition) 
• Pre-change, basis for performance pay mainly based on individual sale 
• Post-change, basis for performance pay was extended to include more 
team based effort 
 
 
Basis for performance based pay 
2010 
Individual sales 75% 
Team effort 25% 
Max payout per year 60.000 
2011 
Individual sales 50% 
Team effort 40% 
Max payout per year 80.000 
 
2010 - Allocation of “Team effort” done by manager 
2011 - Allocation of “Team effort” split evenly between 
employees 
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 Effects of the change 
• Sales behavior of the loan officers changed  
Effects on sale 
 
Change (%) , low level performers 
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Effects on sale 
Change (%) , middle level performers 
Effects on sales 
Change (%) , top performers 
352
Applying the framework 
- an experiment? 
• Previously, I have not used the PC framework explicitly when collecting the 
data to be used. 
• This time, questions in the interview guide included reflection on the four 
dimensions of reality; facts, possibilities, values and communication.  
• Two individuals from the management group were interviewed together with 
eight loan officers. 
– 4 top performers 
– 2 middle level performers 
– 2 low level performers 
 
The question framed 
 
• How do actors relate to changes in the appraisal system and its 
corresponding performance pay? 
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The bank 
Pre-implementation 
2010 
Post-implementation 
2010 
Facts Customer competition Customer competition 
Possibilities The customers choice 
- Develop the skills of the loan officers 
- Pro-active loan officers 
 
The customers choice 
- Further increase the competence of the 
loan officers 
- Pro-active loan officers 
Values Financial performance above average 
Customer satisfaction 
Focus on individual performance  
Financial performance above average 
Customer satisfaction 
Less focus on individual performance  
Communication Vision 
Formal role description 
Bonus card 
Monetary rewards 
Informal and formal individual meetings 
Vision 
Formal role description 
Balanced scorecard 
Monetary rewards 
Informal and formal individual  meetings 
Group meetins 
The loan officers 
The loan officers Pre-implementation 
2010 
Post-implementation 
2010 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 
Facts Measurement and rewards (M&R)on the basis of bonus 
card 
Measurement and rewards (M&R)on the basis of BSC 
Act upon the bonus card Act upon the BSC 
Possibilities • M&R as a direction for 
personal action 
• Focus on sales 
• M&R as integrated 
part of the job 
• Focus on carrying out 
the job required 
• M&R as a direction for action 
• Focus on goals possible to 
influence  
• M&R as integrated part 
of the job 
• Focus on doing the 
“right thing” 
 
Customer satisfaction Customer satisfaction 
Values • Achieve goals 
• Fair evaluation by the 
management (individual 
efforts) 
• Be seen by 
management 
• Individual performance 
and rewards 
• Financial rewards 
needed 
• Do a good job, for 
oneself and the 
customer 
• Fair efforts (individual 
and team efforts9 
• Co-operation and 
focus on overall 
operations 
• Working tasks are not 
decided be the bonus 
card only 
• Financial rewards 
appreciated  
• Achieve goals 
• Fair evaluation by the 
management (individual 
efforts) 
• Be seen by management 
• Individual performance and 
reward 
• Working tasks decided by the 
dimensions of the BSC 
• Financial incentive needed 
• Do a good job, for 
oneself and the 
customer 
• Fair evaluations 
(individual and team 
efforts) 
• Co-operation and focus 
on overall operations 
• Working tasks are not 
decided be the BSC 
only 
• Financial rewards 
appreciate 
Communication 
 
Bonus card 
Precipitation in “top tours” 
Individual BSC 
Non-communication 
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Group 1 
 
• The values represented in the Bonus card, i.e. focus on individual 
performance are more in line with this group. 
• Team performance is seen de-motivating 
• Free riding is mentioned several times 
• Intentions of the change not communicated 
 
 
 
Group 2 
 
• The values represented in the Balanced Scorecard, i.e. less focus on 
individual performance are more in line with this group 
• Team performance is seen as motivating 
• BSC is seen as representing the performance more fairly 
• Free riding never mentioned  
• Intentions of the change not communicated 
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Afterwords  
 
• In the aftermath of the finance crisis, the bank wanted to change its topoi 
• This was partly done through changes in the control system and the 
performance pay structure 
– Less focus on sales 
– Increased focus on team efforts 
• Most loan officers expressed that although other dimensions, such as 
customer satisfaction, were included in the BSC, it was the sales that was 
emphazised, discussed and rewarded.  
• 2013 - Return to individual focus, 60% individual and 40% team based 
• Momentum of the bank industry – sales? 
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Introduction 
• People have tended to engage in blame games whenever 
things go wrong, attempting to avoid unwarranted 
repercussions (Douglas, 1992) 
• Although  actors initiating blame games presumably have an 
idea about what effects they are seeking to obtain from the 
blame gaming, it is not given that these effects materialize 
• Recent publications (Junior et al, 2012, Schwartz, 2012) 
underscore the need to put greater emphasis on how we 
study catastrophes and the ways in which the blame game 
participants seemingly receive counterproductive results from 
their blame game 
2 
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Introduction II 
• Financial crisis 
– Big losses 
– More blame games 
– In the public debate, most attention has been on the 
macroeconomic level, seeking to find solutions to the 
financial problems (regulatory perspective) or merely 
depicting scapegoats. Less is known in the literature about 
how the global financial crisis has transcended and been 
responded to locally 
– Particularly, what happens when loss incurring actors in a 
local setting seek to recapture their money? 
 3 
www.uin.no 
HANDELSHØGSKOLEN I BODØ - HHB  
Introduction III 
• In Norway, the public was suddenly shocked by staggering 
headlines in the media about big financial losses incurred by 
a number of Norwegian municipalities as a result of their 
investments in complex financial products (CDOs).  
– Combined they lost several hundred millions NOK on bad financial 
investments and management.  
– This came to be known as the Terra-scandal. Years later the involved 
municipalities are still struggling to cope with the financial aftermath 
of the Terra-scandal (see e.g. NRK, 2010).  
• We seek to contribute to the literature by learning more about the 
extent to which blame games yield expected results, especially in 
complex settings intertwining the public sector and the financial market 
forces 
 
 
 
4 
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Research questions 
• We set out to answer two research questions:  
– How was the blame game in the Norwegian case 
undertaken?  
• By applying ANT we narrow this down to the following 
inquiry: what controversies were rendered visible 
with the outbreak of the Terra scandal, and what 
devices were mobilized by the actors to shun blame?  
– What direct financial effects of the blame gaming 
can be traced? 
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Approach 
• We deploy Actor network theory (ANT)  
• ANT is particularly applicable: 
 in situations where innovation proliferates, where group 
boundaries are uncertain, when the range of entities to be 
taken into account fluctuates, … you have to follow the actors 
themselves” (Latour, 2005, pp. 11-12). 
• Emphasis on:  
– Controversies 
– Intermediaries vs. mediators 
– Reassembling the social through changes (and translations) 
 
 6 
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Approach (cont.) 
• Latour (2005) advocates the need to see the social as 
an output of dynamic interactions amongst various 
actors.  
As such, different uncertainties are called upon to 
render the traces of the social more visible: 
Group formation  
Action is overtaken 
Objects too have agency  
Matter of facts vs. matters of concern  
 
 7 
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Research setting and data collection methods 
• Research setting: 
– Local government level (municipalities) in Norway 
• Data collection methods: 
– Documents, e.g. : 
• financial statements 
• Internal regulation 
• External regulation 
• Evaluation reports (by the office of the Auditor general and hired 
externals) 
• Newspaper articles, information on municipalities’ home pages 
etc. 
– Interviews and informal conversations 
 8 
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Key events in the Terra scandal 
• 2001-2002: Terra Securities launches a new funding scheme. 
• 2002: Municipalities are requested to outline internal financial management 
regulations 
– Later, some municipalities adapt their regulations to fit their investment 
needs/new prospects 
• 2002: The Vik-letter 
• 2004-2007: the investments are reorganized (repackaging) 
• 20. Aug. 07: Terra informs the municipalities that the value of the bonds have 
fallen below the 55 % threshold: demand for more money 
– The municipalities pay, but remain silent about the transactions. 
• Aug./Sept. 07: Hofstad reads in a local newspaper about Hemnes municipality’s 
investment and starts to investigate 
• 31. Oct. 07: The scandal becomes known nationally through a newspaper 
article by Hofstad in Finansavisen.  
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Key events in the Terra scandal (cont.) 
• 31. Oct. 07 – onwards: Blame game period 
• 19. Nov. 07: the municipalities refuse to make additional covenant payments related 
to their disastrous investments 
• 19. Nov. 07: The case fully caught fire in the media 
• 19. Nov. 07: The Financial Supervisory Authority withdraws Terra S.’ license. 
– Terra S. is bankrupt the next day. 
• Nov. 07 – 2013: Long series of events take place.  
 Two examples:  
– 2009: fighting against the banks 
– Sept. 10: A judge in the District Court of New York rules: Terra S. cannot claim 
compensation from Citigroup, but the municipalities can sue C. They do so. 
– Apr. 13: Southern District Court of New York denied the municipalities involved 
in the scandal to get the lawsuit treated in American court. A spokesman for the 
municipalities (U.S. lawyer) says they will appeal the decision and describes the 
decision as "a temporary defeat."  
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Description of the blame game – overview  
• ”Blame games” refer to what happened after the outbreak in 
the media. 
• The politicians involved were scrutinized by the media and 
others for their role and the things that happened.  
• In the case material we have come across two sets of blame 
games or scapegoat missions.  
– One relates to the effort undertaken by the municipalities, led by their 
mayors in question to evade blame for their involvement in the Terra 
scandal.  
– The other story is one about the public’s chase for scapegoats that set off 
when the Terra scandal became well-known in the national media in 
Norway toward the end of 2007.  
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The public’s chase of the money, the investments’ 
backdrop and scapegoats in the Terra scandal 
 • Led out by the investigative journalist Morten Hofstad. 
• He read incidentally about a large loss (about NOK 40 mill.) incurred by 
one of the loss incurring municipalities, Hemnes. 
– Baffled by the size of the loss (50 % drop in a few weeks) and 
demands for payments to avoid the enforced sale covenant.  
 The municipalities are unwilling to disclose information (officially) 
 Terra Securities (the firm) is also reluctant to provide information 
 Core “facts” and numbers in the case shifted constantly, partly because 
he was fed incomplete and wrong information by the municipalities 
 Turbulent financial markets rapidly altered the market value of the 
investments, making it harder to overviewing the “facts” . 
 Essentially, matter of facts turned into matters of concerns. 
• Hofstad’s story makes the front page headline 31. October.2007 
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The battle over ”facts” 
• Key formation of groups and anti-groups 
• Demand for information from the public 
• Terra S. fights back, seeking to silence the critique: 
• A key part of this strategy was to clearly make the point that nothing had 
been lost and that the numbers and information conveyed by Hofstad was 
incorrect. 
– one of the key brokers, Harald Nordberg exclaimed the following: “Some media 
channels have written that you have lost money. That is bullshit” (Sparre, 2007)   
• Hofstad (2008) later described this experience as follows:  
– “It was surprising to me that Terra’s information strategy in the early phase [of 
the case] was so effective in competing media channels. Other media channels 
seemed to settle with the headline from Terra, stating that “nothing is lost”, 
despite the size of the municipalities’ investments with respect to their size, and 
the ways in which the problems in the American economy impacted the news at 
that time” 
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Repositioning 
• “After two days of publicity at the turn of October/November [2007], the 
Terra case shuts completely down in other media channels. The doubt starts 
to get to me, and questions such as: ‘Am I completely sidetracked [?]’ started 
to emerge” (Hofstad, 2008).  
• Hofstad gets allies 
– The role of the NHH professor T. Johnsen 
• Helped Hofstad to mobilize effort, knowledge, competence and a 
position that made it easier to sustain the contradictory information 
and pressure stemming from Terra’s information strategy 
– Hofstad and Johnsen seize the role of full-blown mediators. 
• The Terra defense eventually falls apart as matters of facts transcends into 
matters of concerns (in the eyes of the public) 
• 19. November the case fully catches fire 
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The initiation of administrative and 
political scapegoating 
• Country governors launces assessments of the loss-incurring municipalities. 
• The Financial Supervisory Authority withdraws Terra S.’ operating lincense. 
• The Office of the Auditor General in Norway launces an investigation of the Vik 
letter: 
– Politicians enters the blame gaming 
– Misconduct in the decision-making: routine problems 
– Reinforces the impression of the Vik letter as being an actant: Mediator 
rather than an intermediary. 
• More investigations: internal vs. external evaluation committees 
– Fierce criticism (especially the externally led committees) 
• Including the violations of the Local Government Act and the 
municipalities internal financial management regulations 
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More on translations, mediators and 
distortion 
• Initially we regarded the internal financial management regulations as an 
intermediary: 
– A key mechanism to enable sound investments 
• We were wrong! 
– The regulations were overturned and thus given new meanings with 
unpredictable outcomes. 
• Happened through new translations and fabrication of the information 
content. 
• Other municipalities did not change their regulations, but simply violated 
them. 
• The municipalities’ interpretations of the LGA § 52 were also found in void 
• Essentially, action was overtaken:  
– Municipalities became overly creative in removing controversies and investment 
hurdles, clearing the way for what turned out to be a financial disaster  
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The blame game orchestrated by the 
loss-incurring municipalities  
 • Early on, few interactions across the municipalities 
• Gradually, between 31. October and the 19th 
November (when the case fully caught fire) the loss 
incurring municipalities joined forces. 
• Two main groups: 
– The Nordland municipalities (Narvik, Rana, Hemnes and Hattfjelldal) 
– Another emerging group of loss-incurring municipalities 
 The two groups join forces along the way. 
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Identifying anti-groups 
• The municipalities searched desperately for 
information and someone to pin the blame on 
• They identified a list of anti-groups (including): 
– Terra S. 
– The two Terra S. salespersons (Norberg and Opstad) 
– Citygroup 
– The owners of Terra 
– The funding banks (DnBNor and Depfa Bank) 
– The former prime minister of Norway 
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The municipalities main defense 
• ’We knew nothing (about the problems) and 
were deceived by profiteers’. 
• Soon, the defense cracks up … 
– The municipalities are made subject to intense 
scrutiny by the media and various investigators (as 
mentioned earlier) 
– Early indications of the not so innocent politicians  
– The information about problems or uncertainties 
were available in several cases, but no one asked 
critical questions  
19 
www.uin.no 
HANDELSHØGSKOLEN I BODØ - HHB  
Seeking to get their money back 
• The aforementioned list of actors in the anti-group were targeted as a 
potential money source for covering the municipalities’ losses. 
– Thus far, virtually all attempts to to regain money failed. Additionally, 
a lot of time was spent on the blame game. 
• However, the municipalities searched for allies to help them in their 
struggle to regain money 
– Relying on various groups, but the most important actors include 
lawyers and consultancy-firms offering advisory services. 
– To illustrate: 
• Lawyer fees, relating to the USA based lawyers and Citigroup case 
amounted almost to NOK 90 mill before the municipalities 
decided to put them to a halt, agreeing eventually with the USA 
based lawyers to rely on the no cure no pay principle.  
 20 
366
www.uin.no 
HANDELSHØGSKOLEN I BODØ - HHB  
Concluding remarks 
• While making the investments the politicians and administrators focused 
very little on technicalities (the discussed intermediaries that turned out 
to be mediators) – the non-human actors. 
• Conversely, while making their defense the municipalities focused 
virtually exclusively on trying to find some scapegoats through 
technicalities 
• First they spent a lot of money on something they did not know or 
understand and turned out to be a disaster. 
• Thereafter they engaged in a new speculative endeavors to regain their 
money, thereby incurring considerable costs and thus far predominantly 
setbacks. 
• Hence, this is a case of a contradictory blame-game. 
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Contribution to the literature 
• First, blame games become difficult to undertake with the 
desired blame shifting effect when partially (or completely) 
relying on intermediaries to argue ones case, rather than a 
larger set of mediators.  
• Second, Financially motivated blame games might lead to 
exacerbating the financial risk and losses— bringing about 
diametrical financial effects.  
• Third, with respect to public administration: the ways in which 
supposedly intermediaries actually turned out to be key 
mediators in the Terra scandal bears witness to routine 
problems and an overly confidence in the public sector 
system. 
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